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
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
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THE BATTLE OF CHILLIANWALAH. 13th JANUARY. 1849.



THE BATTLE OF CHILLIANWALAH, 13th JANUARY, 1849.

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FOR REFERENCE

Not to be taken out

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EDITORIAL

Whatever one may feel about the rights and wrongs of the Sino-Japanese war, there is no doubt that the history of the campaign, when it comes to be written, will form one of the most interesting military studies. The campaign has been remarkable in more ways than one. It is unusual to find hostilities breaking out in two widely separated theatres of war, each opponent considering a different theatre as the more important; and it is even more unusual to find one antagonist suddenly, within the first few weeks of war, reversing his ideas as to the relative importance of the two theatres. Then, on the Japanese side, the campaign has been an excellent example of the correct timing of military movements to suit political conditions. Moreover, the rapidity of the advance of the Japanese armies in northern China, even granted the weakness of the opposition, and the close co-operation between Japanese naval, military and air forces in the Yangtse basin have been noteworthy.

To the Japanese, north China, with its mineral wealth, was from the start the prime theatre of war. Indeed, the campaign there had been expected ever since General Doihara's abortive attempt to create a five-province autonomous regime proved the desire of the Japanese army to establish a buffer state separating China proper from Manchuria and Soviet Russia. The question was only one of time.

To the Chinese, Shanghai, the outlet for Yangtse trade and the commercial and financial centre for a population of two hundred

millions, was almost as vital as London is to England. Northern China they might afford to lose as far as political control was concerned; short of the immigration of millions of Japanese peasants, they could never lose it entirely. The importance which the Nanking Government have placed on Shanghai is instanced by their employment of thirty of their best divisions in the Yangtse valley, as against the thirty-five second class divisions devoted to the whole of northern China. To Japan, Shanghai was at first an undesired escapade. The subsequent initiation of a major offensive on this front certainly revealed aims of a larger dimension than had originally been imagined. The attempted execution of those aims has no doubt been hastened by developments within China. During the last few years Japan has been forced to alter her view of China as a vast sprawling nation, rendered helpless by the jealousies of rival war lords. What Japan has feared has been the rise of a people's movement in China capable of organised resistance to Japanese economic and political aims. As soon as this appeared likely, and there were distinct signs of it in the unanimity with which Marshal Chiang Kai-shek was supported and in the stout resistance put up by Chinese forces at Shanghai in the early stages, it became necessary for the Japanese to attack the foundations of the Nanking Government, in other words to try to oust Marshal Chiang Kai-shek from his dominating position. Political strategy entered admirably into the timings of Japanese military advances. Soviet Russia was occupied with an internal purge and army reorganization. Great Britain was still too much concerned with the Spanish war, her Mediterranean interests, and European affairs generally to risk much in the Far East. The United States of America, with her growing isolationist policy, was unlikely to implement even her neutrality legislation much less to fight in defence of her interests in China. Last, but not least, Japan was assured of the moral support of Germany and Italy in any action she might take, which could even remotely be described as anti-communist.

* * * *

Since the capture of Peiping, described in our last number, almost complete success has attended Japanese arms **The Campaign in North China.** in north China. Their advance has followed the main railways leading west and south from Peiping and south from Tientsin.

The operations westwards from Peiping into Inner Mongolia developed out of the need for protecting the rear of Japanese troops operating in the Peiping area from attacks by Chinese forces based on Kalgan. Except at the Nankou Pass, an immensely strong position where the Chinese had forestalled the invaders, little or no opposition was offered to the Japanese advance. Faced with the prospect of a series of costly attacks at the Pass itself, General Itagaki, the Japanese commander, resorted to enveloping tactics and succeeded in passing a mechanised force round the north of Kalgan which was occupied at the end of August. By the middle of September he had captured Tatung in the north of Shansi Province and had before him the choice of two distinct objectives. He could advance westwards along the Suiyuan railway to Paotou, two hundred miles on, drive a wedge between Soviet and Chinese territory, prevent Chinese flanking movements towards Jehol, and protect the rear of any Japanese army subsequently operating in Shansi or he could risk the threat to his own rear, move down into Shansi and so attain one of Japan's principal economic objects, control of Shansi's mineral wealth. Not an easy decision to the commander of a detached force of only one division and one mixed brigade.

Reckoning presumably on the inefficiency of the Chinese provincial forces opposing him and on some help from the pro-Japanese Mongolian irregulars of Suiyuan, he took the bold decision to split his small force and to pursue both objectives. The advance into inner Mongolia proceeded as smoothly as could be wished and by the end of October Suiyuan was cleared of Chinese troops. The invasion of Shansi went less favourably at first. There are as yet no reliable details of what occurred in that difficult mountain country, but it appears that the ex-communist army, now enrolled under the Nanking flag as the 8th Route Army, put up a stubborn resistance. At any rate little progress was made until the end of October when the Chinese resistance seems to have broken and the Japanese advance on Taiyuanfu, the capital of Shansi, was resumed.

While these operations were in progress, the main Japanese offensive was put in hand. On 15th September, General Terauchi, commanding the Japanese forces in north China, commenced an advance with six divisions down the Peiping-Hankow and Tientsin-Puckow railways. He was opposed apparently by some twenty-five Chinese provincial divisions.

Again details of the fighting are meagre, but it is clear that the advance on both lines was practically unchecked, the Japanese steadily outflanking each successive Chinese position. The theatre of operations in Hopei is intersected with rivers and canals, which should have been easy to defend, and the weather was uniformly bad. The half-heartedness of the defence may be explained by the poor quality of the Chinese troops. The training and equipment of Central Government divisions bears some resemblance to those of European troops, but, as has been pointed out, the Nanking Government retained these divisions for the defence of Shanghai. The provincial divisions in north China were half-trained and lacked such essentials as divisional artillery, let alone heavy artillery, armoured fighting vehicles, and aircraft. Even so the Japanese advance of some three hundred miles in the six weeks following the opening of the original offensive in Hopei was a remarkable achievement. By the end of October, Suiyuan and Hopei were completely in Japanese hands. Early in November, Taiyuanfu, the capital of Shansi, was taken and the province isolated from all help except from south of the Yellow River, which the Japanese columns in Shantung had already reached. So successful had the advance been that General Terauchi felt himself in a position to dissolve the Hopei-Chahar Council, the last administrative link between north China and the Nanking Government. The slowing down of operations which took place during the latter half of November and December was probably due to the need for organising lengthy lines of communication, to political reasons, and to the withdrawal of troops to the Shanghai front. But whatever happens elsewhere, there is now no reason why Japan should not revive her old plan for political and economic domination over the two provinces of Inner Mongolia, Chahar and Suiyuan, and the three provinces of northern China proper, Shantung, Hopei and Shansi. She is already in effective military control of all five.

* * * *

Turning to the Shanghai front, at the beginning of September the Japanese detachment which had landed at **The Shanghai Front.** Liuho was still isolated from the main Japanese forces, which themselves had only a precarious footing along the west bank of the Hwang Pu river from the Eastern Settlement of Shanghai to Wusung Fort. It was some weeks before the

Japanese managed to make any progress against the Central Government divisions, but towards the end of the month they succeeded in taking Paoshan City to unite their two forces. Even so they remained throughout most of October hemmed in to a narrow strip of land along the banks of the Yangtse and Hwang Pu rivers, a position not unlike that which the Allies experienced at Gallipoli. It was probably this deadlock, brought about by the unexpectedly firm resistance of the Chinese troops, that convinced Japan of the need for launching a major campaign in central China. Her economic objects in the north had temporarily at least to be subordinated to the political necessity for coercing the Nanking Government and destroying Marshal Chiang Kai-shek's prestige.

It was some time before the Japanese forces, amounting as they did at the time only to four divisions, succeeded in taking Taching, five miles north of Chapei and eight miles from the river banks; but the capture gave them the depth they so badly needed and from that moment their advance was steady, if slow. On 5th November two divisions, withdrawn from the north China front, effected a landing in Hangchow Bay, some forty miles south of Shanghai. The right wing of the Chinese forces on the Hwang Pu river was taken by surprise and within ten days operations in the immediate vicinity of Shanghai were over, the town being entirely surrounded by Japanese troops. The rapid advance which followed towards Soochow was aided by yet another Japanese landing, this time on the south bank of the Yangtse river, fifty miles north-west of Shanghai. This advance was almost certainly justified on military considerations alone, for the capture of Soochow not only split the Chinese army in two, north and south of Lake Tai, but gave the Japanese control of the most important junction on the railway lines leading to Shanghai.

It is too early to judge whether the subsequent offensive to Nanking was necessitated by military considerations. The decision appears to have been left to General Matsui, commanding the Japanese armies on the Shanghai front. Apart from other reasons, a consideration which may well have influenced the General was the formation, on 17th November, of Japanese Imperial Headquarters, a purely military body, headed by the chiefs of the naval and military staffs, responsible only to the Emperor, and therefore independent of political control from

Tokio. Whatever reasons lay behind the decision, once the die was cast operations were continued with increasing vigour. Wusih, the last Chinese stronghold, fell on 21st November and the road to Nanking lay open.

The threat to the capital led the Chinese Government to decide on evacuation. Important ministries, such as those of Finance and Foreign affairs, together with most foreign embassies moved to Hankow, while other departments went even further up river to Chungking. At the same time Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, who had until then combined the offices of Premier and Commander-in-chief, resigned his political post in order to be able to devote his whole time to the conduct of the war. The new Premier, Dr. Kung, is a relation of the Marshal's by marriage.

At the time of going to press, fighting is taking place within the walls of Nanking. That the city will fall to the Japanese seems certain. That its fall will mean a cessation of hostilities is by no means so sure.

* * * *

Although negotiations between China and Japan have ceased for some months, neither country has declared war. **The League and the Far East.** What attempts there have been to find a settlement have been made by outside powers. At the end of August the Nanking Government addressed a note to the League of Nations indicting Japan on a number of counts and asking for help. The Advisory Committee to whom the matter was referred issued two reports; the first condemned the Japanese invasion of China as being in contravention of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 and the Pact of Paris and as out of all proportion to the incidents which gave rise to it; the second recommended that the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty be convened for consultation. Early in October the American Government signified its willingness to participate in the conference of Powers who were to assemble at Brussels. The task of the conference was hopeless almost from the start. In the first place it was born of a League of Nations resolution and that body carries singularly little weight among nations to-day. In the second, although the conference held itself out to be not a judicial tribunal summoned to condemn and punish but rather a gathering of nations deeply concerned in the life of the Far East, in point of fact Japan had already been condemned. In the third the disparity between Chinese and Japanese views was

so extreme as to hold out little hope of concerted diplomatic action being able to restore peace in the Far East. "Japan always protests that the Occident does not understand the Far Eastern situation," said Dr. Koo, "but the only point the West fails to grasp is the persistent aggression of Japan, not only in violation of her pledged word but in opposition to her self-interest." "Japan's present action is one of self-defence forced on her by China's challenge," stated the note containing Japan's refusal to participate in the conference, "and therefore outside the scope of the Nine-Power Treaty. It is impossible for the Japanese Government to accept an invitation to a conference convened under the Nine-Power Treaty, when she has already been condemned of violating the terms of that treaty. In view of the special conditions in eastern Asia, the most just and equitable solution can be reached by direct negotiations between the two parties directly and immediately concerned."

Under such conditions it was hardly surprising that after a few brief sittings the conference should adjourn indefinitely. But it is unfortunate that the mere summoning of the conference should have led to an outburst of popular indignation in the Japanese Press against Great Britain.

* * * *

The League Council accepted the British Government's recommendations for the revision of their mandate over Palestine and Transjordan, and for the division of that area into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and a neutral area under British mandate. The British Government has now to prepare a detailed scheme of partition for the approval of the Council and it is expected that a new commission will visit Palestine shortly for the purpose. Meanwhile, a most unfortunate wave of terrorism has swept over the country. The murders of Mr. Andrews, District Commissioner for Galilee, and Constable McEwen were the culminating acts to a long series of misdeeds by Arab extremists. They were clear proof moreover of the failure of the methods of conciliation tried during the last two years by the authorities in Palestine. Those methods merely encouraged Arab terrorists in their belief that the Mandatory Government had neither the power nor the will to enforce order. "To-day," the Royal Commission reported, "it is evident that the elementary duty of providing public security has not been discharged." "If

disorders break out again," it recommended, "there should be no hesitation in enforcing martial law throughout the country under undivided military control."

That the Palestinian authorities have taken those words to heart is evidenced by the proscription of the Arab Higher Committee, the issue of warrants for the arrest of six Arab leaders, including Haj Amin Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, and the establishment of military courts with power to pass death sentences for certain offences such as the discharge of firearms and the carrying of bombs. Although the Mufti escaped arrest, he has been deprived of his office of President of the Supreme Moslem Council and of his membership of the General Wakf Committee, of which he was chairman. His influence must have suffered a severe blow, for he has lost offices which gave him control of funds amounting to £67,000 a year, and the appointment of a large number of clerics who were prepared to preach his politics.

In Syria the Mufti has allied himself to the less desirable elements of the Pan-Arab movement which is taking on a new and disquieting form. Until recently Pan-Arabism was an academic subject rather than a live issue for Arab politicians. But Iraq is now an independent State, Syria and Lebanon will attain full independence within three years, and the Royal Commission has pronounced the Palestine Arabs to be fit for self-government. Neither France nor Britain, the Powers chiefly concerned, are hostile to the principle of Pan-Arabism, but they are fully justified in opposing the schemers of Damascus who are trying to turn a Pan-Arab into an anti-Zionist movement. Those extremists are not only doing all they can to promote further disturbances in Palestine, but are embarrassing the French authorities in Syria, who are still responsible for the welfare of that State. While the French and British authorities concerned are working cordially together for the maintenance of order, there are undoubtedly French critics who consider that Britain was wrong to acquiesce in the intervention of Arab kings in the domestic affairs of her mandate and who dislike possible precedents for the intervention of Arab politicians in Tunis and Morocco, where there have recently been serious disturbances at Marrakesh. One thing is certain, the new commission will have no chance of success unless terrorism is suppressed and public confidence restored.

* * * *

The last six months have seen a steady progress on the part of General Franco. Since July the principal events of the Spanish War have been the insurgent offensive in the north resulting in the capture of Bilbao, Santander and Gijon and the failure of the large-scale Government attack at Brunete, near Madrid. The success of the insurgents in northern Spain is easy to understand when it is realised that the provinces of Viscaya, Santander and Asturias were cut off from the rest of Government territory and that General Franco had complete freedom of manoeuvre. His troops were superior in equipment, particularly in aircraft, in training and leadership and his blockade of the northern ports proved at least reasonably effective. On the Government side there was an apparent indifference to the fate of northern Spain, the authorities at Valencia turning a deaf ear to Basque appeals for assistance. Whether that indifference was real or whether it was caused by the need to divert troops to quell the activities of anarchists in Barcelona is not yet known. Certainly the tide of success is at present running strongly in General Franco's favour. He has made an effort to unite, at least for the period of the war, all political parties fighting under his banner. He has been on the offensive from the start and morale is on his side. He has had better material than the Government have had, but he has also had the ability to make full use of it. Seeing that he is in effective control of thirty-five out of the fifty Spanish provinces, it is not surprising that the British Government should decide that they must have agents in insurgent territory. As the Prime Minister pointed out, the Government was bound to take into account its responsibility for the protection of British nationals and commercial interests throughout the whole of Spain, including the north-west and the south-west, as well as Spanish Morocco, now occupied by General Franco. Communist Spain had a British diplomatic representative at Hendaye and it would be unreasonable for British interests to remain unrepresented in insurgent Spain.

The agreement with General Franco provides for an exchange of trade agents without diplomatic or consular status. It in no sense implies *de jure* recognition of General Franco's government. The agreement has met with approval in France and has apparently been interpreted in Germany and Italy as a step towards the acknowledgment of General Franco's government sooner or later,

possibly when he has captured Madrid. The latter is not the view of the British Government, who seek merely to protect British interests while at the same time adhering to a declared policy of non-intervention in what they regard as a purely domestic affair of Spain.

As regards the future, a turning point appears to have been reached in the campaign. The subjection of the northern provinces has freed a large number of insurgent troops and it will be interesting to see what move General Franco decides to make. He can march again on Madrid, the capture of which would be a great blow to Republican morale. He can attack the main Republican forces about Saragossa, where a Government defeat would leave Catalonia open to invasion. He can move east of Madrid through Guadalajara into Castellon, cut the Government's road and rail communications along the coast, and isolate Valencia from both Catalonia and Madrid. Up to the present General Franco's movements have been deliberate, due possibly to the fact that although well-equipped with guns, tanks and aircraft, he has lacked adequate transport. It is likely that he will be forced to hasten his pace as soon as the worst of the winter is over both on account of the increasing pressure of non-intervention and the fact that the Government have stated officially that their "New Army," in which the Republican militia has been incorporated, will be ready by the spring.

* * * *

Although this journal is a Service one and as such avoids entering into political controversies as far as possible, there has been too much correspondence in both the English and the foreign Press regarding German colonial claims for the matter to be passed over without comment. On November 4th a front-page article, the strongest in tone of the many that had already been written, appeared in General Goering's newspaper the *National Zeitung*. Having welcomed Italy's support of Germany's colonial claims and sympathised with her over the lack of understanding of Italian needs in authoritative British circles, the article returned to the attack. "The colonies," it said, "were voted from Germany by a *Diktat* to which Germany is no longer subject. Germany demands, and will continue to demand in ever increasing measure, the return of her African colonies. She not only needs them for her livelihood; she has every moral right to

possess them. The fiction of mandates is sheer hypocrisy. Great Britain's behaviour during the past ten years explodes the pretence that Geneva concerns itself with the mandates except as a matter of form; and it is for Great Britain, the country deriving most benefit from the territories which are Germany's by right, that Germany addresses her demands." Two points in the German campaign for the return of colonies are worthy of notice. In the first place the German Government has so far been much less pressing in its demands than has the German Press under the control of the Minister of Propaganda; in the second there is less mention of the value of colonies as a source of supply of raw materials since the League of Nations' statistics recently published showed that 97 per cent of the world's raw materials came in fact from sovereign States.

In Britain, views vary between those who hold that Germany lost her colonies as the result of a war of aggression, that her ambitions are insatiable and that no change in the colonial settlements of the Peace of Versailles can be countenanced for a moment to those who favour a wholesale return of her former colonies to Germany as a gesture of goodwill. Between the two there is growing up, both in Great Britain and the Dominions, a body of moderate opinion, prepared to discuss the case on its merits and as part of a general settlement towards peace. This body believes that a clear understanding with Germany would do more to further the cause of peace than any other move Britain could make, and there is probably much to be said for this view. The colonial question is a peculiarly difficult one. Although the greatest share in the pre-war German colonies was entrusted to Great Britain, the mandates have never been exclusively a British responsibility. The Dominions, and particularly South Africa, are deeply concerned, as are other countries though to a lesser extent. Many solutions to the problem have been put forward; a wide extension of the mandatory system, the creation of an international colonial bureau of the Powers concerned, the right of the native populations themselves to be consulted. As *The Times* pointed out in a leading article in November, there is surely no case for refusing to discuss the colonial issue as part of a general settlement, but the essential point is that the discussions must envisage a general settlement.

* * * *

The Command Paper regarding "Tribal Disturbances in Waziristan," which was issued in Great Britain earlier this year, gave a brief account of operations between November 1936 and June 1937. A further communique was issued by the Government of India last November, recording events from 14th June to the end of September. It would have been unreasonable to expect that conditions in Waziristan would revert to normal as soon as the Jirgas convened in September had departed. The Waziristan tribes are democratic and it is seldom that one finds a large proportion of any tribe willing to accept the leadership of any one headman in times of stress. In October there were still irresponsible elements at large, who wished to prolong hostilities against the Government. Moreover, the process of settling down was retarded by the activities of the Faqir of Ipi who reverted to his earlier tactics of sending out small bodies of tribesmen to commit offences on the roads and against posts with a view to embroiling the tribes once more against the Government. It was bound to take time for the *maliks* to regain control. In spite of this a marked improvement has taken place in conditions in Waziristan. The punitive action taken recently against the Bhattanis met with little opposition and the tribe soon complied with demands for rifles and hostages. In the Tochi the Dauris handed in the weapons called for and collected the fines imposed on them. A *jirga* of the Tori Khel Wazirs was held at their own request to discuss ways of controlling irreconcilable leaders. The only case in which genuine opposition has been recently encountered occurred during the advance of the 1st Indian Infantry Brigade into the lower Shaktu valley during November.

Throughout Waziristan there is a steady progress towards a return to normal conditions. The scale and frequency of minor offences is declining and several hostile leaders have made submission. The general improvement is illustrated by the running of motor transport convoys from Manzai to Wana for the first time since the attack made on the convoy in the Shahur Tangi last April, and by the gradual return of *khassadars* to duty on the Bannu-Razmak road. In the Shaktu valley the programme of new road construction is almost complete and it has been possible to withdraw certain units to their peace stations. Last, but not least, there is little doubt that the prestige of the Faqir of Ipi has seriously declined and that there is less inclination on the part of the tribes generally to follow his behests.

* * * *

A change in the status of the Territorial Army was announced by Mr. Hore-Belisha, speaking at the Mansion House in October, and measures designed to recognize the Territorial Army as an integral part of the defence system have since been outlined in the House of Commons:

"In the Territorials," said Mr. Belisha, "we had an army almost as large as the Regular Army. Its voice must be heard in the highest councils. His Majesty had approved that its Director-General should be a member of the Army Council. Questions affecting the Territorial Army would be concentrated and administered under the Director-General, who would be given an adequate staff for the purpose. There would be opportunity for Territorial Army officers to reach the highest ranks and His Majesty had decided to create a new post of Deputy Director-General of the Territorial Army, an appointment which would be held for one year, so that the officer selected—a Territorial Army officer—would be able to undertake the duties without too long an interruption of his private interests. The limited tenure of the appointment would also provide a flow of Territorial Army officers to gain the valuable experience which the post would ensure. Another Territorial Army officer would also be appointed as an Assistant Adjutant-General at the War Office."

The change is not only a welcome and important one, in many ways it was inevitable. The Haldane reorganization of 1907 brought in the first Director-General of Territorial Forces, a post which has always been held, except for a short period during the war, by a Regular Army officer, as have the other posts on the directing staff of the Territorial Army, despite an implicit promise that the higher appointments in the force should be open to Territorial Army officers. So long as the Territorial Army remained a second-line force, its lack of a military representative on the Army Council was not perhaps a matter of very great importance. When it was decided to make the Territorial Army responsible first for coast defence and later for air defence, this state of affairs was no longer tolerable. The Territorial Army of to-day is as much a first-line force as the Regular Army and it is right that it should have direct military representation in the highest councils. Of even greater consequence is the decision to include senior Territorial Army officers in the staff of the new department. If Territorial Army officers are to command divisions and higher formations in

the field, it is essential that some of them at least should have experience in peace of the department which has to prepare and organize those formations for war. And these Territorial Army officers can bring to this task a first-hand knowledge of the difficulties and needs of County Associations, of employers and employees which the Regular Army officer can in the nature of things never possess to quite the same extent. The new plan is practically a reversion to the Territorial Forces Directorate of the Great War. One of the first tasks of the new department will be to undertake a comprehensive inquiry into the general administration of the Territorial Army, with special reference to organization, finance, and the simplification of relations between the War Office and County Associations and between the latter and units. In one respect the new department is fortunate. It comes into being at the end of what has been a record year for Territorial Army recruiting. During the year which ended on 31st October last, 43,923 recruits were finally approved for the Territorial Army, an increase of over 10,000 on the figures for the previous twelve months.

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The Army Council has passed through more than one change in the last two years. When the rearmament programme was started, it was found necessary to reinforce the Master-General of the Ordnance, the manufacturer and wholesale supplier of the army, and Engineer Vice-Admiral Sir H. A. Brown was appointed head of a new department of Munitions Production. The creation of the new Territorial Army Department already referred to increased the total of the Army Council to ten members and the military representatives to six.

Early in December the army was surprised to hear that three military members, Field-Marshal Sir Cyril Deverell, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; General Sir Harry Knox, Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh Elles, Master-General of the Ordnance, had resigned. Viscount Gort, who is well remembered in India as Director of Military Training, has been appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Major-General C. G. Liddell, who has been commanding the 4th Division, Adjutant-General. Vice-Admiral Sir H. A. Brown is to combine the duties of Director-General of Munitions Production with those of Master-General of the Ordnance, thus reducing the military members of the Army

Council to five. The post of Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff has been revived and Sir Ronald Adam, who was recently appointed Commandant of the Staff College at Camberley, will be the first holder.

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The Air Raids Precautions Bill, which passed its third reading in the House of Commons in December, dealt largely with the relations between Government and local authorities, between whom there have been differences of opinion regarding the burden of Air Raids Precautions expenditure. But the implications of the Bill are of interest to every resident in Great Britain.

Sir Samuel Hoare introduced the measure by saying that a modern air force could drop every day for many days as large a weight of bombs as was dropped on England during the whole of the Great War period; but he denied emphatically that the danger could not be countered. Precautions against air raids differ in many respects from the activities of the fighting Services. For one thing the field is one for civilians, the householder, the local council and other organizations; for another every man, woman and child is interested, irrespective of class or calling.

The Government consider that the duties of local authorities will be divided into six main categories: Arrangements for the storage of equipment; instruction to the public; the provision of public shelters; the repair of roads, rescue of persons, and clearance of debris; arrangements for the detection of poison gas, for decontamination and the treatment of casualties and arrangements in connection with street lighting and air raid warnings. The question of protecting buildings against the high explosive bomb has been investigated and found to be prohibitive, but public shelters, proof against splinters, are contemplated, and instructions about shelter rooms in the home will be issued to every householder.

In moving the third reading of the Bill, the Home Secretary summarised the two main conclusions which had emerged from the debates. In the first place complete immunity from air attack was impossible. In the second it was false economy to concentrate a disproportionate amount of money and man-power on passive defence, which tended to create a dangerous bias in the public mind for that form of precaution rather than for a vigorous active defence. London's best defence was a strong air force.

In accordance with an undertaking Sir Samuel had given in committee, the third reading included a draft placing specifically on local authorities the duty to provide necessary information to enable Government to prepare plans for possible transference of the population in the event of hostile air attack. Members had stressed the need for preparing a scheme for the evacuation of the population, particularly of children, from large towns. Sir Samuel explained the magnitude of the problem and indicated that the Government felt they would be in a better position to gauge the difficulties and to evolve concrete schemes when they had received the proposals of local authorities.

Not directly connected with the Bill but of equal interest was the statement made by the President of the Board of Trade regarding damage to buildings caused by enemy air action. Neither the big insurance companies nor Lloyds consider that the risk is one that can properly be met by insurance, and the Government have been asked more than once to institute a nation-wide scheme for insuring property against the risks involved. Mr. Runciman, when he was President of the Board of Trade, held that no scheme of insurance against war risks could usefully be created in advance against the unknown conditions of a future war. While the Government still adheres to this opinion, Mr. Oliver Stanley's statement that consideration is being given to the preparatory work which can be undertaken in peace will under the circumstances be reassuring to householders.

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In November, Lord Stanley, Under-Secretary of State for India, announced to the House of Commons the **Reorganization of the British Army in India** decision of His Majesty's Government to make a grant of £600,000 to assist the Government of India to meet the capital cost of mechanizing certain cavalry and infantry units of the British Army in India. The grant, which is to be spread over three years, will be in addition to the £1,500,000 which the Government of India receives annually as a result of the award of the Garraon Tribunal on capitation charges.

The proposed changes conform with the general scheme for modernising the army at home and divide themselves into two groups; the reorganization of British infantry into machine-gun battalions and rifle battalions, and the conversion of British cavalry regiments into light tank units.

British infantry in India have for many years past consisted of what are known as mixed battalions, that is to say units which include both Vickers machine-gun companies and rifle companies in their composition. When the proposed reorganization has been completed, they will consist of four machine-gun and thirty-nine rifle battalions.

The units selected for conversion to mechanized machine-gun battalions are the 1st Battalion, The Royal Fusiliers; the 1st Battalion, The Devonshire Regiment; the 1st Battalion, The Royal Scots Fusiliers, and the 2nd Battalion, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. These four units began their reorganization on the 1st January this year and are being relieved of any specific war role during the period of change. Three other battalions at present serving in India, the 1st Battalion, The West Yorkshire Regiment; the 1st Battalion, The Cheshire Regiment, and the 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment, are also among those selected by the War Office for conversion to machine-gun units, but in their case conversion will not start until after they leave India in the trooping season of 1938-39. Although for war purposes they will remain as mixed battalions so long as they are in India, they have in the meantime begun specialised machine-gun training.

Of the remaining thirty-six battalions of British infantry on the Indian establishment, twenty have been ordered to start conversion to rifle units from 1st January this year, or, in the case of those battalions unable owing to relief or operational reasons to conform to that date, as soon as directions are received from General Officers Commanding-in-Chief. The remaining sixteen battalions will remain as mixed battalions for the present. Their conversion will not start until 1939 or, in the case of those due to leave India in the next eighteen months, until after they have left this country.

After reorganization British battalions in India will no longer have combatant Indian personnel permanently attached to them and the company at Jullundur which trains Indian ranks for British battalions will in time be abolished; the personnel thus set free are to be absorbed into the Indian Army as far as possible.

As regards organization, machine-gun battalions will consist of battalion headquarters, administered by a headquarters company including signal, administrative and transport personnel;

three machine-gun companies, each of three platoons of five guns; and a fourth company containing an anti-tank gun platoon, a light machine-gun platoon, and two rifle platoons. The battalion will be entirely mechanized, both equipment and personnel being carried in mechanical transport. In peace an allotment of chargers for the use of officers on training and manœuvres will be made, but in war the unit will have no animals. The intention is eventually to station the four machine-gun battalions at Rawalpindi, Quetta, Lucknow or Jhansi, and Secunderabad.

Rifle battalions will consist of battalion headquarters, administered by a headquarters company containing a signal platoon, a light machine-gun platoon, and an administrative and transport platoon; and four rifle companies, each of four platoons, each of three rifle sections with one light machine-gun detachment in platoon headquarters. Transport will be pack and mule drawn and battalions will have their complement of chargers in peace and war.

A further point of interest, not directly connected with the scheme of reorganization, is that new rifle and light machine-gun courses will be fired by both the British and Indian Armies next year. These new courses have already been fired by selected units and it is agreed that they are a great improvement on the present type of course. The new course will reduce the time and ammunition expended by the trained soldier in firing at the bull's-eye type of target, and will give him instead more practice at firing at targets and under conditions similar to those met with in war. Particular attention is to be paid to battle practices, to anti-aircraft and night firing.

The second half of the main scheme of reorganization will provide an increase in the total number of armoured fighting vehicles in India. It consists of the replacement of the five horsed regiments of British cavalry and the eight companies of the Royal Tank Corps, now serving in India, by four British cavalry light tank regiments. Of the five cavalry regiments concerned, three will be converted to a light tank basis in India, one will be relieved in due course by a light tank regiment from England, and the fifth will leave India as a horsed regiment and will not be replaced. The 3rd Carabiniers (Prince of Wales's Dragoon Guards) at Sialkot and the 17th-21st Lancers at Meerut started their conversion to cavalry light tank regiments on 1st

January this year. The name of the third regiment which will be reorganized in India has not yet been announced. The four cavalry light tank regiments will eventually be stationed at Risalpur, Sialkot, Meerut and Bolarum.

The 8th and 10th Light Tank Companies, Royal Tank Corps, have started disbandment at Cawnpore and Kirkee respectively. The remaining six units of the Royal Tank Corps serving in India will be eliminated gradually, on a programme to conform with the creation and training of the new cavalry light tank regiments. A Royal Tank Corps depot has already been formed at Kirkee to which Royal Tank Corps' personnel employed as instructors with cavalry regiments undergoing conversion will be attached. To carry out the scheme expeditiously the maximum use is to be made of Royal Tank Corps personnel. Men of that Corps will be attached to all mechanizing units of cavalry and infantry, and the existing Royal Tank Corps School is to be combined with the Ahmednagar Wing of the Small Arms School to form a new Small Arms and Mechanization School. The latter will have a Driving and Maintenance Wing, and a Gunnery Wing teaching machine-gun, anti-tank gun and armoured fighting vehicle gunnery. In addition there will be a small Indian Wing to deal with the instruction of personnel of mechanized or partly mechanized Indian Army units, such as companies of Sappers and Miners.

As regards organization, neither the peace nor the war establishments of the new light tank regiments have yet been settled, but the intention is that they shall conform as closely as possible to establishments at home, subject to their being suitable for Indian conditions.

It is expected that the whole programme will be completed by about 1941.

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Another of the measures to ameliorate the lot of the British soldier announced last year by the Secretary of State for War will soon be given effect.

Troopships.

Both the hired transports, "Neuralia" and "Nevasa," are over age and neither complies with present-day standards of comfort. They will be withdrawn from service before the commencement of the trooping season of 1939-40 and replaced by two new ships built specially for trooping requirements. In addition to the provision of these two new vessels, the

accommodation on all "pre-Dilwara" transports is being improved by increasing the space allotted to each man up to Dilwara standards and by increasing the washing facilities up to six per cent. of the number of troops the transports can carry. An amenity peculiar to the new transports will be reading and writing rooms for troops. These improvements will naturally mean increased expenditure on the trooping service, not so much on account of actual structural improvements as the result of increasing the space allotted to each individual. In the case of India the reduction in the number to be carried in each transport will necessitate one extra voyage out from and back to England every trooping season.

POLICE WORK IN INDIA

(A lecture given before the members of the United Service Institution of India on 1st July 1937 by Sir John Ewart, C.I.E., Indian Police; Director, Intelligence Bureau, Government of India. The lecturer was introduced by the Hon'ble Mr. R. M. Maxwell, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.)

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

The original police system in India in early historical times was strikingly similar to that in England and was feudal in its principles. The landowner or the village community were responsible for meting out justice to offenders and compensating victims within their limits. The Moghuls developed a more bureaucratic system of administration, but did not materially change these principles. In large cities they had police officers called *kotwals*, with autocratic power, as administrators of revenue and law and order. Under the *subadar* of the province were a number of *faujdars*; these controlled a police force disposed in posts under *thanedars*. But this organisation aimed at no more than exercising some check on organised lawlessness, maintaining some degree of security on the high roads and upholding the authority of the ruling Power. Investigation of crime was not part of its duties. The criminal and his victims were still mainly the concern of the local community. Moreover, the Moghul police system was military rather than civil.

As British power extended from the original trading settlements, as little change as possible was made in the system of civil administration which the first-comers found in existence. The piecemeal and haphazard way in which British administration grew up in the provinces of India is perhaps more strongly reflected in the police system than in anything else. Most of our troubles and difficulties to-day are traceable to this. The revenue system was carefully regulated at an early stage because John Company wanted money. Other governmental activities, such as education, started from zero with a clean slate. The police system not only inherited crude and vicious traditions, but it was only thirty years ago that a planned and concerted attempt was made to eradicate the evils of the old system. Thirty years is not a long time in

which to break down traditions of many centuries in a tradition-bound country.

Much earlier than thirty years ago the process of improving the police had started, but sporadically and with no clear or co-ordinated plan. Repairs and alterations were made in the old fabric. In 1861 an entirely new legal fabric was created in the Police Act of that year, which gave the police their legal status in a form which has proved adequate up to the present time and which still requires little or no alteration. But it was not till action came to be taken in 1906 and subsequently, on the report of the Commission set up by Lord Curzon in 1902, that the internal organisation of the police forces in provinces was planned on lines which made it possible to aim consistently at killing the old and bad traditions.

Prior to 1861 the indigenous or Moghul police had been supplemented in many parts of the country by military police battalions, most of which did fine service in association with regular troops, particularly during the Mutiny. On the changes consequent upon the Act of 1861 these battalions disappeared, partly merged in the new civil police, partly forming the nucleus of several fine regiments of the Indian Army, for instance, the 3rd/11th Sikh Regiment and 1st/14th Punjab Regiment. The great advance in police organisation marked by the Act of 1861 was to some extent inspired by Sir Charles Napier, who, soon after the conquest of Sind in 1843, raised a police force on the model of the Royal Irish Constabulary. This was so successful that it was copied during the ensuing fifteen years in many parts of India. The cardinal principle of this system, which was later embodied in the Police Act, was the corps of professional officers. Thus was founded the service now known as the Indian Police. The manning of this service was at first haphazard like everything else in the police in those days. For the past forty years admission has been by competitive examination in England and latterly in India as well.

I joined the service just before the reforms advocated by the 1902 Police Commission were undertaken. There were then many old-fashioned *thanedars* who were little different from their Moghul prototypes in method. Such a man was a great power in the land, but was often uneducated, commanded fear but little respect, and was crude and ruthless in his methods. The constable was paid

Rs. 6 or Rs. 7 a month and was, almost without exception, uneducated. The supervising staff was much smaller than it is to-day and supervision was much less close owing to slowness of communications. Above all, the police service was a despised as well as a detested one. Even for a young Englishman joining it there were difficulties. It was natural to everyone, British or Indian, to treat the police with contempt. Under these conditions it is amazing what good work was done and how many fine, upright and gallant men, both officers and subordinates, there were in the Force.

I have said that it was left to Lord Curzon to realise that, while the legislation of 1861 was a first-class framework, drastic measures were needed to eradicate the old bad traditions and to enable the Force to rise from the position of universal obloquy in which it lay and take a pride in itself. Every policeman to-day owes an inestimable debt of gratitude to that great man and great Viceroy. Soon after Lord Curzon had started us on the upward climb another event of great significance occurred. In 1909, King Edward VII declared his intention to recognise—in the words of the Royal Warrant—"the heroic acts of courage and instances of conspicuous devotion to duty" of members of the police forces of the Empire by instituting the King's Police Medal. The inscription on the obverse of this medal—"To guard my people"—expresses in four words beyond possibility of improvement the ideal of police service. The institution of this decoration and more recently of the Indian Police Medal, for which every policeman, irrespective of rank, is eligible, has been a great stimulus.

I want to emphasise as strongly as I can the fact that the police is a civil force. As in Great Britain, to a great extent a policeman only performs in return for payment tasks which every citizen is in law entitled or required to perform. The police are of the people. It is inevitable that their standards of conduct and duty will always be in general relation to the corresponding social standards of the time, but, as they are constituted to guard the King's lieges, they should be trained to set an example. We are far from fulfilling the ideals of our service and there are men in the Force who discredit it, but the remarkable change which has taken place in the past thirty years in official and public opinion about the police and the increasingly constructive nature of the criticism levelled at the force are the most convincing evidence of improvement and the best stimuli to further progress.

The policeman in India appears before the public in a uniform that is liable to give the impression that he is some sort of soldier. He has many semi-military duties to perform, from furnishing guards and escorts to dispersing mobs by armed force and fighting gangs of raiders or dacoits, and he is proud to take the soldier as his model of smartness and efficiency for the performance of such duties. But the discipline required of a policeman and, consequently, the whole motive of his training is different from that of a soldier. I repeat that he is a civilian and his support is not armed might, but the law of the land whose instrument he is. The best illustration of this principle within my own experience occurred in the Sudan some years ago. In the Nuba Mountains, a particularly turbulent tract, the local civil officer heard that a murder had occurred some three days' march away from headquarters. He sent a single police constable to see what the position was. In due course the constable returned, bringing with him the murderer and 400 of his tribe. My point in relating this incident is that the policeman, if his conduct is right, upholds the prestige of the law and is himself upheld by it. The converse is equally true if the police act wrongly. Here in India I am glad to say that we get innumerable examples all over the country of the single police constable or the subordinate commander of a small detachment reacting instinctively to the spirit of the service and, without superior orders, taking charge in an emergency, being the one steadying influence over a panicky crowd, taking a heavy responsibility for drastic action in defence of the law, or a big personal risk just because he is a policeman. Only a few days ago high praise was expressed by the Premier in the Punjab Legislative Assembly of the conduct of the subordinate commanders of two very weak detachments of police engaged in protecting small groups of one religious community from attack by large mobs of another community. Though these police officers themselves belonged to the same community as the aggressors, they did not shrink from directing controlled and effective fire at the latter, when they could no longer protect their charges otherwise. Again, I recollect a few years ago that a young constable of less than three years' service, off duty at the time, heard that in a village several miles away a man had run *amok*, killed two men and was defying arrest. He commandeered a motor lorry and went to the scene. There he found the maniac murderer standing in the doorway of

a house brandishing an axe and a crowd of villagers standing round at a respectful distance. The young constable took a hatchet from a bystander and went straight up to the murderer and called on him to surrender. His boldness succeeded and the man came quietly. In circumstances like these nothing is easier than for the policeman to look the other way. He can evade action with hardly any fear of being brought to book. He cannot possibly receive an order from a superior. But a good policeman does the right thing on his own. That is police discipline.

The total strength of the police in British India, excluding military police, such as the Assam Rifles and the Frontier Constabulary, is approximately 187,000, or one policeman to every 1,455 of the population, as compared with about one to 420 in London. There is point in looking at the figures in this ratio, for it is the one policeman that on the vast majority of occasions the people of the country see. One policeman controlling a traffic point, one or perhaps two constables doing a night patrol in town or countryside or executing a warrant of arrest. That is "the police" to the average man in his daily life. In the biggest cities of the land it would be hard to find 100 police in one place in normal times. In many vast areas in India which seldom or never see soldiers, the policeman singly or in pairs is the only representative of the executive power of Government that the common man sees. According as he conducts himself well or ill, so are the law of the land and the executive Government respected or hated. It is therefore very well worth the while of any Government to take pains to have a good police force. It is not my object on this occasion to elaborate this point, but there is room for great improvement in the police and that can be brought about mainly by judicious expenditure on strengthening the higher control, on training facilities, on improved technical equipment to utilise the resources of science against the criminal and on better conditions of service for the lower ranks.

Out of the total of 187,000 police, 900 are officers and of those not more than 450 are British. This small British element is not new. Indianisation in the higher ranks has been increasing for a considerable time now, but the great mass of the Force has always been entirely Indian. I should like to take this opportunity of saying that, so far as my personal experience goes, the

increased admission of Indians to the highest branch of the Service, the "Indian Police," has done nothing to lower the standards of efficiency and duty. There are inefficient British officers and inefficient Indians, but it is beyond question that police efficiency throughout India has been steadily rising during the years when the policy of increasing Indianisation has been pursued. The spirit which fights the great temptations to wrong doing which beset a policeman and strives to strengthen the ideal of public service is not the prerogative of the British officer. The latter may justly claim to have set high standards, but our Indian brother officers are for the most part well maintaining them.

The "Indian Police" is an all-India service recruited by the Secretary of State like the Indian Civil Service, and its service, cohesion and spirit is very actively alive. This is the sole all-India element in police organisation, except for the Intelligence system, which is all-India by virtue of close liaison between provincial Criminal Investigation Departments. Every province has its own police force recruited and organised provincially. The size of such forces naturally varies greatly, but a strength of from 20,000 to 25,000 of all ranks may be taken as standard for the police under the control of an Inspector-General in a major province. The general law of the land including the Police Act ensures uniformity in the main lines of organisation for all these forces, for the police everywhere must operate under the law and for its enforcement. But in detail there are considerable variations from province to province. The general system is an Inspector-General for the whole province; three or four Deputy Inspectors-General in charge of groups of districts called "ranges" as assistants to the Inspector-General for administration and inspection, with another Deputy Inspector-General in charge of the Criminal Investigation Department and a Superintendent of Police in executive command of the police in each district. The district force is the essential unit and it may vary in strength from 500 to 1,500 or more. The Superintendent of Police has extensive disciplinary and executive powers as the commander of the district police and is responsible in that capacity only to his own service superiors, but in all aspects of the operations of the police in their relations with the public and as the instrument for the execution of the law the District Magistrate, as head of the district and local representative of Government, has a controlling authority.

Within the district the police are distributed on a permanent basis as part of the framework of civil administration. In this distribution the police station is the unit and it is in principle the same in urban and rural areas. The police station with its allotted jurisdiction of the whole or part of a town or of a rural area of several hundred square miles, is universal throughout India because the law prescribes it. The officer in charge of a police station—in common parlance the *thanedar*—is the authority responsible in law and in administrative practice for the prevention and detection of crime in the area notified as his jurisdiction. If that jurisdiction is urban he will have a large body of men under him for patrolling and watch and ward duties as well as for helping him in investigations. If it is a rural area, he will have generally one or two assistants, head constables or assistant sub-inspectors and ten or twelve constables through whom to control crime. It is quite impossible to describe a *thanedar's* jurisdiction, as it varies enormously according to physical, ethnographical and other conditions in different parts of India, but an area of some 250 square miles containing anything from 50 to 100 villages and a market town or two may be taken as fairly normal.

These *thanas* are the units through which the primary duties of the police are performed. *Thanedars* and their small staffs all over India investigate—in very round figures—some 6,000 murders and 4,000 gang robberies (*dacoities*) a year, and 1,000 thefts and burglaries a day, Sundays included, to say nothing of many other varieties of crime. Not only do they investigate but they take a big share in the presentation of their cases in court and their prosecution, and they get about *forty-five per cent* of all their cases convicted. Moreover, for every case they investigate they prevent many by a comprehensive system of intelligence and surveillance backed by certain preventive provisions of the criminal law. How they do it is a marvel even to those who know them intimately. The investigation and prosecution of offences in India present peculiar difficulties and the Indian criminal is versatile, ingenious and determined to an extraordinary degree. To control a police station effectively a man must have immense energy, marked personality, sound common-sense and readiness to act promptly with an instinctive knowledge of procedure, for he can seldom refer to a law book or expert advice.

Violent crime is prevalent in India; so are riots and mob disorders of all degrees and due to all sorts of causes; so the police have to be armed. A large proportion are equipped with and trained in the use of the rifle or bored out musket. Usually constables are equipped with a baton—why I do not know, for it is hardly ever used and is a very poor weapon. Officers carry revolvers when necessary, but the constable's weapon *par excellence* is the *lathi*—the quarter staff of Old England, and in the Punjab, *lathi* training as imparted at the Police Training School includes some of the "blows, chops, flirts, slips and falsities (or feints)" recommended for quarter staff play by one Zachary Wilde, a master of arms in the year 1711. The *lathi* is a very good weapon. You can greatly strengthen a cordon by *lathis* held horizontally between men; you can persuade an obstreperous crowd effectively by dropping the butt of a *lathi* on their bare toes; you can numb a man's sword arm, and you can, if necessary, in the words of Zachary Wilde, "knock a man down so far as the ground will let him fall." You may also, by following the technique of the same authority, "disoblige your adversaries' knuckles or eclipse one of his eyes." But it is very seldom indeed that a *lathi* does a man a dangerous injury. Nevertheless, for the milder type of crowd we often use cut-down polo sticks—a better weapon than the pick-axe handle.

The subject of riots and weapons leads on to that important aspect of the maintenance of the peace which brings military forces out in support of the civil power. I do not propose to speak of the extreme stage, when the military authority assumes control and martial law in full or modified form is applied. That is a highly interesting type of situation, but it is one for the soldier rather than the policeman to discuss. The lightly held civil and police control which I have been describing depends, however, all the time, on the existence of military force in reserve and the knowledge that we all have that court comrades in the Army and the Navy (witness the help the latter gave in Bombay in the autumn of 1936) are ready at all times to turn out to help us, is a factor of inestimable value. These combined operations require a great amount of study and practice. This is increasingly realised. At the Staff College at Quetta study of the principles and tactics of military aid to the civil power has been given special attention for a number of years.

past and in many military formations exercises and conferences are regularly held. I think there is room for even more of this kind of practice, however, and exercises on the lines of the famous exercise at Quetta, with civil and police officers, including such officials as *tehsildars* and police inspectors, participating, might well be held more often in brigade areas and stations where calls for military assistance are to be anticipated.

Better application of the principles of riot tactics by police and troops in co-operation is probably more responsible than any change in Indian crowd psychology for the fact that, when disturbances occur nowadays, the phase of mass rioting is usually very short-lived and the task of the authorities becomes the prevention and suppression of sporadic affrays, stabbing attacks, arson and similar acts of hooliganism. It is generally recognised that the tactics which are most effective in such circumstances include the rounding up of all known hooligans, the prohibition of the collection of crowds and the carrying of weapons, and the prohibition of movement during the hours of darkness by what is usually called a "curfew order."

One rather disappointing aspect of this tendency for rioting to be sporadic is that, just when we have, after years of delay necessitated by experiment and research, got permission to use tear gas for the dispersal of mobs, we cannot find any mobs who will wait to be gassed. In all the prolonged disturbances in Bombay last autumn, it is very doubtful if gas could have been used effectively. On the other hand, the fluidity of riot situations creates an urgent demand for motor transport and the best possible control by wireless or telephone of a system of unceasing mobile patrols. The value of such patrols is inestimable, both in reassuring the well-disposed, deterring the ill-disposed, and getting to the scene of sudden outbreaks in time to make prompt dispersal and arrests.

Tear gas has proved its value beyond all question for securing the capture of desperate armed criminals without loss of life on the side of the police. As regards its use against riotous mobs, we are now at the stage when we want a chance to put experiment to the test of practice.

But large-scale disturbances such as communal riots and disorderly political agitation are just as distasteful to the police as they are to the army. The really interesting part of a police-

man's job and the one he likes to concentrate his efforts on is the immense variety of crime that he has to study, prevent and detect. This varies from the mediæval to the most modern American-type racket. It is impossible to present anything like a complete picture of the wide field that crime covers, but I will endeavour to convey some idea by a few examples. A type of criminal who deserves special mention is the criminal tribesman. He is peculiar to India and, in spite of organised and in many respects successful efforts to reform him, still constitutes a major problem. There are a great number of these hereditary criminal tribes, some of them with close ethnical and historical affinity with the gypsies of Europe. Most of them specialise in particular types of crime and from among them come the most incorrigible and skilled burglars and thieves in India. Hardly less organised in their criminal methods are the makers of false coin and their agents for putting their products into circulation. Cattle theft—a trade or sport rather than a crime in public estimation among many rural communities—is highly organised. It is most prevalent in the neighbourhood of rivers with vast areas of grazing. A few years ago professional cattle thieves from Sind came by train, as had been their habit for years, to the country between Multan and Dera Ghazi Khan. They rounded up a large number of cattle grazing in the islands of the river and swam them off down-stream. But on this occasion they had been spotted and they were intercepted by parties of police and villagers in boats and swimming with the help of inflated skins. A battle ensued in the middle of the Indus in summer flood resulting in the rescue of the cattle and the capture of many of the thieves. Another cattle theft incident is pure Scottish clan warfare, but happened only some three years ago. The local Phearsons rode into the land of the McTavish's and successfully raided their cattle. But the McTavish's sent out the call to their clansmen and, mounted and on foot, pursued and overtook the raiders, had a lovely battle with them and not only got back their cattle but several of the Phearson's horses. This was not in any wild frontier tract but more or less in the centre of the Punjab. For crime—as we class it—of this sort a simpler code than that of the Indian law is required. Ingenuity is certainly an attribute of the Indian criminal. It was shown in humorous fashion by a simple yokel who used to lead a bitch in an interesting condition round the roads of the

civil station in Lahore and so became the possessor of a number of valuable dogs. More highly developed was the ingenuity of a group of aspirants for easy wealth, including the Treasurer of a well-known College, who managed to insure the life of a servant of one of them with several insurance companies and then tried to bring off the perfect crime by a method which I think almost deserved to succeed. They caught a cobra and made it bite repeatedly a piece of meat. They then made soup of the meat and gave it to the intended victim—but it only made him very sick. After this disappointment they disposed of him by cruder methods and got caught and paid the penalty. In the same category is the famous case when, with the object of securing a big inheritance, a man was skilfully inoculated with plague and duly died. The criminal is very knowledgeable about the ways of the law. There died recently a lawyer, who had practised at a certain High Court Bar, who specialized as consultant before the crime. He gave his clients a method of committing a murder and guaranteed to get them off in the trial if they followed his instructions carefully. Getting rid of the corpse is, of course, one of the elementary steps in a successful murder. Canals and rivers are useful in this connection. A *thanedar* of my acquaintance heard in the course of his rounds that a respectable farmer of the neighbourhood was reported to have got to the stage when he could stand his wife no longer. So the *thanedar* thought he would look him up. He met him in the road, riding a horse with a large bundle on his saddle bow. After a little conversation he said, "Where is your wife?" The answer was, "As you have butted in where you were not wanted, I may as well tell you. Here she is; in sixty pieces. I was on the way to put her in the Sutlej."

There is one thing about crime which is a little disappointing to the professional policeman; it does not observe detective story rules. Under those rules everything from crime to detection happens between tea and dinner or at most between tea and breakfast next morning and no detective bothers about such a tiresome formality as judicial proof. I could quote from memory a dozen outstanding cases where no clue at all was obtained for two years. Even though in the end the culprit was hanged, you can't make a detective novel on such foundation. In October 1926, a Mills bomb was thrown into a dense crowd returning from the Dusserah celebrations in Lahore. We chased several hares but

got no smell of a real clue. Dusserah in 1927 was uneventful. At the same place and on the same occasion in 1928 a bomb was thrown again. On each occasion a dozen persons were killed and 60 to 80 wounded. Continuously from 1926 the best detective I have ever known was on these cases and he did the best detective work I have ever seen, but he got nowhere at all. He was working under my general direction and from a very early stage we had both had a theory about the case, but nothing supported it. One day in the summer of 1930 one of his watchers came and reported that he had seen two men moving house with an odd-looking basket of goods. Then things moved. We found fourteen Mills bombs cleverly concealed in a recess on the underside of a staircase; the whole story unrolled itself; our original guess was proved right and two men were convicted. The detective of fiction would have got away with it on his first guess without waiting four years.

I will end, ladies and gentlemen, by thanking you most sincerely, not so much for your patience in listening to me, as for the encouragement which your interest in the obscure doings of the police, as indicated by your presence here, gives to all members of the Force.

THE ACTION OF THE 1ST (ABBOTTABAD) INFANTRY BRIGADE NEAR DAMDIL ON THE 29TH MARCH 1937

During February and March 1937 the situation in Waziristan had deteriorated as the result of propaganda by the Faqir of Ipi. Accordingly additional troops, of the 1st Division, had been sent to North Waziristan. By the end of March the Tochi Column, from Bannu, was located at Miranshah, to watch the Madda Khel Wazirs, whilst the 1st (Abbottabad) Infantry Brigade was at Damdil.

Hostile tribesmen had on several occasions indulged in acts of hostility, such as the sniping of camps or determined attacks on piquets. Several hundred tribesmen were known to be gathered in the Lower Khaisora valley, a few miles south-east of Damdil, ready to seize any opportunity for hostile enterprises; but in the last days of March negotiations in progress between the combined representatives of the Utmanzai Wazir tribal sections and the Faqir of Ipi had not yet proved completely abortive.

During this period, the action of troops was confined to the protection of their camps and the main lines of communications, air action was being taken only on a very limited scale at the request of the political authorities, and the initiative necessarily lay to some extent with the tribesmen.

The 1st (Abbottabad) Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier R. D. Inskip, D.S.O., M.C., consisted of the 1st South Wales Borderers, the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 6th Gurkha Rifles. The 13th (Dardoni) Mountain Battery, R.A., and the 15th (Jhelum) Mountain Battery R.A., were also in camp at Damdil and under the command of the 1st Infantry Brigade.

In the account which follows it is necessary to remember that the Gurkha battalions had proceeded to Waziristan at short notice with a strength of 5 British officers and 500 Gurkha officers and other ranks. The strength of a battalion for operational purposes after provision had been made for camp protection, for the garrisons of camp and water piquets, and for necessary camp duties, fell considerably below the figure of 500, and rifle companies consisted of three weak platoons each.

The troops at Damdil were responsible for opening the road two or three times a week for the passage of M. T. convoys from Mir Ali to Razmak and back. For this purpose they were required to protect the road concurrently in two directions: northwards for a distance of six miles towards Tal-in-Tochi, and south-westwards for six miles towards Dosalli Scouts' Post—a total of twelve miles of road.

On the 29th March the northern sector of the road, from Damdil towards Tal, was opened by the 1st South Wales Borderers supported by the 13th Mountain Battery (less one section).

The 1/6th and 2/6th Gurkha Rifles with the 15th Mountain Battery were given the task of opening the road for the six miles of the southern sector, towards Dosalli.

The 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles was responsible for the protection of Damdil camp and for various administrative and escort duties. One section of the 13th Mountain Battery was in action near one of the Damdil camp piquets from where it was able to afford support in either the north or south sectors.

No opposition was met by the 1st South Wales Borderers, and the fighting which occurred was confined to the south of Damdil.

The country in this area is extremely difficult. Although the features at Ring Contour, Point 4641 and Point 4792 are higher than any ground to the immediate south, the country lying between them and the main road consists of a series of low ridges covered with heavy scrub, and intersected by numerous small *nalas* with steep and scrub-covered sides affording abundant cover for an enemy. Air reconnaissance of the areas in which the action took place revealed no indications of the tribesmen actually concealed there.

The procedure adopted for the protection of this sector of road was varied on each occasion. On the 29th March the plan was as follows:

- (a) The 2/6th Gurkha Rifles with the 15th Mountain Battery (less one section) was to occupy the features from Ring Contour westwards to Point 4641.
- (b) The 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, less the detachments mentioned below, was then to pass through, moving between Ring Contour and Asad Khel, and secure the road up to milestone 52. One company and one section of

machine guns, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, were to be brought up in lorries from Damdil as soon as the first objectives had been secured.

On this day no troops were to move south of the Khaisora river.

The 2/6th Gurkha Rifles, less one company in brigade reserve, left camp at 6 a.m. on the 29th March, and by 7-25 a.m. had occupied without opposition Ring Contour and Point 4641, and a forward locality at "W." At this stage the battalion had in reserve two rifle sections and one section of machine guns. The 15th Mountain Battery (less one section) was in position on the col between Ring Contour and Point 4641.

The 1/6th Gurkha Rifles (less "A" Company and one machine gun section to follow later in lorries) with one section 15th Mountain Battery left camp at 6-30 a.m. Moving to the south of Ring Contour the battalion passed through the positions held by the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles and prepared to secure their first objective, a ridge running to the north of milestone 50½, whilst also watching the left flank and searching the difficult and broken ground to the front and north. The advanced guard, commanded by Lieut. R. A. L. Marks, consisted of one company (less two platoons) and one section of machine guns.

At 8-5 a.m. the advanced guard was moving along the low hills immediately north of the road near "X" on the attached sketch. At this time heavy fire was opened, from south of the Khaisora, on the main body of 1/6th Gurkha Rifles who were also on the hills north of the road, moving towards the first objective.

A few moments later the advanced guard also came under heavy fire from south of the Khaisora and almost simultaneously tribesmen emerged in considerable numbers from the deep wooded *nala*, north of and parallel to the road, and attacked the advanced guard. Details of this fighting are inevitably somewhat obscure, but it is evident that the enemy attacked with fanatical fury and actually closed with the advanced guard in hand to hand fighting. The advanced guard suffered heavy casualties, including Lieut. Marks and two Gurkha officers killed. The remnants were pinned by heavy fire to whatever positions they happened to be in, and there defended themselves against further repeated attacks.

Meanwhile the sound of firing had reached Dosalli, and Lieut. H. O. Stibbard, Royal Tank Corps, immediately moved down the road towards Asad Khel with his section of No. 6 Light Tank Company (armoured cars), dispersing parties of tribesmen as he approached the survivors of the advanced guard. In addition to supporting the advanced guard these armoured cars kept down the enemy fire by patrolling the road and engaging tribesmen south of the Khaisora valley at long range. They also rendered invaluable assistance in evacuating casualties from that part of the advanced guard which was near the road. Later in the day this section was joined by a further section of the same company which had accompanied the M. T. convoy from Mir Ali to Damdil. These armoured cars patrolled the road continuously covering the south flank, and without their assistance it is doubtful if the casualties could have been got away.

At the time of this attack on the advanced guard, Battalion Headquarters, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, had the equivalent of one weak company and one machine gun section in reserve. A piquet, supported by a section of machine guns, had been posted to watch the south flank. The section of the 15th Mountain Battery was in action near milestone 49.

A piquet from "C" Company had just moved off under covering fire of one machine gun section, to occupy a spur running south-east from Point 4792. Almost concurrently with the attack on the advanced guard this piquet was stopped near "Y" by heavy fire, and although reinforced by another platoon was unable to make headway. It was now becoming apparent that large numbers of tribesmen were concealed in the *nalas* north of the road.

By about 8.20 a.m. battalion headquarters, with about 30 men from "B" and "C" companies was in position at "Z." Attempts to gain touch with the advanced guard were unsuccessful; partly because all signallers with the advanced guard had become casualties but mainly because of the heavy fire in the forward area which prevented any movement along the ridge.

At 8.35 a.m. "A" company, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, arrived in lorries at milestone 49, and were ordered to drive the tribesmen from the *nalas* north of the road and establish a piquet on the spur of Point 4792, which the original piquet had been unable to reach. This company covered by the fire of two machine guns

sections, and of the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles, advanced as indicated by the arrow on the sketch map. They were finally held up by the close fire of concealed tribesmen, after suffering several casualties including the company commander.

At about this time the tribesmen began to present good targets to the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles and 15th Mountain Battery. Fire from these units secured "A" and "C" companies from any further attack, but any movement continued to draw instant fire at close range from concealed tribesmen, and the troops were virtually pinned to their ground. Attempts were also made by parties of tribesmen to attack the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles and to outflank their positions north of Point 4641. These attempts were frustrated by rifle and light automatic fire, and by the fire of the section of 13th Mountain Battery from camp. The company in brigade reserve, which arrived opportunely, was used to reinforce and extend the north-western flank where several minor but determined attacks were repulsed.

The 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles were now ordered out from camp, and at 1 p.m. attacked Point 4792 from the north-east, with a view to relieving the pressure on the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles. This attack was successful, and the battalion then worked southwards driving numbers of tribesmen out of cover so that they came under small arms fire. Artillery also shelled the *nalas* and drove out other parties of tribesmen who suffered heavy casualties during this phase. This movement by the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles practically surrounded many of the tribesmen, and it was only the approach of dusk that prevented full advantage being taken of this favourable position.

The attack by the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles immediately relieved the pressure on "A" company, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, about "Y," and enabled it to withdraw covered by fire from the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles and 15th Mountain Battery.

Whilst this was taking place Captain O. C. T. Dykes, who was commanding the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, accompanied by Lieut. N. F. B. Shaw and Lieut. L. N. Smith, R.A., the F. O. O. of 15th Mountain Battery, collected some 30 men from those at battalion headquarters and in spite of persistent and heavy sniping from both sides of the road worked his way forward along the ridge and brought in the remaining casualties of the advanced guard.

• These were evacuated by motor ambulance and lorries which,

escorted by the armoured cars, had come up to milestone 50.

The 1/6th Gurkha Rifles having evacuated their casualties withdrew at about 4.30 p.m. assisted by the armoured cars and covering fire. Coming into brigade reserve they took up a position in rear of the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles to cover the withdrawal of the latter.

It was now evident that the withdrawal of the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles would present difficulties owing to the intersected nature of the country, the close proximity of the enemy and the approach of dusk. The battalion had suffered casualties on the summit of hill 4792 and on its southern slopes, and the evacuation of these and the subsequent withdrawal would occasion further delay if opposed. Accordingly the 1st South Wales Borderers, who had returned to camp at about 2 p.m. from the northern section, moved out and took up a position to the north-east of Point 4792 to support the withdrawal of the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles. The latter battalion having under great difficulties collected and evacuated its casualties, withdrew successfully, covered by artillery fire and by fire from the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles and the 1st South Wales Borderers, without sustaining further casualties. At about 6.45 p.m. it passed clear of the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles who then withdrew followed by the 1st South Wales Borderers.

The tribesmen had suffered heavy losses and although the final stages were carried out in failing light the withdrawal was not followed up. The last troops reached Damdil camp by 7.45 p.m.


Throughout the day aircraft of No. 5 (A. C.) Squadron R. A. F., operating from Miranshah, co-operated closely, and took close support action on several occasions.

The strength of the tribal *lashkar* is reliably estimated to have numbered from 700—1,000. Their casualties were subsequently confirmed at 94 killed and 64 severely wounded, with a proportionate number of slightly wounded. The high percentage of killed is an indication of the severe nature of the fighting, and the effect of this action was such that the Tori Khel Wazirs took little active part in the fighting which subsequently took place in north Waziristan.

Our own casualties amounted to 34 killed (including 2 British Officers) and 45 wounded (including one British officer).

Sketch Map to Illustrate the
ACTION OF THE 1st (ABBOTTABAD) INFANTRY BRIGADE
South West of DAMDIL, 29th. March 1937.

DAMDIL



GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1937.

In the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1937 the following four essays were received:

1. "Fire descended from Heaven."
2. "In bello quies."
3. "If a strong man be not armed, how shall he secure his house?"
4. "He is come to open the purple testament of bleeding war."

The judges appointed for the competition, *viz.*, Mr. C. MacIvor G. Ogilvie, C.B.E., I.C.S., Air Commodore R. H. Peck, O.B.E., R.A.F., and Colonel G. N. Molesworth, I.A., have given first place to the essay "Fire descended from Heaven," submitted by Lieutenant-Colonel R. P. L. Ranking, M.C., 2nd Royal Lancers (Gardner's Horse).

The Council of the United Service Institution of India has, accordingly, awarded a gold medal to Lieutenant-Colonel Ranking. The winning essay is published below:

SUBJECT

"Mr. Baldwin has said that 'The Rhine is our frontier.'"
Discuss this.

"Let us never forget this; since the day of the air, the old frontiers are gone. When you think of the defence of England, you no longer think of the chalk cliffs of Dover; you think of the Rhine. That is where our frontier lies."—Mr. Baldwin (Official Report, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 30th July, 1934).

What is a frontier?

In the first place let us consider the meaning of the word "frontier," and the implications which arise therefrom. The "Concise Oxford Dictionary" defines this word as "part of a country that borders on another;" this is correct as far as it goes with reference to the strict application of the word to a geographical frontier, but is there any other kind of frontier? What does the word imply? There seem to be three primary implications which bear on the subject under discussion. Within the frontier of any country which wishes to maintain its integrity

- (a) no hostile Power can be allowed to establish a footing;

(b) defensive measures against hostile attack can be provided in time of peace and initiated as required;

(c) preparations for the counter-offensive can be made.

This seems a case in which the converse may be applied, so it follows that any area in which the above three needs can or must be fulfilled may fairly be held to lie within the zone of interest or "strategic frontier" of the Power concerned. It is these three implications of the word, rather than the word itself, which provide us with the key to Earl Baldwin's meaning.

Geographical Factor

Although the geographical situation of the United Kingdom is so well known as to require no elaboration, yet it is useful, since this factor has such an important bearing on the subject, briefly to consider its salient features. The United Kingdom lies (as in reality it is) like a piece thrown off from the main Continent of Europe; geological disturbances in past ages have resulted in the separation of the islands from the mainland by a stretch of sea varying in width from 23 to 370 miles. The longest axis, a distance of 610 miles, lies at an angle of approximately forty-five degrees to the coast line of the mainland, with the result that the whole of the east flank gradually approaches the Continent as it comes further south. At no point is Great Britain wider than 325 miles and in many places it is considerably less; this means that its life is constricted into a narrow strip, of which the long face lies open to possible assault. In days gone by, when man was dependent upon nature for his motive power, the prevailing westerly winds could be counted on as an ally to defeat or delay the approach of an enemy; but since the advent of mechanical means of locomotion, the value of this help has materially decreased. The "moat defensive to a house" of Shakespeare's time has now lost a great portion of its strength through the development of transport methods which have rendered man to a great extent independent of the elements.

Defence

It is axiomatic that in any scheme of defence the "line of foremost defended localities" must be sufficiently in advance of the positions vital to the defence to ensure that these latter are not over-run or overwhelmed by fire at the beginning of the assault. When all is said and done, the first point at which a nation attacked can at the outset defend itself is along its frontier; that is to say, its border with the neighbouring hostile Power. Some

countries, by reasons of geographical chances, are lucky enough to have their vital points so far from their frontiers that distance itself renders it difficult for an attacker to strike a decisive blow. It was the distance to a truly vital point which to a great extent ruined Napoleon's campaign in Russia in 1812. Modern developments, however, have considerably reduced the defensive qualities of distance alone; and in case where sufficient distances do not exist, special protective measures have to be taken in order to defend any vital centre.

Vital Centres

As this stage it is well to consider what constitutes a vital centre, and what these are in the case of the United Kingdom. Put in its simplest form, a vital centre is a place the capture, destruction, or neutralisation of which by a hostile Power must directly or indirectly jeopardise the whole system of defence. What are these points? The first which comes to the mind is London itself, with its docks and its network of railways, both of them essential to the life of the country from the transportation point of view: its banks and other centres of financial activity, not to mention its political, administrative, and social institutions. Situated nearby are the arsenal at Woolwich, the small arms works at Enfield, and the dockyards at Chatham. The danger and the importance of London have long been recognised; in "Air Defence," by Ashmore, we read:

"As a capital London is indispensable to its nationals to a degree unequalled in any country of the world;"

and again:

"In London to-day (1929) is centred at least one-third of the total activities of England; this vast agglomeration of wealth and energy is so disposed as to form the most convenient target for bombs; it is too near the coasts that give on to the Continent to be easy of defence; it possesses an ideal leading mark in the Thames estuary."

Many of the most important industrial areas so essential for war production lie in central and east-central England; although attempts are being made to palliate this dangerous state of affairs by the move westwards of some important munition installations, yet the large-scale move of factories is out of the question, both from the point of view of the expense involved, and by reason of the fact that in most cases their location has been dictated by economic factors. A judicious sub-division of essential factories would render

a complete stoppage less probable, but the industrial concerns of the Midlands and the London docks and railways must always remain a large commitment to be protected. Besides these, the various shipbuilding yards along the coast, the many electrical power and control stations, the communication centres inland are all possible targets; in addition to the strictly military objectives such as aerodromes, arsenals, and administrative installations.

Geographical Frontiers, now and in the past

What are the *geographical* frontiers of the United Kingdom from the direction of which danger is to be apprehended? On the east the North Sea, and on the south-east the English Channel. It is unthinkable that our zone of interest should ever again be confined to these narrow limits, unless the British Empire is to vanish and England decline to the level of a state similar to that which existed at the time of the Roman or Danish invasions. The conjoint island of England and Scotland has always been peculiarly susceptible to events in the Low Countries and northern France. In the time of Elizabeth, English volunteers went overseas to help the Dutch resist the onset of the Spaniards. Some of the greatest campaigns of Marlborough and Wellington were fought to prevent the domination by France of the eastern shores of the North Sea; Napoleon realised to the full that Antwerp was "a pistol pointed at the heart of England" and articles in past treaties have been primarily designed to ensure the integrity of Belgium. History repeated itself during the Great War, when the possession by the Germans of the greater portion of Belgium, with the resultant establishment of hostile submarine bases along the shores of the Channel and air bases inland, caused, to say the least of it, very considerable difficulty and danger to the British Empire. This point has been brought out again and again; one of the more recent occasions being in Mr. Eden's speech of 26th March, 1936:

"We have never been able to dissociate ourselves from events in the Low Countries, neither in the time of Queen Elizabeth, nor in the time of Marlborough, nor in the time of Napoleon, and still less at the present day when modern developments of science have brought the striking force so much nearer to our shores. It is a vital interest of the country that the integrity of France and Belgium should be maintained, and that no hostile force should cross their frontier."

Scientific Development—the Air

There is no need to ask what is this scientific development which has thus increased the importance of the Low Countries and northern France; aircraft with its rapidly increasing range and striking power comes immediately to the mind. No count need be taken of action by carrier-borne aircraft; besides the fact that the proximity of the United Kingdom to the Continent renders such form of attack unnecessary, the feasibility of such attack would presuppose the defeat or neutralisation of the British Home Seas Fleet, a contingency which must never be allowed to arise. Added to this, recent exercises at Singapore have shown that within about 225 miles from the land, aircraft carriers are likely to be a comparatively easy target for the defending torpedo-bombers. Imagine for a moment the eastern shores of the Channel and North Sea to be in the hands of a hostile Power with an air force only the equivalent of our own. What would be the result? Our sea communications by the east and south-east coast would be rendered precarious in the extreme; the whole of England, southern Scotland, and part of Ireland would lie open to air attack, thus necessitating the retention of considerable air forces for defence, besides the fact that our essential industries would lie within *close* range of hostile bombing. Even climatic conditions, which in time past have formed one line of defence against attack from the Continent, must now largely be discounted as an auxiliary; the cloudy weather which all too often obtains in the British Isles now tends to help the attacker by reducing visibility and thus screening his approach. What are the chief characteristics of air attack—the secrecy of preparation and speed with which the assault can be delivered; these confer on the attacker the advantage of being able to deliver a stunning blow at the outset. This necessitates the defender being in a state of constant readiness.

“Although no official figures have yet been announced, the maximum speeds of German military prototypes seem to be in the neighbourhood of 300 miles per hour.”—
(Golovine—“*Air Strategy*.”)

This figure may not yet have been achieved, but at the present rate of progress it cannot be long before it is attained, and it is one which should be kept in our minds. If we take a speed of 275 m.p.h. to be possible at the present time we shall not be far out in our calculations. The radius of modern high performance medium

bombers may now be taken as 450 miles, and this is a figure which must increase as time goes on. Turn for a moment to the diagram and by striking the arc of a circle of 450 miles radius with the centre at London, it will be seen from what localities air attacks on south-east England can be sent out. If we strike a similar circle with the centre at Manchester, it will be seen that Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield and Birmingham are all within range of air attack from the Continent. Hostile bombers based on aerodromes situated between the Belgian frontier and the Rhine can deliver attacks over the greater part of England, including the western ports such as Liverpool and Bristol. As the range and speed of bombing aircraft increase, the area open to hostile attack must also become larger. Taking the two factors of speed and range of aircraft together and reducing them to a matter of time, it will be seen that approximately only one hour forty minutes will elapse between the time the attacking aircraft start from the furthest hostile aerodrome and the time the attack is delivered on London; as a result, the time available for full defensive measures to be put into operation will be considerably less. It is a platitude to say that to counter an attack, early information of such an attack is essential; the more swiftly the attack can be delivered, the more speedily must the warning come in, and the further out must the observers be to give the requisite information. This brings us to the first essential of air defence—depth, without which no successful opposition can be made to enemy attacks.

“It is this room that is the essential in a large-scale air defence problem. Room will give time for warning, time to get patrols to their fighting height; room will allow you to organise the service of information vital to a successful defence.”—(Ashmore—“*Air Defence*.”)

Air Defence Measures

Let us now consider the time necessary to set active defence measures in train to counter the hostile attack. Under favourable circumstances this may be taken at a fair estimate as twenty to twenty-five minutes, including the time taken for the warning to be given and the interceptor fighters to gain operational height. In terms of distance, what does twenty-five minutes represent at 275 m.p.h.?—approximately 114 miles. This in itself means that the warning of the impending attack should come in from a point 114 miles away from the target. If reference is again made to the

diagram and other arcs struck with centres London and Manchester and radius 114 miles, the points from which warning of air attack should be given will lie along the arc of these circles. It is therefore a self-evident fact that this depth referred to above cannot, by reason of geographical characteristics, be adequately obtained within the United Kingdom. Assuming that the danger is to come from the east, south-east and south, at no point is the centre of London further away from the coast line (along which the most advanced home ground observation and warning stations can lie) than 75 miles, or at 275 miles per hour a period of seventeen minutes. We must remember also that London covers a very considerable area, that vulnerable targets exist on its circumference and that others lie nearer to the coast than London itself; these facts alone must reduce the safety margin. The result of this must be that a warning given from the coast line of the United Kingdom will not allow sufficient time, taking all factors into consideration, for full measures for the defence of south-east England to be put into operation. Some warning can perhaps be given by ships cruising in the Channel and North Sea or by small airships fitted with sound locators patrolling over that area; no great reliance could, however, be placed on these, as such airships would of necessity be an easy target for hostile attack and, both from the point of view of transmitting information by wireless and observing the approach of hostile aircraft, moving patrols could not give as effective results as a well co-ordinated listening organisation on the ground with fully established means of communication by land line.

The widening of the "Zone of Interest"

The factors of time and space, added to the development of weapons, have pushed the zone of interest, and hence the strategical frontier, further afield; and this extension must tend to grow as the speed and range of bombing aircraft increase. The strategical frontier can, therefore, never coincide with the geographical frontier. By reason of the development of air forces the United Kingdom has lost its insularity and is more than ever susceptible to the conditions obtaining in the Low Countries and northern France.

"One may safely assume that the defensive frontier of the British Isles in any future war will be extended far beyond the English coast line. Fighter and reconnaissance patrols will operate over the coasts of Belgium and

northern France, and perhaps even further afield."—
(*Golovine—"Air Strategy."*)

The security of the British Isles renders it essential that no hostile Power should be permitted to establish air bases within close striking distance. For this reason alone British policy must preserve as one of its cardinal points the maintenance of the freedom of the Low Countries and the assurance that the coast line of northern France shall never be in the hands of a hostile Power.

Co-operation required

It is hardly sufficient that the countries on the east coasts of the North Sea and Channel shall be benevolently neutral towards the United Kingdom. What is required, in order that a really adequate measure of air protection shall be put into effect, is their active co-operation. This means that the era of "splendid isolation" is gone; the United Kingdom and France are already bound by treaty obligations and the recent announcement by Belgium of her independence of the Locarno Treaties seems well calculated to advance this co-operation. The Franco-British declaration resultant on the Belgium statement notes:

"The determination expressed publicly and on more than one occasion by the Belgium Government (*a*) to defend the frontier of Belgium with all its forces against any aggression or invasion, and to prevent Belgian territory from being used for purposes of aggression against another State, as a *passage* or as a base of operations by land, by sea, or in the air; (*b*) to organise the defence of Belgium in an efficient manner for this purpose."

The declaration goes on to state that Great Britain and France maintain towards Belgium their undertakings of assistance given under the Locarno Treaty and the London Agreement of 19th March, 1936. In addition, the Belgian Government has categorically stated its fidelity to the Covenant of the League of Nations, and to the obligations which devolve on members of the League. This in itself presupposes that Belgium will be ready to take action against any Power which the League has declared to be an aggressor; and as a result the use of Belgian territory for defensive air or land operations under Article 16 of the Covenant is likely to follow. It must be noted how the theme of "aggression" is stressed throughout. Setting aside all ethical considerations, from the point of view of self-interest Great Britain could never appear in Belgium as an

"aggressor;" so Belgium in opposition to Great Britain is straight-way ruled out. A source of danger to the United Kingdom would be an attack upon Belgium by a stronger Power to the east; but as the Government of Belgium has declared its intention to resist such an attack and to prevent Belgian territory being used as a passage for attack, these, combined with the undertakings given by Great Britain and France to help Belgium, must result in the active co-operation of the British, French and Belgian air forces. If this can be assured, the essential network of observers will be pushed out further in the direction from which the potential danger will come and use can be made of the ground organisations on the mainland to enable interceptor fighters to start off further from the vital targets. This perhaps is a counsel of perfection and it is probable that in the initial stages it may only be possible to utilise the territory of our allies across the Channel as an "outer warning zone;" but the ability to locate a portion of the British air striking force nearer the outer periphery of the zone of interest must in itself afford a measure of protection to home territory. By judicious bombing of hostile aerodromes, the enemy's preparations may be greatly impeded or his air bases may even be pushed back out of range of the vital positions which it is desired to protect. Admittedly, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, and our own forward aerodromes will doubtless receive some measure of attention from the enemy; but, unless the air force of the enemy is predominantly overpowering, the more he can be forced to dissipate his bombing resources over a number of minor objectives, the more respite will be obtained for the more important ones which lie within the chain of protective aerodromes.

The Rhine

Admitted then that the adequate air defence of the United Kingdom requires a depth greater than can be obtained in the British Isles alone, and that our interest in the "Low Countries" is as great now—or greater than it has been in past history—why did Earl Baldwin choose the Rhine as our frontier in the wider sense of the word? It is not because Germany to the exclusion of all others is regarded as a potential enemy; *any* hostile first-class Power which possessed itself of Belgium, Holland, and the north coasts of France would constitute a threat. The reasons actuating this statement seem in the main to be twofold; in the first place, the Rhine is a geographical feature which, in the light of present-day condi-

tions, is located sufficiently far away to form the outer fringe of our "zone of interest;" in the second place, it is a simile easily understood and recognised by the man in the street, who thus may be induced to cast his gaze further out than he otherwise might. But does the Rhine really fulfil all requirements as our strategic frontier? For a portion of its course the Rhine has German territory on both banks, so here we cannot prevent in peace time the location of German aerodromes to the west of our "frontier." Strictly speaking this is tantamount to an infringement (although an unavoidable one) of our zone of interest. To the north of where the Rhine enters the sea there is Dutch territory whereon hostile aerodromes could be established, and the amount of this territory must increase as the various land reclamation schemes come to fruition; our interest in the integrity of Holland is as acute as in the case of Belgium. As the speed and range of aircraft grow in the future, so the advisability of pushing further afield our zone of interest must also increase. This, however, from practical considerations, is not possible, as it would entail the location of the "strategic frontier" actually within German territory where it could never be utilised.

Conclusion

We see then that now and for some time to come, until all danger of war in Western Europe is definitely and finally removed, the Rhine must remain our "frontier." This statement was made by Earl Baldwin in no sense of hostility to Germany or any other Power, but in order to reiterate in a form intelligible to all the essential points of British policy that the freedom of northern France, Belgium and Holland must be maintained, and that no modification of the present eastern frontiers of these three countries can be tolerated. "Die wacht am Rhein" is as essential to the British Empire as it is to Germany.

DIAGRAM

Miles 50 0 50 150 Miles



"ANY COMPLAINTS?"

By "EXPLORER"

Second-Lieutenant Jones of the Loamshire Regiment approached the battalion messing office, observed the artless notice pasted on the door, "Keep out unless on duty," and entered the sanctum.

"Good morning, Sergeant Rushton," said he to the meticulous, white-frocked cook-sergeant, who was wrestling with the A.B. 48.

"Good morning, Sir," replied the N.C.O., springing to attention. "Come to take over, Sir?"

"Yes, curse it; I can't think why I was selected as messing officer as I know nothing about the job and I haven't done a course at Poona."

"Pardon me, Sir, but I don't think you'll need to worry about the actual cooking. Your job is to look after the accounts, supervise generally and utilise the daily ration to the best advantage. And I think you'll enjoy it, Sir, once you get going."

"Well, you'll have to teach me and you'd better start now. As the last messing officer went off to hospital so suddenly I shall not be able to 'take over' in the usual way. You do the talking and I'll make a few notes."

"Certainly, Sir. Do you know what the daily ration consists of?" asked the Sergeant.

"No, I'm afraid I don't. A pound of bread, a pound of meat, I suppose, with a few bits thrown in. I used to know the English ration when I was at Sandhurst but no one ever discusses the ration in India."

"Very well, Sir," said the Sergeant, warming to his subject. "Each individual on the ration strength of the battalion is entitled to the following:

1	lb.	bread.
1	"	fresh meat—(12 oz. preserved).
4	oz.	flour or rice.
2½	"	sugar.
5/7	"	tea.
½	"	salt.
10	"	potatoes.
8	"	fresh vegetables.
2	"	beans.
6	"	onions.

Plus, of course, a cash allowance of 4½ annas a man; this for 650 men is Rs. 182-13-0 per day or Rs. 5485 per month."

"That seems rather a lot. Do you mean to say the soldier eats it every day?"

"Ah, one moment, Sir, if you please. I should like to explain something. There are, roughly, three methods of feeding a British unit in India:

(a) By messing on the official ration and cash allowance only; this calls for a balance of income and expenditure and the A.B. 48 must be square at the end of the month. Many units use this method.

(b) The next method is as for (a) but supplemented by a daily charge against the men: in some units, this charge is as much as three annas.

(c) The third method is the 'under-drawn ration' idea. Of course, Sir, we underdraw."

The young officer appeared quite unperturbed by this disclosure. "Now, Sergeant Rushton," said he, "will you please explain what you mean by under-drawing? I'm an expert at over-drawing myself!"

"I'll try to make it clear by showing you two diet sheets, Sir; let's take the Royal Blankshires. They run their messing by the first method. They draw up the full ration and the A.B. 48 is all square at the end of the month. During the month they would draw:

21,004	lbs.	meat.
21,004	"	bread.
937	"	tea.
5,051	"	flour.

The messing officer would have just over Rs. 5,000 or Rs. 182 per day to spend on groceries. The diet sheet would run out something like this for one day:

Early meal.
Tea

Breakfast.
Tea, bread, fried battered steaks;
fried onions, gravy.

Dinner.
Meat pies, potatoes,
vegetables, custard,
apricots.

Tea.
Tea, bread and butter.

Supper.
Tea, bread, potato cutlets,
fried onions, gravy.

Purchases from cash allowance.

			lbs.	Rs.	a.
Milk	100	10	15
Butter	24	24	0
Dripping	79	39	8
Sugar	40	6	4
Apricots	30	15	0
Custard	14	7	14
Condiments	6	0
Meat	175	32	13
Potatoes	175	32	13
Tea	7	2	10
Bread	178	5	9

183 6

Of course, Sir, if the men were charged, say, two annas a day, the messing officer would have a little more money to play about with and the diet could be improved."

"Yes, I suppose that is so, but I'm sure the soldier hates the idea of paying extra for his meals."

"Quite right, Sir, extra payment is most unpopular in the barrack room. Now, let's take our battalion of the Loamshire Regiment. We usually"

"Now the mystery is to be explained. Sergeant Rushton, you remind me of a conjurer about to let the audience into a secret!"

"It really isn't a secret, Sir; I can show you best by this little table. This is what we did last month, Sir.

Monthly Ration.	Under-drawn.	Balance.	Price.	Cash value.
				Rs. a.
Meat, 21,004	8,201	12,803	Rs. 7-14 per 100	645 13
Bread, 21,004	6,992	14,312	Pies 7 per lb.	244 0
Tea, 937	100	837	As. 5 "	31 4
Flour, 5,051	1,700	3,351	Rs. 5-4 per 100.	89 4
				<hr/>
				1010 5-0

Now, Sir, we feed about 650 men each day. We find that with care in preparation and economy in issue we can still give the individual soldier as much meat, bread, tea, etc., as he has always been used to but, at the same time, use less in the operation! I'll explain the special economies later. As we have not drawn the full ration, we are entitled to the cash value of the 'under-draws' at the end of the month. In this case, you will find that in addition to the Rs. 5,000 you have to spend you can rely on an extra Rs. 1,000 from the C.M.A. That little bit extra will make all the difference in improving the messing. Our diet-sheet, as you will see, is slightly better than the Blankshire one I showed you and I have underlined the little something the others haven't got.

Early meal.	Breakfast.	Dinner.
Tea, <u>ginger biscuits</u> .	Tea, bread, <u>butter</u> , fried battered steaks <u>Marmalade, pease pudding</u> fried onions, <u>gravy</u> .	Meat pies, potatoes, vegetable, custard, apricots.
<u>Tea.</u>	<u>Supper.</u>	
Tea, bread and butter <u>Jam</u> .	Tea, bread and <u>butter</u> , <u>fried fish</u> , <u>chipped potatoes</u> .	

That particular menu costs exactly Rs. 225-14-0; you will remember that the Blankshire menu ran out at Rs. 183-6-0. But we've got the money in the till, Sir."

"Do we spend the full amount each day?" asked Second-Lieutenant Jones.

"No, Sir, the amount varies and you will find, if you look through the messing account, that we make a profit of Rs. 300 a month on the average."

"Doesn't the Government claim that?"

"No fear, Sir! You see, as long as the money is spent on the *men's messing* no auditor can object and the cash balance accumulates and pays for the Xmas Dinner, extra expenses in camp and such like. That is another advantage about this system as the P.R.I. does not have to pay out anything from battalion funds."

"Now, suppose some senior inspecting officer comes round and asks me about all this wangling. What authority have we got for it?"

"You will find it in R.A.I., Sir; correction slip 222 of 1932 first drew attention to it; now it's para. 488."

"Any snags about it?"

"No, Sir, but we are not allowed to under-draw vegetables and we are not allowed to under-draw anything issued by the R.I.A.S.C. with a view to purchasing the identical commodity locally. That, I think, is just plain common sense."

"How do we collect the extra cash?"

"At the end of the month a statement is sent to the Quartermaster showing the number of rations admissible and the amount of 'under-draws.' This is checked and later on the value of the under-drawn articles is credited to the messing officer's account."

"And you think this is the best system?"

"I'm sure of it, Sir. It enables the messing staff to improve and vary the diet and to try experiments. If a menu has never been tried before this constitutes the main reason for trying it once. But you can't do this unless you have a small cash balance behind you. Recently, we have found several dishes the men like. Also the money seems to go farther, Sir. We can give them butter for breakfast instead of margarine, bully-beef, fish and chips, jam, cake and several other things but, of course, we never give them luxuries."

"How about supper?"

The sergeant laughed. "The supper question is rather funny, Sir. As you know, we now have an extra anna cash allowance per day to provide suppers. Well, for a long time before we got it we gave the men supper. But only about a quarter of the battalion used to turn up. Directly the men knew they were *entitled* to supper things changed. Now we get nearly the whole battalion in each night except on pay days."

"What financial effect has it had on the messing account?"

"Before we collected the anna, Sir, we used to give them bread, soup and sometimes stew for supper. Now we dish up

fish and chips or a proper meat meal. This is a bit more expensive and instead of clearing about Rs. 300 a month our profit has decreased by half."

"What about the economies you mentioned?"

"Well, Sir, it's like this. There is usually a lot of waste in army messing and you will remember the swill tubs we used to see in England. We have no waste meat because we use only what is necessary and it is all eaten; the bread is cut up into small slices, put on the issue table and each soldier helps himself. At the end of the meal the spare bread is collected, returned to the messing store and reissued for the next meal. We have practically no waste bread. The making of all tea is strictly supervised and food is issued from a central store. The messing corporal looks after that."

"What about swill? Don't we sell that?"

"Swill, Sir?" replied the Sergeant with some slight indignation, "why, no contractor would offer to buy our swill 'cos there aint none! We've got no swill tubs!"

EDUCATING OUR SONS FOR AN ARMY CAREER

BY MAJOR N. S. RAWAT, KASHMIR STATE FORCES

Given sons, the problem is to give them suitable education. The problem of a son's education is a difficult one for many fathers, but it is even more difficult for the majority of officers of the Indian States Forces who have, rightly or wrongly, high ambitions in this respect but far fewer opportunities of being able to attain them.

By suitable education is meant here not the attainment of many high-sounding degrees such as B.A. and M.A., but a good all-round education which will develop the mental and moral qualities of the boy, his character, his ability to stand on his own and to assume responsibility whenever required; which will ensure that the boy is well acquainted with present-day affairs of major importance, is perfectly at home in all social functions or activities in which he may be called upon to take part; that he looks people straight in the face at all times and does not feel shy or labour under a self-imposed "inferiority complex;" in other words the sort of general education usually imparted at the public schools in England and to which attention has of late been given in India both in the press and on the platform. It is felt that, equipped with this sort of education, the youth should have far better chances of holding his own, doing well in this world and ultimately proving a good Indian citizen than with the purely academic or theoretical education which the majority of present-day Indian schools or colleges give.

Much has been said about the poor quality of education within reach of over 75 per cent of Indian youths but mighty little, if anything, has been done to improve matters. Who has not seen the modern "matric" or undergraduate coming up in hundreds for practically any post carrying a salary of Rs. 20 p.m.? Yet some of them are completely ignorant of who the Viceroy is, or who Riza Shah is. Some of them will tell you that the importance of Singapore lies in its being the capital of Assam and that Delhi is hotter than Bombay in summer because of its proximity to the equator and so on. Many of them will, hardly be able to utter a word in public or look at you while

speaking, whereas others will be trembling with an unknown fear and perspiring profusely. Now, armed with this type of education will it not be sheer luck, a fluke, a miracle if the boy does anything out of the ordinary in life's battle?

It is all very well to preach that India is an agricultural country and that there is an urgent necessity for Indian youth to receive agricultural and industrial training. But, in actual practice, a soldier's son in nine cases out of ten likes to follow the footsteps of his father. An army career still appeals to him as being far more honourable than a quest for wealth and rank alone, in spite of the challenge that is being thrown out more and more now against the martial (or the enlisted) classes.

"Bah! the profession of arms, martial classes! What nonsense! Is there any such entirely separate class called 'Martial Class' anywhere else in the world? Give a man a musket, train him in its use and he will become as good a soldier as any. This is true in countries like England, Japan and America so why should it not be true in India too?" This assertion is at times boldly made by men whose religion "Not to kill"—the best of religions—prohibits them even from taking their evening dinner for fear of eating or drinking by chance some insect with their food or drink. Some of these people have seldom seen or heard an ordinary shot-gun fired, much less heard the late Commander-in-Chief's "Whine of bullet on the frontiers." Yet a number of their sons are already officering the Indianised units of the Indian Army!

All this makes the father think seriously, scratch his head, get advice from various persons as to what he should do regarding his son's or sons' education. It is generally the latter, *i.e.*, the plural number, for to the average Indian father in middle life sons are born in much too rapid a succession and his worries and responsibilities increase many times. He cannot in the already overpopulated India look forward, as his contemporary in Italy or Russia can, to any appreciation or help from the Government or State for having done his bit to increase the population. He applies to various Indian and European schools or colleges for a prospectus and before long collects an amazing mass of literature on the subject. He pores over this for days and at last makes a choice of the school he would send his boy to. His choice in this respect is mainly governed by the tradition or reputation of the

institution selected, its expense, climate, distance, and the social status of the boys usually admitted into the school. As far as entry into the Indian Military Academy is concerned, the Royal Indian Military College beats hollow all other schools in India. But for reasons of expense, this and also another equally fine institution, the Doon School, are simply prohibitive. Much as the father would like to send his son or sons to these schools, his purse does not allow it and he has with reluctance to look elsewhere. It is very seriously doubted whether the above schools will be within easy reach of any Indian commissioned officer until he has attained his captaincy or more! The choice thus often falls on one of the European schools situated in the hills. In such schools boys of European or Anglo-Indian descent receive their education up to Senior Cambridge standards and Indians are hesitatingly and reluctantly allowed up to a limit of 25 per cent. The father argues with himself, "Now, for all the open competition for the Services or even for entry into good business concerns one must, in addition to other qualifications, possess 'go' and 'drive' and be well up in the English language; one must be able to read, write and speak English fluently and correctly if one wishes to make any impression at all at the Examining Board. So why should I not pinch and scrape—save something monthly and send my son to a European school, the fountain head of the English language and manners, where the chances of developing character are greater?" He is probably not far wrong in taking up the above line of thought. For the profession of arms, especially for leadership in the wider and the correct sense, we Indians have to learn from the British officers, who have proved their worth in this respect for the last hundred years or more not only in India but over the different battlefields of the world. We have to learn the art or science of war, whatever one may like to call it, from them and in their language. Ask any British officer, no matter how good a linguist he may be, to explain his ideas in this respect in our language; he will not be able to do it half as well as in his own mother-tongue and naturally so. He will fumble for suitable words and the trend of his thoughts and ideas will be obstructed. The whole charm will have gone, vanished. Even an educated Indian military officer finds difficulty in translating into simple, every day Urdu phrases like "Appreciation of a situation;" "Use your imagination;" "Paint the picture;" "Initiative." Hence the

extreme importance, amongst other things, of the English language for an officer who elects to make the army his future career. He must not only be able to read, write and speak it, he should also be able to understand the language really well and to express himself in it as he would in his own mother-tongue.

So the poor boy is despatched to one of these European schools, where he finds the first term or year of his stay very trying indeed; the manners, the living and the food are all entirely new to him (I am not talking here of the few isolated cases where the father or mother of the boy happens to be a European, or an Anglicized Indian). The boy having gone to the school at a young and impressionable age makes headway. It is amazing how well some of these little imps do and how they become thorough little *sahibs*! These boys generally come to look down upon Indians, except those Indians who speak English and dress in European ways, as aliens and foreigners and call them "Indian chaps." They naturally lose the little they know of their own religion, for, as far as I know, none of these European schools cater for the religious training of Indians. The Indian boys begin to understand the significance of the church, the chapel, and the Bible, and forget the importance of Ramayan, the Quran, or the Granth Sahib. Not that it makes a vital difference, for after all there is good in all religions. But it does put the boy completely out of gear when in later life he is called upon to attend a temple, a mosque or a gurdwara or to perform some religious ceremony. The poor lad feels completely out of touch with his own people. It takes a good time, years in fact, for the lad to re-establish himself in this respect.

In addition to this denationalisation, another drawback of these European schools for an Indian and especially for a Hindu boy is the quality and type of food. He simply cannot accustom himself to the boiled stuff called "Irish stew" and similar dishes. A constant appeal is made by the boy to his parents: "Can I be given some Indian food, please, occasionally?" The father writes a polite letter to the headmaster, or principal as they generally like to be called in India, and gets a curt reply: "Eminent authorities have declared the food given in our school to be good and wholesome and your lad must accustom himself to it. He is a delicate lad in this respect. We can only comply with your request if you are prepared to pay an extra 33 per cent

on the monthly charges" and so on. And the matter ends there. The vacations come and the boy returns home skin and bone—a perfect skeleton! It requires all the arguments and persuasions on the part of the father to make the mother, an Indian mother too, agree to her son's return to the school next term.

It costs the father in the neighbourhood of Rs. 8,000 before his son passes the Senior Cambridge at such schools against not more than one-sixth of that sum for the boy to matriculate at an Indian school; and in both cases the boy will require a further four years to get a degree from one of the colleges in India.

A good many fathers therefore try the cheaper method, that is they let the boy matriculate at one of the local schools and then enter him for one of the colleges nearby or put him under cram-mers for a couple of years while he works for the Indian Military Academy or for some Service. This alternative, though much cheaper and quicker, cannot ensure the same standard of genuine education or the same strong foundation and background. The boy is always handicapped in after-life. So, as far as knowledge of the English language and manners, character, and a general "toning up" are concerned, the European school education is probably well worth the expense and the sacrifice.

The three King George's Royal Indian Military schools at Ajmer, Jhelum and Jullundur are well run and have shown good results. But these are open to the sons of Indian Viceroy's commissioned officers and N.C.O.s only and would probably require much reorganization to convert them into public schools. To do this great expense would have to be incurred.

For boys intending to make the army their career the best schools in India, therefore, taking everything into consideration are, in my opinion, first, the Royal Indian Military College and next the Doon—the newly started Indian public school. Both of these schools are situated amongst lovely surroundings in Dehra Doon with a good healthy climate; possess an excellent and highly qualified staff; provide first-class food; admit boys of reasonably good status (no driver's or ticket collector's sons here!) and have good arrangements for imparting religious training to young Indians. Great stress is laid on the development of both brains and brawn. Plenty of games and sports are available. The life is an outdoor one and provides opportunities for building the boy's character and power of leadership. The only disadvantages

are the lack of society of European boys and the excessive expense. In these two schools there are, as far as I know, very few, if any, European boys, and the advantages of mixing and living with them as pals and comrades and of learning from them are not obtainable as in the European schools I have mentioned. I wonder whether this shortcoming could not be removed by encouraging the admission of a proportion of boys of European parentage of good status.

About the high expenses. I fear I am repeating myself once again. My question is: "Are the martial classes enlisting into the army to obtain their full opportunity of officering the Indian units of the future, or are they not? Is the Government going to raise its little finger to assist them in doing so, or is it not?" If the answer be in the affirmative, and if there be a genuine desire to give such opportunity to those who have all along been considered and declared by competent authorities to be the ideal material, then something must be done, and done quickly, to reduce the monthly charges at these two schools in favour of fathers who are or were in the army and who wish to send their sons into the army too! If this is not done, the majority of officers in the future Indian Army may certainly be sons of monied people but rarely will they come from the martial classes! How can one expect a soldier (generally poor) to compete with a rich man in the matter of spending money—a man who has generations of hoardings to gloat over? If such a concession should ever be made the State Forces should surely have a claim to it too, considering that their strength is about 50,000 all told, and that they have for years, directly or indirectly, rendered service to the Empire in some form or other. Should not the purse-strings of the nation be loosened for a cause of this nature, a cause aiming at the improvement of the soldier who is the nation's mainstay in its hour of danger?

EXPANSION AND PROBLEMS OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE IN GREAT BRITAIN

(A lecture given before the members of the United Service Institution of India on 15th July, 1937, by Air Commodore R. H. Peck, O.B.E., R.A.F.)

The lecturer was introduced by Major-General C. J. E. Auchinleck, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., O.B.E.)

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

I have been asked to lecture to you to-day on the expansion of the Royal Air Force and some of the air problems which face us in Great Britain. I do not think I can start better than by explaining to you the phenomenal strides which air development has made in the last two or three years, and how the truly amazing technical advance, which has occurred, has altered the whole air situation and the air problems with which we are confronted.

A change has taken place no less revolutionary and sweeping than that caused by the discovery of steam as a means of motive power, or the use of metal for the construction of ships; more sweeping than the invention of the screw propeller or the turbine. Inventive progress seems to take the course not of a steady upward curve, but of sudden upward movements alternating with periods of very gradual ascent. We are still in the middle of one of those sudden, steep upward movements and will not have exploited the results of current technical possibilities for another three or four years. Then we may hope and, as taxpayers, we should earnestly pray for a period of comparative quiet.

During the past few years we have grown accustomed to aircraft of a certain standard of performance of which the following examples are typical:

The day bomber.—A light two-seater of about 500 h.p. carrying 500 lbs. of bombs for 500 miles at 90 to 130 miles an hour, and mounting one gun forward and one gun to the rear.

The army co-operation aircraft of very similar characteristics.

We in India know these types well in the Wapiti, the Hart and the Audax.

Besides these, there has been the heavy bomber mainly designed to operate at night; slow in speed, perhaps 80 to 110 miles per hour, conveying half a ton or a ton of load, and of

perhaps 800 miles in total range; one gun forward, one gun lowered beneath in what is known as a "dustbin" mounting, and one gun in a tail turret.

Finally there was the single seater air defence fighter mounting two guns forward and flying at 230 to 240 miles per hour.

There are many other classes and sub-classes of service aircraft, but those described above have been the bread and cheese of the bill of fare.

A few years ago America took the lead in technical development, spurred on by the splendid flying opportunities her country affords, her stable weather, vast distances, lack of national frontiers hampering air transport and her overwhelming wealth. The struggle for the blue riband on the transcontinental coast to coast journey with mails and passengers led to a white-hot competition for performance, and in the course of this struggle were evolved almost simultaneously several remarkable technical inventions and features of design. These include:

The retractable undercarriage;

The variable pitched propeller;

The low resistance engine housing;

The all-metal stressed-skin wing and body structure, with its low structure weight and low frictional resistance;

The split flap for slow landing, coupled with the large aerodrome; and

High octane petrol.

These various devices, appearing as they did simultaneously, effected an astonishing revolution in aircraft performance. It became possible at once to fly with double the load at double the speed for double the distance.

The typical medium bomber became capable of flying 1,000 miles at 250 to 260 miles per hour with 1,000 lbs. of bombs. The heavy bomber became capable of flying 1,500 miles at 240 miles per hour with a ton to two tons of bombs. If, moreover, for reinforcement purposes, we slow down the speed to a beggarly two miles a minute, the new aircraft will fly twice the distance, or all the way from Baghdad to Lahore in 16 hours, without landing to refuel. Our pilots will now have to grow cushioned seats if they are to stay the course!

The new fighters mount several guns and possess a speed of over 300 miles per hour. Higher octane fuel allows of higher

compression ratios in the engines with higher output and lower fuel consumption.

I explained that we were not yet at the end of the present sharp upward curve of advance. Higher landing speeds and therefore high maximum speeds may be accepted; still higher octane fuel is being developed and the engines to use it; improvements in propellers and superchargers are being made; and all these have to be exploited before the scientists have to return to their laboratories and evolve any fresh inventions. Most of the speeds quoted above should be capable within five years of an addition of 100 miles per hour or its equivalent in other characteristics.

The beginning of the Royal Air Force expansion in 1935 found us with the old types in our squadrons and old style designs on the stocks. We had to face not merely an expansion in numbers, but a revolution in aircraft, in engine and in accessory design. No time was available in which to experiment with or test these new designs. We had to order straight off the drawing board what seemed sound and promising experimental prototypes. We have been very fortunate in that almost all of them have fully justified the advice of our technical staff and to-day we have coming into the Service fighters and bombers better, for the moment, than any possessed by foreign powers. But the race is keen and incessant, and the next designs of other Powers will, therefore, surpass our own and, until the progress of technical development slows down again to a steady gradient, we shall have continually to issue new specifications to take advantage of the latest progress and to re-equip a proportion of our units with the latest types.

So much for the technical race which is in headlong progress.

Now let me turn to numbers and first-line strength.

As Joffre once said, "In the air this is always a crisis." Throughout the brief life of the Royal Air Force we have suffered from violent changes of policy, and if sometimes our organisation seems incomplete and imperfect in detail, bear in mind that we have been through some devastating disruptions.

At the beginning of the war we mustered in the Royal Flying Corps some 100 odd aircraft in all, some of these very odd! At the end of the war we had expanded to 187 squadrons, 3,300 first-line aircraft, 30,000 officers and 264,000 other ranks.

By March 1920 we had been broken down to 23 squadrons. In March 1923 our Home Defence Air Force consisted of three squadrons.

Then we were told that we should expand to 52 squadrons for Home Defence, but successive postponements in the cause of economy and disarmament had set back the completion of this programme to 1938.

In 1934 we had still only 42 squadrons, and this was the position when the Government suddenly came to realise how we stood relative to the rearming of continental Powers. We were then thrown, after the lean years of starvation, into a series of expansion schemes following each other like cascades. Between 1934 and March 1936 we had received successive orders to expand from 42 squadrons to 52, to 75, to 123, and then to 129, the latter including considerable increases in squadron strengths and re-equipment with aircraft of twice the power and capacity. The total strength at home is fixed, for the present, at 1,750 first-line aircraft. To this has to be added appreciable increases overseas, a very substantial increase in the Fleet Air Arm, and an adequate scale of war reserves.

This expansion virtually trebles the numbers of first-line aircraft at home. The greater part of this expansion was to be completed by March 1937, and the whole of the squadrons were to be formed by the summer of 1937, that is to say, in less than two years.

These figures will show you more clearly than anything I can say how colossal the problem has been which the Air Ministry has been called on to solve and will enable you to gauge the difficulties which have confronted the Service in striving to maintain the quality of units of which the quantity had so suddenly and drastically to be increased. It represents an expansion as rapid as can be achieved under pressure of war, while at the same time we have had to strive to maintain the characteristics and qualities which a service should possess in peace.

I looked through the Air Force List recently and noticed that only one squadron in the whole Service had its complement of flight-lieutenants—many had only one. This is now rapidly being rectified. Responsibility has had to be given at far earlier ages and to those with far less service experience than we should ever have contemplated. I think, however, that those of you who have

met and worked with some of these young officers and N.C.O. pilots in our squadrons in the recent operations on the North-West Frontier will agree with me that they have stood up to the test well and have carried their increased burdens and responsibility in a way which leaves no doubt that, taking it by and large, the material is right and that the training is sound.

And now a few words as to the Home Defence problem which this expansion is being provided to meet.

The continental Powers, like ourselves, are aiming, at present, at the creation of large air forces of a first-line strength in the region of 1,800 to 2,000 aircraft, except for the U.S.S.R. whose aim is nearer 3,000. Each is providing a large proportion of bombers including again an appreciable proportion of heavy bombers. It seems at present as if bombers will fall into two classes—medium bombers carrying half a ton of bombs and a crew of three at as high a speed as possible, say, about 250 miles per hour, and heavy bombers carrying two to three, or even more, tons of bombs at a somewhat slower speed, say, 220 miles per hour. These speeds are, however, being increased. The heavier bombers, offering a larger target, may be employed mainly by night, but, of course, both classes will be able to operate by day or night.

Naturally there are many other tasks besides bombing for which aircraft are required in war; army co-operation in all its forms, air fighting, oversea reconnaissance, anti-submarine patrol, naval purposes, and so on. In an air force of 1,800 to 2,000 aircraft, however, 1,000 to 1,200 may perhaps be bombers, and 300 or so may be employed as fighters.

Now that leads me to one of the first problems which the air staff have to solve—the problem of the numbers which might be brought against us. We may know that in peace there is opposite us a first-line strength of 1,800 to 2,000 of which, say, 1,000 are bombers, medium and heavy. But it is impossible to say whether that is the number which may be sent against us at the outbreak of war. A large strategic bombing air force is a new thing in war. We do not know whether it will be organised for war on military lines or on naval lines. An air force, remember, has as many characteristics in common with a fleet as it has with an army. An army is organised to take the field at a strength of so many divisions and arrangements are made to maintain the army at that strength for a period of, perhaps, many months of hostilities, if

not indefinitely. Its reserves are designed to last till replacements can be trained and constructed. Therefore, if one takes into account the potentialities of reserve divisions, one knows more or less what force will come against one. Navies have reserves, but reserves in quite a different sense. They do not remain in dock to replace casualties in the line of battle in order to maintain it at a given strength in capital ships. Every first-class capital ship is put into the line at once because a naval battle can be lost in a few hours or without prolonged hostilities. We cannot be certain how air reserves will be employed.

Some foreign Powers have sports flying associations and large numbers of reserve service aircraft. In a totalitarian State these could, without great difficulty or publicity, be organised as additional squadrons. Such a State may decide that a short war is essential, that it will be better to put the whole fleet into the battle rather than use its reserves to maintain a smaller force for a longer time. In that event one may be faced not with 1,000 bombers, but with 1,200 to 1,400 bombers. That might make all the difference to the issue of the air campaign.

That is why we are so anxious to ensure that every aeroplane, no matter what may be the role ordinarily allotted to it, shall be capable of acting as a bomber if the need arises. That is why we have striven and will strive for a central air force able to concentrate the maximum strength on whatever may be the critical point at the moment. That is why we have resisted the provision of three separate air forces, each able to be defeated in detail while the one that is hard-pressed is unable to obtain assistance from the others because they are under some other control. So much for the problem of numbers or relative strength.

Successive Governments of Great Britain have stated that in air strength and in air power the air forces in Great Britain will not be allowed to fall into inferiority to those of any Power within striking distance of our shores. The principal Powers so placed are France and Germany and it is, therefore, convenient to consider the air defence problem in relation to one or other of them.

And here I want to say a word of warning with special emphasis. In choosing, as I propose to do, Germany as the example wherewith to illustrate the air defence problem, I do not wish to be misunderstood. I do not do so because I consider in any way

whatever that that great Power has any intention of hostility towards Great Britain or that there need be any apprehension of attack from that direction. On the contrary I believe that the Fuehrer's repeated assertions that his aims are peaceful are perfectly sincere; as sincere as are our own. I believe and hope that the present good relations between the two countries will improve further and that we shall draw closer together in pursuit of our common aim of peace in Europe. I am, therefore, taking that example merely as an example to illustrate our problem and am regarding it as an academic example.

Now for the difficulties involved actively in the defence of Great Britain. It is a truism and a platitude that, with the invention of the aircraft, the prized isolation of Great Britain is over. But I think that many people do not quite realise its significance. Practically one-third of the activities and livelihood of Great Britain is concentrated in the Greater London area, and this concentration is still increasing. Many of the industries and imports on which we depend vitally, such as for example the cold meat supply, are handled mainly through the Port of London. The seat of government, of shipping control, of banking and finance are all concentrated in a confined space, and to this target the Thames, by day or by night, is an ideal pointer. The distance from the coast, when warning of attack is gained, is but a few score miles. No country in the world has so many major interests concentrated in so vulnerable a spot.

It is a great mistake, however, to regard the problem as being that merely of the defence of London. A very few years ago when air raids were small, London was the principal target within range. To-day, owing to the recent inventions of which I have spoken, the whole of the industrial midlands, Liverpool, Bristol and the Tyne area are within range of attack. No less important, the shipping approaching our east and south coasts ports is also within range of attack and, as ranges increase, so will the number of ports, the approaches to which are within range, also increase. The initiative lies with the attacker, of course, and his choice of objectives, which we must defend, is vast. Aircraft can be switched more easily than any other instrument of war from one target to another situated a long distance away. It should not be difficult, for this reason, for an enemy to contrive to be in superior strength to the defence at each successive point selected for attack.

Formerly our infamous British weather afforded us a large measure of protection, but to-day, with better means of navigation and the advanced development of no-visibility flying, this sure shield has worn somewhat thinner.

Now a word as to the weight of attack and what attack by a force of 1,000 bombers actually means. It means that for an intensive period of a few days perhaps 500 tons of bombs might be carried and for an indefinite period 200 to 300 tons.

A bomb contains about three times as much explosive as a shell of the same weight. A bomb load of the kind I have described has, therefore, the same explosive content as 15,000 to 20,000 six-inch howitzer shells.

That relates to high explosive. We have also to consider the incendiary bomb, weighing perhaps 2 to 4 lbs. The incendiary bomb has this difference, that its action continues after its own destructive power has been exhausted. The incendiary bomb constitutes a big problem if the aim of the enemy is to interrupt the life of cities, delivery of supplies of grain, fuel and so on. I will leave you to multiply out for yourselves the numbers that can be dropped by a bomber force of the kind I have described. So much for the weight of attack.

What forms might the attack take? We have to consider what are the various plans which might be found for the employment of a large bombing force against us, of the kind which the great Powers are developing—a force, say, of 1,000 bombers, medium and heavy. I propose first to concentrate attention on the attack and to touch on the defence afterwards.

What forms of pressure might the enemy employ? There is first the much ventilated "knock-out blow" to be directed against cities, designed to force a panic-stricken people to compel their Government to sue for peace. Such an attack would have its best prospect of success against a people ill-defended, ill-educated, and ill-prepared against air attacks. Its chances of successful employment against Great Britain are, I think, steadily dwindling.

We may next consider the surprise attack on London and other centres on, or even shortly before, the declaration of war; a blow directed mainly against the seat of government, of finance, the power-houses, and communications. The aim of this form of attack would be to disorganise rather than merely to terrorise. Terror, though incidental, would, however, also be formidable.

Thirdly, an attack might be directed, as a first stage, upon the air forces and air resources of the country. The aim of this plan would be to destroy the air forces on the ground and in the air, the stored war reserves of aircraft, engines, spare parts, and fuel, and the aircraft and aero engine factories and repair shops. A powerful enemy air power operating against one smaller, or possessing older aircraft of inferior performance, might stand a good chance, in a campaign of several weeks, of crippling the output of the factories and in reducing the effective first-line strength. The initiative lies with the aggressor. The war of transgressors is hard, but that of aggressors in a totalitarian State is easy. The aggressor can choose his own moment; he can arrange for his peak factory output to be attained much earlier than can the victim of attack, and thus, if the reserves can be seriously reduced, there is a definite danger that the attacked air force might be got down and prevented from getting up again. If then the attacker still retained an effective number, or could build up a substantial proportion of his bombers, I do not think that the crippled Power could indefinitely continue the struggle.

Fourthly, an attack might be concentrated on imports and food resources in conjunction with a submarine campaign. This might include shipping approaching port, the docks and shipping in port, the cold storage installations, and so on.

Then there are, of course, other plans which might assist the army's and navy's pressure. These are self-evident and do not call for special comment. It will suffice to mention the munitions industry which might be attacked with a view to reducing military expansion and the means for carrying out an offensive, and the fleet in harbour that might be attacked with a view to its affection preparatory to a sea battle.

Now a word as to the various tactical forms of attack which the defence has to meet. Air attack can be made in a variety of forms and the defence has a good many problems to consider.

At the outbreak of the campaign attacks could be prepared in almost complete secrecy at the home bases and launched as a surprise at the shortest notice with no more difficulty than the movement of a fleet to sea.

Aircraft could, as I have explained already, be diverted against any of a very large number of targets on a front of 300 miles, switching now here and now there.

Bomb attacks could be made from high altitude, not very accurately of course, but accurate enough to "brown" large targets. Our fighters would have to be ready, at a height not too far below the bombers, to be able to climb the difference and engage them.

In combination with a high altitude attack a low flying attack at a few hundred feet might slip over and would then be unseen by these patrols far overhead.

Attacks coming in at high altitude could shut their engines and approach on a shallow dive, but at greatly increased speed.

Attacks could be made in mass formations appearing at the objective in superior force to the defence, or in hundreds of formations of, say, three aircraft with the object of tiring out the defence.

The problem of warning of approach of these attacks must be remembered. We rely upon warning being received from watchers on the coast. Ships at sea are hard to listen from and would be vulnerably placed. Our chief vital interests on shore lie mainly between 60 and 120 to 150 miles from the east and south coasts. At 240 miles per hour that represents a quarter to half an hour from the time of crossing the coast line.

Warning must be received at the aerodrome from the coast watchers, the aircraft must be started up and climbed to fighting height, there to begin the first stage of pursuit. This does not leave much margin, if the fighter is to "catch the bus." On the other hand standing patrols mean many more aircraft. What we need is longer warning. A nice problem.

There is then the problem of the fight itself. How to close with the enemy, himself flying in a formation of several aircraft giving mutual support. How the enemy formation is to be broken up to enable the fighters to close. What the best formation is for the fighters to adopt. How an enemy, navigating by wireless on a dark night over a cloud layer which the searchlights cannot penetrate, is to be found and engaged. There are, of course, many other problems, and I have only touched on the more obvious.

Of the defence I do not propose to say very much. I should add to the indications I have already given that it will take the form of a zone of guns, searchlights and fighters, through which the enemy aircraft must pass, to reach our vital centres, except, of course, such as lie on the actual east coast itself. There will be

a very comprehensive intelligence system for marking down the course followed, in and out, by enemy attack and radio touch with the aircraft to direct them to the points where contact will be gained. All intelligence and control will be centralised; centres will also have special anti-aircraft gun defence and anti-low-flying defence weapons will also be suitably allotted. I should say here that I regard the A.A. gun defence as an essential and most valuable part of the defence system. Recent experience in Spain indicates that against the large aircraft of to-day, a well-trained and effective battery possessing the latest equipment can be an effective destroyer of aircraft. I hope that this side of the defence will be carefully fostered and encouraged.

I should, perhaps, add a word about the balloon barrage for the London defence. There is a layer of cloud over our weather beaten isle on a large number of days in the year. The presence of the barrage will keep pilots above the cloud layer especially at night, and thus appreciably diminish their efficiency, and it will catch the low-flying attack. I think it will be a very useful adjunct.

You will note that in this lecture I have dealt only with the active defence. I should emphasise that this is only one of the essential elements in air defence which are three in number. Firstly, the counter-offensive to break up the attack at its source. This is the main element in air defence. It is a separate subject which it has not been possible to include within the scope of this lecture. Secondly, the active defence to take toll of the attackers as they come through. It must be realised that, except for the balloon barrage, there is no physical barrier in air defence comparable to the barbed wire covered by the machine-gun and the fixed defence system on land. The defence must gain its supremacy by taking toll of the attackers as they come. If one or more aircraft could be shot down out of each squadron that came over the effect in diminishing the actual scale of attack and in deterring the less determined from pushing through resistance would speedily make itself felt.

Thirdly, the passive defence to diminish the effect upon personnel and material of those bombs which are brought through our active defence and released at their objective.

For the reasons given under the second element above it will be appreciated that until the brunt of attack has been broken,

many bombers must inevitably get through to their objective. To diminish their effect is the role of the passive defence.

Passive defence is a vast subject in itself with which I have no time to deal. Suffice it to say that for two years it has been pursued and is being pursued by His Majesty's Government with great vigour and thoroughness. We have started behind other nations, but strenuous and comprehensive efforts are being made to reduce the vulnerability of Great Britain to the air attacks which succeed in getting through. It is an enormous undertaking with ramifications into every aspect and every corner of the life of the country.

In conclusion let me say just this. A great deal that I have said may seem somewhat pessimistic. I may have given too deep an impression of the extent and difficulty of the problems involved. That is perhaps inevitable in a lecture setting out to describe problems.

There is, as I see it, no reason to despair whatever and every reason for satisfaction with the solutions that are being evolved. Air defence is not an insoluble problem. Air attack, like any other form of attack, has its answer. That answer means years of research, thorough and elaborate organisation, careful and constant training and the expenditure of millions of money—but it is steadily being worked out.

It may be that the potentialities of air attack may give pause to nations hesitating on the brink of war. If war should come, then the preparations now being energetically pushed forward by our Government will, I am certain, justify themselves and the Royal Air Force and the Anti-Aircraft Defences will, I believe, equally give a good account of themselves in close and effective co-operation.

BADGES AND DEVICES WORN BY THE SILLIDAR TROOPER

By YUSUF

In this short paper no attempt is made to discuss the badges and devices worn by the officers of the various Indian cavalry regiments. Any one wishing to study these may do so by perusing the Indian Regulations, published from time to time, or by consulting military outfitters. Neither do we propose to deal with the question of dress, arms, equipment or horse-furniture—a subject the recording of which would fill a large book, even supposing that the details of such are extant, remembering that every regiment under the sillidar system provided its own particular requirements, made to its own particular pattern, and that, moreover, with changes in time and commanding officers, these patterns were also prone to alteration.

Prior to 1862 the difference between the regular cavalry and the irregulars of the armies of the Honourable East India Company was well defined.

Their appearances were also widely dissimilar, for, whereas the former were dressed in French grey uniforms, cut like those worn by the British Light Dragoons, and supplied with the arms, equipment and horse-furniture of the Light Horse pattern, the latter wore native dress and enlisted with their own *tulwars*, lances and saddlery.

The Light Cavalry troopers were provided with the Maltese cross shaped cap-plates and silvered buttons, bearing the regimental number and "Light Cavalry" embossed round the rim. The 4th Bengal Native Cavalry were the only regular Lancer regiment. We presume that their lance pennons, following the British fashion, were red over white.

The sillidars of the irregular *rissalahs* had no need for badges. The difference in pattern and colour of their various articles of clothing were sufficiently distinguishing.

Usually the horse-hair tuft, fixed below the lance point, was dyed to regimental colour.

After 1860 the Native Cavalry, both regular and irregular, was gradually reorganised on the old Moghul sillidar system. This system, modified from time to time in order to keep pace with

more up-to-date ideas of efficiency and uniformity, pertained until the Great War.

The Madras regiments were, however, retained on a semi-regular basis.

Like their predecessors, the Irregular Cavalry, the sillidar regiments found no necessity for badges in the first twenty years of their existence. The colour and patterns of the regimental *lunghis*, *alkhalaks*, *kamarbands* and trimmings were sufficiently distinctive.

It was not till the gradual introduction of khaki (first a blouse only, later an entire ensemble), with its all-pervading sameness, that the need for badges in the cavalry arose.

Notes of various badges and devices are made under separate headings, including those worn by the non-sillidar regiments of Madras.

(a) *Belt Plates*.—Before the Afghan War of 1878—80, the *sowars* of most Indian cavalry regiments wore black or white belts. Some of these fastened by a snake fastening, such as rifle regiments use, and others by a belt-plate. In some regiments these belt-plates were circular brass affairs of the "union locket" variety, similar to those worn by the infantry. The 10th Bengal Lancers wore this type up to the second Afghan War.

Most regiments, however, wore heavy brass rectangular waist-plates about three inches long and two and a half inches high. After the Afghan war, with the introduction of khaki, brown leather belts took the place of the old black or white ones, and many regiments, like the 10th Bengal Lancers, adapted with these a light buckle fastening.

Although the waist-plates disappeared from the belts of the Punjab, Bombay and Hyderabad Contingent cavalry, the Guides and many of the Bengal cavalry regiments retained them with their brown belts for use both in full dress and in khaki.

About 1884 the non-sillidars of the Madras cavalry were issued with Native Infantry pattern brown belts having brass union lockets, but ten years later received another variety, furnished with plain brass rectangular waist-plates.

The plates of the 19th Bengal Lancers were of white metal without any design. The Guides also wore white metal plates, but had imposed upon them their title and the cypher of Queen Victoria.

The other regiments which wore brass rectangular belt-plates had usually upon them a simple design—XII over B. C.; 14 over B. L.; Crown over XVI, etc.—though the 6th Bengal Cavalry had the plume of the Prince of Wales, and the 7th Bengal Lancers a Crown, VII, and the title scroll placed upon the plates.

The 1st Skinner's Horse originally had 1 over B. C. on the plate, but, after becoming the "Duke of York's Own," substituted a rose set upon two crossed lances and tablet "D.Y.O."—a handsome design.

Regiments in possession of this type of belt wore them in the Great War.

(b) *Lance Pennons*.—The lance pennons of the Indian regiments have always been of the same colours as those carried by British cavalry, *i.e.*, red over white. There were, however, three exceptions.

The 10th and 19th Bengal Cavalry, who were amongst the first Indian regiments after the Mutiny to be made into Lancers (1864) carried pennons coloured respectively red over blue, and blue over white. The 3rd Skinner's Horse had pennons of blue over yellow.

(c) *Shoulder Chains*.—"Chains" and the sillidar—to the old "*Quai Hai*" they seem inseparable. It is a pity that they have been discontinued. They gave to the *sowar* a touch of *panache* that was unique. Admittedly a Mauser bullet in the shoulder is a thing to be avoided by the wearer of chains, but, for duty in cantonments, can we not have them back?

They are extremely smart and, unlike most military trappings, are entirely a British-Indian army article, and not copied from continental troops.

They seem to date from the second Afghan war, for photographs of *sowars* before 1878 show nothing, not even a shoulder strap, upon their *alkhalaks*.

Perhaps some of the Afghans may have worn part-armour of this type and suggested the idea to us? Old cavalrymen who served in this war have stated that they never saw chains worn till after it.

They were originally shaped like shoulder straps, but later became longer and overhung the shoulder.

Eventually every regiment of Indian cavalry adopted them for both full dress and khaki and, indeed, rode into the Great War wearing them.

There were many different patterns in use, as of course regiments placed their own orders for these.

Latterly all were made "bastion ended." Some were cut square at the narrow end, and others shaped so as to fit at the neck.

There were many variations in the type of link used. Some were made of split rings and others of steel or iron hoops. Some corps like the 1st Cavalry (Frontier Force) had large rings, others, like the 8th Cavalry and the 36th Jacob's Horse, very small ones.

The pattern in which the links were joined together also varied with the regiment. The 10th Lancers, for instance, had theirs set in a peculiar harrow-like formation.

(d) *Buttons*.—The buttons worn by *sowars* were of brass, except for the 19th and the Guides, whose were of white metal. Most of the regiments used buttons impressed with their crest, the other *rissalahs* had plain ball or half-ball ones, similar to those of the Hussars. The buttons of the cavalry squadron of the Deoli Regiment were enamelled black and bore the number 42 upon them.

(e) *Badges*.—Metal badges were never worn by *sowars*, either upon their *lunghis* or upon their collars, as was sometimes done by Indian infantry. After the second Afghan war, however, all wore badges upon the shoulder-chains.

These "numerals," as they were called, were the only badges worn by the Indian cavalry soldier. They were usually made of brass by the regimental mistri, though the 11th and 19th Bengal Lancers, 7th Bombay Cavalry and Guides wore ones made of white metal. The shoulder badges of the Bengal and Punjab cavalry were simple affairs, and usually consisted of the regimental number followed by B. C., B. L. or P. C. The 3rd, 13th and 19th Bengal Lancers wore them in the form of a monogram, as did the 5th and 25th Cavalry after 1903.

More ornate were those of the 11th Bengal Lancers, who wore just the Prince of Wales's plume; and of the 3rd Madras, 2nd and 7th Bombay, 1st Hyderabad Contingent, 8th and 29th Lancers, who wore their number and title set upon two crossed lances; also the 4th, 5th and 6th Bombay Cavalry, who wore the number and title upon crossed sabres.

The 3rd Bombay Cavalry (Queen's Own) wore a crown over their badge, and later, as the 33rd Q.V.O. Light Cavalry, kept up

the custom. (To-day of course this crown on the title is the special mark of an Indian "Royal" regiment.) The 6th Bombay Cavalry incorporated the Prince of Wales's plume in white metal with their brass numeral.

All regiments altered their "numerals" at least once between 1903 and 1913, many twice; for instance, the 18th Lancers, 26th Light Cavalry and Central India Horse, who all, after 1906, mounted the Prince's plume over their badges. The 26th made a third alteration after 1910 by adding "K.G.O." below the plume. The 33rd wore after 1911 their new title "Queen Victoria's."

In this period full shoulder titles rather after the fashion of those now issued to Indian infantry were also used by the 3rd, 19th, 21st, 31st, 35th and 36th regiments.

The six corps raised during the Great War, *viz.*, 40th—45th Cavalry, also had this type. Perhaps the most surprising was the numeral of the 20th Deccan Horse; it was an almost exact replica of the cap badge of the 20th Hussars!

The Great War had a curious influence on some of these badges. The 10th, who originally wore X.B.L., after 1903 reduced this to X.L., a simple and effective device. When, however, in 1916, the 40th Cavalry was formed this "XL" became misleading and was changed for the title "10 Lancers."

Both the 35th Scinde Horse and the 36th Jacob's Horse used to wear Birmingham-made full titles in small brass lettering. Cut off as they became from sources of manufacture, their war-time badges had to be made up in the field and were fashioned in a much simpler form.

With the passing of the Great War the sillidar has also passed. The present-day excellent *sowar* is very much a regular light cavalryman. Unfortunately his badges and devices, such as remain, have for the greater part also become regularised and are now mere uninspired articles of Ordnance issue, die-stamped to sealed pattern, and displaying no individuality.

Fortunately there are signs that the regimental spirit is setting about to alter this!

THE FINAL PHASE OF THE MESOPOTAMIA CAMPAIGN
—12TH MARCH 1917 TO THE ARMISTICE, PART III—
(concl'd.)

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL J. E. SHEARER, M.C., 1/15TH PUNJAB REGIMENT

24. As the likelihood of Russia making a separate peace increased, so did the danger to India and Afghanistan from Bolshevik propaganda grow. The British Government consequently arranged to send General Dunsterville, with an armoured car detachment and a number of British officers, *via* Hamadan and the Caspian to train Georgian and Armenian levies in the Caucasus as a barrier against Pan-Turkish and Bolshevik propaganda. They also approached the Persian Government for permission to move British troops into Persia in order to maintain political stability in that country. This was the birth of "Dunsterforce."

25. "Dunsterforce." (Vide *Sketch Map No. 6*)

On 27th January 1918, General Dunsterville left Baghdad for Tiflis with a party of eleven officers and eight non-commissioned officers in Ford vans, protected by one armoured car. The only practicable route was through Kermanshah-Hamadan-Kazvin-Enzeli and Baku. The road was covered in snow and it was not until late in February that General Dunsterville reached Enzeli. There he was arrested by the Bolsheviks, who refused to let him go further, but he managed to bluff his party out of arrest and get back to Hamadan.

General Dunsterville then asked for the rest of his force (which even now totalled only 150 officers and 300 N.C.O., instructors) to be halted at Khaniquin and Shahraban, while he stayed at Hamadan to watch the Persian situation. At Hamadan he set out to gain the confidence of the local notables and distributed money to the famine-stricken inhabitants in return for road work. Bicherakoff, who was also at Hamadan with his small force of loyal Russians, placed himself under General Dunsterville's orders; and at the end of March seized Kazvin just in time to stop the Jangalis from capturing it.

Meanwhile, the last undisciplined remnant of Baratoff's Army had left Persia and the situation in the Caucasus was steadily deteriorating. The Turks were making determined advances between Batum and Lake Van with the evident object of joining up with the large Tartar Mohammedan population in Trans-Caucasia and Daghestan, while the Germans had just captured Odessa and were obviously intent upon securing the Batum-Baku corridor.

General Dunsterville was prevented by the Jangalis and Bolsheviks from carrying out his original task in Tiflish, but he pressed for a small British force to hold the road Qasr-i-Shirin-Enzeli. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff agreed and directed General Marshall to send troops to Kermanshah to keep touch with General Dunsterville in Persia. By the end of March the 1st/4th Hampshire Regiment, one squadron 14th Hussars and some armoured cars were spread out in small detachments between the Pai Taq Pass and Hamadan and General Dunsterville said that he then felt secure.

26. *The situation in Mesopotamia, January to March 1918.*
(Vide *Sketch Map No. 1.*)

While these events were happening in Persia and in Trans-Caucasia the position in Mesopotamia remained a stalemate with the IIIrd Corps on the Diyala, the 15th Division in the area Ramadi-Falluja and the 1st Corps at Samarra.

The Turkish XIIIth Corps was in the area Altun Kopri-Qara Tepe and their XVIIIth Corps at Fat-Ha, so that neither could be hit easily. The Turkish 50th Division at Khan Baghdadi was, however, within easy reach and General Marshall accordingly decided to destroy it and to occupy the bitumen wells at that place.

27. *Action at Khan Baghdadi (26th March 1918).*

Khan Baghdadi was captured and the Turkish 50th Division completely "mopped up" by General Brooking and his 15th Division and General Cassels' 11th Cavalry Brigade. General Brooking's plan was almost identical with that for the action of Ramadi. Again he deceived the enemy by making all his preliminary concentrations by night, the reinforcing troops hiding in palm groves by day. He had dummy defensive positions dug at Ramadi in order to make the Turks think that he was settling in there for the hot weather and the last few days before the attack

the 1st Corps carried out ostentatious preparations for an imaginary attack from Samarra. The Turks in the Khan Baghdadi position were consequently deceived into remaining where they were long enough for General Brooking's net to close round them.

At dawn on 26th March the 50th and 42nd Indian Infantry Brigades made a frontal attack, while General Cassels with his 11th Cavalry Brigade and armoured cars moved round the enemy's flank and cut his line of retreat up the Euphrates. After hard fighting all day the whole Khan Baghdadi position was captured. That night the Turks failed in their attempts to break through General Cassels' cordon and on the morning of the 27th began to surrender in large numbers. General Brooking had, however, a pursuit force of infantry and machine-guns ready in Ford vans. As soon as the Turks began to surrender on the 27th, he released this force together with cavalry and armoured cars in pursuit up the Aleppo Road. The pursuit was carried out relentlessly and resulted in the destruction of the whole Turkish 50th Division.

The main lessons of this skilfully-planned battle are—

- (i) *Surprise*.—It is a first-rate example of the skilful application of this principle both before, during and after the battle.
- (ii) *Mobility*.—Again the mobility of the cavalry was fully used, first to place their fire power astride the enemy's line of retreat, and secondly in pursuit. The mobility of Ford vans and armoured cars was also employed in relentless pursuit at a speed beyond the capabilities of horses.
- (iii) *Use of "Contact" aircraft to guide troops*.—Previous aerial reconnaissance was reduced to a minimum in order not to frighten the Turks prematurely out of the trap; but aeroplanes were used during the battle to guide cavalry and armoured cars over unreconnoitred ground and to report the progress of infantry attacks.
- (iv) *Control and "Team work"*.—General Brooking's arrangements for getting back news, as at Ramadi, kept him better supplied with information than is usual during a battle. It is understood that mounted liaison officers were freely used for this.

But the dash and self-reliance of his brigade commanders, combined with their good 'teamwork,' are a perfect example of how a battle ought to be fought.

28. *General Situation in April and May 1918.* (Vide *Sketch Maps* Nos. 1 and 6).

The centre of interest shifted in April to Persia and the Caucasus. The Tartars of Russian Azerbaijan had revolted against the Bolsheviks and were actively helping the Turks in their advance on Baku. In addition, the Turks were making another drive from Lake Van and Urmia on Tabriz. Such resistance as the Armenians in the north and the Christian Jelus around Urmia were putting up could not last long. The threat to India through Persia and Afghanistan was therefore becoming really serious.

29. *Capture of Kifri and Tuz Khurmatli, 24th to 29th April 1918.* (Vide *Sketch Map* No. 1).

The security of the Qasr-i-Shirin-Hamadan Road having become of primary importance, General Marshall decided, early in April, to capture the area Tuz Khurmatli-Kifri-Qara Tepe which the enemy had for some time been using as a base for propaganda in Persia. He allotted this task to the IIIrd Corps.

General Egerton, while simulating a converging attack on Qara Tepe and Kifri, really aimed at capturing Abu Gharaib and Tuz Khurmatli in order to destroy enemy forces east and south-east of those places. The attacking force was divided into five columns:

Column A.—6th Cavalry Brigade.

Column B.—13th Division (less 39th Infantry Brigade) which was sub-divided into—

B. 1.—38th Infantry Brigade and attached troops.

B. 2.—Advanced H.Q. 13th Division, 40th Infantry Brigade and attached troops.

Column C.—37th Indian Infantry Brigade (less two battalions) and attached troops.

Column D.—14th Lancers, one horse battery and one section armoured cars.

Each column had its own bridging material supplies, transport and aircraft as they were to be widely separated and far from supply railhead.

The plan was as follows:

Column A was to advance north from Ain Laila and destroy the Turks at Tuz Khurmatli on 27th April. *Column C* was to cross the Diyala and close on Qara Tepe from the east while *Column B-2* was to advance north from the Sakaltutan Pass and cut off the Turks' retreat to the north-west from Qara Tepe. *Column D* was to demonstrate near Abu Gharaib so as to induce the Turks to occupy the Jabal Hamrin, facing south, while *Column B-1* destroyed them by an advance up the Narin river.

The operations were somewhat delayed by rain and mud, but Kifri and Tuz Khurmatli were occupied and the Turks in that region destroyed by the 29th April with little loss to ourselves.

One criticism of this plan is that it was too elaborate. The widely separated columns lacked real strength. The Turks were on interior lines and had early information of our intentions in spite of careful precautions for secrecy. General Egerton would have risked the defeat of his columns in detail had the Turks concentrated and attacked them in turn. As it happened, the Turks did concentrate round Tuz Khurmatli, but made the mistake of waiting there until Columns A and B had also concentrated to attack them.

30. *Temporary occupation of Kirkuk*

After this action the Chief of the Imperial General Staff ordered General Marshall to occupy Kirkuk in order to relieve Turkish pressure in the Urmia region. He did so under protest and had, as it turned out, to abandon it later on owing to supply difficulties. However, he obtained leave to advance on Mosul in September, on the grounds that the capture of the Turks' advanced base there would be the best safeguard to the Qasr-i-Shirin-Hamadan Road. Meanwhile, the extension of the railway from Samarra to Tikrit was also sanctioned.

31. *Advance to Resht, on the Caspian Sea.* (Vide Sketch Map No. 6).

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff also directed General Marshall to reinforce General Dunsterville by at least one infantry brigade, but General Marshall protested that he could not maintain that force in Persia and got permission to experiment first with a small mobile force. This force, the "Motor Mobile

Column," as it was called, was an interesting and successful experiment. It consisted of:

400 rifles 1st/4th Hampshire Regiment	} (Carried in 500 Ford vans.)
600 rifles 1st/2nd Gurkha Rifles	
One section 21st Mountain Battery	
A field ambulance	
One squadron of eight armoured cars	

By the end of June it had secured the road from Kazvin to Resht and linked up with Bicherakoff at Enzeli. The action of the Motor Mobile Column checked the advance of further Turko-German agents into Persia and stopped the German-Jangali attempt to raise Persia against us as a preliminary to an attack on our lines of communication in Mesopotamia and a move towards the Indian Frontier.

32. *British plans to safeguard Persia and to gain control of the Caspian (1st June to 15th August 1918)*

A whole chapter of the "Official History" is devoted to the somewhat confusing events of the two and a half months from 1st June to 15th August 1918. During that time the amazingly thorough and widespread German plans to cause trouble in India became increasingly evident. The Germans were evidently determined to secure Baku for its oil, Krasnovodsk for its cotton crop, and the markets of Central Asia generally.

But the Turks were also determined to capture Baku as part of their pan-Turkish scheme, in addition to capturing Persia. They thus fell foul of the Germans who did everything in their power to prevent their allies getting Baku. On 8th June, Germany made peace with Georgia and forced the Turks to sign a non-aggression pact with that country and with Russian Armenia. She then took possession of the Georgian Railways in order to deny them to the Turks for their advance on Baku. The Turks were annoyed and continued to advance slowly on Baku by road in defiance of the Germans. Fortunately these dissensions gave us the time we so badly needed.

Early in June General Dunsterville suggested that we should occupy Baku at once and asked for one infantry brigade and one artillery brigade from Mesopotamia for the purpose. The Home Government after much discussion agreed to the despatch of a force of three battalions and a battery with the object of destroying the Baku oil pumps, pipe-line and reservoirs and obtaining control of all Caspian shipping to prevent its use by the enemy.

On the 3rd July, Bicherakoff, with his own Russians and some British armoured cars, sailed for Alyat, where he took up a position on the Kura river, 150 miles west of Baku, in order to delay the Turkish advance. He was slowly pushed back fighting until the Turks were within 3,000 yards of Baku Docks on 31st July, when he side-stepped northwards to Derbend.

Meanwhile the British Government became impatient with General Dunsterville for not taking reinforcements to Baku. General Dunsterville, however, did not consider himself strong enough to do so in face of Bolshevik hostility in Baku and Enzeli. A Menchevik *coup d'état* occurred at Baku on 19th July and this led to the suppression of the local Bolshevik leaders and the despatch of ships for the purpose of transporting British troops from Enzeli to Baku. The first small party of British troops landed at Baku on 4th August, thus encouraging the local forces in their defence against the Turks. By 15th August, 400 rifles of the 1st/4th Hampshires and 7th North Staffords and some armoured cars, had reached Baku; the Jangali nuisance had been finally quelled and two more British battalions were on their way from Mesopotamia.

Our forces reached Baku just in time to prevent its immediate capture by the Turks, but the situation was still critical as the Turks were in a strong position close to the town and Bicherakoff was still at Derbend involved in quelling a local rising.

By the middle of August a small British mission with one battery were *en route* to Karasnovodsk to safeguard it from attack by sea and to buy the stocks of cotton stored there.

33. *Fall of Baku and break up of "Dunsterforce"*

On 17th August, when General Dunsterville arrived in Baku he found the situation there most unsatisfactory. The town was controlled by five dictators and they in their turn were controlled by the Fleet. Everything, including operation orders, was discussed at length by committees who passed resolutions but did little else. The ground west of the town was naturally strong for defensive purposes, but the local irregular troops had done practically no digging or wiring to improve it. They had not even filled the gap left in the line by Bicherakoff's troops, with the result that the Turks had infiltrated through to the Tartar oil-workmen's villages north and east of the town. Consequently, instead of holding a comparatively short line across the

peninsula from sea to sea, a long, straggling, line west and north of Baku had to be held. Added to this the local troops had no discipline and practically no training. No reliance whatever could be placed on them as fighting units. All General Dunsterville could do was to post his own troops on the more important tactical points of the position and hope that the local troops would remain in the gaps between our troops. He had a little over 1,100 rifles of the 39th Infantry Brigade, a few guns and armoured cars. In addition he had a small naval detachment, with guns and mountings, under Commodore Norris, which was intended to form the basis of a British flotilla on the Caspian. Opposed to this force the Turks had three divisions totalling 5,300 regulars with 26 guns, and 8,000 Tartar irregulars under Turkish officers.

Luckily the Turks thought that General Dunsterville had 3,000 British, 4,000 Russian and 6,000 Armenian troops at Baku and so were reluctant to attack.

General Dunsterville reported on 20th August that the position was far from hopeless. Our arrival had had a good moral effect in the whole Caucasus area. The Daghestanis had offered their help, and Bicherakoff had promised to arrive in the reasonably near future with 10,000 fresh troops from North Caucasia. All depended upon available British reinforcements from Persia being sent to enable General Dunsterville to hold out until Bicherakoff's arrival. He considered that our immediate withdrawal from Baku would be treated as bad faith, and would have a bad moral effect in Persia and Trans-Caspia. He pointed out, also, that he could only control the Caspian so long as he remained at Baku.

The first Turkish attack took place on 26th August. This was the first of a series of small attacks with limited objectives carried out repeatedly until 1st September. In every case the local troops ran away and left our troops with flanks exposed. General Dunsterville threatened to evacuate Baku unless the local troops would fight properly, but the dictators replied that their fleet would sink our transports if we attempted to retire. General Dunsterville then appealed again to General Marshall for reinforcements, but these were refused and he was ordered to destroy the oil installations and evacuate Baku. He could comply with neither of these orders as the local fleet would not let him retire

and the local oil owners refused to destroy their only means of livelihood.

Between 1st and 12th September the Turks kept up an intermittent bombardment but did not attack. During that time two more companies of the 9th Worcestershire Regiment and 500 rifles and 10 machine-guns of Bicherakoff's force arrived.

During the night 13th/14th September the Turks made a determined attack on most of the positions. As usual the local troops at once ran away. By nightfall of the 14th September, our line was back round the outskirts of the town and there was no alternative to immediate evacuation. General Dunsterville had worked out the evacuation scheme so thoroughly beforehand that the embarkation and escape to Enzeli of his force was carried out without a single casualty, in spite of the opposition of the dictators. As previously arranged the local fleet and merchant ships scattered to Petrovsk, Enzeli, Asterabad and Krasnovodsk, and so were of no use to the Turks. This turned out to be a blessing in disguise, as the scattering of the local fighting ships enabled Commodore Norris to gain control of the Caspian by putting his own guns and crews into ships which he managed to secure in Enzeli.

Now let us turn to the events in Persian Azerbaizan. The reason why General Marshall had peremptorily refused to send reinforcements to Baku was because the Turks had advanced from Tabriz to the Kufan Koh and were threatening to advance on Hamadan from the south of Lake Urmia. In each area the Turkish strength was about ten times the strength of any regular troops which General Marshall could collect to oppose them. The Turkish move, bluff though it afterwards appeared to have been, had a direct bearing upon the fall of Baku, since it tied down the reinforcements which General Dunsterville required so urgently, a strategic lesson worth noting.

As soon as Baku fell, the Turks began to withdraw troops from Trans-Caucasia and Persia to Constantinople to meet the dangerous situation created in Turkey by Allenby's capture of Palestine and by the Allied successes in Salonica and France. The immediate threat to north-west Persia was therefore at an end.

In the latter half of September 1918 General Marshall broke up Dunsterforce, recalled General Dunsterville and sent General

Thomson to command "Norperforce," as the troops in north-west Persia were then renamed.

I think history will agree that General Dunsterville had achieved the main object for which he had been sent, with ridiculously inadequate forces. The main lesson which we can draw from Dunsterforce is the amazing success which a courageous bluff by a few determined men can achieve in oriental countries.

34. *Instruction to General Marshall, 2nd October 1918.*

On 2nd October the Chief of the Imperial General Staff informed General Marshall that the Turks might sue for peace in the near future. The British Government wished to exploit their successes at once so as to eliminate Turkish influence south of the Taurus mountains. General Marshall was to gain as much ground as possible on the Tigris, but work on the lines of communication to Enzeli was not to be retarded. The feasibility of helping Allenby by a cavalry raid up the Euphrates to Aleppo was also to be examined.

General Marshall pointed out that, as his spare transport was already on the Persian line of communication, he could not carry out the cavalry raid; but that he could advance on Mosul by combing out all the available transport in Mesopotamia. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff consequently ordered this latter course to be adopted with as little delay as possible.

35. *Turkish dispositions covering Mosul. (Vide Sketch Map No. 1).*

The Turkish dispositions were thought to be as follows:

(a) *On the Tigris—*

- (i) About 90 sabres, 2,600 rifles and 28 guns holding a strong position astride the Tigris at the Fat-Ha Gorge, on a frontage of eight miles.
- (ii) About 30 sabres, 2,900 rifles and 14 guns in a supporting position on the line north bank of Little Zab-Humr-Ain Dibs.
- (iii) Small bodies of troops at Sharqat and on the line of communication back to Mosul.

(b) *Altun Kopri-Kirkuk-Taza Khurmatli—*

330 sabres, 2,200 rifles and 30 guns, some of which might be on their way to the Tigris.

- (c) In addition, the 5th Turkish Division was reported to be moving down the Great Zab river to Fat-Ha.

36. *General Cobbe's plan of attack.* (Vide Sketch Map Nos. 1 and 7)

General Cobbe was ordered to carry out the advance on Mosul with his 1st Corps (now consisting of the 17th and 18th Indian Divisions), the 7th and 11th Cavalry Brigades. General Lewin, with part of the 40th Infantry Brigade of the IIIrd Corps, was to co-operate by pinning down the enemy in the Kirkuk-Altun Kopri area.

The Fat-Ha position was a difficult one to attack. The Jabal Hamrin and Jabal Makhul were only passable in four places, the Ain Nukhaila and Darb-Al-Khail Passes, the Fat-Ha Gorge and Balalij. Water was available at the passes for a small body of troops only and there was none between Shuraimiya and Balalij. A frontal attack was, therefore, forced on General Cobbe, who made the following plan for the capture of the Fat-Ha position on 24th October:

- (i) *The 18th Divisional Group* was to capture the position on the left bank of the Tigris, assisted by the 7th Cavalry Brigade, which was to cross the Darb-Al-Khail Pass and take the enemy position in reverse.
- (ii) *The 17th Divisional Group* was then to capture the right bank position assisted by covering fire from across the Tigris by the 18th Division.
- (iii) *Both divisions* were then to pass through the Gorge, advance up both banks of the Tigris and capture the Little Zab-Humr-Ain Dibs position.
- (iv) *The 11th Cavalry Brigade* was to move unobtrusively over the Ain Nukhaila Pass and cross the Little Zab with the objects of intercepting Turkish movements between Altun Kopri and the Tigris and securing a bridge-head over the Little Zab for the 1st Corps. General Cassels was warned that his brigade would probably be required later to ford the Tigris above Sharqat.
- (v) *The Light Armoured Motor Brigade* was to move by Tel Ajar and Hadr and place itself across the enemy's line of retreat about Sharqat.

To preserve secrecy, the water supply in the Ain Nukhaila and Darb-Al-Khail Passes was not developed until the last possible moment and ostentatious preparations were made on the right bank of the Tigris for an outflanking movement *via* Balalij.

37. *Actions at Fat-Ha Gorge and the Little Zab, 23rd to 26th October*

The enemy did not wait for the attack. On the 23rd October the 18th Division began to feel their way forward as hostile activity seemed to be lessening, and during the night of the 23rd/24th they discovered that the enemy had gone.

On the 24th, both divisions pushed through the Fat-Ha Gorge where progress was slow, as the Turks had blown up the roads on both banks. The 17th Division had such difficulty that they had to convert two infantry brigades to a pack transport basis by entirely immobilizing their third infantry brigade and leave behind almost all their wheeled artillery.

They found the enemy strongly entrenched about Mushak which they failed to capture until the enemy retreated during the night 26th/27th October.

Meanwhile, the 7th and 11th Cavalry Brigades secured bridge-heads over the Little Zab at Shumait and Zarariya respectively; the left bank of the Tigris was cleared completely of Turks; a bridge was built over the Little Zab where the main road is shewn crossing that river in Sketch Map No. 7, and by noon on the 26th most of the 18th Division had crossed and brought their artillery into action against the Turks about Humr. By nightfall on that date, General Cassels had forded the Tigris and established himself along the Wadi Muabba astride the Turkish line of retreat. The armoured cars were also astride the Mosul road between Huwaish and Sharqat. General Cobbe's plan was working successfully.

38. *The Battle of Sharqat, 27th to 30th October 1918. (Vide Sketch Map No. 7)*(a) *27th October*

When it was realised that the enemy had retired from the front of the 17th Division, General Leslie, the divisional commander, organized a pursuit column consisting of a squadron of cavalry and such infantry as could be made available quickly. The country was broken and the column, although it started at 7 a.m., only managed to reach Qalat-Al-Bint that night. Meanwhile it was ascertained that the enemy was digging in south of Sharqat with half his force. General Cobbe appreciated that the enemy intended to use the other half either to break through the 11th Cavalry Brigade or to cross the Tigris.

Meanwhile, General Cassels' patrols discovered Turks in position astride the main road about two and a half miles south of Huwaish. General Cassels promptly decided to attack these, both to conceal his own weakness and to make the enemy disclose his dispositions. The advance was carried out by the 23rd Cavalry, but when the enemy disclosed his strength to be fully one thousand rifles and four guns, General Cassels stopped the attack and disposed his own brigade and the Light Armoured Brigade so as to hold the Turks and prevent them outflanking his weak line. These dispositions were successful and the 11th Cavalry Brigade passed a quiet night.

Now to turn to the 18th Division on the Tigris left bank. By 9 a.m. the 53rd Infantry Brigade and attached troops commenced marching up the left bank of the Tigris in order to gain touch with General Cassels and deliver a much-needed convoy of gun ammunition. By 8 p.m. they had arrived opposite Sharqat without meeting any enemy or seeing any signs of an attempt by them to cross the Tigris. So they continued to march all night and by 5-30 a.m. on the 28th had got touch with General Cassels. This march of thirty-three miles was a fine performance and helped materially in closing the net round the Turks.

(b) 28th October

During the whole of this day General Cassels had to fight desperately. Soon after dawn the Turks commenced to advance northwards to try to break through the 11th Cavalry Brigade. General Cassels countered with an attack on the enemy's outer flank by the 7th Hussars (less two squadrons). This checked the enemy who continued a fire fight all day, spreading out wider and wider in their attempt to outflank General Cassels. The fact that the weak 11th Cavalry Brigade and armoured cars succeeded in holding the Turks illustrates the delaying power of modern cavalry, when skilfully handled.

At 2 p.m. the situation was somewhat relieved by the arrival of the 1st/7th Gurkhas from Sanders' Column. This battalion took over the sector astride the main road, thus relieving the Guides Cavalry, who went into reserve.

At 4 p.m. General Cassels heard that the enemy detachment to his north had come to within three hundred yards of the detachment of 7th Hussars, but had not attacked.

At 4.15 p.m. the Commander, 7th Cavalry Brigade, reported personally to General Cassels for orders, and his brigade could at that time be seen crossing the Tigris at the Hadraniya Ford. General Cassels directed them to piquet the enemy to his north and to extend his own outer flank in an arc back to the Tigris at Hadraniya.

General Cassels' skill in making full use of his small force, combined with the endurance of his men, prevented large numbers of the enemy from breaking through and escaping. The Turks' real opportunity of escape was now gone. There was still some chance of them making a wide detour to the west during the night, but they did not do that. They could not escape across the Tigris, as General Sanders had the far bank well piquetted.

Meanwhile, although Wauchope's column was exhausted and the remainder of the 17th Division and its artillery was scattered owing to the difficulties of the road, General Cobbe insisted on their continuing to advance in order to relieve the pressure on General Cassels. Wauchope's column consequently resumed its advance at 3 a.m. on the 28th October. It was joined by Coningham's Column (45th Sikhs and 1st/10th Gurkhas) from the crest of the Jabal Makhul, and both toiled steadily forward over the atrocious nullah country. By 2 p.m. the position at Sharqat had been captured and the enemy were in retreat. But the 17th Division was so exhausted and so badly in need of water, that it was decided not to press the pursuit further that day.

(c) 29th October

During the night the Turks advanced to within one hundred yards of General Cassels' line but made no real attempt to break through or to escape round his western flank.

At 7 a.m. the 1st/39th Garhwalis reached General Cassels as a further reinforcement. They had made a forced march of over forty miles from the little Zab, a very fine performance indeed.

Meanwhile, the 7th Cavalry Brigade were having trouble with the Turkish detachment near Hadraniya, which was pressing southwards and it was not until evening that this force surrendered and the threat to General Cassels' rear was finally removed.

The exhausted 17th Division continued its advance at 1.45 a.m. This advance across broken ground by moonlight is an interesting example of the use of a "double-headed" advanced guard covering a wide front. By noon the leading elements of the

JABAL SINJAP

MOSUL


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
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AMPAI PUSHT-I-KUH MOUNTAINS
BOUNDARY OF MESOTANIA & PERSIA



Sketch Map No 6.

To Illustrate the
OPERATIONS of DUNSTERFORCE.




Key
FRONTIER OF PERSIA _____
FRONTIERS OF TRANS-CAUCASIAN STATES _____
NORTH PERSIAN L. of C. _____

SKETCH MAP No 7

BATTLE OF SHARQAT

23RD TO 30TH OCTOBER 1918.



two advanced guard battalions were held up about four hundred yards from the enemy's final position, along a series of ravines some two and a half miles south of General Cassels' force. The main body was scattered and it was not until 4 p.m. that General Leslie could commence an organized attack. This was successful at first, but a determined counter-attack at 5 p.m. caused considerable casualties to the leading battalion. In the growing darkness and haze of dust, however, the 112th Infantry succeeded in penetrating the enemy's position.

(d) 30th October

The night of the 29th/30th was spent in confused fighting in battle outposts, but the Turkish commander and the whole of his force surrendered at 7-30 a.m. Between the 18th and 30th October, General Cobbe's force captured 11,322 prisoners, 51 guns, 130 machine-guns and three river steamers. This complete success had been achieved by the daring and brilliant leadership of Generals Cassels and Norton and the gallantry of their brigades, combined with the dogged endurance and courage of the infantry of the 17th Division, who continued to advance and fight long after they had reached the normal limits of human endurance.

This fighting is a good example of the skilful co-operation of all arms in a relentless pursuit which gave the enemy no respite to recover his morale. The 17th Division kept on out-marching its cable communications; visual signalling was not successful in that very broken country, there were few wireless sets with the force, and the local situation was often obscure. But contact aircraft and message picking-up were successfully employed and General Cobbe was able to keep control throughout of all his widely scattered detachments.

39. The Armistice and Occupation of Mosul

As soon as the Turkish Tigris Group surrendered, General Cobbe sent the 7th and 11th Cavalry Brigades and the Light Armoured Car Brigade to "mop up" any enemy who had escaped towards Mosul.

On 31st October they reached Mosul to be informed that an armistice had been arranged between the British and Turkish Governments.

ATTACK ON A TRAIN NEAR THE PEZU PASS, WAZIRISTAN—24TH MAY, 1937

The following account is reproduced as it provides a typical example of the action of a tribal raiding gang. The combating of raids of this nature, carried out as they are by considerable bodies of tribesmen acting on a well organised plan, has been one of the problems in Waziristan during the past year.

The scene of the raid was the Pezu Pass, situated between Bannu and Tank, near the border of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts, on the narrow gauge railway. The pass was formerly notorious for the bands of robbers who infested it.

It is of interest to recall that until the "Circular Road" was constructed in Waziristan, as a sequel to the operations of 1919-1920, and the whole area thereby brought under a certain measure of control, raiding by tribal gangs into the settled districts of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan was of frequent occurrence. In the year 1919, between the 1st May and the 1st November, a period when admittedly the 3rd Afghan War had produced an unsettling effect, the Mahsud tribe alone carried out 100 raids, in the course of which 135 persons were killed and 110 wounded, 448 camels and 1,674 head of cattle were lifted and property valued at Rs. 35,000 looted. During the same period numerous raids were also carried out by the Wazirs of the Wana and Tochi areas.

The unsettled conditions which prevailed in Waziristan during 1937, as a result of the agitation carried out by the Faqir of Ipi, led to a breaking away of certain of the younger and irresponsible elements from the control of their tribal elders, with the result that there was a revival of raiding on a scale almost unknown for the past fifteen years. This was the case particularly with the Mahsuds and Bhattanis who numbered amongst them hostile leaders such as Mullah Sher Ali and Khunia Khel, Mahsuds, and Din Faqir, Bhitanni. These leaders whilst outwardly ardent supporters of the Faqir of Ipi had taken advantage of the general atmosphere of lawlessness to encourage raiding gangs, possibly because this type of enterprise seemed calculated to offer surer profits and less danger than joining the *lashkars* in the field

in order to engage in direct conflict with the troops. Raiding was not confined to the settled districts; Mahsud gangs also preyed on *powindahs* travelling by the Gomal route and deprived them of goods and camels. Raiding by Wazirs took place in the northern portion of Bannu District.

Early in May 1937 the incidence of raiding had led to special precautions being taken with the administered border. Additional Frontier Constabulary had been drafted into the area, the garrison of the normal Frontier Constabulary Posts had been strengthened and others had been established. Extra armed police had been provided, and arms had been issued to certain of the villagers to enable the inhabitants to contribute actively towards their own protection. A special police officer, designated the "Civil Defence Officer," had been appointed, with headquarters at Tank, to control anti-raiding measures. In addition the civil forces referred to above had been strengthened by cavalry, armoured cars and mobile infantry stationed at Bannu and Tank, with detachments at Ghazni Khel and Khairu Khel, north of the Bain Pass. The possibility that raiders might attempt to hold up a train had been appreciated and infantry escorts were being provided on trains. Aircraft of No. 28 (A.C.) Squadron, R.A.F., specially stationed at Manzai, were available for reconnaissance, for escorting trains and for co-operation with mobile columns and with Frontier Constabulary.

The general efficacy of these measures had been tested on more than one occasion. For instance a gang returning to tribal territory from a daring raid on the village of Paharpur, on the 2nd May, had been intercepted by a detachment of the Scinde Horse, from Tank. On other occasions raiding gangs had been engaged by Frontier Constabulary and aircraft, and the difficulties of carrying out a successful raid and effecting withdrawal unmolested to tribal territory were known to have deterred other gangs, whilst in some instances raiders who had actually assembled for an enterprise preferred to disperse at once without taking any action.

On the 24th May the escort for the train running from Bannu to Manzai was provided by one rifle company and one machine-gun section 1st Battalion, 13th Frontier Force Rifles (Coke's Rifles) which was proceeding to Tank to augment the garrison there. The train left Bannu at 8.15 a.m. and at 10.45 a.m. arrived at

Lakki. Here the line bifurcates, the main branch running eastwards to Kalabagh on the Indus River, whilst the line to Tank and Manzai takes off southwards.

Southwest of Lakki the dangerous section of the line begins. The railway here crosses the Bhitanni hills. This range, bare, stony and almost waterless, rises abruptly from the plains and forms the dividing line between Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts. Scored by deep valleys and precipitous *nalas* the range is crossed by two passes. The Pezu Pass lies to the south-east, and through it runs the railway to Tank, in a series of deep cuttings, one of which is 400 yards long and 47 feet deep, and the motor road to Dera Ismail Khan. Further to the north-west is the Bain Pass over which runs the motor road from Lakki to Tank. It will be seen from the sketch that the administrative border adjoins the Bain Pass and is guarded by a chain of posts of Frontier Constabulary at Kairu Khel, Faqir Chauki and Bain. North and west of the administrative border lies the tribal territory of the Bhitanni tribe the eastern area of which is, in normal times, under the control of the Deputy Commissioners of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts.

On arrival at Lakki the troops were disposed for the protection of the train. The object was twofold; to engage any tribal gangs that might be encountered by fire from the train, and to facilitate rapid detrainment with a view to taking offensive action.

The railway is a single line of 2' 6" gauge, rolling stock is limited, and even with two engines the length of the rake that can be drawn is governed by the gradients to be negotiated in the pass. It had not at this stage been possible to provide special armoured trucks, although these have since been improvised. The troops were disposed in the following way. One light machine-gun was placed on the leading engine, to fire forwards and clear the track. The machine-gun section was mounted in the leading coach in order to cover each side of the train. One rifle platoon, ready for action, was disposed in each of the next four carriages. One compartment was reserved as a hospital. The engine driver was to give a prearranged signal by whistle if danger or attack was apprehended.

The raid owed its inception to events of a few days before. On the night of the 19th/20th May a successful raid had been carried out on the village of Umar Tattar Khel, in Bannu District, about 9 miles north of Pezu, in which four Hindu girls were kid-

napped and a quantity of loot removed. In the course of this enterprise the gang had received, either voluntarily or as the result of pressure applied, promises of help and co-operation in future raids from an inhabitant of Shahbaz Khel, a village about six miles north of Pezu. On the 20th May this raiding gang returned to Hussain Khel, in Bhitanni territory and, having distributed the girls and loot, resolved to organise a fresh raiding gang on a more ambitious scale.

The new gang numbering 360 tribesmen, consisted of 80 Mahsuds under a son of the notorious Khunia Khel, and 280 Bhitannis under various sectional leaders. This gang assembled on the evening of the 23rd May at a village some seven miles from Bain.

The raiders started at dusk and at 9-30 a.m. crossed the Bain Pass between the Frontier Constabulary posts at Faqir Chauki and Bain. From the Bain Pass onwards the raiders were in the danger area and piquets were therefore dropped at intervals along the hills with a view to securing the unmolested retreat of the gang, hampered as they would be by booty. Out of the original gang of 360, some 260 were employed on this protective role; another 40 were left to act as a reserve and assist in conveying the loot, at a place where water existed, whilst the actual hold-up of the train was carried out by 60 raiders.

After covering some twelve miles the raiders rested a short time at Karghocha Oba, where there was some water and, continuing on their way, arrived on the morning of the 24th May at a rainwater pond near the village of Wazir Khan, west of Shahbaz Khel. Here the raiders were met, by prearrangement, by five men from Shahbaz Khel village, who brought food and meat for the party. Discussion then took place as to the most suitable time and place for the raid, the leaders basing their plans on the local information and knowledge given them.

Having settled their plan the raiding party moved to the Pezu Pass and at about 2-15 p.m. took up positions in the hills by a railway cutting some 500 yards north of Pezu village. A party was despatched to damage the track with a view to derailing the train, but the first sleeper had not been removed when the train, which somewhat opportunely for the raiders was running late, came in sight.

The train from Lakki Marwat was climbing the Pezu Pass when there was a signal whistle from the engine simultaneous with a burst of fire from the light machine-gun mounted on the engine, which engaged and scattered the party on the line. The leading engine driver losing his presence of mind brought the train to a standstill in a cutting so deep and narrow that it was impossible for the troops to detrain in order to engage the tribesmen more effectively or even to fire. The raiders now opened fire along the whole length of the train. Their fire was largely ineffective, particularly on the leading coaches, since the fire of the light machine-gun mounted on the engine, and later of the machine-guns in the leading coach, prevented the tribesmen from exposing their heads over the bank of the cutting. Some casualties however occurred amongst the troops crowded in the narrow carriages, the wooden sides of which were not bullet proof.

After a short period of little more than a minute the engine driver was prevailed upon to start the engine again. As the train left the cutting the troops were able to engage the raiders by fire and inflicted, it is believed, three casualties. The train now quickened its pace and the raiders had to content themselves with firing at lengthening range, which they continued to do for some time.

The remainder of the journey was completed with little incident, a few shots being fired at the train, and returned, between Tank and Manzai.

Casualties amounted to two men of the escort and one passenger killed, and four men of the escort wounded.

Surprised at finding troops on the train, and disappointed of loot, the raiders at once began to withdraw along the line of their piquets previously posted. As they did so they were observed by an aircraft of No. 28 (A.C.) Squadron, R.A.F., which attacked with machine-gun fire and wounded at least two raiders.

As soon as information of the attack was received, measures to intercept the raiders were set on foot. One company of infantry supported by one and a half sections of armoured cars, two squadrons of cavalry and a force of Frontier Constabulary were posted on a general line between Ama Khel and Khairu Khel, astride the Bain Pass across the line of withdrawal of the gang. Meanwhile four platoons of Frontier Constabulary moved out from Pezu with the object of driving the raiders against this cordon.

**SKETCH TO ILLUSTRATE
A TRIBAL RAID
ON A TRAIN IN THE PEZU PASS, 24th MAY 1937.**

B A N N U D I S T.

B H I T T A N N I
A L I K H E L

B A D Z A I
T A T T A P I N G
W A R A S P U N
S H A K H I

Saragarh Range

Administrative Border

Khairu Khel
Sqn Cavalry & M.G. Troop
F.C. Post

Pahar Khel
F.C. Post
Fakur Chauki

Umar Khel

Bain
F.C. Post

Mullazai
F.C. Post

Ama Khel

Pai

Tajori

Gul Imam R.S.
F.C. Post

Shah Alam

Gul Imam

Drakki

Pezu
Armed Police S.F.C.

Trans-Indus Rly 2' 6" gauge

Motorable road Gul Imam to Pezu under construction

Hold up

Raiders

Shah Baz Khel
Wazir Khan

Umar Tattar Khel

Tattar Khel

Ghazni Khel
One Company (less 2 platoons)

Abba Khel
Lakki 9 m.

To Bannu 33 m

To Dera Ismail Khan 28 m

Sheikh Budin
3231
4308
3461
4518
2740

Paniala

Manzai
28 (A.C.) Squadron R.A.F.
One Battalion (less 2 coys)
H.Q. and one Section Armed Car Coy.
One Section Post guns
100 details.

TANK

To D.I.K. 36 m.

D. I. K.
(One and a half Sqn. Cavalry & M.G. Troop.
One M.I. Troop S.W. Scouts.
One Sub-section armoured cars)

Approximate line of approach and withdrawal of raiders

Dispositions of Regular Troops, Frontier Constabulary and Armed Police in Red

Cordon line to intercept raiders retreat

Approximate line of approach
and withdrawal of raiders → → →
Dispositions of Regular Troops, Frontier
Constabulary and Armed Police in Red.
Cordon line to intercept raiders retreat.... ← ← ←



Later it was learnt that at 5 p.m. a party of 100 tribesmen bearing 3 wounded, one of whom died shortly afterwards, passed the village of Teri. The raiders, however, were aided by a heavy dust storm which gave place later to a thunderstorm, natural agencies whose favourable intervention was attributed to the supernatural powers of the Faqir of Ipi. Although touch was gained with them on three occasions the raiding party which had by now split up into several small gangs the better to escape observation succeeded in evading the cordon and, crossing the Bain Pass at about midnight in a heavy rain storm, they reached Bhattani tribal territory. The facts of this withdrawal were confirmed the next day by trackers.

Certain features of this incident, although characteristic of most tribal raids, are worth recapitulating. They are:

- (i) The careful organisation of the gang and the precautions taken to secure a safe line of retreat.
- (ii) The dependence of the gang upon local information, which may be obtained either voluntarily from willing supporters in villages or extracted under threat of reprisal and personal violence. Food and water may also be needed, and secrecy must be assured.
- (iii) The ability of gangs to cover great distances. In this raid the distance from the place where the gang assembled, after dusk, to the Pezu Pass was some 25 miles. The gang, therefore, before recrossing the border, traversed approximately 43 miles within about 30 hours. Greater distances than this are, however, frequently covered.

SHOOTING IN ALBANIA

BY CAPTAIN W. G. HINGSTON, 1ST PUNJAB REGIMENT

Officers stationed in India do not often get home leave during the winter, but with the new orders recently published it may become less rare. Many of those who do get home would like to do some shooting, but the expense is considerable in England and it is not easy to rent a good shoot just for one season. There are, however, many places in Europe where excellent shooting can be obtained at reasonable cost. Hungary offers marvellous partridge and goose shooting; excellent duck shooting can be had in northern Italy; good varied bags are possible in Sardinia and in north-eastern Spain. Unfortunately in all these countries, with the exception of Spain, the sport is well organised and relatively expensive in consequence. For those who wish to shoot when and where they please and do not mind some discomforts, the Balkans provide as good sport as can be found anywhere in the world.

Albania is the nearest and most accessible of the Balkan countries. Desperately poor, its people are spirited, fierce, hardy mountain folk, very hospitable and extremely proud of their freedom. In the days when the Turks ruled Albania, their control was always less complete there than in any other part of their empire. Since the war Italy has poured money into the country; many Italian goods are on sale; roads have been built and attempts made to develop the meagre local resources. Despite this progress the country people are still turbulent and blood feuds are carried on much as they are amongst the Pathans.

Albania supplies some of the best scatter gun shooting in the world. It is particularly famous for woodcock, although duck, geese, snipe, quail and pigeon also abound. There are not many centres, but of the few Scutari, Tirana and Santi Quaranta (Sarande) are the best. The latter is probably the easiest to reach. It lies on the coast, sheltered by the Island of Corfu, and quite close to the Greek frontier. The town is very small and primitive, although electric light and running water have recently been installed and both can be relied upon to work for a few hours each day. The hills rise straight from the tideless sea, the

houses being built in two tiers on the hillside. The one road winds up over the hill into the interior, its surface so bad that the worst road in India would be good in comparison. There is but one hotel, consisting of some rooms on top of a warehouse on the water front, but dignified by its one star in the Automobile Association Handbook. The food is cheap, plain and wholesome. The bathroom is also used as the game larder, and the water is heated by a large stove just beside the bath. On the rare occasions that the bath is required for washing, the stove is lit and soon the room is like a veritable inferno. Having removed the day's bag of woodcock from the edge of the bath, and dodged beneath the hanging clusters of snipe and duck, the bather will be well advised to touch the water with care. In some mysterious way the stove and bath become connected with the electric light system and a nasty shock can be taken. In fact the lighting system must have been installed by a practical joker, for it is apt to become connected with all sorts of objects. On one occasion the author, half-asleep in the early hours, grasped the iron end of his bed and the next moment an electric shock so galvanized him into action that he beat all previous records for rising on a cold morning.

The shooting is at its best from the middle of December until the end of February. Sarande is about five or six miles from the shooting area. The hill behind the village rises to a height of some two thousand feet and from the top there is a magnificent view. Below is a broad, flat valley, through which a river flows, and on the far side rise snow-capped mountains ten thousand feet high. The valley is a paradise for the shooter. To the south the river flows into Lake Butrinka, through a wide marsh, where duck are found in their millions. All through the valley are maize fields, at this time of year deep in mud and full of snipe. In between the fields are wide briar thickets in which the woodcock lie. The road winds across the valley on a low embankment, for after rain much of the land is under water. But the road is of little use to anyone wishing to get to the marshes, for they are never nearer to it than five miles of heavy going.

It is not possible to describe the duck shooting without an overdose of superlatives. Mallard and teal are there in their tens of thousands, pochard, pintail, shoveller, gadwhal and garganey also abound. Grey lag are numerous. During the day the duck

have to be shot from a punt poled through the marshes and large bags can be obtained, but the morning and evening flights provide the best sport. The shooter must be in position before light and then, from the first glimmer of dawn, the duck can be seen coming down the valley at a great height. Down they dive to the water at tremendous speed the wind roaring through their wings, surely the most thrilling sound on earth. For over an hour the flight lasts, until sunrise, when the task of picking up begins. It is advisable to make the hide in a bush or in the reeds on the edge of an opening, for birds falling in the high reeds can rarely be found. The evening flight is different. A place on a spit of higher land stretching out into the marsh is the best and, there, crouching on the damp ground, the shooter must wait. The sun goes down, the dusk creeps up, until one despairs of the flight ever beginning. Then, just when one is deciding that it is too dark to shoot, there is a roar of wings from the marsh. Hundreds of thousands of birds appear to rise together and to start off up the valley. Every sort of shot is given, high birds, low birds, crossing from all directions until dark has really arrived and it is only possible to hear the beat of wings in the air. As one trudges home through the mud, birds can be heard all around one landing to feed. Tired, dirty and happy, one reviews a day's shooting that can have fallen to the lot of few. If there is a moon it is possible to continue shooting on the way home, and can there be any more exciting form of shooting than that?

The snipe are very wild, if anything more so than in England and they provide far more exacting shooting than do the snipe in either India or Africa. Common snipe predominate, but there are many pintail; neither jack nor painted snipe were seen although they are reported to be there. Walking up was almost impossible, but it was easy to enlist small boys as beaters to drive the birds towards the hills and then to catch them breaking back. By this method the author on two occasions bagged more than twenty-five brace in an hour.

But the woodcock provide the greatest joy of Albania. Lurking in the briar thickets, which may be anything from five to forty yards wide, they give most sporting shots. Suddenly flitting out silently, breaking back, swerving between the trees, they keep the shooter on the alert the whole time. Dogs are essential for pushing them out, and are difficult to obtain. Local dogs are

bad. Wild to start with, but refusing the thickest places, they soon tire and will not work at all. To take a good dog out from England is both expensive and inconvenient owing to the quarantine on return. The best plan would be to buy from a keeper a couple of dogs who have just about finished their usefulness, and to have them destroyed before leaving Albania; an unpleasant thought, but probably the soundest and kindest in the long run. Bags of a hundred woodcock a day to two guns are frequent, while the odd pigeons, hare, quail or duck can also be picked up.

Sarande is not difficult of access. By train to Brindisi and thence by a Greek coastal steamer, it is only sixty odd hours from London. Second class is not expensive and is quite comfortable, while considerable reductions are given in Italy on the normal train fare.

The greatest difficulty is with regard to guns and cartridges. Their transit across France presents no difficulty, but in Italy the regulations are so numerous as to make the taking of guns hardly worth while. The guns are confiscated at the customs on entry and rejoin the traveller, with luck, at Brindisi. Cartridges cannot be taken at all. Italian cartridges are indifferent and they alone can be obtained in Albania. In fact English cartridges are much coveted and a present of a box of twenty-five is regarded as very handsome. The best plan is to send both guns and cartridges round by sea, although this means shipping them some six weeks in advance. Any tourist agency will do this, as well as arranging tickets and berths. For Albania there is no need to go to an agency to make shooting arrangements, shooting being free everywhere. The sole expense is a licence which costs approximately twelve shillings.

The language of the country is Albanian. A knowledge of Italian is useful, but does not get the best value out of the inhabitants. Greek is also spoken widely. French and English can be useful, but far the best value will be obtained from a knowledge of low class American. Many of the villagers went to America during the boom years, and they are delighted to have the chance of airing their "English." A party of peasants will always greet the stranger in Italian, but on receiving a reply that they are meeting an Englishman, some bashful man, wrapped in a sheepskin rug and probably carrying an old flint lock gun

over his shoulder, will be pushed forward to converse in a language that both he and his friends proudly imagine is English.

The author made the hotel his base of operations, going out by himself with his bedding, change of clothing and cartridges on one of the small hill ponies, and sleeping in the huts down in the valley. Although very poor the Albanian is proud. He takes the stranger into his house, as a guest, gives him his bed and treats him as a friend of the family. To offer money for the lodging is an insult. Payment is most easily made by engaging the host or his son as "*shikari*" for the next day, for thus are his scruples overcome. One miserable wooden hut, kept by a lonely man in the marshes, was a sleeping place on four occasions. After the ceremonial Turkish coffee has been drunk, everything goes with a swing. At night there are apt to be other tenants of the bed. Rats scamper over the sleeping forms. On one occasion the author on retiring for the night removed only his braces, hanging them on a nail on the wall. In the morning they had disappeared, but after a long search were found in the rafters. Only the back loops remained, the rest having provided a luscious meal for the rats. In spite of the discomfort the author has very fond memories of the evenings, spent in an atmosphere of smoke, reeking with the smell of wet clothes and unwashed bodies, sitting round a log fire burning on a stone in the middle of the room. Neighbours come in to help amuse the guest, and the air of friendliness and goodwill is very pleasant.

For a keen shot, who also wishes to see a little-travelled part of the world, this primitive country is ideal. The author will be delighted to give any further information he can to anyone thinking of going out there. The cost for four weeks, including the time of travel, comes to about £65, and this includes board and lodging, travel and tips, as well as the shooting. To give some idea of the extent of the shooting the author in twenty days got just over fourteen hundred head of game to his own gun. With two guns this bag would have been considerably more than doubled.

REVIEWS

REMEMBERING KUT

BY DORINA L. NEAVE—EDITED BY JOHN BROPHY

(Arthur Barker, Ltd. 12s. 6d.)

The sad futility of General Townshend's advance to Ctesiphon is now a matter of history. Without a clear policy or military objective the ill-equipped Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force was given a task far beyond its capacity. The initial stages of the campaign found units short of stores, transport and equipment. Inadequate base organisation at Basra, with an ever-increasing line of communication along the treacherous, Arab-infested reaches of the River Tigris, did little to remedy the situation. The tragedy which resulted from this lack of foresight and administrative chaos was inevitable. After a difficult withdrawal and a long siege at Kut-el-Amara, General Townshend was forced to surrender with some 13,000 officers and men.

The investment of a beleaguered garrison seems, for some not easily defined reason, to capture the imagination at the expense of less colourful operations of war. Although military history proves the strategical folly of confining a field army within the limits of a fortress, it is the successful sortie or the eleventh-hour relief that has provided traditional heroes since the legendary days of Troy. Perhaps this explains that special chivalry which is so often extended to a garrison which capitulates after a gallant and protracted defence. The troops in Kut might well have been entitled to the honours of war. The absence of even a vague sense of humanity on the part of the Turks towards their defeated enemies becomes all the more despicable. All prisoners of war must sustain a blow to their pride of race and self-esteem, but the prisoners of Kut were more than unfortunate to receive from the hands of their captors a callous treatment which is all too commonplace in countries where life is cheap. Their troubles too were greatly aggravated by the climatic conditions of the barren, unhappy land through which they were driven at the point of the bayonet.

Lady Neave's book gives us a brief but comprehensive resumé of the early stages of the campaign. The rest of the volume is largely devoted to the personal records of survivors. These accounts—and they are pathetic reading—leave us in no doubt about the dreadful state of the so-called prison camps and the cruelties of a 2,000-mile march under a burning sun. But the figures speak for themselves: scarcely one-third of the prisoners returned to their homes, and of these many must still suffer from their grim experience. On the other side of the picture we have a story of dour courage and unbroken spirit. It would be hard to forget the desperate attempt to run the blockade up river into Kut in the steamer "Julnar," a last hope that deserved a better fate; or to remain unmoved by tales of self-sacrifice for dying friends and of brave jests in the face of adversity.

It is easy to be wise after the event, and so criticism must be tempered by an understanding of the difficulties existing at the time. In this respect the authoress is fair, if not almost too lenient, for surely in peace time steps can be taken to allocate responsibilities, and to make plans based on a careful study of potential theatres of war and a sound estimate of our own resources. And again, there is little excuse for lack of supplies and medical equipment. But the main object of this book is to recall the deeds and sufferings of the Sixth Division rather than to stress any particular military lesson. Our thanks are, therefore, due to Lady Neave for her memorable work and for her generous wish to devote the proceeds of its sale to a survivors' fund. It is not too late to remember Kut.

G. R. B.

THE BRAVEST SOLDIER—SIR ROLLO GILLESPIE

1766—1814

BY ERIC WAKEHAM

(*William Blackwood & Sons.* 12s. 6d.)

The author has taken his somewhat flamboyant title from the claim made by Sir John Fortescue in his sketch of Gillespie in "A Gallant Company." "Had he (Gillespie) lived in these days," wrote Sir John, "he would have been smothered with V.C.s, D.S.O.s and M.C.s. . . . Reviewing his career again, I still think him the bravest man who ever wore the King's uniform."

Gillespie began his service in the year 1783 as a cornet of the 3rd Horse, or Carabiniers, then stationed in Ireland. After a runaway marriage, and trial and acquittal on a charge of murder rising out of a duel, he sailed for the West Indies, where he took a prominent part in the fighting at San Domingo. He performed deeds of almost legendary bravery, and his superior officers spoke of his ability and devotion in glowing terms. They were confident of the success of any enterprise on which he was employed. He was loved by his men, and far ahead of his time in matters of administration. He saw that the accommodation for troops and the hospital arrangements in Jamaica were appalling and set about reform. This was so successful that, on his return to England, he disembarked a regiment 300 strong. Such an effective strength was unprecedented for a corps which had served for a long time in the West Indies.

In 1805 Gillespie made the hazardous journey overland to India and had many exciting experiences and encounters. Soon after his arrival at Arcot where he commanded the garrison, the native troops in the neighbouring fort of Vellore mutinied. It was here that Gillespie performed one of the most spectacular exploits of his life, remarkable throughout for deeds of daring. Hearing of the mutiny while out for his morning hack, he hastily summoned his troops and set out for Vellore at a gallop. He soon outstripped his men, however, and arrived in front of the fort with only one officer and four men. It was at once clear that the few British soldiers within the fort were in desperate straits; so Gillespie decided to attempt an entry without

waiting for his troops and actually succeeded in forcing the wicket gate before they arrived.

Throughout his service in India, and later Java, he performed many such exploits, always in the face of incredible odds and followed by his troops with the utmost confidence and devotion. It was an understood thing that if an impossible task was to be performed, Gillespie was the man to do it.

On his return from Java in 1813, he took part in the Nepal Campaign, where he met his death while leading the troops to an assault on the fortress of Kalunga.

Sir Philip Chetwode, who has written an introduction to this book, remarks on the fact that Gillespie, whose name was so renowned in his own day, and the story of whose deeds reads like the legends of the knights of old, should be unknown to the general public to-day.

The book is well worth reading, not only for the story itself but also for the commentary it offers on the art of colonial warfare in Gillespie's day, when men fought literally face to face and chemical and mechanical weapons, as we understand them to-day, were non-existent. It calls to mind the dreadful conditions under which soldiers serving abroad were compelled to live, the lack of proper quarters and hospitals, the difficulties of transport; and, in contrast, the gallantry and devotion with which they carried out their duty.

R. L. G.

HALDANE 1856—1915

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK MAURICE

(*Faber & Faber.* 18s.)

I finished the first volume of Sir Frederick Maurice's "Haldane" with the hope that I should soon be able to read the second. This is not always one's reaction to a lengthy biography. If the earlier pages of this work are rather full of quotations from correspondence and details of the upbringing and ancestry of Haldane, perhaps, without this foundation, the author could scarcely have produced such a comprehensive picture of the man. Without such a picture it would be difficult fully to appreciate the reasons for Haldane's meteoric rise, and equally dramatic and sudden fall.

It is as a Secretary of State for War that Haldane is best remembered by soldiers. But for him we should in 1914 have had no organized expeditionary force, no Territorial Army; we should have had none of that uniformity of organization and training which made possible the rapid employment of Dominion forces in large numbers. Few politicians could have achieved as much as Haldane did in the face of opposition from financial and vested interests.

The author's facility for character-painting is such, however, that the success of this philosopher at the War Office seems to the reader to be assured from the start, even though charge was assumed at a time when he might be, and was by his own chief, expected to fail. The story of his acceptance of the office is illuminating. It presents one with the key both to Haldane's success

and to his ultimate downfall. His self-confidence, which in a lesser man would be termed conceit, his ability for clear thinking, his somewhat ruthless handling of political "strings," brought him many admirers, but a greater number of enemies. "Schopenhauer," as Campbell-Bannerman caustically dubbed him, was put into the War Office in the expectation, almost the hope, that he would fail. His success, the logical outcome of ability and almost fanatical devotion to duty, even if it had been realised as clearly at the time as it is to-day, was always precarious, undermined by the very factors which made it possible. His ability and self-confidence forced him, throughout his life, to take whatever line of action seemed to him to be of advantage, not necessarily to himself, but to the nation as a whole. He trod no narrow path of party policy, and, if respected by many, was ultimately trusted by few of his political equals. Actions based on none of the accepted party policies of the day made him a suspect, as an unknown quantity will always be suspect, to "the man in the street." His philosophical creed was never capable of examination, because rarely understood by even his more educated colleagues. The semi-hysterical rumours and suspicions of the early days of the Great War were almost bound to be directed against a man well known and respected in the highest German circles. With the people clamouring for his downfall, the opposition welcoming it, and many of his colleagues lukewarm in his defence, the issue could never be in doubt. He must have needed all his philosophy at such a time.

The inner histories of many international and political issues are disclosed in this volume, and make fascinating reading. They illustrate the many facets of a brilliant personality. In the end one is left with the impression that it is as a social educationalist rather than as a lawyer or leader that Viscount Haldane will be remembered by posterity. The provincial universities represent for him the memorial which he would most have valued.

C. M. H.

THE ART OF THE ADMIRAL

BY COMMANDER RUSSELL GRENFELL, R.N. (RETIRED)

(Faber & Faber. 12.5.6d.)

Commander Grenfell has presented his readers with an exposition of naval strategy written clearly and expressed in a language consistently free from those service tags which are only understandable to the favoured few. His book should therefore appeal to the great British public, in whose blood the call of the sea can generally be found in some degree, as well as to the professional sailor, soldier, or airman.

The first seven chapters deal with purely naval strategy as it existed up to 1918, and avoid the complications due to the advent of air power. This leads to simplicity and enables the reader to grasp the basic facts before he is forced to think in a third dimension, which is still a matter of difficulty to most of the present generation. Nevertheless, it results in many statements being made in the early chapters which have to be heavily qualified when the effect of the air has been considered and the reader is left to qualify them himself.

The next three chapters deal with the psychological side of naval warfare and make most interesting reading. The author is to be congratulated in bringing this side of warfare into true relation to the strategical and other problems he discusses. This side of war is so often forgotten that it is refreshing to note the weight given to it by the author.

The greatest interest of the book, however, lies in the last two chapters dealing with the influence of the air and the composition of the fleet.

The author has approached the problem of the influence of air on naval warfare in a very unbiassed fashion and his conclusions appear to be sound. One is left with the feeling that within, what the author describes as the coastal area, aircraft, assisted as necessary by the small surface vessel, will become the primary weapon whereas, outside that area the aircraft is likely to remain an auxiliary to the warship and that the control of the sea in the future as in the past depends on co-operation between the various armed units operating in it or over it. The ardent protagonists of the surface vessel on the one hand and of aircraft on the other appear to forget that, whenever a new weapon is introduced, wild claims have always been made about it, which have dissolved into thin air as soon as the test of war has been applied. In naval warfare of the future it is the co-operation of all weapons controlled by one directing mind which will decide the issue. In this respect the author appears to have made the case for shore-based as well as ship-borne aircraft being under naval command in war.

A further point brought out, but not fully developed, is the great difficulty of securing overseas bases in face of hostile air superiority. This fact leads one to realize the importance of possessing territory in the right geographical and strategical positions and the vital necessity of developing such territory in peace or certainly taking active steps to ensure that it cannot be utilized by the enemy through lack of preparation to defend it. Great Britain is well endowed with such territories, except in the Mediterranean, but she is slow to realize the importance of developing them due to the altered conditions produced by the advent of air powers. Failure to do so may well give the initiative in the next war to our potential enemies.

The last chapter is highly controversial dealing with the problem of the battleship in modern naval warfare. The author clearly favours its abolition but is wise enough to leave it an open question for his readers to decide. It is clear, however, that the British Empire cannot as yet abandon the capital ship though it would appear that its days are numbered.

The book can be recommended to both the student of war and the general reader who should both receive advantage from its perusal.

S. W. K.

"I FIND AUSTRALIA"

By WILLIAM HATFIELD

(Oxford University Press. 7s. 6d. net.)

In this book, Mr. Hatfield describes how, because of an innate desire to know Australia, he threw up a safe job in England, and reached Adelaide by working his passage out at the age of nineteen. Faced on landing with the necessity of living, he was himself surprised at being given a job at the first office at which he enquired; a job of boundary-riding on a sheep station did not deter this young man, who had never been in the saddle; heat, mosquitoes, snakes, hard work, and rough companions weighed nothing against the fact that this was a job with pay and food, and above all that it was his "Open Sesame" to the interior of the country he had travelled so far to know.

From his first sheep station the author trekked into Queensland to cattle work, and thence to almost every kind of occupation in the great continent; learning first-hand as he went, and amassing an intimate knowledge of the life and problems of Australia. The story of his adventures makes excellent reading, giving the reader a living picture of conditions "down under." The attractive maps on the inner cover make it easy to follow the author's travels, although they would have been much improved by the marking of rivers as well as place names. To those who have never felt the wander-lust it may seem strange that any one could let the years slip by so aimlessly with no apparent object other than ultimately to write a book about Australia, but years of experience have qualified him not only to write, but have inspired him to present to his public an interesting picture of Australia which must stimulate in them a desire to know more of the vital problems of the continent.

Amongst other things may be mentioned the subject of the colonisation of the vast empty Northern Territory; the practicability of which the author hopes to be able to demonstrate personally. He has presented his case with such enthusiasm and sincerity that, in spite of the fact that general opinion does not entirely concur with his, his readers must surely look forward to the successful launching of his experiment, and wish him luck in his new and great adventure.

E. S.

"STAND TO"

A DIARY OF THE TRENCHES, 1915—1918

By CAPTAIN F. C. HITCHCOCK, M.C.

(Hurst & Blackett, 15s.)

Captain Hitchcock, the author of "Saddle Up," gives a straightforward account of what he saw and did as a subaltern of the 2nd Battalion, The Prince of Wales's Leinster Regiment, during the war. He makes no attempt to write up his tale, even so his diary grips the attention from beginning to end. It is in marked contrast to so many war books we know in that the author is never morbid and never indulges in introspection. He writes plainly of the horrors and hardships of trench warfare in France

and yet shows what little effect they had on officers and men in a good regiment.

We have read other war books and plays full of morbid, super-sensitive characters and it is easy to fall into the error of imagining that the average man in France was mentally unbalanced. Captain Hitchcock's diary is a corrective and shows the British soldier adapting himself to strange conditions in his usual cheerful manner.

From a military point of view there is much of interest. Routine in trenches and rest areas is well described and there is an admirable account of a large scale trench raid. The author, like many others, questions the value of these raids ordered by the higher command. It is interesting too to be reminded that neglect of the rifle as a weapon of defence was an early failing. Even in 1915 the infantry in France had lost their skill in musketry and had come to rely on bombs. Of interest to all soldiers, we commend this volume especially to those who were fortunate enough to be too young to fight in the Great War.

W. A. S.

"BETTER VILLAGES"

By F. L. BRAYNE, M.C., I.C.S.

(Oxford University Press, Bombay Indian Branch, Rs. 2.)

To all who take an interest in rural reconstruction, Mr. Brayne's name is a household word. Particularly is this so amongst the Panjabi classes which supply the Indian Army with the bulk of its recruits.

India is predominantly a country of village communities. Uplift movements that originate in her few large cities touch only an infinitesimal proportion of her three hundred and fifty million inhabitants, and are dead almost before they reach the suburbs. The village community is the basis of India's national life, and if India is to take her place once more amongst the nations of the world, she must build herself a place by raising the standard of living in the villages, which *are* India. In recognising this fact, Mr. Brayne is following in the footsteps of Kabir, Guru Nanak Dev, Mahatma Gandhi, and a host of other Indian reformers.

In Mr. Brayne's own words, "Better Villages" is a book "pointing out briefly what has to be done and how it should be done. It is intended for the lay worker, official or non-official, and only contains what every intelligent person living or working in a village should know for his own and his neighbour's well-being."

The Army in India has long realised the connection between rural reconstruction and an adequate supply of fit, mentally alert and contented recruits and the principles of rural reconstruction are now taught to all candidates for the Indian Army first and second class certificates of education. Those responsible for instruction in this subject should find "Better Villages" of the greatest assistance.

D. F. W. W.

"LEGS, GENTLEMEN, LEGS!"

BY C. H. BURNS


(Constable & Co., Ltd. 7s. 6d.)

The author of "Legs, Gentlemen, Legs!" is a man of sense and understanding who writes of horses as simply and directly as he deals with them. This explains the obvious success which he has obtained with his methods. He is also one of those who prefers "to spoil his own horses," thereby getting the last penny-worth of enjoyment out of them.


Some of his views are not orthodox, but he argues his case logically and with a refreshing diffidence. His book will help anyone who sets up and runs a small stable for amusement and, in spite of what the author says, it will also help those who are beginners in horsemanship and horsemastership, or who only ride for exercise.

There is a lot of horse sense in this compact and inexpensive volume.


T. S.



THE STORMING OF MOULAN, 1884



THE STORMING OF MOOLTAN, 2ND JANUARY, 1849.



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EDITORIAL

The reform of the Covenant of the League of Nations has recently been debated in more than one European capital. As Colonel Beck, the Foreign Minister for Poland, put it: "The possibility of maintaining a state of affairs in which the statute and regulations of an institution set up to embrace all the nations of the world are applied only by some of them is illusory." And Hr. Sandler, the Swedish Foreign Minister, went on to warn the Council of an even more pressing danger. There is a tendency to transform the League into an alliance of countries in opposition to non-member countries. "Democracy against dictatorship" is very much the order of the day. If an attempt is made to set up a group of powers primarily concerned with the defence of a political doctrine, hostile to totalitarianism or to any other particular principle, then there is no hope whatever for the future of the League.

Experience has undoubtedly shown that too much was expected of the League at its inception. Adherence to the Covenant as it was originally framed implied the surrender by every member of a measure of national sovereignty in the cause of international co-operation; but national sovereignty has survived more stubbornly than the founders of the League had reason to foresee, and the world is still a long way off being ripe for the creation of a super State over-riding national governments. Then it was a most unfortunate mischance that linked the Covenant

with the Peace Treaty and, in the eyes of many nations, with the maintenance of the territorial settlements of Versailles. And it has now been proved, on at least one memorable occasion, to have been a grievous error to have included any regulation, such as Article XVI of the Covenant, which provided under given circumstances for the automatic and compulsory application of sanctions by member States. But when these mistakes have been admitted, it must in fairness be added that the League embodies, as nothing else has ever done, the principles of international co-operation. It provides *par excellence* a clearing-house for the exchange of information on which to base plans for the promotion of world trade, the economic welfare and raising of the standard of living of mankind. If the League were used in this way to relax economic tension, it could not fail to be a powerful factor for political appeasement. Despite the fact that pacts of non-aggression—one may instance that between Poland and Germany—have been concluded outside the auspices of the League, the latter has in fact a long record of the settlement of international disputes to its credit, many of which would have grown to formidable dimensions had they not been submitted to arbitration at Geneva.

The British peoples are as firm as ever in their conviction that the principles of the League and of the Kellogg Pact must be made to prevail if the world is to progress at all. In their view the Covenant carries into world affairs the outlook of a great and liberal democratic society, which they believe to be one of the greatest achievements of the human race. That the Covenant may need reform they are prepared to admit, but not that the Covenant itself is visionary. Indeed, the trend of opinion seems to be towards an admission of the fact that compulsory arbitration is as useless as compulsory sanctions have proved to be. It is the right of every State to submit its disputes to the Permanent Court of Justice or to the Council. It is the right, and should be the duty, of every nation to refuse to aid another which has committed an act of unprovoked aggression. But the decision to take an active part against that other nation is on an entirely different plane. It is one that must be taken by the individual government concerned and not placed on it as a duty necessitated by membership of an international body. And there is much to be said for this point of view, for genuine friendship and lasting

peace can only be achieved by the voluntary, not the compulsory, co-operation of democracies and dictatorships.

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The Van Zeeland report on the possibility of obtaining a reduction in the obstacles to international trade was published in London at the end of January. M. Van Zeeland had been asked by the British and French Governments to undertake an inquiry into the possibility of obtaining a general reduction of quotas and of other obstacles to international trade. His investigation carried him to most European capitals and to Washington and lasted for some ten months.

M. Van Zeeland summarises the three main impediments to international trade and makes recommendations in each case. Dealing with exchange restrictions and fluctuating currencies he recommends that creditor countries should resume foreign lending, that the external obligations of debtor countries should be finally adjusted and, when this has been done, that export and import credits should be made available to those countries through the medium of the Bank of International Settlements. While he believes that the best method of preventing fluctuating currencies is the re-establishment on a modified basis of the gold standard, he realises that such a course is at present impracticable and recommends instead an extension of the Tripartite Monetary Agreement between Britain, America and France.

M. Van Zeeland is emphatic that a concerted attack must be made on tariffs and other forms of indirect protection if international trade is to recover its health. He recommends that governments should undertake not to raise their present tariffs and that they should gradually reduce those tariffs which are exceptionally high. Taxes and other restrictions on the export of raw materials should be abolished. Bilateral commercial agreements, based on the most-favoured-nation cause, are to be encouraged.

Finally, he considers that industrial quotas should be suppressed and agricultural quotas modified. No new quotas should be imposed and no existing quota tightened up.

As regards procedure the report recommends that international collaboration might usefully take the form of a collection of joint declarations; partly negative, binding the signatories to

abstain from further harmful practices, such as the raising of present tariffs and the imposition of new quotas; partly positive, pledging the nations concerned to take up and examine in detail other problems arising in their economic relations. Among these presumably must be placed the extension of the Tripartite Monetary Agreement, the reduction of tariffs, the resumption of foreign lending and the suppression of quotas.

Previous attempts to promote the flow of international trade have, it is believed, failed to secure the support of the public because they were put forward on grounds not always evident to the layman. Economic nationalism has been denounced as an evil in itself, the revival of international trade and the stabilization of currencies on a gold basis have been spoken of as ends in themselves irrespective of their political and social effects. M. Van Zeeland avoids these errors. He emphasises that the object of an economic pact should be to assist the participants to raise the standard of living of their nationals by raising the general welfare and believes that this objective is more likely to appeal to Governments and peoples than the theoretical arguments of the economist. International trade, he points out, is not necessarily an end in itself, but is a means to an end—the improvement of the standard of life of the masses. It is because he has adopted this psychological attitude that we think his report may bear fruit. Measures of self-protection, both in democratic and totalitarian countries, have not been lightly adopted. Many of them, such as exchange restrictions, are necessary to maintain the small amount of economic stability that still remains. The difficulties of reconciling national self-sufficiency with the machinery necessary for free trade are great. No country whose economy is based on the control of exchange and imports can be expected to agree to suppress exchange control and to remove tariff restrictions at a blow. If States were suddenly freed from the restrictions on which they had built up their self-sufficiency, their economic stability would collapse at once. M. Van Zeeland recognises this when he calls attention to the fact that the first steps towards the re-establishment of international trade must be a common undertaking not to dam still further the small flow that now exists and the extension of the Tripartite agreement to include Germany and Italy. As the *Daily Telegraph and Morning Post* points out, "if politically the hour does not seem very propitious,

the very urgency of the case may tend to overcome hesitations, which would otherwise be insuperable."

* * * *

The proposal made by Mr. Boothby, M.P., that a system of **National Service in Britain** compulsory national service should be introduced in Great Britain has received considerable attention in the Press. "We do not want conscription," he said, "but I believe the time is coming, if it has not already come, when we shall have to face up to the necessity of some form of compulsory national service. I can conceive of nothing that would do more good inside this country and bring more stability to the world. I would like to see young men given a period of one year's training by the State between the ages of seventeen and nineteen. Modern war is technical and complicated, and training in the use of arms would necessarily form part of the course, but not the predominant part."

Similar proposals have been made before in Great Britain and, except during the stress of war, have come to nothing because the bogey of military conscription has blinded the nation to the fact that it is the duty of every citizen to devote part of his time to the nation's welfare. That every citizen owes something to the State for his safety and well-being is shown in one sense by his liability to taxation. What Mr. Boothby is proposing is in essence nothing more than the addition of a form of direct and personal service to the indirect forms which citizens already have to give. Perhaps the most important argument that can be put forward in favour of compulsory national service is that it would foster comradeship and a sense of civic obligation in a way which indirect service can never do. In many countries to-day young men of different social origins live and work together at an impressionable age with the result that they carry with them through life an understanding of each other's point of view, which is not at present obtainable either in Britain or in India. And, putting aside questions of military training, there is undoubtedly work on which young men can usefully be engaged in any country; work such as the prevention of floods, the clearing of waste land, the construction and repair of roads, and, in Great Britain, the building of the public shelters required by the air raids precautions scheme.

The objections to a system of national service are well known. It would cost the State money and there are obvious limits to the employment of large numbers of young men on public works. It would inevitably mean a serious interruption in the education of those who are to follow the professions and finally there is the danger, and it looms large in the minds of the British peoples, that the system would carry with it the germ of military conscription.

Despite these objections we think that the proposal is one which merits detailed investigation. The essential condition for the success of any system of national service is, of course, that it should reflect the wishes of the nation as a whole.

* * * *

The work undertaken by the government of Great Britain **Supply in** to perfect the passive measures of defence of the **War.** civil population against air attack is well known. Less spectacular, but no less important, measures for the control of supplies in time of war are nearing completion in the hands of the Food (Defence Plans) Department.

Supply in war can from a British point of view be summed up in two words—oil and food. There are many plants which can help to mitigate the difficulties, but it is only in the co-ordination of all those plans that a satisfactory solution is to be found. Primarily of course we require command at sea for the protection of our merchant shipping all over the globe and an air strength sufficient to protect that shipping as it nears home ports, the ports themselves and the stocks which have been accumulated. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that measures of passive protection can be no more than valuable supplements to a strong navy and air force. Of those measures storage, or at least steps for the creation of storage accommodation, come first in importance. While this is so as regards both food and oil, it is peculiarly important as regards the latter. The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force are entirely dependent on the free supply of oil fuel, the Army is nearing the same degree of dependence, and oil is widely used by the Merchant Navy and civil industry. Successive governments have rejected the idea that the Royal Navy should revert to the use of coal and there is no hope of its use being resumed in industry where it has been superseded by oil fuel in modern

processes. We possess, it is true, an enormous tanker capacity and we draw oil from all over the world, but nominal ownership of oil assets will not necessarily secure supplies in war, and the British Empire has limited natural resources. Storage is an obvious solution and it is satisfactory to learn that steps have already been taken to increase Service reserves of fuel and to install them in places safe from air attack.

As regards food our position is comparable to that of 1917 and 1918. We are and must remain dependent on sea-borne supplies. Quite apart from what we do in peace, it is estimated that we would depend in war on imports for over half of our meat, cheese and sugar, and nearly all our fats and cereals. British merchant shipping totals some two thousand ships less than it did in 1914 and for that reason alone the position is serious enough. There are possibilities in the steps, such as the Wheat Quota Act, which have already been taken to increase home production. Even so there are very patent limits and the area of Great Britain under arable cultivation is less than it was before the war. In this sphere greater possibilities lie in the realm of food control, the distribution, rationing and limitation of the price of food. And it is in this respect that much quiet work has been carried out by the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence and civil departments. A shadow organization is being steadily developed which will be responsible for the control of supplies and prices. It is intended that food control shall come from the start, before there is a shortage and prices have risen alarmingly. On the outbreak of war the food controller will take possession of stocks in the hands of merchants and cargoes at sea. Working on behalf of the nation as a whole he will be the one purchaser in the open market and, since Britain is a very large importer of food supplies, he should wield a great influence over prices. The allotment to manufacturers at fixed prices of those foods which need to be processed will be made and retail prices will be fixed by government order so as to allow of a fair margin—but only a fair margin—for expenses and profit. The appointment of fifteen divisional food officers, which has already taken place, foreshadows the introduction of a system of rationing. In this way the State will be placed in complete control of the whole food supply of the nation.

The problem is indeed so large and one which interests

directly or indirectly, so many departments of government that it could never have been solved without a co-ordinating minister. Elasticity is essential and the primary object of all this planning is to create an organization sufficiently flexible to meet any emergency arising from either naval or air attack.

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It is not easy for observers in India to arrive at any very definite conclusions regarding recent events in **Germany.** Germany and Austria, but Herr Hitler's changes in the civil and military leadership of Germany and his relations with Austria have certainly aroused anxious interest throughout the world.

The circumstances of the German Army purge, as it has been called, appear to have been as follows. The Minister for War, Field-Marshal von Blomberg, well-known for his close connection with the Nazi Party, recently contracted a marriage of which army officers, or at least those brought up in the very high pre-war traditions, disapproved. A protest lodged by General Fritsch on behalf of the army resulted in the removal of both Field-Marshal von Blomberg and General Fritsch, the resignation of a number of senior officers of the army and air force, and the assumption by Herr Hitler of the supreme control of the German forces. These, roughly, are the known facts, but it is clear that the roots of the trouble lay far deeper. It had been known for some time that the German army, which before the war had a large influence over the political direction of affairs, disapproved of some aspects of Nazi foreign policy. For one thing it was particularly opposed to a continuance of interference in Spanish affairs, once the necessary experience had been gained in the effect of modern weapons in war. For another it was on the whole opposed to the State control of armaments, a measure also disliked by many industrialists. And there was inevitably a clash of interests between the Nazi offices in Munich and the older secretariats in Berlin.

If the causes of the Führer's changes are a matter for speculation, the results of those changes must be even more doubtful. A new office, the "Supreme Command of the Armed Forces," with General Keitel as co-ordinating authority but under Herr Hitler's direct control, has been opened; and Baron von Neurath has been appointed head of a new secret Cabinet Council, which will tender

advice on foreign and political affairs. On the face of it these changes appear to have resulted in a substantial gain in power to the Nazi Party at the cost of the army. On the other hand the new council contains a very fair proportion of army representatives, who should still be able to give their opinion on matters of foreign politics. The most that one can say is that Herr Hitler has imposed his personal control in Germany more firmly than ever.

What is more important is that he appears also to have obtained almost complete control of Austrian affairs. The truce concluded in 1936 between Berlin, Rome and Vienna has not proved an easy one to keep. By its terms Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini agreed to recognise Austria's sovereignty and the right of the Austrian Government to control political factions within Austrian territory. Despite the agreement Nazi influence, even if it worked underground, steadily increased during the next eighteen months and in February this year Herr von Schuschnigg, after a personal interview with Herr Hitler, was forced to acquiesce not only in the grant of official recognition to Nazi activities in Austria, but also in the allotment of a number of cabinet posts, including the direction of the police, to prominent members of the Nazi Party. The casual observer might well have supposed that this would satisfy Nazi ambitions but within a few days of the formation of a new cabinet in Vienna German troops had crossed the frontier with the ostensible object of thwarting Herr von Schuschnigg's proposal to refer matters to a plebiscite of the Austrian people. What the result of a plebiscite, held under conditions of complete freedom, would have been will never be known. It might or might not have resulted in a victory for the Nazi Party. Now the time for a plebiscite has passed, a greater Germany already exists.

While Great Britain is not primarily concerned with either German or Austrian domestic affairs, events such as these are more than domestic and cannot fail to make themselves felt in all European countries. It is only to be hoped that they will not lead to a deterioration in the European situation in general and Anglo-German relations in particular.

* * * *

The departure of a British Mission, composed of representatives of the Army, Navy and Air Force, to Lisbon **The Mission to Portugal.** has received less attention than its importance merits. The alliance formed in the 14th century between Britain

and Portugal has been maintained for centuries not merely by sentiment or trade interest, but for strategical reasons. The accidents of geography and the naval problems resulting therefrom have been responsible for this unbroken bond between the two countries. The sea communications of the British Empire with the Mediterranean, South Africa and South America pass by the coast of Portugal and her island possessions of Madeira, Cape Verde and the Azores. Portuguese harbours have been of use to Britain in almost every major war in which she has been engaged and it is essential that they should remain in the hands of an allied power. Portugal too benefits by the alliance, for Great Britain undertakes the defence of Portuguese coasts, sea communications and land frontiers against an aggressor, a burden which might well prove too big for Portugal to shoulder alone in these days.

The outbreak of the Spanish civil war in 1936 placed Portugal in a peculiarly difficult position. The Portuguese Government of Dr. Salazar is a government of the Right, although the dictatorship is mild when compared with others in Europe. It had watched with growing anxiety the evolution of events under a communist government in Spain and they appeared not unlike the events which had occurred in Portugal in 1910 when the monarchy was overthrown. Throughout the civil war, Dr. Salazar's policy has been based on domestic considerations rather than on any fundamental desire to draw nearer to Herr Hitler or Signor Mussolini. Two dangers appeared to be threatening Portugal—the infiltration of subversive influences from across the border, and the possibility of her national independence being impaired by the imposition of international control arising out of the activities of the Non-Intervention Committee.

The facts that Portugal accepted the principle of non-intervention only with reservations and that she severed relations with the Spanish Government have led to suggestions that she intended to abandon the British alliance. That suggestion received a categorical denial some months ago when Dr. Salazar publicly repudiated the idea and described the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance as unalterable.

While the detailed terms of reference to the Services Mission have not been made public, the nature and scope of the assistance to be afforded by each country to the other in the event of war

will, it is understood, form the basis of the discussions. Portugal, with a major war in progress at her door, will no doubt expect British naval power to keep her coasts and communications open for her. Britain for her part can never over-estimate the importance of the Lisbon-Azores-Cape Verde strategic triangle. The prospects that the Mission will succeed in its task of strengthening the ties of friendship which unite the two countries seem to be bright.

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A despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies laying down the terms of reference of the technical Commission which is now on its way to Palestine was published as a White Paper in January. The Commission is to inquire into the scheme proposed by the Royal Commission of last year and its functions are to be confined to considering the practical possibilities of partition. The new body has been asked to make specific recommendations regarding the boundaries of the proposed Arab and Jewish areas and of the new British mandate, and to report on the economic and financial questions involved in partition.

If this is all that the despatch envisaged, the future would at least be reasonably clear. Unfortunately the despatch opens up prospects of delay and confusion, which necessary as they may be, are nonetheless regrettable. It is asserted that, while His Majesty's Government have expressed their general agreement with the arguments and conclusions of the Royal Commission, they are in no sense committed to approval of the plan for partition or to the compulsory transfer of Arabs from the Jewish to the Arab area. It is pointed out that even if partition is found to be equitable and practicable, the British Government will in any case have to refer their proposals to the Council of the League of Nations. If the scheme is approved by the League Council, a further period will be required for the establishment of new systems of government under mandate in the areas concerned and, if the necessary consent is forthcoming, for the negotiation of treaties with a view to the eventual establishment of independent States. It may also be necessary, in the light of the technical Commission's report, for His Majesty's Government to consider further the suggestion of the Permanent Mandates Commission that the Arab and Jewish areas should be administered temporarily under a system of "cantonization." The investigations of the technical Commission

must occupy several months, and for some time to come any action taken can only be of an exploratory nature.

Under the circumstances it was hardly to be expected that the despatch would be anything but coldly received by all parties in Palestine. Jewish circles, while relieved to hear that the proposal for partition is at least maintained, fear that the proposed area of the new Jewish State will be much diminished. Arabs, seeing that the terms of reference are in principle limited to an investigation of the previous and unpopular scheme of partition which they themselves have rejected, profess to regard the coming of the new Commission with indifference. Many men of both races believe that a plan is foreshadowed to secure self-government for the Jews within the areas already heavily settled, in place of the establishment of a Jewish State with reasonable room for expansion as recommended by the Royal Commission. All parties agree as to the disadvantages of a further long period of uncertainty. Unfortunately uncertainty seems likely to prevail for many months to come. No one has ever considered partition as more than a regrettable compromise and it was perhaps a pity that the Government and the Press in Great Britain should at first have welcomed the report of the Royal Commission quite as readily as they did. The debates in Parliament and at Geneva soon damped the ardour of even the most enthusiastic supporters of partition.

Some delay in the settlement of the problem is inevitable merely because Great Britain is a member of the League of Nations; Palestine is not a Crown Colony and references to the Permanent Mandates Commission take time. But it would be a grave mistake to hasten a far-reaching settlement, which can not hope under any circumstances to gain more than the grudging approval of the parties most concerned. Meanwhile the work of government has to be carried on under conditions of peculiar difficulty.

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We referred in our last number to the fact that the Japanese Aims in China. inauguration of a major campaign in the Yangtse valley revealed that Japanese aims were of a larger dimension than her previous penetration of north China had led people to imagine. It is an interesting speculation to consider what those aims are and it is only fair to present what we believe to be the Japanese standpoint.

By the opening of the present century Japan had built up an army and navy which were strong enough to make her secure from attack under the conditions then prevailing and entitled her to a position among the Great Powers. By the end of the Great War she had, by adopting the technique of the West, built up an immense light industry and had established shipping and banking resources. Her fight for the lighter industrial markets of the world was at first most successful, but it was soon met by tariff action in almost every country except China and Russia. If other nations would not accept Japanese piecegoods, Japan could not hope to obtain the raw materials she required and it became apparent that, to achieve economic equality with other powers, Japan would have to found her economic life on coal and iron, as other nations had done. Up to 1920 there had been two great centres of heavy industry and it was largely due to their location that western European and American influence had spread so rapidly. After the war, however, Russia established a third. Unfortunately, from a Japanese point of view, not only was this industry in the Urals too far away for practical purposes, but the Soviet leaders appeared to be aiming to make Russia self-supporting rather than to co-operate in the sphere of international trade, except where trade could be combined with an expansion of Soviet territory, as in Mongolia and Sinkiang. China alone was left and Japan was forced to turn her attention to the problem of increasing China's absorptive capacity. This could best be arranged by the development and exchange of the raw materials which China possessed in abundance for the manufactured goods which Japan produced. Coking coal existed in Manchuria, Hopei, Shansi and Shantung; high grade iron ore in the Yangtse valley. It is true that low grade ore was to be had in the Philippines and high grade ore in India, but both countries were under the domination of a great power and India was on economic grounds too far away. Since iron generally moves to coal, the obvious area for a Japanese controlled heavy industry was in northern China in the vicinity of the Gulf of Pei-chi-li. While a measure of political control in the north was a first essential, by itself it was not enough; for the Chinese showed neither the ability nor the inclination to develop, certainly not to develop under Japanese tutelage, the ores of the Yangtse basin. The economic situation was further influenced by the fact that China, aided by Western capital and supervision, had already a considerable light goods

industry of her own and that industry was often in direct competition in the Far East with the mills and factories of Japan. This clearly did not suit the Japanese programme and the elimination of foreign interests, among which the British and American were predominant, became a secondary object, if for the time being it was a distant one, of Japanese policy.

Quite apart from foreign interests, there was a very real case for the Sino-Japanese co-operation of which Japanese statesmen have spoken so much. If co-operation and the development of China could be brought about, the advantages to Japan—and incidentally to the world—through the raising of the standard of living in the East would be enormous. But the achievement of co-operation was complicated by military and political issues. The fear of Russian aggression, particularly air attack, and the infiltration of communist ideas was a very real one in Tokio. The Japanese hate and fear Communism. They see in the Soviet army the one challenge to their ambition to be the acknowledged suzerains of eastern Asia. The double-tracking of the Siberian railway to the Far East neutralized to a great extent the strategic advantages which Japan had obtained by her purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the creation by the Soviet of a powerful Far Eastern Army Group did nothing to allay Japanese fears. In the view of Japanese soldiers, the best method of meeting these new dangers lay in an expansion of Japanese influence in Mongolia, far to the west. That Japanese expansion first in her northern provinces and then into Mongolia should be disliked by the Chinese was understandable; but it was less easy to see why other powers should object so strongly in view of the fact that Russia had in recent years obtained control of large stretches of what was nominally Chinese territory without calling forth any protest from Britain and America. On military grounds, therefore, there was also much to be said for the exclusion of foreign interference in affairs on the mainland of Asia.

Economic domination of China and the elimination of foreign interests are, we believe, the cardinal points of Japanese policy to-day. And on that score there is probably no divergence of opinion in Tokio. The question is not what is to be the ultimate aim of Japan, but how, when, and to what extent the accepted policy is to be carried out.

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After the capture of Nanking, the Japanese put forward tentative peace proposals through the German ambassador in China in the hope, presumably, that with the fall of the capital the Chinese will to resist had been broken and the prestige of Marshal Chiang Kai-shek so seriously impaired that he would have to give way. The terms suggested were the recognition by China of the independence of Manchukuo, the creation of a separate autonomous state in the five northern provinces, the dissolution of the Kuomintang, the adherence of China to the anti-Comintern Pact, the grant of a special concession to Japan at Shanghai, and the cessation of anti-Japanese activities.

Whether it was seriously expected that the terms would be accepted is not known. Certainly they could never have been accepted by a nation in whom the will to resist was still existent. From an English point of view they were equivalent to a demand that the independence of Scotland be recognised, that England north of the Humber should be separated into another State, that the National Government should be dissolved and a foreign power be given a special concession in the City of London. Not unnaturally the proposals were rejected at once by Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Government's will to resist was illustrated by the creation of fresh booms across the Yangtse, the commencement of a road from Szechwan, one of China's remoter provinces, to Russia, and a decree placing private manufacture under State control.

With the refusal of peace terms Japanese Imperial Headquarters was faced with the problem of planning a further campaign. The time and circumstances were reasonably favourable for implementing a policy for the complete domination of China and the creation of a Japanese-controlled regime for the whole country; no military interference by outside powers was likely and Japan could still place further troops in the field. On the other hand that policy would strain Japan's financial resources to the limit; it would leave her weakened for many years and it would entail a wholesale blockade of the Chinese coasts, including south China, with its attendant possibilities of friction with Britain and the putting into force of American Neutrality legislation. Again the decision taken is still a matter of speculation and one can only judge by events. But it appears likely that, while

Japanese Imperial Headquarters still firmly intends to impose its will on the Chinese Government, operations on a moderate scale have been planned and care is to be taken to avoid steps which will lead to intervention by any outside power. The latter point is borne out by the replacement of General Matsui, the General Officer Commanding in Central China, by General Shunroka Hata, a known moderate, and the reported arrival of high officials in Shanghai to prevent the recurrence of further incidents in the International Settlement.

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Any campaign in the interior of China was bound to resolve itself at an early point into a war of railways. After the fall of Nanking, the main Chinese forces retired to Pengpu, some ninety-five miles north of the capital, while the Chinese Government had already withdrawn to Hankow. Early in January there were strong rumours that a Japanese invasion of Kwantung, in southern China, was imminent. Hankow is at present the strategic centre of China and it could be reached either by a northward advance along the railway from Canton, a westward advance based on the Yangtse river, or a southward advance down the Peiping-Hankow railway line. The first course was superficially an attractive one, since South China was at the time denuded of troops and the invasion would automatically have closed one of the few remaining routes by which China could obtain arms. That the project was postponed was probably due to limitations in shipping resources and desire, which was becoming steadily more marked, to avoid estranging Britain still further. The second course had obvious difficulties, a river campaign is never the easiest form of operation, and it left unsolved the problem of the main Chinese forces which would have been left on the flank of a Japanese advance up the Yangtse. The third course has evidently been adopted, for towards the end of January the Japanese southward advance along the Peiping-Hankow and the Tientsin-Pukow railways was resumed. On the former line the objective was Chengchow an important arsenal centre at the junction of the Peiping-Hankow and Lunghai railways. A Japanese victory on this line will force the Chinese to withdraw south-west across a difficult river country, devoid of rail or road communications.

On the latter line the Japanese advance is being carried out both from the north and the south and is being fiercely resisted by the Chinese based on Soochow.

It is too early to say what the result of these operations will be, but it seems unlikely that the resistance of the Chinese regular armies can continue much longer. Lacking artillery, armoured fighting vehicles and aircraft, with a failing supply of ammunition and the equipment necessary for the prosecution of modern warfare, the odds are heavily against them. Should they decide to stand and meet the Japanese forces in open battle, they will have even less chance of success. But that is not to say that with the defeat of the Chinese regular forces Japan's task will be accomplished. Japan will still have to wear down guerilla resistance in a country the size of India and she will have to reconstruct the administration of a nation in the face of bitter opposition from many of its inhabitants. Her self-appointed task is a colossal one, a matter not of months but of years.

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The withdrawal of troops from Waziristan continued during December and on the 15th of that month **Waziristan.** "Wazirforce" ceased to exist. The 3rd Indian Infantry Brigade, a mountain battery and light tank company, and a few administrative units were the only troops over and above the normal garrison left in Waziristan at the beginning of the year. The withdrawal of the remainder had marked the close of a long period of unrest which had its origin in events which occurred in April 1936 and came to a head in the following November.

During the last eighteen months many parts of Waziristan have been visited for the first time by troops, and large areas hitherto more or less inaccessible have been opened up by the construction of dry weather motor roads. New Scouts' Posts have been established at Biche Kashkai and Gharion; others are being stocked with a reserve of supplies so that they may serve as temporary bases for columns of regular troops. The possibility of constructing additional landing grounds to facilitate maintenance by air, a feature of the recent operations, is being investigated. From a tactical point of view the strength of the Wana garrison has been increased by one battalion with the object of allowing the Wana column to operate at a more effective strength.

General policy in Waziristan remains unchanged. No attempt at disarmament has been made, but disarmament and the peaceful settlement of the tribes are more than local problems. For the present a considerable extension of the system of protected areas has been undertaken and, judging by experience, this should lead to more peaceful conditions of life, although it is realised that the system is one that will be gradual in its effects.

As regards events there is little to record. Cases of wire-cutting, attempts to damage culverts, and sniping still occur and there were minor operations in the Spinwam area in January. The Faqir of Ipi, in Madda Khel country, is still a potential centre of unrest. Although the tribes have evinced little inclination to follow his behests during the last three months it remains to be seen whether he will be able to rally hotheads to his cause when the summer migration begins.

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The speech of the Honourable Finance Member introducing **The Indian Defence Budget** the Budget proposals for 1938-39 contained several interesting comments on the cost of Indian defence. Referring to the financial year 1937-38, he estimated that the increase in defence expenditure over the budget estimates would amount to Rs. 260 lakhs. The most important single item was the cost of operations in Waziristan, which accounted for Rs. 176 lakhs. Another considerable item was the abandonment of the Lahore abattoir and the associated scheme for the establishment of cold storage facilities in Northern India, which he now anticipated would cost Rs. 26 lakhs. The balance was made up of a variety of smaller items, the most important of which were additional expenditure on Quetta reconstruction, a general rise in prices, initial expenditure on the reorganization of British cavalry and infantry, and the increased cost of British troops occasioned by the grant of His Majesty's Government of various improvements in the conditions of service in an attempt to arrest the growing shortage of recruits.

Referring to the Defence estimates for the year 1938-39, Sir James Grigg went on to say that, putting aside an apparent increase due to a change in accounting procedure, the net increase over the estimates of the previous year was Rs. 38 lakhs. Two agreements had recently been concluded with His Majesty's

Government on the subject of defence expenditure in India. The first related to His Majesty's Government's contribution of Rs. 80 lakhs towards the capital cost of mechanising British cavalry and infantry in India. Rs. 27 lakhs, the first instalment of that sum, which was payable over a three-year period, would be available in 1938-39. The second agreement related to naval expenditure. The Government of India in conjunction with the Admiralty had recently had under examination the question of India's naval defence. Under long-standing arrangements India paid to His Majesty's Government a direct contribution of £100,000 a year towards the cost of the naval defence of India and the protection of trade in alien waters, and also defrayed various charges amounting to two or three lakhs a year on behalf of vessels of the Royal Navy. The conversion of the Royal Indian Navy into a combatant service capable of assisting in the work of the Royal Navy in war and the steps which were being taken by the Government of India to build up their local naval defence had rendered it desirable to review the existing arrangements. His Majesty's Government had agreed to forego the annual payments hitherto made, on condition that the Government of India maintained a sea-going fleet of not less than six modern escort vessels which would be free to co-operate with the Royal Navy for the defence of India and in addition fulfil their responsibility for local naval defence of Indian ports. The Government of India had accepted these conditions and the contribution would cease on April 1st.

Adding the nett increase of Rs. 38 lakhs in the estimates, the contribution of Rs. 27 lakhs from His Majesty's Government and Rs. 90 lakhs which represented a nett saving resulting from the temporary shortage of British troops in India, the total to be accounted for was Rs. 155 lakhs. Of that Rs. 85 lakhs would be expended on the mechanisation of British cavalry and infantry, the remainder being utilised to cover an increase in the standing charges of the Army.

That, however, did not exhaust the defence programme of 1938-39. The Defence Reserve Fund and the military expenditure-equalisation funds would be drawn on to the extent of Rs. 80 lakhs to provide further funds for improvements to coast defences, the erection of a factory to make India self-sufficient in high explosives and the mechanisation of certain Indian units, a scheme for which was now under consideration.

Last year Sir James Grigg had warned the House that the nett figure for defence expenditure had only been achieved by the curtailment of services which were bound to be provided sooner or later, and that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief considered the provision to be seriously inadequate for the real needs of defence. In view of the present world situation and the large increase in defence expenditure of almost all other countries, Honourable Members would not be surprised that some increase had also been found necessary in India.

The decision to convert two regiments of Indian cavalry, the 13th Duke of Connaught's Own Lancers and the 14th **Indian Cavalry.** Prince of Wales's Own Scinde Horse, into armoured car regiments was announced in March and marks an important step forward in the modernization of the Army in India. Although there has been a considerable degree of mechanization in the Indian Army for some years, that mechanization has been more or less confined to the transport of certain combatant units such as Sapper and Miner and Signal troops and companies, and to maintenance units such as the cavalry brigade transport companies of the Royal Indian Army Service Corps. The present proposals, which embrace the mechanization of two complete fighting units, inaugurate in effect a new policy.

Recent experience in the Mohmand operations of 1935 and the Waziristan campaign of last year has shown that armoured cars are essential both for distant reconnaissance and the support of troops operating on the flanks of the line of advance of a column, as well as for the close protection of lorry convoys. The two regiments which have now started conversion will have important tasks to perform in future and may be looked on as the pioneers of development in the Indian Army. One of them will eventually be stationed at Peshawar with a detachment in Waziristan, and at a later date a training squadron for both regiments will be formed at Sialkot.

"IBLANKE"

THE ADVANCE TO THE SHAM PLAINS 11/12TH MAY 1937

(See sketch maps)

The stone walls of Dosalli Scouts' Post, perched as they are on the crest of a sixty-foot cliff which drops to the dry bed of the Khaisora River, are dwarfed by the tangled, scrubby hills rising seventeen hundred feet above them on the further bank of the nala. Through these hills, running north to its confluence with the Khaisora directly opposite the Scouts' Post, the Sre Mela stream falls steeply from the springs that give it a perennial flow through a gorge biting into the northerly rim of the Sham Plains, which would be better named "The Sham Plateau." This gorge opens out into a gradually widening valley a mile and a half from its head, until, at the junction of the Sre Mela with the Khaisora the valley is roughly a mile in width. Two towers on the left bank mark the point where the gorge finally surrenders in favour of the valley. From the Scouts' Post these towers appear to be perched half way up the hillside, but in fact, owing to the rise of the river-bed, they are only a few feet above the stream. These towers were later to be included inside the perimeter of what became known as Kach Camp.


On the right bank of the Sre Mela the hills rise almost vertically in places to the knife-edge crest of the Iblanke Ridge. The left bank is seamed with wide deep tributary streams each of which forms a serious obstacle to any advance across them. The Iblanke may be compared to a colossal *lion couchant*, sadly in need of a square meal with its Spine and Shoulder Bones showing sharply above its lean scarred ribs. The Tail of the monster rests in the Khaisora nala on the north, while its outstretched Forelegs merge into the Sham Plateau six miles to the south. A shallow, dry nala bed runs between the Forelegs southwards, becoming the main headwater of the Sham Algad which traverses the plateau from north-west to south-east. The Neck, a mile and a quarter long, slopes down from the prominent Shoulder Bones, gradually narrowing to the Scruff, which, four hundred yards long, is razor sharp and rises steeply to the dome of the Skull. This Scruff of the neck is in fact the Iblanke Narai, and is overlooked on three

sides at close range by the peak that forms the Skull and two well defined ridges running downwards to the east and west and curving back towards the shoulders. These ridges may be likened to the Ears. The comparison to a lion is further enhanced by the scrub which clothes the body giving place to a thick mane of tall holly trees, which, growing shoulder to shoulder, completely cover the Skull Ears and Forelegs. The Skull, and the ridge of the Right Ear are plainly visible from the Scouts' Post standing boldly up on the skyline, but the knife-edged Narai is lost against a background of tree-covered hills.


Returning to the Scouts' Post; past its front gate running due east and west is the Central Waziristan Road, level here after its 3,000 feet climb from the Bannu plains, but rising a few furlongs to the west till it eventually climbs the Razmak Narai.

Such was the ground, but a superman would find it difficult to draw this picture from the one inch map available at the time. With naive frankness the Survey of India show in an inset that the area is mapped from an untriangulated eleven-year-old air survey, while the contours that cover the rest of the sheet, here give way to close packed from lines of even more dubious integrity. The sketch map attached has been compiled from a R. E. Survey carried out at a later date than the period under consideration. The one inch map shows few if any spot points on or near the Iblanke Ridge and it is therefore difficult to gauge from it the order of importance of the tactical features.

Normally life at the Scouts' Post must be a dull affair, the only change from the daily routine being the traffic making up time on this God-sent level stretch of road on the run to and from Razmak. By May 11th, however, things had changed. For the past six months the Faqir of Ipi, backed by the Tori Khel Wazirs and an ever changing following from other tribes attracted to his banner by religious fervour and the hope of loot, had been openly "agin" the Government. The scene of active operations had now shifted almost to the gates of the Post itself. To the west the road had been torn up till touch with Razmak was only possible for wheeled vehicles by a two-hundred-mile detour through Bannu, Tank and Jandola. For pack transport this eighteen-mile gap was made the more difficult by the destruction of the only intermediate water-supply at Razani. Eastwards severe fighting had taken place in the lower reaches of the Khaisora in November



DOSALLI CAMP and SCOUTS' POST from the IBLANKE RIDGE. The motor road constructed after the operation can be seen disappearing into the bed of the KHAISORA RIVER, and again in the foreground.



Looking towards the Right Shoulder Bone (centre) and Skull (extreme right) from the centre of the Back.

1936 and again in April 1937 while just over a month before the Abbottabad Brigade, engaged on road protection duties only four miles away, had been embroiled in one of the more unpleasant engagements of the campaign.

These events had been followed by the concentration at Dosalli of the Waziristan Division consisting of the Abbottabad, Bannu, and 3rd Infantry Brigades with the usual proportion of divisional troop. The open space in front of the Scouts' Post had been transformed into an outsize in perimeter camps, while within the Post itself Divisional Headquarters had usurped barrack-rooms and stores for use as offices. Following on this the Abbottabad Brigade had moved two miles up the Sre Mela, and had established themselves in Village Camp on May 8th. For the previous three days the almost ceaseless sound of small arms fire with the occasional dull thump of 3.7 howitzers had showed that the enemy were present in large numbers and that the thickly wooded hills on either side of the valley afforded them ideal cover for sniping the camp and attacks on piquets.

It was obvious that these operations heralded an advance to the Sham Plateau, which formed the summer refuge of the Tori Khel Wazirs, our chief opponents. Were they and their flocks to be denied the coolth and green grazing of these plains during the hot weather already beginning, their submission was only a matter of weeks. But the enemy were aware of this, their Achilles heel, and were undoubtedly prepared to resist any advance southwards from Dosalli. The Sre Mela gorge had been strongly fortified by sangars cleverly concealed from both ground and air observation, and an advance by this route could only be slow and costly. Though numbers to comb the ground still count in the frontier hills, especially when these are thickly wooded, this narrow gorge did not give room for an advance on any but the narrowest of fronts, nor did it give much scope to use the automatic weapons which are our chief assets against the tribesman. Again, politically, it was essential to prick the bubble of the Faqir's reputation before the neighbouring Mahsuds, who were growing restive, threw in their lot with the Wazirs.

Such was the situation that faced the Divisional Commander, nor was the problem simplified by the fact that he had only taken over the appointment a fortnight before. To counteract this, however, he brought to bear a mind fresh to the frontier and

untrammelled by conventional mountain warfare tactics, which so often resolve themselves into a bludgeon advance along the line of least resistance—the nearest nala bed. The solution he adopted was a bold one, original in conception, and one that in twenty-four hours altered the whole trend of the campaign. Briefly, a night advance up the Iblanke Ridge directed on the Sham Plateau was planned. Once the enemy's position blocking the Sre Mela gorge was turned, the Abbottabad Brigade at Village Camp was to push forward and establish Kach Camp at the entrance of the gorge. Thereafter the turning force, by then established if all went well in Camp "A"* in the north-east corner of the plateau, were to be maintained by a track constructed up the bed of the Sre Mela. On May 9th verbal orders were issued that Tocol, as the Bannu Brigade is styled when on column, was to carry out the turning movement by means of a night advance, and preparations were at once set on foot by the brigadier and his staff.

Secrecy was of primary importance, and to attain this the resources of the whole of the Waziristan Force were called upon. A night operation, by reason of the special preparations required, such as the cooking of rations, dumping of surplus kit and personnel, and the making and issue of distinguishing badges, can seldom be concealed from the troops. Both at Dosalli and Village Camps there were several "friendlies," such as *kassadars* and contractors for local produce, in daily contact with the rank and file, and all of these were potential enemy agents. The best that could be hoped for was to conceal the line of advance and objective of Tocol, no easy matter when all tongues were discussing the prospects of an advance towards the Sham Plateau. Accordingly, by various means it was let slip that Tocol reinforced by eight platoons of the Scouts was to move on the night 11/12th May with a view to repairing the road to Razmak and reopening the water-supply at Razani Camp. To lend colour to this story, orders were issued and all preparations made for the Razmak Brigade to move out from that camp on Razani on the morning of May 12th. These orders were only cancelled at 11 p.m. on the 11th, well after the camp gates were shut and there was therefore no likelihood of the news reaching the enemy before reveille next day. Again on the 10th May a section of light tanks escorted a

* Coronation Camp—Editor.

subordinate of the Military Engineer Services to Ranzani, where a thorough examination of the damage to the water-supply was carried out. Commanding officers of units in Tocol were only given full details verbally on the morning of May 11th, and were ordered to complete their preparations without further orders, and not to divulge the route or objective of the column until 6 p.m., three hours before the main body was due to pass the starting point. Confirmatory written orders were not issued until 5 p.m.

The success of these measures may be gauged by the fact that a *lashkar* of 400 tribesmen gathered in the Razani area to oppose either Tocol or Razcol as opportunity offered.


Now for the plan in detail. Reconnaissance, the first preliminary emphasised in the text-books for a night operation, was obviously impossible, since any activity in the Iblanke area would have roused the enemy's suspicions, and would have led them to lock this their only back door. The brigade commander, therefore drew upon the local knowledge of the Tochi Scouts, eight platoons of which Corps had been placed under his command for the operation. The Scouts were of opinion that a track up the ridge line, not shown on the map, was practicable for a force of all arms with pack mule transport. Not very encouraging in an area where experience had proved that many tracks with the distinction of being marked on the map were impassable for animals even in daylight without considerable improvement. Air photographs were little better. The thick scrub effectively hid all signs of the track, and a study of these stereoscopically made the backbone stand out so vividly that to the uninitiated only a Blondin, aided by innumerable arc lamps, would be able to pass over it by night. Accepting the Scouts opinion, the next step was to pick on an objective to be made good by first light beyond which daytime dispositions would have to be adopted. A study of the map showed the two Shoulder Bones boldly ring-contoured, and these appeared to be the highest points on the ridge. A comparison with the ground as seen from Dosalli made it appear that these two peaks were those so prominent on the skyline, whereas in fact the peaks seen were the lion's Skull and the tip of his Right Ear. On this the brigadier decided that by dawn he must reach a line south of the two Shoulder Bones so clearly marked on the map. Strangely enough the immense tactical importance of securing the knife-edged "Scruff" of the neck was not stressed by the Scouts, who,

possibly, had never patrolled so far south under the British officers then present with the wing at Dosalli. Nor was it realised that this feature lay well to the south of the Shoulder Bones, and was so thoroughly overlooked at point blank range by the Skull and Ears.


To compensate for the lack of reconnaissance and to gain full value from their characteristics, the eight platoons of Scouts were given a role equivalent to that of advanced guard mounted troops, with the special task of piquetting the two Shoulder Bones and seizing an east and west line three-quarters of a mile to the south of them by first light. Here they were to halt until relieved by the advanced guard, whereupon they were to precede the latter down to the Forepaws and cover the occupation of Camp "A."

Behind the Scouts the 2nd/11th Sikh Regiment with a detachment of the 12th Field Company Q.V.O. Madras Sappers and Miners were detailed as advanced guard. They were ordered to relieve the Scouts in their piquets on the Shoulder Bones, which would then become the first two normal daylight piquets covering the passage of the main body, and to take over from them the line of their "first light" objective.

Immediately in rear of the Sikhs the 2/4th P.W.O. Gurkha Rifles were to "close piquet" the route as far as the Shoulder Bones, so as to protect the column and prevent it from straying off the track during the hours of darkness. Their piquets were to consist of a road sentry, who was not to leave the track, and four riflemen. Piquets were to be posted personally by the commanding officer at a hundred yards interval on alternate sides of the route, and distant only ten yards from it. Extra piquets were to be posted at points where there was any possibility of the column going astray. To carry out this task the normal organisation of platoons and sections marching in column of fours or file was replaced by companies organised in piquets of five men, the commander of each being marked by a white arm band. Company headquarters were dropped with the first piquet found by their company and platoon headquarters with the last piquet from their platoon. This ensured a double check on the withdrawal of piquets by the rear guard, since the company commander knew at the outset the number of piquets into which his command was organised, while the platoon command could check up with the former the number withdrawn from his command. To ensure



Looking West from the centre of the Back. The SRE MELA Valley with DOSALLI VILLAGE and the perimeter of VILLAGE CAMP beyond it on the left.



Looking up the SRE MELA Valley from the South bank of the KHAISORA RIVER. The IBLANKE RIDGE left background. The Skull with the Right Ear sloping down from it is the highest peak on the skyline in the right centre.

that the next piquet for posting was immediately ready, each piquet commander was instructed to grasp the commanding officer's left hand as soon as he found himself at the head of the battalion. It took the adjutant some little time that afternoon to impress on youthful lance-naiks the importance of this familiarity with the man who controlled their destiny. All Vickers and Vickers Berthier gun mules marched in rear of the battalion, so as to prevent any gap in the column of piquets ready for posting. And, to increase the rifle strength, mule leaders were replaced by men armed with the pistol, who in any event were useless should it come to a rough and tumble in the dark, and who, in addition were better fitted to lead mules over rough ground unencumbered as they were with a rifle. In the main body, column headquarters were to be followed by the 2nd Argyll and Southerland Highlanders (less one company), the 7th and 19th Mountain Batteries, the 12th Field Company (less detachment with the advanced guard), the 8th Field Ambulance, and finally the Supply Issue Section and the second line pack transport of the column. Not a single follower was permitted to accompany the brigade, which in at least one Indian battalion led to the junior subaltern being appointed *Mess Khansamah* in addition to his other duties when dinner was called for the next night in Camp "A."

It was realised that animals would be severely taxed by the rough going, so these were reduced to the barest minimum. All riding animals, including those on charge of the field ambulance for the carriage of sick and wounded, were excluded, while the Argylls left behind a platoon of their machine-guns. Second line transport was reduced to that sufficient to carry one blanket per two men and tea, milk and sugar ration for two days. For an Indian battalion only ten mules were allotted for this purpose with other units in proportion, battalions being at equal strengths of 600 other ranks. Each animal carried its own grain for two days, and all fodder was jettisoned. In addition to these loads each mule carried two filled water *chaguls*,* since the information regarding the water-supply in the vicinity of Camp "A" was conflicting. Actually the majority of these *chaguls* were either torn off by the undergrowth or drained of their contents when the mules carrying them stumbled or fell. In spite of this rigid economy in transport a total of 725 mules moved in the column,

* Canvas water bags.

of which only 60 were in the second line. Further to assist the animals over the ground, and to guard them against attack in the dark, one driver was allotted to each mule, while a company of the Argylls and two companies of the 1st/17th P.W.O. Dogras were distributed among and along the flanks of the batteries, field ambulance and train, these being additional to unit's own baggage guards.

In regard to supplies, animals have already been dealt with. Each man carried two days cooked or preserved "hard scale" rations in his haversack, less the ingredients for tea, which were carried on the second line. Though it was hoped that supplies for the third day (May 14th) and thereafter would reach the column *via* the Abbottabad Brigade in Kach Camp, arrangements were made for the Royal Air Force to drop rations on Camp "A" on the afternoon of the 13th.

Intercommunication was ensured by the allotment of the four pack wireless sets to column headquarters, the advanced and rear guards, and to the 12th Field Company towards the rear of the main body. These sets were to report position half hourly. A Royal Air Force set to keep touch with the air after first light was accompanied by a R. A. F. liaison officer, and was carried on one of the spare battery mules. Each unit in addition provided a British liaison officer with column headquarters, while a pair of Scouts were detailed as guides to the advanced and rear guards and to the main body respectively. Touch was to be maintained by the marking of the route by the Gurkha piquets and by intelligence personnel at the head of each unit ready to double forward in pairs as connecting files.

As to the problem of time and space, an officer acted as pace-maker at the head of the main body, and was instructed not to exceed a rate of one mile an hour. It was realised that in all probability this was an optimistic estimate of the rate of advance, so an ample margin was allowed when calculating the time of start. This was fixed so that should the advance be only at half a mile an hour average, the Shoulder Bones would be made good an hour before first light. Included in the calculations were short halts at 10-30 p.m., and thereafter at every half hour to allow of the column closing up. The answer to this sum gave 9 p.m. as the time the head of the main body should pass the gate of the Scouts' Post.

Finally, the rear guard was to be found by the Dogras, less the two companies escorting mules, and was charged with the task of withdrawing the Gurkha route piquets and those put up next day in the normal manner.


Instructions issued to the Abbottabad Brigade by divisional headquarters on May 11th laid down that the brigade would leave Village Camp at 6 a.m. on the 12th, and establish itself in Kach Camp at the entrance to the Sre Mela gorge. Camp piquets to the east of Village Camp were to be warned at as late an hour as possible of the move of Tocol across their front, and were not to put up Verey Lights or to fire to the East except for their immediate protection. It was stressed that the bed of the Sre Mela was likely to be extremely difficult even for pack transport, and every effort was to be made to clear a camel and later a motor track up the gorge. A camel convoy was scheduled to run through from Dosalli to Camp "A" *via* Kach Camp on May 13th, otherwise Tocol would have to be rationed by air.

So much for the preparations, and now for a description of the operation. By 9 p.m. the column was formed up on the Central Waziristan Road facing east with its head at the Scouts' Post, but it was only at this time that the Tochi Scouts cleared the starting point, as a sinking moon in the first quarter lit up the countryside to a far greater extent than had been anticipated. It was not until 10 p.m., therefore, that the head of the main body filed past the shaded red light at the gate of the Post, and this delay gave officers time to reflect on the operation before them, which, owing to the hurry and bustle of preparations, had not been possible before. The prospect was not particularly inviting, and the sudden breaking of the silence by the *maulvi* in the Post calling the Faithful to prayer, caused at least one heart to miss a beat until the reason for the outcry was realised. At about this time two rockets climbed up the sky and hung for some little time before falling approximately to the south-east, and apparently in the wrong direction to have been fired from any of the camps down the road. Speculation was rife as to whether they were signals of the enemy, but so far no solution has been offered, nor do the enemy appear to have profited by the warning, if warning it was.


The ample time allowance was very soon justified, and from the outset the pace nowhere approached the maximum figure of a mile per hour. Only four hundred yards from the starting point

the route plunged down a steep stony nala to the bed of the Khaisora, and, though it was a bright starlit night, progress was painfully slow, especially for the mules. As soon as troops and mules cleared this defile, the advance became almost a run across the open shingle of the wide nala bed, only to slow down again as the real climb began on the far bank and continued without intermission until the Right Shoulder Bone was reached. In the river-bed touch between the Sikhs and Gurkhas was almost irretrievably lost. All the connecting files had doubled forward into the dark from the head of the latter, until the commanding officer and adjutant with the numbered piquets behind them could see or hear nothing to their front. To divert the leading piquet to the duty of regaining touch forwards would have thrown out the sequence and numbering of piquets memorised by company and platoon commanders. There was nothing for it but for the adjutant to cast forward and hope to hit off the line while the commanding officer continued to drop the piquets. The noise of a Sapper and Miner mule, at the tail of the Sikhs, failing to surmount the rocky far bank, and falling in a shower of clanging picks and shovels saved the situation, and touch was regained by thinning out the connecting files into single men.

From this point onwards the night advance was monotonous, yet at the same time crammed with incident. The only sounds were the sudden rattle of stones dislodged by man or mule, or a greater clatter when one of the latter stumbled, fell and rolled down the hillside until his headlong progress was arrested by a bush strong enough to hold his weight. Time after time the same men stumbled and fell down the steep hillside to right the frightened beasts, grope about in the dark for the loads, adjust these and lead the animals back to the crest line. That the mules were scared was obvious from their almost continual trembling, and it was only by the greatest determination of the officers and men concerned that all of them were brought on without loss, until daylight disclosed one or two so hideously cut as to necessitate their destruction. In places the route crossed a solid sheet of rock, offering scant foothold for the laden animals, and on occasion the rock formation would be stepped as much as two feet, at each of which every mule would jib until forced to jump up to the next level. Halts were frequent, and at these the sweating men closed up and then huddled together, the keen night air soon chilling them once they ceased their exertions. The



The Scruff of the Neck (The IBLANKE NARAI) from the Western slopes of the Right Shoulder Bone. The Skull extreme right background



Typical of the ground covered by Tecol in the dark. On the IBLANKE RIDGE.

scheduled half hourly halts were as a result cancelled, and the column crawled forward, the men halting, crouching and finally rising to their feet again as those in front moved on. That a track existed at all was doubtful in many places, and at least one of the extra long halts was due to the guides having lost their way and taken the Sikhs on a long detour.

At 1 a.m., column headquarters heard on the wireless through the set with the Sikhs that the Scouts had halted on the northern end of the "Scruff" of the neck at half an hour after midnight, and were within shouting distance of the enemy on the Skull four hundred yards to their front. The backchat that always passes between the Scouts and the enemy elicited the fact that the latter were still in ignorance of the presence of regular troops behind the Scouts, and were fully confident of being able to stem the advance of the "militia." The Sikhs reported at the same time that their head was about a mile in rear of the Scouts and that they had relieved the piquets on the two Shoulder Bones. The main body at this time had lost distance from the Gurkhas, closed up on the tail of the Sikhs, and could not assess the length of the gap in front of them. The only proof that they were on the right path were the piquets they encountered every few yards. Almost simultaneously the rear guard reported clearing the starting point, from which it was evident that the column was strung out over three and a half miles of appalling going with four hours of darkness still to go.

A wireless message was therefore sent to divisional headquarters that the "Gateway," as the Scouts daybreak objective had been named, had been reached, but that it was not known if it was closed or not. The column commander now decided that it was essential to make good the ground gained, and the Sikhs were accordingly wirelessly halted and close up preparatory to taking over from the Scouts. It was equally essential to close up the main body, so orders were issued for the head to halt, although in doing so there was a risk of the Sikhs and the remnants of the Gurkhas getting out of reach of quick support should they require it. By 2 a.m., the main body was closed up in single file and the advance was resumed, the Sikhs being ordered at the same time to take over from the Scouts who were to push on. At about 3-30 a.m., the Sikhs reported the route to be getting even more difficult, and it was obvious that the pace was beginning to tell on the mules, falls becoming even more frequent among them. The column

commander now decided to move forward to the advanced guard and assume control personally.

Progress was painfully slow, but by 4-30 a.m., contact was established with the Scouts, and the Sikhs, less their piquets on the Shoulder Bones, were closed up just short of the "Scruff" of the neck. At 5 a.m., the column commander reached the headquarters of the Sikhs to see the Scouts moving on the Skull by way of the Left or Easterly Ear. He ordered the Sikhs to piquet various features that could be dimly seen so as to cover the column when full daylight disclosed its nakedness; in addition they were ordered to take over the Skull when it was captured by the Scouts, and extend their right flank along the Right (Westerly) Ear. Support was to be given by the machine-guns of the Gurkhas, who were practically all that was left of this battalion after dropping night piquets over four miles by the route followed, and also by the 7th Mountain Battery which came forward at a magnificent pace considering the very difficult going.

At 5-30 a.m., enemy fire broke out all along the line of the Skull and Ears, but the Sikhs and Scouts, supported by four platoons of machine-guns and the 7th Mountain Battery, one section of which moved well forward in close support, quickly drove the enemy from their positions. By 6-30 a.m., the real "Gateway" was forced with total casualties to us of three killed and five wounded, of whom one killed and three wounded were Indian officers, testimony to the short range at which the enemy had been firing. At this juncture the Air reported the left of the Abbottabad Brigade to be just reaching point 5,869, a mile west and two hundred feet below the top of the Skull, while the enemy were seen to be on the run and affording excellent targets to the close support planes. The advance continued until at 7-15 a.m., the Sikhs were holding an area a mile and a quarter in depth and upwards of a mile in width at the front, extending from the Shoulder Bones to the tip of the lion's nose. They were accordingly replaced as advanced guard by the Argylls supported by the 19th Mountain Battery. This battalion took on the piquetting of the two Forelegs, while the Scouts manœuvred to their right front down the Right Foreleg and to the west of it. In the meantime the rear guard had been calling in the Gurkha night piquets, and as each company of this unit closed, it moved forward to the Narai, where the battalion was reformed and ready to be re-employed by 7 a.m.

Enemy opposition had by now almost ceased, and by 10 a.m. the Argylls had piquetted down to a line level with the right forepaw, with the Scouts on their right overlooking the site of Camp "A." By this hour the Abbottabad Brigade was consolidating Kach Camp. The Gurkhas now took over from the Argylls with orders to relieve the Scouts, piquet the left forepaw, and occupy the hills to the west and south of the camp site. A few enemy concealed in the dense scrub that covered these last features slowed up the advance across the billiard table surface of the plain, while a deep nala between the hills and the plain, unmarked on the map, swallowed the leading company for half an hour and caused some anxiety to the battalion commander.

The South Wales Borderers from a grandstand on the hills to the east of Kach Camp (point 5853) had during the past few hours witnessed large parties of the enemy streaming across the plain in a southerly direction, and subjected to numerous accurate dive-bombing and machine-gun attacks from the close support machines in the air. They had also seen the advance of the Scouts and the Gurkhas across the plain, the whole looking like a battle of the Lilliputs.

By 11-30 a.m., the site of Camp "A" was safe from enemy interference, and at 1-30 p.m., the rear guard, which had not been followed up, closed into camp. Next morning after a considerable amount of work in the head of the gorge a camel convoy came through from Dosalli *via* Kach Camp bringing with it rations, tents, blankets and the followers of all units. In the afternoon the R. A. F. dropped the necessary supplies for consumption on the 14th, thereby duplicating the rations brought up by the camel convoy. On this day a wireless message was received from divisional headquarters renaming the camp "Coronation Camp" in recognition of its having been established during the hours of the ceremony at Westminster Abbey.


Reliable intelligence estimated that the enemy strength opposed to the two brigades during this operation amounted to about 500. Of these 47 were killed and 42 severely wounded, the majority of these latter being doomed to die of their wounds owing to the complete lack of medical aid. In addition, two of the enemy were captured, one of them a mere boy from the other side of the Frontier. Casualties in Tocol have already been given. Those in the Abbottabad Brigade amounted to one killed and five wounded, of whom two of the wounded were other ranks of the South Wales Borderers.

And now for the lessons that can be derived from this operation. There is little need to call attention to the importance of detailed preparation, which is adequately dealt with in the narrative. Nor is it necessary to comment on the arrangements made for intercommunication, maintenance of touch and the marking of the route during the hours of darkness.

In the administrative sphere the question of the training of animals becomes one of great importance to fit them for night operations. Though orders were issued to exclude mules liable to bray, how often is this failing noted in peacetime, and can it be truthfully said that any mule accustomed to be continually with others will refrain from announcing his loneliness when separated from the herd? Undoubtedly the massing of all the mules of a unit in one party at night has much to commend it, not only to prevent braying, but also to facilitate their protection and to reduce the number of gaps in the column. Attention should also be paid to "night blindness" to which many mules and horses are prone, while transport mules almost always require more training in rough ground work especially at night, in order that they may be as mobile as the Ordnance and Equipment mules of the fighting units.

The complete lack of reconnaissance is perhaps the most noteworthy feature of this operation. To some this omission would have preceded almost certain failure, but in frontier warfare reconnaissance is often impossible, and must be dispensed with. Although the difficulties of the Iblanke route were very great and were fully realised, it was known that the ridge led to the objective, and it was obvious that, provided the high ground was rigidly adhered to, it was impossible to go far astray.

Justification for the lack of reconnaissance was the attainment of almost complete surprise. As an army, with several years of peace training behind us, we are inclined to over-estimate the prowess of the Pathan, and to invest him with almost superhuman attributes. That he is easily hoodwinked by well thought out and concerted false trails is proved by this operation. Again, his mobility and power of quickly summing up a tactical situation would appear to lend weight to the immense value of night operations, when it is impossible for him to see our dispositions or to guess at our strength. In this connection it is worth remembering that the tribesman shares with all uncivilised peoples a fear of the dark, more especially when the movements of his enemy are entirely a matter of conjecture.



CORONATION CAMP from the North-East. The gorge of the SRE MELA begins to the left of the camp and runs north behind it.

The lack of reconnaissance leads again to the time and space problem. The difficulties of the route were an indeterminate factor, but the method adopted in working out the time and space made it impossible not to reach the daybreak objective laid down, unless an impassable natural obstacle was encountered, an unlikely eventuality in view of the information tendered by the Scouts.

From a tactical viewpoint, the value of an advance on a broad front is well illustrated. This term is rapidly degenerating into a catch phrase where the essentials are lost sight of. A corollary to the broad front theory is the necessity for adequate supporting fire to be readily available on all parts of the front. In view of the known difficulty of the Iblanke route, there must have been a temptation to reduce or even eliminate the supporting weapons with Tocol. This is supported by the exclusion of a platoon of the Argylls' machine-guns. That no further paring down of the supporting weapons was countenanced, in particular of the artillery, was justified by the value of guns and machine-guns in the attack put in at first light by the Sikhs and the Scouts to make good the Narai. It must be accepted, therefore, that when employing broad front tactics each detachment even down to a company must be provided with readily available fire support.

The psychological moment when the change over from night to day dispositions must be carried out needs accurate gauging. In this case the knife-edge conformation of the Iblanke Ridge helped the main body at daybreak, since it was on the highest ground and could not be overlooked from the flanks. Nevertheless the consolidation of the two Shoulders and the minor feature between them and of the Narai before it was light enough to shoot undoubtedly saved a number of casualties at the head of the main body.

As to the qualities required of a commander in such an operation, it must be stressed that the mental outlook must be one of complete confidence of success. The prospect of even partial failure must be ruthlessly shut out of the mind. The more careful the preparations the greater the odds on success, but once these are completed and orders have been issued no doubt must be allowed to intrude. Calm, unshakeable confidence must be the keynote, and must pass right down the chain of command until it imbues all ranks with the belief that victory is certain. Added to this mental quality must be physical fitness. Night operations impose a great physical strain, and a fit man will endure this better, and thereby be mentally more acute, than one whose resources cannot stand up so well to the expenditure of bodily energy.

Let this be the end of the narrative. A road now zigzags up the Iblanke, a fitting memorial to the mind that conceived and the men that carried out the advance up its rugged length. May it in the future be an incentive to others to make night operations the normal in frontier warfare, and not as hitherto as rare as flies in amber.*

NOTE.—*In the operation order which follows, the names of features have been inserted in brackets after map references in order to make the orders intelligible to readers. As one of the battalions taking part in the operation had only just joined the brigade and so had not had time to assimilate standing orders, some detail which would normally be unnecessary was purposely included in the written orders for the advance—EDITOR.*

THE OPERATION ORDER ISSUED BY TOCOL FOR THE ADVANCE TO THE SHAM PLAINS

TOCOL OPERATION ORDER No. 83.

SECRET.

Ref. 1" map 38 H/13.

Copy No. ,
11th May 1937.

INFORMATION.

1. (a) The advance of WAZDIV to the SHAM PLAIN 0233 is to continue on 11th and 12th May. 1 Inf. Bde. and attd. tps. have been ordered to secure a new camp, KACH CAMP at 006356. They are advancing from VILLAGE CAMP 06.00 hrs. 12th May. Two Bns. 3 Inf. Bde. arrive DOSALLI 11th May to take over TOCOL CAMP and camp pqts.
8 pls. Tochi Scouts are placed under comd. TOCOL from 20.00 hrs. 11th May.
- (b) R. A. F. is to provide continuous Cl/R and Cl/S on 12th May.

INTENTION

2. TOCOL will advance to the SHAM PLAIN on night 11th/12th May, and will secure CAMP "A" at 023336 on 12th May.

METHOD

3. *Route.* Between SCOUT POST and house at 022409 (just east of POST)—KHAISORA R. to 0240 central (the base of the Tail)—IBLANKE 0239, 0238 (The Backbone)—S. E. of features in 0337 (The Shoulder Bones)—Spur in 0336 (The Neck)—nala running South in 0335, 0334, 0333 (nala between the Forelegs)—thence West across the SHAM PLAIN.

* Night operations were a prominent feature of the Mohmand operations of 1933 and 1935—Editor.

4. *Tochi Scouts.* Will cover the advance moving by IBLANKE to features in 0337 (The Shoulder Bones), which they will piquet thence as in para. 3.

They will halt on the general line of 36 Grid Line (a line East and West through the join of the Neck and Skull) to allow Tocol to close up.

5. *Adv. Gd. Comdr.:* Lt.-Col. KEY, 2 R. Sikh.

Tps.: One sec. 12 Fd. Coy.

2 R. Sikh.

Det. 8 Fd. Amb.

(a) Will relieve Tochi Scouts pqts. on features in 0337 (The Shoulder Bones).

(b) First bound to 36 East and West Grid Line (a line East and West through the join of the Neck and Skull).

6. *Piquetting Tps. Comdr.:* LT.-COL. MURRAY LYON,
2/4 G. R.

Tps.: 2/4 G. R.

(a) Will post pqts. of five rifles at intervals of approx. 100 yds. on alternate sides of the route, and at any point where the track might be mistaken. Pqts. will not be more than ten yds. from the track. Piquetting will begin where route leaves main road.

(b) Duties of pqts. To prevent enemy from approaching Coln., and prevent Coln. from losing its way.

(c) Pqt. Comdrs. will wear white arm-bands on left arm.

7. *Main Body.*

Time at S. P.

One pl. 3 Rajput	}	...	21.00 hrs.
Coln. H. Q.			
Sigs.			
2 A. & S. H., less one Coy.	21.02 „
7 Mtn. Bty.	21.08 „
19 Mtn. Bty.	21.12 „
12 Fd. Coy., less two secs.	21.16 „
8 Fd. Amb., less dets.	21.19 „
28 S. I. S.	}	...	21.21 „
2nd Line Tpt.			

S. P.—Scout Post. Will be marked by one RED Lamp.

8. *Route to S. P.*

<i>Unit.</i>	<i>Route.</i>	<i>Gate.</i>
2 R. Sikh	... Rd. from right of own lines	
Pl. 3 Rajput	} ... East of Coln. H. Q.	... S.E.
Coln. H. Q.		... S.E.
Sigs.	... Main Camp Rd.	
2/4 G. R.	... Own perimeter	... S.W.
2 A. & S. H.	... Along Dogra perimeter	... S.E.
7 Mtn. Bty.	... Rd. East of own lines	... S.W.
19 Mtn. Bty.	... Rd. East of own lines	... S.W.
12 Fd. Coy.	... Main Camp Rd.	... S.E.
8 Fd. Amb.	... Main Camp Rd.	... S.E.
2nd Line Tpt.	... As for units to which attached.	

9. *Escorts.* One coy. 2 A. & S. H. will escort 7 and 19 Mtn. Btys. One sec. 12 Fd. Coy. will escort 8 Fd. Amb. Two Coys. 1 Dogra will escort tpt. Escorts will move in file on both flanks of the units they are protecting. They will be distributed throughout the length of the units protected, and will move close in to them.

Duties: To prevent unit from being rushed or stampeded.

10. *Rear Gd.* Comdr.: Major SEED, 1 Dogra.

Tps.: 1 Dogra less two coys.

Det. 8 Fd. Amb.

Duties: Will withdraw and retain route pqts. and 2 R. Sikh pqts. in 0337.
(The Shoulder Bones.)

11. *Animals.* No riding animals will accompany Coln. Only authorised pack mules will be taken.

12. *Guides.* Tochi Scouts will detail guides as under:

Adv. Gd.	} ... Two each.
Main Body	
Rear Gd.	

Guides will be handed over at S. P. by Maj. GARROW, and will wear two white arm-bands.

13. *Pace.* Maj. WEALLENS, 2/4 G. R., will set the pace which will NOT exceed 50 yds. per minute. He will move at head of Main Body. One sec. 3 Rajput will escort Maj. WEALLENS.

14. *Halts.* Coln. will halt at 22.30 hrs., and thereafter half hourly (*viz.*, 23.00, 23.30, etc.).

15. *Lights.* On no account will there be any lights or smoking.
16. Rifles will NOT be loaded, but magazines will be charged. Bayonets will be fixed.
17. *Action if enemy met.* If the enemy is met or makes any attempt to break into the Coln., the bayonet only will be used. Coln. will halt and lie down until ordered to proceed. There will be no firing before 05.30 hrs.

18. *Distinguishing marks:*

All Officers	..	White band on head-dress.
Coln. Comdr.	...	Two white cross-belts.
Bde. Staff	...	One white cross-belt on left shoulder.
Unit Comdrs.	...	One white cross-belt on right shoulder.
Officer leading coln.	}	... White patch on back.
Officers at rear of each unit.		
Guides	...	Two white arm-bands.
Pqt. Comdrs.	...	White arm-band on left arm.

19. *Position of officers:*

- (a) Coln. Comdr. ... Head of Main Body.
- C. R. A. ...
- O. C., 2 A. & S. H. } ... With Coln. Comdr.
- O. C., 12 Fd. Coy. }
- Other Unit Comdrs. in Main Body ... At head of own unit.

(b) An officer will move in rear of each unit.

20. *Touch between units.* Every endeavour must be made to keep closed up. Connecting files will be sent out if there is any danger of touch with the unit ahead being lost.
21. 2 A. & S. H. will take out *only* two M. G. Pls.

ADMINISTRATION

22. *Supplies.* (a) The following rations *only* will be carried:

On the man B.T. ... Two days hard scale.
 On the man I.T. ... Two days cooked. Tea, sugar and milk.
 On the animal ... Two days grain (no bhoosa).

(b) Cookers will NOT be taken.

23. *Water.* All water bottles, *chaguls* and *pakals* will be carried full.

24. *Baggage.* One blanket or greatcoat per two officers or men only will be carried in 2nd Line Tpt.
25. *Colour Parties and Police.* Will march with own units.
26. *Baggage Gds.* 1 N. C. O., and 10 men per Bn., other units in proportion will march in formed bodies in rear of own tpt. Will assist in adjusting loads and assist mule leaders in negotiating difficult places.
27. *Tpt.* (a) Allotment—See Appendix "A."
(b) Mules will NOT be linked together. A. T. Coys. will supply one driver per mule for all animals sent to units other than inf. bns. In the case of inf. bns., one R.I.A.S.C. driver per three mules will be supplied. Bns. will detail additional mule leaders to complete to one per mule.
(c) Baggage mules will form up on Scout Football Ground on East face of Camp by 21.45 hrs. 1st Line mules will accompany units to which attached.
(d) Mules which are known to neigh at night will NOT accompany the Coln.
(e) Loads must be so secured as to minimise noise.
(f) Mules for $\frac{2}{4}$ G. R. will be detailed from 10 A. T. Coy.
28. *Ammunition.* Full unit echelon will be taken.
29. Men will be rested as far as possible on 11th May and must have a full meal NOT later than 20.00 hrs.
30. *Tents.* Will be left standing. 50% will be vacated by 18.00 hrs.
31. *Surplus kit.* Will be dumped in Bde. H. Q. area commencing 17.00 hrs. Gds. will NOT exceed one pl. per bn., other units in proportion. 20 lbs. per B. O., and 10 lbs. per I. O., or O. R., to be dumped separately. Units will submit statements showing order of priority and maundage of balance for subsequent transport to Coln.
32. *Surplus animals.* Will remain in units lines on night 11/12th May.
33. *Packs.* (a) Will NOT be carried.
(b) Following will be carried on the man in addition to two days' rations:
Jersey, spare socks, soap and towel.

34. *Followers.* No followers will accompany the Coln.
35. *Pqt. Stores.* Sufficient materials will be carried by 12 Fd. Coy. for wiring six pqts. each of one pl.
36. *Tools.* Bde. reserve tools will move with 12 Fd. Coy. "A" ech. tpt.
37. *Medical.* (a) All ranks will carry First Field Dressing.
(b) 8 Fd. Amb. will be prepared to take over casualties of Tochi Scouts.
38. *Rifle notes.* Two mules carrying rifle racks will accompany 8 Fd. Amb. (total capacity 24 rifles).
39. *Provost.* S. C. will post traffic control posts shown on attd. sketch by 20.00 hrs. (Not attached, as only administrative detail covering the move to the Starting Point.)
40. *Messing—Additional Officers.* Officers will be attached to messes as under:

Capt. GIMSON, Tochi Scouts	...	Coln. H. Q.
Capt. TAYLOR, Tochi Scouts	...	2 A. & S. H.
Lt. PRENDERGAST, Tochi Scouts	...	1 Dogra
Sqn. Ldr., R.A.F.	...	Coln. H. Q.
A. L. O.	...	Coln. H. Q.

INTERCOMMUNICATION.

41. *Liaison Officers.* Each unit will detail a British officer to accompany Coln. H. Q. They will report at S. P. at 20.50 hrs.
42. *No. 1 W/T Sets.* Adv. Gd.
 Coln. H. Q.
 12 Fd. Coy. } One each.
 Rear Gd. }
43. *Reports.* Adv., and Rear Gds., and 12 Fd. Coy. will report their situations by W/T at all half hourly halts. Messages will be "log" messages and need NOT be written. Units in Main Body will similarly report verbally by runner at each half hourly halt.
44. *Synchronization.* Unit reps. will report Coln. H. Q. 20.00 hrs. to synchronize watches.

Ack.

L. B. D. BURNS, CAPTAIN,
B. M., Tocol.

Signed at 11.55 hrs.

Issued by orderly.

Distribution: List "A" Plus Tochi Scouts, DOSALLI, A. L. O.,
3 Inf. Bde.

APPENDIX "A" TO TCOL OPERATION ORDER No. 83,

DATED 11TH MAY 1937.

Allotment of R.I.A.S.C. Mules.

<i>Unit.</i>	<i>1st Line att'd.</i>	<i>Baggage.</i>	<i>Total.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
Col. H. Q. .. }	15	1	16	
Pl. 3 Rajput .. }				
Sigs. ..	3	1	4	
7 Mtn. Bty.	4	4	
19 Mtn. Bty.	4	4	
12 Fd. Coy. ..	55	4	59	
2 A. & S. H. ..	45	10	55	Unit finds 37 mule leaders.
1 Dogra ..	43	10	53	do.
2 R. Sikh ..	43	10	53	do.
2 1/4 G. R. ..	43	10	53	do.
A. T. Coys. ..	6	4	10	
8 Fd. Amb. ..	15	2	17	
Vet. Det. .. }	1	Baggage with	1	
S. I. S. .. }		A. T. Coys.		
Spare mules	20	20	
Total ..	269	80	349	

Details of First Line:

Coln. H. Q. ... Office 1, Water 2, Tools 6, Mess 1, Rifle kotes 2, Grenades 3, Total 15 R.I.A.S.C. mules.

Sigs. ... No. 1 W/T set 1, Water 2, Total 3.

Fd. Coy. ... Water 3, Tech. stores and explosives 12, Water stores 14, Mess 1, Wire and Pickets 19, Additional cutting tools 6, Total 55.

Fd. Amb. ... Tech. Eqpt. 9, Water 3, Tents 2, Mess 1, Total 15.


Inf. Bns. ... Sigs. 4, S. A. A. 19, Water 11, Med. 3, Tools 4, Mess (Ind. Bn.) 2, Mess (Br. Bn.) 4, Total 43 (Ind. Bn.), 45 (Br. Bn.).

THE IBLANKE 'LION' MAY 11/12 '37.



SKETCH MAP OF WAZIRISTAN May 1937.

SHOWING COMMUNICATIONS.



ABYSSINIA TO-DAY

By MAJOR A. H. J. SNELLING, R.I.A.S.C.

In discussing Abyssinia it must be remembered that most of the sources of information are necessarily Italian and are thus not exactly disinterested. *The Times* correspondent at Jibuti sometimes supplies a corrective but news from this source is scarce. Thus the initiation and, still more, the alleged completion of some of the grandiose projected schemes must be taken with a grain of salt.

Abyssinia was one of the oldest independent kingdoms, having existed for at least thirty centuries. Italy considered that it could not, therefore, be looked upon as a colony populated by primitive tribes in a semi-savage state. Also the word empire was flattering to Italian pride and a soporific to quieten any unrest caused by the expenditure of lives and still greater expenditure of money. India was quoted by Italy as a parallel for the use of the word but, as mentioned later, the Italian Government made it quite clear that there should be no self-government in their new acquisition. In a speech made on the 5th of May 1936, Signor Mussolini stated that "the defeated and fugitive chiefs and *rasses* no longer count." Last May Signor Lessona, Minister for Italian Africa, announced in a speech "no continuation, no resurrection, either open or covert, of what was Ethiopian feudalism." Again there is confirmation from the remark of Marshal Graziani when announcing to the Duce the capture and execution of Ras Desta. He said he was pleased to place in the Duce's hands the "clear and totalitarian victory that will allow us to devote ourselves without anxiety to the civil development of the empire." The extent to which Italy proposes to carry this policy of absolute control was manifested on December 1st, 1937, when an Abyssinian Metropolitan of the Coptic Church was invested in Addis Ababa by the Viceroy. Until then, and for centuries past, the Coptic Church in Abyssinia has owed allegiance to an Egyptian Metropolitan. All this makes it clear that Italy decided early to start afresh and not attempt to rule through the remnant of the ancient feudal system, still less to allow any meed of indigenous rule.

Many people are under the impression that a full feudal system was in vogue in the country until the Italians arrived.

This, however, was not so. When, after Adowa, Menelek formed his empire he was naturally nervous of the considerable power of the almost independent *rasses*. His throne rested entirely on their goodwill, an unenviable position when each province has its own armed forces. To consolidate his own power the emperor initiated the policy of replacing the regional chiefs when opportunity arose, by trusted henchmen drawn chiefly from his own province of Shoa. Hailie Selassie continued this policy at an increased tempo giving as his reason the pretext that a government on European lines was more suitable for the country in these enlightened days. Whether the Abyssinians really agreed with this sentiment is doubtful but silence was the wiser course, as it is likely to remain under the Italian regime. Thus, at the time of the Italian invasion, Menelek's policy had progressed so far that the feudal overlord had vanished except in Tigre, Shoa and a few minor provinces. The rest of the country, possibly ninety per cent geographically, was governed by officials who were controlled from Addis Ababa. In these areas, therefore, there was no feudal system through which Italy could govern. This gave her an excellent ostensible reason for the elimination of the "dreaded yoke of the rapacious Shoan" and its substitution by the "beneficent" direct rule of Italian officials. Where feudal chiefs still existed the system was equally simple of application. If a feudatory submitted to the Italians (*e.g.*, Tigre) he was given the honorary rank and was told that his province would be improved for him. If a chief resisted the invader his followers were defeated and the chief either killed in battle or executed, as was Ras Desta. Where overlords had departed with the Negus the situation was even simpler and the improvement of the area could begin at once. And so an authoritarian direct rule has been brought into force unencumbered with native states and brooking no interference from internal or external sources. Finally, to round off the empire, Eritrea and Somalia have now been added to Abyssinia proper and the whole has received the title of the "Italian Empire of East Africa."

While Italy has decided to import direct rule into the country she does not propose to instal an exact copy of the form of government and jurisprudence now existing in Italy. This would be not only impracticable but would preclude the possibility of giving certain Abyssinians the pretence of even assisting as advisers. Nor

is it proposed necessarily to replace all local usage and custom by Italian law. Differences in mentality, level of civilisation, social development and religious beliefs would, in any case, make such an arbitrary change impossible. Some adaptation is essential. Hence the fundamental principles of the future government which were defined by Signor Lessona in the Italian Senate. These may be briefly summarised as follows:

1. Government and all political power is to be exercised by Italians alone and no interference with or qualification of this will be allowed.
2. Eminent Abyssinians may be appointed as advisers to the Central Government. Local administrators may also call upon such notables to assist them.
3. The governmental action of the Italian authorities can be exercised through these advisers in such a way as will avoid deviations from local law and custom but such native administration will not be allowed to conflict with law and order nor to interfere with the ethics of European civilisation.

These principles, again, make it clear that there is no implication whatever of future self-government. The principles themselves have been implemented by the basic rules already existing in Eritrea and Somaliland. This, it is hoped, will weld Italian East Africa into a homogeneous whole while avoiding complications in the older territories.

For purposes of administration the country has been subdivided into five regional governments or provinces, the Central Government being at Addis Ababa. As far as possible efforts have been made to retain in a single province peoples with similar languages, customs, and economic conditions while ethnic and religious factors have also been considered. The provinces have again been split up into *commissariati*, *residenze* and *vice-residenze* the same ethnographical principles having been kept in view in their demarcation.

The official language is to vary according to the province and may be Amharic, Tigrigna or Arabic. Instruction in native schools may be given in any one of six languages according to the local custom while in all Mahommedan areas Arabic is compulsory. This is to demonstrate that Italy does not wish to interfere

with local conditions, always provided that they suit Italy and her colonists.

Naturally during the war and for some time afterwards the military commander was automatically governor of the newly conquered territory. From every aspect, particularly in the matter of recognition by other Powers, it was essential that a civil governor should be appointed as soon as possible. And so, it being considered that the military task had been accomplished, S. A. R. the Duke of Aosta¹ was nominated Viceroy on November 20th, 1937.

The colonisation of Italy's surplus population is a pressing and vital matter, both because its disposal was the advertised motive for the invasion of Abyssinia and because the Italian will soon want to see tangible results for the great expenditure that has taken and is taking place. The allotment for Italian Africa for 1938-39 is 1,785 million lire (say £18 million)² and this is exclusive of a grant of 3,000 million lire (say £32 million) for road construction in the next four years.³ These are considerable sums for an impoverished Italy and the people will expect a commensurate return. Even these amounts are only a drop in the ocean if Italy proposes to send out millions. The sea journey for one person cannot cost the Government less than £10, while transport from the port will be at least another £4. These are conservative figures but a million persons will cost some 14 million pounds before a lira has been spent on their housing, land, tools, seed or settlement.

It is, of course, only in the uplands that the European can settle and work. Naturally the native also prefers these more productive and healthier areas and the problem of displacement with concomitant local friction will arise as it has elsewhere in Africa. Kenya is a case in point but Italy proposes to act on a far greater scale and the native is to get little compensation for his lost holdings which will be compulsorily ceded. However, there are areas in Abyssinia where the local situation may simplify colonisation. Caffa may be cited as an instance. Fifty years ago this country was a thriving coffee plantation with an estimated population of over a million. Continuous wars, expeditions, and

¹ Formerly Duke of Spoleto, leader of the Italian Karakoram Expedition.

² Provisional estimates, 1938-39, approved by Council of Ministers on December 14th, 1937.

³ Royal Decree, dated October 15th, 1937.

slave raids (not to forget the "abuses of the Shoan overlord") are said to have reduced the population to a mere 50,000 while the greater part of the area has reverted to equatorial jungle with the coffee bushes, or trees now, still producing their berries which only fall and rot. In areas such as these the native problem may not be so serious but elsewhere eviction must be necessary. It is to protect and assist the colonists in such contentious areas that the Abyssinian element has been entirely excluded from the government of the country. Italy, of course, claims that the "juridical foundations of the Empire have been made sufficiently elastic to allow Italians and natives to live side by side in tranquillity and with respect for each others' spheres of activity." The British Empire has had such problems to deal with and has found that they cannot be settled by the mere utterance of a grandiloquent phrase.

At the moment, as Italy herself admits, there are few settlers on the land. There are, however, some quarter of a million Italians engaged in the construction of public works, communications, employed in commerce and industry and a few on the land itself. When the situation permits these will be joined by their families bringing the numbers up to about a million. The majority of these men and their families are to be the first of the future settlers on the land. This number Italy confidently expects to triple or quadruple in the next few years.

At the moment roads and buildings are of greater importance than colonisation as communications are essential before settlement can begin. The work must be done by Italians as the native refuses to do the work of a navvy.

To avoid friction in this process of demographic colonisation a survey of the ownership of the land has been undertaken as a preliminary step. Also the Minister for Italian Africa has announced a "six-year plan" (a "five-year plan" would hardly become Fascism) of public works which are to be put in hand at once.¹ The nine main features of this plan are:

1. Road construction.
2. Maritime works, Assab to be the imperial port. Inland waterways.
3. Hydraulic and hydro-electric works.

¹ Colonial Estimates. Speech in the Chamber, May 19th, 1937.

4. Hygienic improvements.
5. Construction of mining plant.
6. House-building and town-planning.
7. Reafforestation and land reclamation.
8. Telegraph and wireless development.
9. Military works.

Before leaving the matter of colonisation two recent edicts are of interest. Firstly, the word "native" is not to be used, possibly something that Italy has learnt from the British Empire. Secondly, there is the prohibition against inter-marriage between the Italian and the indigenous subject.¹ The main reason for this is undoubtedly an effort to preserve the prestige of the Italian labourer. Its ostensible reason is to prevent dangerous cross-breeding with consequent damage to public morality and to protect both races. As it is to be rigorously enforced, it would seem advisable to ship Italian families to Abyssinia as early as possible before large numbers of immigrant husbands are languishing in prison.

It is in the economic sphere that it is most difficult to obtain a true picture of what really is happening. In Italy itself almost all real news on the subject is suppressed and only inspired "information" appears. So I will give first the Italian side of the picture and then quote a report from *The Times* Jibuti correspondent. The reader can then draw his own inferences.

The whole object of the Italian demographic colonisation scheme is to enable the Italian to pass out quickly from the worker stage into the class of small proprietor with his own little farm. At present the Italians are chiefly labourers and, in a country where the standard of living is low and European amenities expensive, they have to be given an inflated state-aided wage. Many also have to support families in Italy. High wages involve the control of the cost of living or this latter will rise beyond all reason. Such control exists with some success in Italy and elsewhere though how long an artificial measure of this type can succeed is conjectural. But Italy is different from Abyssinia where there is a vast discrepancy between the cost of living of the native and the European. Eventually the wage scale is to be adapted to the controlled cost of living, a somewhat complicated undertaking.

¹ Royal Decree of June 24th, 1937. Punishment for those "maintaining such conjugal relations" is one to five years imprisonment.

Italy expects her Empire to provide sufficient for itself as well as the raw materials required by the mother country and also to export enough goods to foreign countries to maintain a favourable trade balance. Further, the Empire must not compete with Italian trade but only complement it. To supervise this ambitious programme a bill¹ has been passed providing for the creation of three colonising bodies. These bodies have been empowered to call upon the large trading corporations in Italy to collaborate with them in regulating private enterprise.

It must be admitted that the above schemes are excellent in principle but practice is another matter. The few colonists, less than 100,000, who have already settled are engaged in the production of meat, milk, wool, hides, coffee, oil-seeds, cotton, cereals and precious metals. It is interesting to see what *The Times* correspondent says about the preferences given or about to be given to even such a small beginning and their effect on the economic development of Abyssinia. In a message to that newspaper, published on January 4th, 1938, he paints a gloomy picture of the great Italian ideals already stated. The old Abyssinian export of hides, coffee and skins, worth over a million sterling in 1934, has ceased entirely. The natives persist in passive resistance and miles of valuable coffee plantations and agricultural land have been untended for two years. No new exportable commodity has been produced and it will be years before cotton can be grown in any useful quantity. Wheat and flour now have to be imported instead of, as in 1934, there being a small exportable surplus. Imports generally have greatly increased.

He goes on to say that the new decrees have strangled trade. To provide foreign currency no firm may export to Italy unless it sells a proportion of its products to foreign countries. In the case of hides only one-third of those sold abroad may be exported to Italy where prices have soared in consequence.

The Maria Theresa dollar has been replaced by the paper lira, the Government hoping that pressure and time would gradually eliminate the dollar. But the native is existing on even less than usual and hoarding his dollars which are now practically unobtainable. Italy wants the silver but so does the native who

¹ Approved by Cabinet on 19th October 1937.

does not trust paper, a fact which tends to stifle both the local and export trades.

As already explained the Italian labourer must have a high wage. As expected, this has forced up prices beyond the control of the price controllers which again goes to cripple the export trade. As state control multiplies, so does speculation. The extent of the control can be gauged by the organisations which the correspondent quotes. He mentions the Technical Commission for Control of Industrial Development; the Technical Commission for the Control of Agricultural Development; the Monopoly for Hotel Building; the Monopoly for Hotel Ownership; the Monopoly for Matches, Tobacco and Salt; the Commission for Controlling the Distribution of Building Materials; monopolies for petrol, commercial motor transport, and so forth.

That is the other side of Italy's ideology. Peace has been more devastating to Abyssinia's economic conditions than war and it seems clear that the present state of affairs calls for sweeping changes and a more practical outlook. Failing this the whole Abyssinian enterprise may prove a colossal financial and economic failure leading to growing dissatisfaction which may turn to serious discontent in Italy, a situation that not even a dictator can view with equanimity.

To maintain internal order and protect the frontiers a colonial army of the Empire has been formed. Its basic organisation is much the same as that of the Army in India. It is divided into two parts; the African Detachments being composed entirely of Italians while the Colonial Detachments are formed of Abyssinians with Italian officers. The regional system of recruiting is employed for the native army and families are allowed to live with their husbands in the camps. This last simplifies the obtaining of sufficient numbers of recruits and is also an excellent method of political penetration and dissemination of propaganda.

The basic unit of the Colonial Detachments (Abyssinian) is the battalion which comprises three rifle companies and one machine-gun company. It has a fixed headquarters within its own recruiting area but the battalion can operate at a distance for a limited period. Enlistment is on a voluntary basis though this may be of an Italian pattern.

The Colonial Brigade (Abyssinian) consists of the following:

Four battalions.	}	one battery 65/17 guns.
One artillery group		two batteries of 81 mortars ¹
Engineer company.		
Field hospital.		
Services representatives.		

Eleven brigades are organised as above while the remaining six have a platoon of cavalry instead of the fourth infantry battalion.

The African Detachments (Italian) form the mobile reserves in the hands of the Viceroy and regional governors. That at Addis Ababa contains two regiments of Grenadiers, one regiment of artillery, three companies of engineers and the usual supply detachments. Attached is a special motorised unit of the Black Shirts of Africa which is capable of transporting the entire division. In Addis Ababa the ostensible task of the force is to guard the Viceroy but, to relieve it of purely garrison duties and to enable it to operate as a fighting entity, there also exists in the capital a force of four battalions of Black Shirts and eight batteries.

The remainder of the Italian troops are at the disposal of the five regional governors. They consist of nine motorised units of the Black Shirts of Africa. The military organisation is completed by the Engineers of Africa containing various specialists and a railway company. Finally there are the usual ancillary services.

The approximate aggregate strength of the armed land forces is stated to be:

2,000	officers (regular).
500	officers <i>di complemento</i> .
1,800	non-commissioned officers.
20,000	Italian troops.
40,000	Abyssinian troops.
12,000	horses and mules.

The General Headquarters staff is at Addis Ababa with a chief and assistant chief of staff, an inspector of artillery, inspector of Black Shirts and the heads of the supply services.

The essential principle of the organisation is that the armed land forces of Abyssinia shall be self-contained and able to undertake the defence of the frontiers and enforce internal order without having to call for any reinforcements from Italy. This

¹ These are infantry weapons in the Italian army but are used as artillery in the Colonial forces.

principle is being extended to Libya to which country large movements of troops from Italy have been reported recently.

Given that the above numbers are approximately correct, and there is little reason to doubt them to any extent, there is admittedly no sign of that enormous force which, it was alleged, would be raised to conquer perhaps Africa or more possibly Arabia. But it is also equally certain that Italy could not afford such a vast army at present. Again Italy's main and most urgent need is for raw materials. To supply these will necessitate large areas being put under cultivation, mines developed and all the other concomitants of production. This will require native labour which, though large, is not inexhaustible, nor can the native both serve in the army and work in the fields and factories. Thus, though a large army does not exist at present, it is well to remember that the basic organisation for raising it can now easily be improvised and it is well known that men of an excellent fighting type can be found in emergency or when the economic situation permits their release from productive work.

Before leaving the subject of the land forces a quasi-military organisation must be mentioned. By a Royal Decree¹ the Italian governors of the five provinces have been permitted to enrol the Italian labourers now in Abyssinia into a Voluntary Militia for National Security. At the end of May 1937, there were said to be about 130,000 of these working on roads and buildings. The objects of this scheme are threefold. Firstly, to maintain the prestige of these men by giving them uniforms, arms and regulations. As the Abyssinians despise navy work and will not do it, this matter of keeping up appearances as far as Italian labour is concerned is an important one. Secondly, the officers of the contingent maintain the "rights" of the workers *vis-a-vis* the contractors. The organisation also arranges all games and religious observances and generally supervises sanitary arrangements. Finally, they can be used in emergency as a disciplined body either to protect themselves or to assist in local security schemes.

¹ Cabinet approved this measure on October 19th, 1937.

MUNITION PROBLEMS BEFORE AND DURING WAR

A lecture given before the United Service Institution of India, by General Sir Henry E. ap Rhys Pryce, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., Master-General of Ordnance in India, on the 22nd July, 1937.

The lecturer was introduced by the Hon'ble Mr. J. C. Nixon, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

The essence of the munitions problem is to see that our forces in comparison with others are adequately armed both as regards the quality and quantity of their armament, and protected against hostile arms. This means constant research to improve our own weapons and the keeping of an unceasing watch on developments throughout the world, not only in pure armament but also in scientific matters. The need for this close watch will be appreciated when we remember how a simple thing like chlorine gas, ordinarily used for bleaching purposes, dyes or medicines, was unexpectedly utilised as a weapon of war by the Germans. We can neglect nothing and we have to be thankful to many men for their help in enabling us to keep abreast of other nations on land and sea and in the air, even if we are at times bothered by cranks and charlatans. The two worst cases I can remember of the latter were the crank who had a scheme for making icebergs under hostile submarines which brought them to the surface where you dealt with them as you willed, and the charlatan who dealt out death rays as he turned a handle. A general was sent down to inspect the weapon and much to his astonishment, when it was turned on a flock of sheep in a field, they died. However, being prepared for all things, he had brought along a veterinary officer who held a *post-mortem* then and there and discovered that the sheep had been given a dose of arsenic in time to ensure their death during the demonstration. But to many men we owe a deep debt of gratitude. Stokes for the Stokes mortar, Swinton, Churchill and others for the tank, Mills for the grenade.

Apart from keeping in touch with developments, we have to consider in peace the amounts of armament and munitions which will be required in war. It is no secret that we underestimated our requirements for the last war and that for two years men had to make good in lives and blood what they lacked in material.

When we see that the war plans of most nations to-day involve the mobilization of all adults, either for fighting, production, or necessary public services, it will be realised that we cannot afford to underestimate a second time. But this difference between peace and war requirements is hard to visualise. At the beginning of the Great War there were 486 guns in France. In 1918 there were 7,603 guns and 3,022 mortars, while the monthly shipments of ammunition had risen from a few hundred tons to some two hundred thousand.

Still this estimate must be made and for the sake merely of illustration I will assume that our war requirements are calculated to be eight times our peace requirements. To keep stocked in peace eight times our normal needs would be enormously costly. As a compromise, therefore, we have to decide what we must maintain in peace and what we shall have to or can expand to in war. We can then settle what arrangements must be made for the difference, until such time as Ordnance factories and the trade can get into full war production.

Now the problem for many articles, of which in the Ordnance alone we have close on thirty thousand, has usually to be worked out on the following lines. Ordinary monthly peace requirements are known and met by manufacture on a steady flow and there is usually no trouble, but in case of a breakdown through strikes, transport delays, or sudden rises in demand owing to minor operations and other causes, we in India keep a three months stock of indigenous and a six months stock of overseas supplies, these periods being about the time that the trade and government factories usually take to comply with orders. With the present feverish race in armaments this period for overseas delivery has lengthened considerably and we shall have to increase our stocks. It is therefore more important than ever that we should develop indigenous sources of supply and manufacture so as to ensure our being self-supporting as far as we can and to avoid the unnecessary locking up of capital. Having decided on our estimate of monthly war requirements, calculations have to be made for the plant, machinery, tools and motive power required to produce them and for the labour necessary to work the tools and plant. If all of these can be made available at about the same time, well and good. But usually one or other item will hold up full-scale production. For instance light and heavy machinery are now taking twelve and eighteen months respectively from the date of order to receipt.

The difference between what the factories and the trade can produce in peace and what they will be required to produce in war, and the time they require to get into full war production, are the basis on which war reserves must be maintained. You will therefore see why we in India are anxious for three things:

Firstly, an adequate supply of highly skilled labour;

Secondly, the development of indigenous resources, which will give us our full requirements quicker than overseas supplies; and

Thirdly, a substantial reserve of plant and machinery available within the country.

It is in the matter of labour that much requires to be done. As an example we may take the gland of the muzzle attachment for a Vickers machine-gun. Twenty-six operations and nineteen different tools are required in its manufacture, as well as thirty-one gauges to see that the work is correct. The extension in the use of machines in place of handwork, the greater accuracy and finer tolerances now demanded, the introduction of new metals, high speed tools and welding, and particularly the making of jigs and gauges require a higher class of workman than the old type. Thirty years ago Sir John Hewett wrote regarding technical and industrial education that on no subject had more been written and less accomplished. That is still true to-day, although a start has been made by certain Provincial Governments, by the Railways and by the Ordnance. What India needs so much is the imparting of technical education to people with a sound general education and not to ill-educated workmen who cannot grasp modern technicalities. Unfortunately the well-educated man dislikes the practical side and wants a highly paid appointment without the preliminary period of hard work which employers deem essential for the making of a successful supervisor. The finished products of industrial schools have little resemblance to a skilled worker and what is really needed are apprentice schools attached to large workshops and factories.

As regards indigenous supplies, it would probably be best to take another example, a .303" rifle cartridge. To the ordinary eye it appears to consist of a nickel bullet, a brass case, a cap with some explosive mixture in it and, from hearsay, some cordite. But the manufacturer wants thirty-two different materials to make the cartridge. The copper and zinc in it may have come from Australia, Rhodesia, or Canada, the nickel from Canada, the lead from Australia, mineral jelly from Burma, antimony from China,

aluminium from Canada or Scotland, tin from Malaya, glycerine from England, mercury from Spain, Italy, or the United States, sodium nitrate from Chile, sulphur from Japan or Sicily and manganese, shellac, beeswax, acetone, soda ash and cotton waste from India. In the same way, not in this cartridge, but in the processes required to make it, some sixty-nine articles have been drawn from all over the world. How much more advantageous it would be if we could obtain most of these from India and Burma.

We have done something towards this. We now get antimony from Burma instead of China, and we make glycerine in India. But the mercury required for fulminates in explosives, that is in the cap of the cartridge, is not to be had locally and, if supplies were cut off, we should have to substitute either lead-azide or diazodinitro-phenol. And the very small amount of sulphuric acid, which is the key to most chemical and metallurgical processes, produced and used in India shows that the country is still in its industrial infancy. From a munitions point of view the production of metals and metallic ores is of the greatest importance. India imports annually twelve crores worth of metals mostly in the shape of finished products, some of which she will be unable to get in war, and exports about six crores worth of ores, some of which are of the greatest value in war. India and Burma have large natural resources in manganese, wolfram and bauxite, the latter two being the ores from which tungsten and aluminium are produced. As regards manganese, India is actually the second biggest producer in the world and it was largely due to a Mr. Heath of the East India Company that this metal was introduced to the world to make an alloy with iron which revolutionized the steel industry in England. Of tungsten it has been said that to deprive a nation of access to supplies of the metal is to cripple its military power in war and to ruin its industrial life in peace. As you know, tungsten and steel, as an alloy, are necessary for all high speed cutting tools and are far more efficient than the ordinary carbon steel. Aluminium is not made in India because it is said that a 10,000-ton-a-year plant would be required to make production profitable and nobody is willing to put down the money for it, possibly because there is an insufficiency of cheap hydraulic power available. Yet factories with half this output are working in Europe.

Here we have three of the most important metals, not only for munition purposes but also for commercial uses, available in

plenty in their raw state in India and Burma. What an advantage it would be if some Indian magnate would start to manufacture them in the country instead of their being exported to come back as finished products.

More serious perhaps is the fact that India has to import in peace machinery worth thirteen crores of rupees and belting worth half a crore of rupees. In war a drop of, say, 20 per cent. in these imports caused by enemy action at sea and a further drop of anything between 20 and 50 per cent. due to the fact that the United Kingdom would have to supply her own needs first, might occur. All that we could do in the circumstances would be to patch up the old machinery and try to carry on.

From the little I have said, I think you will realize that in war a nation's strength is measured not only by its army, navy, and air force but also by the quantities of basic raw material it possesses or can obtain, by its machine power, its capacity for industrialization and its means of transportation; for it is on these that defence forces depend for their maintenance.

Let us now suppose that war has broken out and consider the problems involved from the broadest point of view. The first essential is the maintenance of credit and exchange. Manufacturers must know where they stand as regards prices if they are to carry on production at all. In the Great War, until America came in, one of our greatest troubles was this constantly narrowing bottle neck of money. The British Government had in the first place to guarantee £500 millions of overseas securities to provide money wherewith to extend munition factories and to finance the war generally. As time went on it became increasingly difficult to pay for imports and, as you may remember, the British Government had to call on such citizens as owned American securities to surrender them in return for a British war loan to the same value, so that they might pay with those securities for munitions bought in America.

The next requirement is the control of shipping, since import into India in one form or another—whether as natural ore or as finished products—will be necessary. Various expedients can help to economise shipping resources—good dock and clearing organizations, the drawing of supplies from the nearest source and so on. It may seem strange talking about shipping and finance, but India is dependent on them for her purchases and imports, and without them she cannot produce munitions on an adequate scale.

Having done our best to ensure a constant flow of raw materials, our next task is to turn out enough finished articles to meet demands. To make the necessary estimates of what will be required we must have information about the strength of our forces, where they will be employed and for how long, the climate of the theatre of operations in summer and winter, so as to provide adequate and suitable clothing and equipment, and the scale and severity of the anticipated fighting. These estimates must be made for periods of at least twelve months ahead, if raw material is to be readily available, and only a first-class prophet can give the right answer.

How divergent opinions can be as to the length of operations is shown by Sir John French's estimate of three months, Lord Kitchener's estimate of three years, and the actual four and a quarter years of the Great War with its repercussions for some two years afterwards in Afghanistan, Mesopotamia, and other places. One's judgment is apt to be affected by the disinclination to prepare for a long and costly war. But it is better to win than to lose, and anything still unused at the end of the war can be utilised to reduce budgets. So it is really sound policy to calculate wholeheartedly what effort is required, how long it will take to win and to prepare for that.

It will soon be evident whether pre-war estimates were sufficient or not, and there will nearly always be a deficiency in one form or another. The watch on supply and demand must never be relaxed. The moment it is seen that supplies are likely to be short a priority committee should be appointed by Government to decide how available supplies are to be allocated and what development of resources is necessary to ensure that likely deficiencies are made good. In addition to the Fighting Services there will also be other claimants; the railways, public services, and the trade. It will be necessary to consider which of these is really the most important claimant from the point of view of winning the war and to devote the bulk of available supplies to its use. The development of supplies will call for co-operation by Provincial Governments, who may have to appoint controllers for the materials required. Government, the Services, and the trade will all have to be represented in this control and it will be necessary to have, in addition to experts, men with powers of rapid decision, forceful men, full of intuition and ability to improvise.

The last major problem will be that of contracts. When war breaks out, peace contracts will still be running. They will have

to be supplemented by war contracts for far larger amounts. There will be the danger of mushroom firms that spring up, put in low tenders, and usually fail to supply; there will be a rise in prices due to paucity of supply and inter-competition; and demands from firms for Government assistance in the way of procuring the extra machinery and raw materials required. Last, but not least, arrangements must be made at the time for the rapid liquidation of contracts on the cessation of hostilities. It was found in 1918 that many firms were in arrears with their deliveries and claimed that they should be allowed to make good those arrears. As the troops had had to do without the goods and had been inconvenienced by their lack, it was unthinkable that we should take and pay for them when we no longer needed them. Therefore, in contracts we must have a clause that on the cessation of hostilities the amount to be delivered shall automatically be reduced to the amount that has actually been delivered, the disposal of raw material and semi-finished articles being arranged by mutual agreement between the contractor and the State.

I have spoken so far from the producer's standpoint, but we must also look at matters from the point of view of the user. The first thing that the user has to do is to keep in thorough repair what is essential for fighting. If he does not do this, he not only lowers his own fighting efficiency but throws a great strain on munitions factories. Apart from personal care on the part of the user, the difference between peace and war is so great that we have to have specialists in the field—Ordnance inspectors, mechanical engineers, armourers and armament artificers, to see how arms, ammunition and equipment are standing the strain and to be ready with remedies. In war a single gun may fire as much in one day as a six-gun battery normally fires in a year in peace and it is not surprising that faults are discovered which have never before come to light. Amongst the things that have to be dealt with are periodical inspection of the bore of a gun to ascertain wear and erosion and the date when it is likely to become too inaccurate for further use; constant inspection of ammunition, especially if it has been imported from a foreign country or made under conditions of haste; and a special watch on new equipments started during the campaign. For example, in the Great War, the 6-inch artillery equipment, a new one at the time, had in the light of practical experience nearly one hundred and fifty modifications made to it, all tending to improve efficiency and many being devised and carried out in the field.

Salvage is another most important duty of the user. The savings can be immense, if it is carried out well. Units can help enormously in avoiding waste and unnecessary indents if they carry out salvage as a matter of routine. I can quote two instances. I remember after a battle having an indent put in to me for forty-one Lewis guns. I arranged for salvage parties to be sent out from each battalion concerned and they succeeded in picking up thirty-four guns in a perfectly good state, so that the indent was reduced to seven guns.

The second case was one of definite panic on the part of a certain division at Loos in September 1915, which wired its army headquarters that it had lost the whole of its equipment, which required instant replacement without the formality of indents or vouchers. Equipment there would have meant guns, rifles, machine-guns, bayonets, belts, pouches and ammunition. A sane and steady Ordnance officer was sent up to visit the division, its brigades and units, and found that the only important deficiencies were twenty-six machine-guns, seventy-six bicycles and five pontoon wagons, all of which were replaced within a few hours.

Apart from recovery of lost equipment, it is surprising what can be done with apparently worthless stuff. In the war old clothes that looked mere rags had a market value of nearly a thousand rupees a ton, were cleaned, torn, and rewoven into good cloth. Laces were cut from the uppers of old boots and roughly one new boot could be made from the remains of four old ones. It is wonderful too how an article that has finished its useful life as one thing can get a new lease of life as something else. Old tentage makes good cook's clothing or nose bags; worn out ground sheets become ration bags; spokes of condemned wheels make excellent legs for tables and chairs.

Apart from his workshop and salvage activities, an Ordnance officer's life in war is mainly one of estimating what troops are likely to require, ordering the same and receiving and delivering it. Estimates have to be based both on a long and a short view; the long one possibly a year ahead so that factories can make the munitions in time; the short view for the immediate necessities of the current month and the month ahead. The fluctuations in ordnance requirements will be large enough at any time. In France, for the two months before the German offensive of March 1918, the Royal Army Ordnance Corps were issuing a weekly average of seventy thousand rifles, packs, blankets, boots, and respirators and these are only some of the thirty thousand articles

with which, as I mentioned earlier, the Ordnance Services have to deal. During the three weeks following the offensive just on four hundred and seventy thousand of the same articles were delivered, or six times as many. With the great increases in demands for armoured fighting vehicles, anti-aircraft and gas equipment, the problem of estimating requirements will not be any easier.

I must apologise for having been able to give only a very brief and inadequate outline of my subject, but to try and compress the vast problem of munitions supply into the space of an hour is well nigh impossible. I trust, however, that I have made it clear that one must in future look on economic mobilization as of equal importance with the mobilization of armed forces and that the more a nation is self-supporting in economic resources and trained to use those resources wisely, the greater will be its chances of success in a prolonged struggle. If I have made this clear I feel confident that in time India will become more self-reliant from a war economic point of view, whilst at the same time improving her economic position in peace. Before closing I would like to express my thanks to the officers of the M. G. O.'s Branch, the members of the Principal Supply Officers Committee, and to the director of the Geological Survey of the Government of India for their assistance in preparing information and facts for this lecture and I would thank you for having listened to a somewhat dry subject.

PEACE OR WAR?

BY COLONEL H. H. RICH

At the end of the Great War a certain senior officer is reported to have said: "Thank Heaven, that is over, now we can get down to a bit of real soldiering." In effect his words meant that war was over and training for peace could again be started. The writer suggests that this idea is still prevalent to-day and that training of commanders is training for PEACE and not training for WAR. This is borne out by the fact that no sooner do units come back from operations on the Frontier than people start talking about annual collective training.

The opening words of Training Regulations show that training for war has but one aim—success in battle. Unfortunately training for peace has two major goals—the one numerical and the other psychological. The numerical goal makes us strive to produce better figures than last year; better figures than those of someone else. In this striving for figures the end sometimes justifies any means. The psychological goal makes us study the foibles of our superiors and, by pandering to these, acquire a superficial gloss which does not always represent the true metal underneath. Although the psychological goal has some slight value under the heading of "surprise and distraction of the enemy" which will be discussed later, the numerical goal is nothing but a danger. It inculcates a linear habit of thought and we fight our battles by measurement instead of tactics. How often is an attack anything but a succession of frontages divided into equal parts? We usually hear—

"Y" battalion right, "Z" left;

"A" company right, "B" left;

irrespective of the fact that "Z" battalion and "B" company have to cross an open plain to reach their objective, when by following behind "Y" battalion or "A" company and then attacking from a flank they would suffer considerably fewer casualties.

Field Service Regulations, Volume II, section 11, has a long paragraph on the art of command. The contents of this paragraph can be suitably summarised under two headings—destructive and constructive. Under the destructive heading are given some of the difficulties which beset a commander in war—danger and

fatigue; unforeseen incidents; the enemy doing something unexpected; important messages going astray; and imperfect knowledge of the situation. Under the constructive heading are included—clear definition and maintenance of object; surprise and distraction of the enemy; speed in action; concentration of all available means; offensive action; and constant thinking ahead. This last heading is not in the book, but it includes two headings that are, *viz.*, “quick thought in action” and “constant watchfulness.”

We train our leaders by giving them tactical exercises either with or without troops. We differentiate between exercises designed to teach definite lessons and those intended to give practice in command. It is with the latter that this article largely deals and the writer proposes to consider both exercises with and without troops generally. Tactical exercises without troops will be referred to as “tewts,” exercises with troops as “exercises” and manoeuvres as “manoeuvres.”

Danger and fatigue

Danger, except of the bowler hat, cannot be brought into peace training. In “tewts,” and usually in exercises, we make our plans under the most favourable conditions, often before any movements have taken place or, at the worst, after a short approach march. During manoeuvres commanders do occasionally have to work under conditions which involve approximately the same degree of fatigue as they would experience in war. As a rule it is extremely difficult to bring in fatigue without producing unreal situations or introducing boredom. In war we strive to keep commanders as mentally fit as possible and we do our best to prevent their undergoing undue fatigue and the same should hold good in peace training. In war commanders ride or drive about in cars. A long march for officers before a “tewt” would be a prodigious waste of time and we cannot start by making senior officers double round the race-course or ride twenty miles across country. Mechanization helps us a little in this respect, and officers who have driven some way in a covered lorry which ensures that the exhaust gases have their fullest effect will not be at their physical best when confronted with a situation. The use of gas masks might assist in producing a species of fatigue quickly. But to expect troops to make a long march as a mere preliminary to a situation is asking a lot of human nature unexhilarated by the excitement of war. Reluctantly the writer has come to the conclusion that it is almost impossible to introduce fatigue, except during manoeuvres, without, at the same time, bringing in unreality and boredom.

Unforeseen incidents

The British character is such that it likes to find a precedent for everything and we have carried this trait into the army to such an extent that we are, probably, the most regulation-ridden body in the world. The result is that our military minds are extremely orderly and we dislike anything unforeseen. The history of battles teems with examples, small and great, of unforeseen incidents turning the fortunes of war; the geese that saved Rome, Wolfe's track up the heights of Abraham, Wellesley's ford at Assaye and the landing in the wrong spot at "X" beach in Gallipoli, which the Turks had thought impossible. In spite of all these lessons our "tewts" and exercises are usually straightforward and if a director does produce something we had not thought of, he is immediately accused of being a conjuror and of producing "rabbits out of a hat." We must get rid of this habit of thought and realise that unforeseen incidents will always be occurring in war. By using our ingenuity we can bring unforeseen incidents into peace training so that we shall get into the habit of expecting them in war. We should remember Marshal Lyautey's words:

"No one ever sees enough of the unforeseen, of risks, of miscalculations; no one ever reckons broadly or largely enough."

And also General Fuller's:

"We must prepare ourselves for the unexpected in place of training others for the cut and dried."

The enemy doing something unexpected

We are still inclined to look on war as a kind of game and expect the enemy to conform to a set of rules framed by ourselves. Accordingly in most "tewts" and exercises the enemy is accommodating and plays the game. He waits patiently while we do our numerous reconnaissances, evolve our fire plan and fix our zero some three hours later. Almost the only unexpected thing he ever does is to slip away in this period and then we are apt to accuse him of doing the impossible. Imagine our feelings in a "tewt" if the enemy suddenly attacked us in the interval between first contact and the zero hour of our attack; we would certainly count it as an unfriendly act on the part of the director whom we would also write down as a super-magician. Again the enemy obligingly keeps the machine-guns which we have located in the same places; will he be so accommodating in war? We must train ourselves continually in peace to be ready for unexpected developments on the part of the enemy so that when they occur in war, as

they surely will, we shall be in the right frame of mind to receive them.

Important messages going astray

We are fortunate in our signal service in peace in that messages are almost always delivered into the hand of the right person in a reasonable time. Runners and despatch riders do not often get lost and are rarely made casualties. Eventually our peace training causes us to make the unwarrantable assumption that a message written is a message delivered. We do not think of the difficulties and dangers that arise in war. Wires are cut by enemy shell fire and by our own vehicles, runners get wounded or deliver messages to the wrong people, and places are not nearly so easy to find when bullets make one take a really covered line of movement. It is not very difficult to introduce into exercises and even "tewts" an air of reality in this respect; all that is required is an issue of wire cutters to umpires and the occasional loss of a runner.

Imperfect knowledge of the situation

One of our greatest errors in training, especially in "tewts," is that we give too much information and what is more we dish it up nicely. So much is this the case that commanders expect this in exercises and manœuvres and are inclined to do nothing until they get it. In war all information has to be sought for and often fought for. The information we get is in direct proportion to our efforts to obtain it. If we give general instructions we shall get vague information. The information-gaining officers—either on the ground or in the air—are never completely in the mind of the commander, however much he may strive to put them there, as the commander's mind never is or never should be stationary. There are always fresh gaps that the commander wants filled and he has perpetually to be giving his mobile troops and air force fresh instructions to try and fill these gaps in his information.

The details of information are collected by subordinate commanders who, in most cases, have to extract the news they want. To take a case in point, where a company from an Indian battalion is finding the enemy, a patrol reports that it saw fifteen enemy in a certain place; that is all to the good, but think what it would mean to the commander if he knew that the whole of the enemy was there or thereabouts. How can this be found out? Often by judicious questioning as to whether an officer had been seen or not. It is in these details that we must practise ourselves in peace and our schemes should not omit to impress these important

matters on the minds of all commanders. Again, in Field Service Regulations it is recognised that the subordinate in the front line is too busy doing other things to be keeping on sending back messages and that the superior commander must take steps to collect his own information. It is doubtful if this is brought out sufficiently in exercises. Too often we sit back and curse the man in front for not sending us news and use this lack of information as an excuse for doing nothing.

Clear definition and maintenance of the object

Theoretically the definition of the object is often one of the hardest military problems, especially in written exercises and academic discussions; in practice it is probably not so difficult, and often reduces itself to the words of General Sir Alexander Napolington who is reported to have said: "I never know what the object is, but I know what I want to do."

That is what we must be clear about—object, knowing what we want to do, or anything else it can be called. If our instructions are vague, it is up to us to tackle our superiors and make them give us something solid on which to bite. If a subordinate gets indefinite instructions and accepts them, he has only himself to blame when his subsequent actions meet with disapproval.

Once we have made up our minds about the object, all our energies must be directed on its attainment. Nothing is easier and nothing more likely to lead to failure than the attempt to do everything or, still worse, to chase each hare as it crosses our path. In war many things will tend to draw us away from our object, unsuspected enemy dispositions, threats of hostile action from unforeseen directions and information arriving in after we have made our plan. The last is always a source of danger and often exercises an undue effect on us, as, being the most recent, it leaves the most vivid impression on our minds. Rigidity in war is one of the seven deadly sins, and although we must at times, especially when vitally different information comes in, be prepared to change our minds, we must, at the same time, remember the adage—"Order, counter-order and disorder."

It is considered that this aspect should occasionally be introduced into training with a view to bringing out the difference in action when a commander sticks to his object and when he allows himself to be influenced by some, in reality, trivial information which takes too prominent a place in his mind.

Surprise and distraction of the enemy

War is chiefly a combat between the wills of the opposing commanders and often a battle is won or lost before a shot has been fired. Bravery and staunchness of the troops can, on certain occasions, mean the difference between victory and defeat, but when a commander starts with an inferiority complex it takes more than that to restore the balance. Fear of the unknown is, probably, the most cogent fear there is and this is equally true in war. Most commanders are, naturally, prone to consider their own doubts and uncertainties and do not realise that the enemy leader is in an equally parlous state. We should try and exploit this indecision on the part of the enemy until we get him into a dithering state of nerves. To achieve this we must always be thinking out ways and means, big and small, to keep the enemy guessing. A false reconnaissance can be made to cause him to think that an attack is coming from a certain direction when it is, in reality, coming from another; the use of artillery registration for the same purpose and the employment of smoke to deceive him are other possibilities. In fact there are a thousand and one ways in which we can gain the desired end, but do we do it? Are we not, as I have indicated before, creatures of habit and consequently too straightforward? The first thing to do is to make a plan and stick to it, but once the necessary steps have been taken to put that plan into execution then is the time to deceive the enemy. We can use our reserves, possibly, for this purpose and we can certainly employ our mobile troops.

We must get into the habit of thinking out how we can deceive the enemy and keep him guessing. Study and reflection are necessary; we should read the ruses employed by the commanders of old and recollect stories of human nature, stories like the "Second Degree" in the "Green Curve," and then we shall realise how easily gullible people are. This is particularly the case if the enemy has, for any reason, a preconceived idea and if we have been able to sow a wrong seed in his mind. It is well worth trying to keep such an idea alive by odd bits of information which tend to confirm his preconceived notions.

Speed in action

Speed in action is largely the result of organization and clear thinking in peace. In nearly every operation there is a preliminary drill and it is in this preliminary drill that we can gain time. Without taking an unjustifiable risk it is impossible to

speed up by cutting down the time allotted to other people—the junior leaders—for their reconnaissances and orders; their going wrong can mean the difference between defeat and victory, just as can the error of the highest commander.

Almost the first action of a commander when having to make a plan is a short appreciation of the time factor, and any minutes spent on this will be saved many times over. Take the case of a battalion commander who has been told to attack, crossing a start line at a certain time. He should sit down and consider the number of minutes before his battalion has to be at the correct place, this often means the difference between a full and a hungry man. Then the time factor for reconnaissances and orders of section, platoon, and company commanders and his own orders has to be calculated and the sum subtracted from the time available before zero hour. The result gives the amount of time that can be spent on his own reconnaissance. The commander will thus know whether he has time to visit both flanks or whether he will have to make his plan from some central viewpoint. The actual timings for the periods allotted for the reconnaissances and orders of platoon and section commanders will be based on figures worked out in peace. As their movement is small the time will not be much altered by the ground. Company commanders have bigger areas to cover and will be dependent to a certain degree on ground, but against this is the fact that they will be mounted.

There are various expedients for giving everyone a flying start, such as indicating the areas which subordinate commanders should be studying before they get their detailed orders, pointing out landmarks, and generally putting them into the picture so that the actual giving out of orders will be shortened.

As this speed in action is in peace so largely a question of organization, there should be no excuse for the commander who wastes time and directors should make a point of checking to see if there has been an avoidable loss of time. There is, of course, a difference in the time factor in peace and in war. Reconnaissances will always take longer in war when there are enemy bullets and shells and we have to crawl about instead of assuming the ostrich-like movement so often seen in peace; but the real difference in the time factor in war is noticeable after, and not before, troops have crossed the start line.

Concentration of all available means

Rarely, if ever, are we in the enviable position of having sufficient troops to be safe everywhere with a surplus for putting

in at the decisive point. Usually in order to concentrate all available means in one place, we have to take calculated risks in others. We must remember that the greater the strength we collect at the decisive point the greater will be our chance of success, and if we win there it does not matter if we are defeated locally elsewhere. Bound up with this concentration is the question of a reserve and in this we must keep our sense of proportion. The Englishman likes to *keep* a reserve instead of *having* one; that is, he likes to keep a unit or sub-unit always in reserve for use at the last possible moment or, preferably, not for use at all if the emergency does not arise. Having a reserve is slightly different. Here, to start off with, a unit or sub-unit is kept in reserve but, when a sudden opportunity (not emergency) presents itself, the reserve is pushed in, may be quite early in the operation. Then the reserve must be built up again by collecting troops that have done their job or been squeezed out when the first reserve was put in. A reserve is a necessity, but it is just as necessary to use it when opportunity offers.

We can do a lot towards getting this mentality in our peace training and directors should be prepared to encourage the "calculated risk" commander at the expense of the "safety first" commander. Exercises should occasionally be framed to bring out unexpected opportunities to teach commanders the use of their reserves when the chance presents itself.

Offensive action

It is a platitude to say that battles cannot be won without offensive action, but, at the same time, Field Service Regulations warn us against adopting the offensive just for the sake of so doing. When there is doubt as to what to do, offensive action almost always pays and on these occasions we should remember one of the earlier maxims of Sir Alexander Napolington:

"Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just,

But ten times he who gets his blow in fust."

The spirit of offensive action is one that should be encouraged in all leaders down to the most junior, since it is largely courage and endurance which, other things being equal, result in victories in war. The balance between victory and defeat is surprisingly small and there have been many examples in history of victory being achieved by the action of a few individuals or a sub-unit. We must, however, keep our sense of proportion over this, as the size of the sub-unit which is able to effect

a decisive result depends on the size of the force involved; for instance no one would expect a rifle section working independently to turn the scales in a brigade attack whereas a company, certainly, or a platoon, perhaps, occasionally could do this.

Our training could help very greatly over this spirit of offensive action; unfortunately it does not, as sometimes independent action on these lines may upset a director's carefully arranged day. When sub-units are not given credit for successful action they are discouraged and their leaders will not take similar action on another occasion. It is a question of intelligent umpiring and a sufficiency of umpires. There is no reason why a director should not allow his plans to go awry; he should be able to produce something fresh. We have an excellent system of "stand fast" and "continue" bugle calls and have only got to get the troops used to them.

Constant thinking ahead

This heading does not appear in the paragraph of Field Service Regulations quoted at the beginning of this article, but it includes two that are—"quick thought in an emergency" and "constant watchfulness."

A commander, however junior, can never "let up;" as soon as he has made a plan and issued orders to put it into effect, he must start thinking of the next phase of the operation. His thoughts will probably run on two lines; possible enemy reactions to his plan; and the movements of his headquarters and reserves to keep up momentum, to take advantage of success or to retrieve failure. He must try and put himself in the enemy's position and think out ways by which his plan can be embarrassed and then his method of taking advantage of the enemy's action. His ideas, in attack, might run on these lines: "Supposing the enemy discloses unexpected fire power from such and such a direction and holds up my attack, how can I best deal with it?" And he thinks out the answer which is probably more of his own fire power applied to that area. Also a commander should be continually asking himself if it is time to move his headquarters or reserves forward, remembering the principle that—

"Reserves should be moved forward . . . as the attack progresses, so that they can be used with the minimum of delay."

Here it is always a question of taking a risk. A commander may consider that when his forward troops have reached a certain place it is probable that the attack will succeed and that he should then move up his reserve and headquarters. If he has

guessed right his reserve is in a position to deal with any enemy counter-attack. If he has guessed wrong he is no worse off, provided that he has moved his reserve to a tactical bound; even in this case it will probably be to his advantage in causing surprise to the enemy who will not expect to meet it so far forward. It is largely a question of appreciation of ground, and the commander of a small force should put himself in a position from which he can get a general view of the area in which his unit is working.

So it seems that, in war, a commander's day is divided up into distinct phases. Phases of quick physical action in making reconnaissances or moving from old to new headquarters, alternated with phases of deep mental concentration in making plans and then thinking ahead as to their effect.

Is this so in our peace training? The tendency is often the other way, the commander does a reconnaissance and gives out the necessary orders. He then sits back, chats to the director and umpires, admires the view and does not do much until he gets back a report that the objective has been captured. He then sets in motion a leisurely advance and arrives on the objective in time to become personally involved in the enemy's counter-attack. We must do all we can in peace training to make a habit of this thinking ahead, usually the director will have to initiate it. Probably all that is necessary is a question as to when the commander proposes to move his headquarters and reserve, and if he seems dilatory then the lesson can be brought out by arranging an enemy counter-attack at an inconvenient moment.

Conclusion

Unfortunately Training Regulations uses the word "doctrine" on its first page. A consequence of this is that many people take it in the wrong sense of dogma and in their efforts to teach a common doctrine become doctrinaires. The step is not a very big one. Take a horrible example—the Battle of Dujaila in the operations to relieve Kut. The doctrine was that an artillery bombardment was essential to an attack. When the troops arrived a redoubt was unoccupied, but the bombardment was duly carried out; the Turks had time to reoccupy their trenches and the subsequent attack was a failure.

Our peace training is apt to run on these lines: common doctrine—doctrinarianism—rigidity—defeat in battle.

Training for war should be on these lines: common sense—appreciation of ground—wits—courage and endurance—success in battle.

IMPROVISED ARMoured TRAINS ON THE NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL A. A. PHILLIPS, V.D., THE N. W. RAILWAY
BATTALION, A.F.I.

The present training in the North-Western Railway Battalion in improvising armoured trains takes place in camp and consists of armoured a high-sided truck with sleepers and shingle and a low-sided truck with sandbags. It imposes a heavy strain upon the men most of whom are unused to manual labour. In actual practice they would never be called upon to undertake this labour since railway staff are far too valuable to be used for cooly work. The value of the training lies in the fact that by actually performing the work the men learn how to supervise it. From this point of view the training undoubtedly is of considerable use. For instance, when it was first started sandbags were heaved up into the truck from ground level. Now it is taken as a matter of course that the first thing to do is to construct a ramp by which the material may be carried in. At the same time it must be admitted that the training is wasted on a large number of privates who have not sufficient intelligence or military knowledge to supervise a job of this sort. On the other hand with really good detailed plans any intelligent N. C. O., or railway foreman without military knowledge, should be able to supervise the work without previous practice. It is considered, therefore, that the right answer is to cut out this training altogether so far as the men are concerned and to confine it to a theoretical lecture to the N. C. Os. But it is essential that plans should be issued to every detachment and it might even be advisable to keep material ready cut into the required length in loco sheds.

As regards the nature of the armoured, sandbags are very unsatisfactory. They take up an excessive amount of space, are very heavy, and are dangerously unstable if raised to more than kneeling height. Shingle and sleepers are better but they also have the disadvantage of excessive weight and bulk. As an instance of this may be quoted the case of a permanent improvised armoured train which used to be maintained some fifteen years ago by the Regular Army at Rawalpindi. The armoured of the barbette trucks was shingle held against the sides of the trucks by boards. Even in this case when at the request of the Army a

small amount of extra shingle was added, the trucks were condemned as unfit to run since, even when empty, the weight on the springs was excessive. Still more is this likely to be the case if sleepers are used instead of boards. However, if it is decided to continue the use of improvised armour, the best design would probably be a framework of sleepers holding the shingle against the sides of the truck (high-sided) by corrugated iron sheets. It is essential that an overhead framework should be provided over which tarpaulins may be stretched. This will serve the double purpose of protection from bombs and protection of the crew from the sun. Armouring with sandbags should definitely be abandoned as unsatisfactory both on account of the reasons given above and because it has been found to take longer to armour with sandbags than with shingle.

The question of the most suitable type of armour for these trains leads on to the further question of whether it is really necessary to armour them at all. Armoured trains may be used for three purposes:

(i) *In regular warfare where they are likely to be exposed to shell fire.*

In the Great War on the western front armoured trains became merely a vehicle for moving heavy guns rapidly from point to point. I believe I am right in stating that in some cases these trains carried armour of considerable thickness to protect them against shell fire. In open warfare the main theatre in which they were used was in Russia. The British in certain cases used them in teams of three the leading trains carrying infantry and "landing parties" of both infantry and cavalry while the rearmost train supported them with artillery. In all such cases it is obvious that the train must carry armour of sufficient thickness to afford protection not only against rifle fire but also against shell splinters. Hitherto the necessity for such trains has never arisen in India. Should it arise it is obvious that the trains will have to be specially prepared or built for the purpose.

(ii) *In Frontier warfare*

The permanent armoured trains, which used to exist in India but have now been scrapped, came into action more than once.

The essential condition for frontier warfare is that the train should be proof against rifle fire from modern weapons. The present method of improvising armoured trains provides no overhead cover and the personnel concerned are in consequence practically helpless if ambushed in a cutting. The point was well

illustrated in the Afghan War of 1920 when an improvised train manned by regular troops was derailed in a cutting at Kucha Garhi and the whole crew wiped out. For frontier warfare, therefore, trucks should be armoured with armour-plate. It is inadvisable that trucks should be kept permanently armoured both on account of the expense of maintaining them and of tying up rolling-stock in this manner and also on account of the fact that vehicles deteriorate when not used and it takes a considerable time to bring them into condition to run. For this purpose, therefore, designs should be got out for armouring with armour-plate, preferably bogie covered wagons. The design should provide for overhead cover and for cutting out the end of the wagon to convert it into a barbette truck. Obviously this is a job for railway workshops which should, if it is considered necessary, keep the material ready.

(iii) *In Internal Security*

This is the primary use for which our improvised armoured trains are intended, but it is doubtful if the armouring is by any means essential. Our chief experience of the use of armoured trains for internal security was obtained in the Punjab in 1919. Although armoured trains and improvised armoured trains at this time were of considerable use and on several occasions came into action, I am aware of no instance in which a shot was fired at them. A few examples of their use at that time may be given as illustrations from which to draw deductions.

In one case an armoured train doubled on its tracks and came suddenly upon a mob demolishing the line behind it. A number of casualties were inflicted on the mob which was caught by the searchlights of the train.

In another case a train proceeded under the orders of the G. O. C., Lahore District, to collect the *lambardars* of all villages near the line between Lahore and Montgomery. These men were brought in, interviewed and warned by the G. O. C., and returned to their villages.

In another case a train landed a party which attacked a group of rioters occupying a village and drove them out.

In other cases trains were used to patrol sections of the line in order to raise the morale of the railway staff and to arrest a few disloyal ones. In the western Punjab where roads are non-existent, whole sections of the line were cut off from all communications for several days until relieved by improvised armoured trains which toured the line, restoring confidence, gaining information and

giving demonstrations of the power of their weapons to interested local inhabitants.

In all these cases, however, it appears that their functions could just as well have been carried out by unarmoured patrol trains. Even if fired upon, the sides of the trucks provide protection from sight and a considerable amount of protection from fire which would probably be from shot-guns or from sporting rifles with soft-nosed bullets. I feel that on this question of armouring we are suffering from a similar obsession to that which I once found when I was attached to a contingent of light motor patrols. All their training and tactics were based on the Armoured Car Manual. They had entirely failed to realise that an unarmoured motor car is a very different proposition to an armoured one and has entirely different functions. The true functions of the unarmoured and very vulnerable motor car are not, as this unit imagined, to sail boldly up within range of the enemy and spray them with bullets from Vickers guns mounted in front of the car, but to serve as a highly mobile vehicle for the conveyance of machine-guns and riflemen from point to point—the vehicle itself being as far as possible kept out of sight or out of range during action. In the same way my view is that what are required for internal security are patrol trains for the purpose of conveying a small force rapidly from point to point in protection of the railways. Their crews should be prepared to fight just as much outside the train as in it and there is no necessity to armour the train.

One thing, however, that really is necessary if these patrol trains are to perform their functions at night is that they should have searchlights. From my experience as an armoured train commander, one searchlight at each end is insufficient for a train. The obvious way of attacking or putting out of action an armoured train is to derail it. It is, therefore, absolutely essential that a searchlight should be kept continuously focussed on the line in the direction in which the train is proceeding and in both directions when it is halted. If, however, the two searchlights generally provided are utilized in this manner the train is of little use as a military unit since it cannot illuminate the country on either side of it. Two searchlights are therefore necessary at each end—one for watching the track and one for swivelling to the sides. These searchlights could probably be improvised from engine headlights which are very powerful. The point which must be studied, however, is how the current is to be generated. The current for the single searchlight on an engine is generated by a small steam turbine. If it is not possible to fit additional

turbines to the engine to work all the lights required, it would be necessary to carry some sort of petrol or kerosene engine to work the generator. It is quite certain that without sufficient lights patrol trains would lose three-quarters of their value since it is almost invariably at night that attempts are made to tamper with the track or stations. It is thought that patrol trains should be marshalled much on the lines of the present improvised armoured trains with the engine in the centre. At each end there should be an exploder truck, that is, a low-sided bogie truck or preferably two low-sided 4-wheeler open trucks (since these are easier to re-rail) and a high-sided truck with overhead shelter. In the high-sided truck all that it would be necessary to improvise would be raised emplacements for a machine-gun or a light automatic and for two searchlights. The centre of the train would be occupied as at present with vehicles carrying stores and troops.

A further point which is well worth considering is the protection of the train. As noted above the enemy always endeavours to derail an armoured train. Every commander is supposed to provide for his own protection. But here we have the spectacle of a unit advancing with neither advanced guard nor rear guard. Almost every division of the North-Western Railway has a Drewry rail car which accommodates eight men in addition to the driver and has some room over for stores. These are fast, comparatively light, move with equal facility in either direction and are fitted with headlights. It is suggested that they should be earmarked to serve as advanced guards to patrol trains. In many cases they might even serve independently as patrol vehicles where the number of men which they carry is considered adequate.

A further vehicle which would be of considerable value for scouting and advanced guard work, is the motor trolley of which we now own considerable numbers. These vehicles normally carry only two men in addition to the driver and crew but they have the great advantage that they are so light that their crew can re-rail them or even carry and push them past a small break in the line. They are reasonably fast but as a rule carry no headlights.

A final suggestion is in regard to the responsibility for patrol trains. At present the responsibility for improvised armoured trains is that the railway supplies vehicles and material, the Regular Army provides the escort and the Auxiliary Force, India, is responsible for preparing the trains. In addition to the escort these trains generally carry a technical staff provided by the railway in order to repair the track or the telegraph wires. It used to be laid down quite correctly in the Armoured Train Manual that the

first function of an armoured train commander is to get the traffic through. I would suggest that this is a function which the regular officer is not qualified to perform but that it is one to which an Auxiliary Force officer is pre-eminently suited as it requires the careful balancing of military and railway requirements. It is an undoubted fact that even a railway officer finds it difficult to realise that the particular train of which he is in charge, whether it is an armoured train, an inspection special, or any other train of this nature, is not necessarily the most important train on the line. The tendency is for him to feel that all other trains should give way to his train. If this is the case with railway officers, still more would it be so with Regular Army officers who are unaware of the relative importance of various trains or of the technicalities of train working. I, therefore, feel very strongly that the Auxiliary Force should endeavour to find an officer to command every patrol train. If this is impossible, then a senior N. C. O. should be appointed to advise the regular officer commanding the train. It is not enough that the latter should consult the guard of the train who is naturally primarily concerned with railway considerations. What is required is an adviser with some knowledge of both railway and military considerations.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRESS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA

(A lecture given before the members of the United Service Institution of India by Alexander Inglis, Esq., Staff Correspondent, "The Times," London, on 8th July 1937. The lecturer was introduced by Lt.-General Sir John E. S. Brind, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O.)

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

In 1795 the poet George Crabbe published a work called "The Newspaper" and his opinion of that institution reminds me of an anecdote that is told in the United States about the late President Coolidge. Known as "Silent Cal," Coolidge had a remarkable gift of laconic repartee and the story is told of a Sunday lunch party at the White House when a guest asked the President what had been the subject of the sermon he had heard at church that morning. Never given to wasting words Coolidge replied: "Madam, the subject was sin!" This was not very helpful, and the lady doubtless anxious to make the most of her temporary acquaintance with the President then asked: "What was the attitude of the preacher towards sin?" "Oh," replied Coolidge, "he was against it!"

George Crabbe, in his poem "The Newspaper," is certainly against it. One would have thought in his time, before the telegraph and telephone had been invented, before photography had emerged from its elementary stages, and before journalists had developed their flair for finding out things into something of a fine art, that the newspaper of his day would have been a delectable publication, devoted to the genial essay, the reporting of the casual and unimportant incident, and the dignified presentation, without headlines, of foreign intelligence. But Crabbe certainly thought otherwise and his poem is a serious indictment of the contemporary press, written with a bitterness that is generally absent from his other work.

When Crabbe was writing, the political journal was developing simultaneously with periodicals that were devoted chiefly to domestic and foreign news and to commercial affairs. It was Steele and Addison who introduced the social note that was the forerunner of the personal gossip column of to-day. Later came the

right to publish parliamentary reports, and by the close of the eighteenth century newspapers with quite large circulations were in existence. In 1808 Leigh Hunt brought out the *Examiner* and went to jail for expressing his views too freely. William Cobbett managed to reduce the price of his paper, the *Weekly Political Register*, from one shilling and a half pence to twopence, thus making an appeal for popular support for his particular ideals of reform. The introduction of cheaper postage encouraged the development of the press and the abolition of certain "taxes on knowledge" increased its growth. In 1828 the proprietors of *The Times* had to pay the State over £68,000 in stamp and advertisement taxes and paper duty. But after the reduction of the stamp tax in 1836 from 4d. to 1d. the circulation of English newspapers, based on the stamp returns, rose from 39,000,000 to 122,000,000 in 1854.

Improved machinery, cheaper paper, and the expansion of State education contributed to the development of the newspaper as we now know it, and the ever-increasing tempo of modern life encouraged that casual reading which has helped to create the popular press. The close of the Victorian era found the halfpenny newspaper in existence, and it did not have to contend with the snobbery that existed when the penny paper was first introduced.

The growth of journalism in England may be said to have passed through four important stages. The first was its establishment with the invention of printing, when news sheets dealt almost exclusively with happenings abroad and at home. The second was a period of persecution when journalistic activity was checked by the Star Chamber. The third period was one of liberation from official surveillance, which was also marked with the introduction of popular interest in the press. And the last phase was the process of expansion and organization which began with the opening of the present century and is still in course of evolution. During these stages the newspaper developed from being the cult of a few to the vogue of the many. In its early days it went largely into the country house, the rectory, and the club, and was in effect a medium for the aristocracy; its later years find it in every home. Some of the most important figures in English literature, from Defoe to Dickens, have been associated with the growth of the press. Steele, Addison, Johnson, Leigh Hunt, and a host of lesser literary lights did much of their best work in the periodicals of

their time. In our own day many of the leaders of literature play their part in the constant evolution of the press.

For the press is continually in a process of evolution which is leading to fields that cannot be conjectured. Its history from the first has been one that has aroused both praise and criticism, and those of us who are inclined to scoff at the inanities of the present day popular press are inclined to forget that the inanities of former centuries are only forgotten, which does not mean they did not exist.

It is a remarkable thing that the newspapers to-day which exert the most significant influence upon public opinion are those which still retain the essential features of the original news sheets. The first newspapers dealt very largely with foreign affairs, and the great newspapers which count in Britain and America to-day derive their material from the same source. Newspapers in both countries have undergone remarkable developments, particularly since 1900, owing to the improved technique in production and a vast expansion of the reading public. But the success of what is known as the popular press has been due more to the introduction of extraneous features than to the improvement of the genuine functions of the newspaper. These extraneous elements have been devised chiefly to increase sales, which in turn affect advertising rates. The advertiser is the backbone of the modern newspaper. But other factors contribute to large circulations. Newspaper insurance is now an established feature of many newspapers, and competitions which demand little skill, accompanied by large cash prizes are conducted mainly to attract and hold readers. Beauty contests, crossword puzzles, and competitions affecting all aspects of sport can scarcely be said to have any bearing on news, although the crossword puzzle has come as a godsend to many country clergymen, who are reputed to augment their stipends by devising crosswords for some of the better papers, which like to besprinkle their pages with classical allusions. Apart from these extraneous subjects, the modern newspaper endeavours to appeal to nearly all possible interests and has become severely departmentalized as a result. An extraordinary range of interests is catered for, many of which have no relation whatever to legitimate journalism. The specialist writer and the feature writer have come into their own, but the space devoted to the genuine news of the day is decidedly less than when the century opened, although newspapers are larger in size

and greater in number. Indeed, the journalistic door has been opened so widely that it is somewhat difficult nowadays to define a journalist. As the *Encyclopædia Britannica* points out: "Although there is a well defined qualification and status for civil servants, clergymen, dentists, barristers, solicitors and chartered accountants, journalism still continues to be such an indeterminate calling that there is no precise qualification or status for the journalist." The editor of *The Times* is equally a journalist with the more humble, but in his sphere no less necessary, police court reporter, and there are many people who call themselves journalists who supplement income from other sources by contributions to newspapers and periodicals. Especially during the present century there has been a notable increase in the number of people who have made their mark in other spheres, in politics, the Church, and public fields of activity, to embark in journalism and compete with the regular journalist for considerably higher emoluments, and so general has this practice become that the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Stanley Baldwin, was able to announce as a matter of self-congratulation that he had never contributed for payment an article of any sort to a newspaper.

The expansion of the telephone, the telegraph, and the wireless has contributed greatly to the development of the modern press and the competition among newspapers, and by widening the field of journalistic enterprise has increased the information and knowledge than can be brought daily to the breakfast table. Men typing out dispatches in London to-day actually set the type automatically in newspaper offices in Edinburgh, and wireless photography enables pictures of events taking place in Australia to be in London and New York the same day. One enterprising American newspaper is even contemplating simultaneous publication in Boston and London, and the proposal is not fantastic. The newspaper will be set up in the one country and wireless photographs of the pages will reach the other in time to enable the two issues of the paper to be published together. Mechanical inventions have thus greatly expanded the scope and influence of the press, which has further been developed by the monopolistic control of newspapers. Since the century opened the proprietor rather than the editor has been in the ascendant, so far as the popular press is concerned. In the case of those newspapers, both in Great Britain and the United States, which exert a real and

genuine influence on public opinion this is not so. There are only a few editors to-day, and they are generally anonymous, whose positions have not been weakened by proprietors who like expressing their personal views in print under their own names. In London there are not more than three or four such editors, but in the Provinces there are many independent newspapers whose editors exert an influence out of all proportion to the circulations of the papers they edit. The same is true in America, where a large number of admirable newspapers retain their individuality and distinction. The common habit of referring to the Beaverbrook press or the Hearst press indicates to what extent the system of multiple ownership has advanced. Like all such systems it tends to eliminate individuality and to develop standardized newspapers. It also tends to make the future of the press a matter of big finance. It is estimated that about seventy-five per cent. of the newspapers of Great Britain are controlled by large corporations or monopolistic companies. The journals under their control may be cheaper and more expeditiously produced, but they undermine the idea of the newspapers as an entity with a spirit and character of its own. On the other hand the reading public appears to be aware of the implications underlying mass produced newspapers, for the papers which seem to influence public opinion most are those which have held aloof from combines and monopolies. *The Times*, after a brief spell in harness with Lord Northcliffe, "has reverted to its traditional policy, as the first newspaper in the world, occupying its place with easy dignity," to quote again from the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. The *Observer*, the *Sunday Times*, the *Daily Telegraph*, and the *Morning Post* are among individual newspapers in which the proprietors rarely if at all intervene in editorial policy, and in the Provinces the *Manchester Guardian*, the *Liverpool Post*, the *Scotsman*, the *Glasgow Herald*, and a number of others show that independent journalism is still appreciated and is indeed the main medium for moulding public opinion.

I fear that many people outside the United States derive their ideas of the American press from the films. It is an inexplicable thing that the Americans, who are so quick to resent unjust criticism of their own country, should tolerate with equanimity the constant libels of American life and institutions which Hollywood disseminates throughout the world. Hollywood itself is a charming place, an artistic colony of delightful people who

themselves are the target for an international criticism which is wholly unjust. Men and women there work much too hard to find time for that reckless living which is so commonly believed to exist. Doubtless in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, and New York, "newspapermen," as they are called, of the type to be seen on the screen are to be met with in real life, plying their craft on behalf of the popular press in much the same manner as their prototypes are doing in London, Birmingham, Manchester and Glasgow. But in the main I have found the average American journalist to be much the same as the average British journalist—an alert fellow with an inquiring mind, well informed not only in the affairs of his own country but deeply interested in the affairs of the world. If his study of foreign affairs is less thorough than that which characterises his British counterpart it is frequently more extensive, for the average American is keenly interested in what is happening everywhere even although he may prefer an isolationist policy so far as his own country is concerned. American journalists have this international outlook developed to a marked degree.

It is true that the comprehensiveness of the average American newspaper tends to bring within its staff, as is the case with the popular papers at home, an extraordinary variety of journalistic types. After all few British newspapers employ their own poet who has to do his daily piece before the paper goes to press. Several American newspapers employ poets of their own. It is a somewhat unexpected experience to pass along the corridor of an American newspaper office and find a door with the inscription "John K. Quintal: Poet," and realise that John K. is part of the staff, turns out at the office at nine, as the other men do, and between breakfast and lunch composes a sonnet, a lyric, or just pure doggerel in time for the first edition. A great many American "folks," as they like to call themselves, read the poems of Edgar Guest before they read the news. Edgar Guest produces a daily poem that is syndicated throughout the country to hundreds of newspapers, and editors who might feel inclined to discontinue his poetry are flooded with protests from indignant readers. But the poet is only a sideline in an American office, which employs specialists in a wider variety of fields than applies even in the departmentalized British press. In this regard the American press is helped, even more than the British press, by advertisers. The simple

answer to people who ask why American papers are so large is that America is a land of advertisers (I mean it in its legitimate sense) and the press is the popular advertising medium. The motor car, the real estate market, the church, and other institutional activities are given great prominence in the American press, and most newspapers devote special weekly supplements or pages to these interests. Religion is given considerable prominence and the reproduction of sermons every Monday is a characteristic feature of many newspapers.

There is indeed scarcely any aspect of American life that is left untouched by the larger daily newspapers. Their interests range from breakfast clubs to women's movements, from service organisations to cultural activities, quite apart from the ordinary features which are common to the British press. Even experts in statistics are employed to circulate their graphs, charts, and figures and to use their statistics, as Andrew Lang once said in another connection, as drunk men use lamp-posts, for support rather than illumination. It is true that activity in an American newspaper office makes a Fleet Street office feel like a mausoleum, but the gum-chewing, slang-speaking "newspapermen" of the films are the invention of that medium and are not, in my experience, common to American journalism.

Journalism in the United States has followed much the same historical development as in Great Britain, with perhaps greater emphasis on the expansion of the popular press, and the elaboration of control by combines. Sensationalism has been greatly encouraged in recent years, partly due to the less rigid observance of libel laws than obtains in Great Britain. It is also a fact that in the United States, as in Great Britain, the newspapers which have the most influence on public opinion are not always those which have the largest circulations. Such influential papers are well distributed throughout the country. Indeed, the nationally popular newspapers wield less influence in America than they do at home, largely owing to the continental dimensions of the country, which tend to localise circulation in much the same manner as applies in India. Even with the aeroplane New York papers take some time to reach the Pacific Coast, which is unlike the situation in Great Britain where the important London papers are available in the north of Scotland on the day of publication. But there are several important papers which significantly influence public opinion outside their own communities and in some

cases outside their own countries. The *New York Times* is probably the most important of these, but quite a number have a significance out of all proportion to their circulation figures. Among them are the *Boston Transcript*, the *Baltimore Sun*, the *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, the *Kansas City Star*, the *Cleveland Plain-dealer*, the *Springfield Republican*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and several others. One of the most notable products of American journalism since the century opened has been the *Christian Science Monitor*, which is read throughout the world and is particularly appreciated in the chancelleries of Europe. It marks a genuine effort to emphasize the international note in journalism, by subordinating nationalism to the wider commonwealth of the race.

The popular newspapers in the United States have even a stronger vogue than at home, but they exert even less influence on public thought. Chain groups of papers circulate in all the larger towns of nearly every State, but they are often bought for features other than their news. These features include, as I have indicated, the daily poem; comic strips outlining the adventures of characters like Andy Gump and Aunt Het, who are fictional creations which genuinely reflect the oddities and humour of American life; daily sermons and a vast shoal of syndicated material which implies that a great industry exists for the output of all kinds of material that really belongs to the magazine rather than the newspaper. The serious treatment of literature and the drama is a feature of many of the best papers, but the society column common to many British newspapers is given a much more democratic range in America. Anonymous journalism is much less usual in the United States than in Great Britain, and writers are known by name throughout the continent. Some commentators, generally known as columnists, earn fabulous salaries, chiefly by supplying brightly written comments on the current news. The press agent or publicity man is also a popular institution, and is generally employed by large business concerns, theatres, institutional establishments, and even churches, to keep the affairs of these organisations before the public. This is made possible by a close collaboration between the advertising pages and the news columns, the one affecting the other much more than is the case in Britain. It is therefore true to say that in many American papers there is more material of the kind that cannot legitimately be called news than there is in the

papers at home. But American readers are well versed in the psychology of newspaper methods in their country and are quite competent to sift the grain from the chaff.

The average British reader picking up an American newspaper of the popular type is frequently bewildered by the headlines and general "get-up" of the paper. The headlines are a journalistic trick to cope with the rush of American life, and the opening paragraph of an American news article is drafted with a special purpose. The aim of the headlines is to give a quick idea of the news, and the opening paragraph of an American news message generally contains the gist of the whole article. This is invaluable to the busy reader faced with a large newspaper. Headline writing is an art acquired by experience, but brightness and brevity are essential. There is the often told story of how Mr. John Masefield, the Poet Laureate, on arriving in New York declined to be interviewed. This was treated to an attractive headline in one paper which said: "King's Canary Refuses to Chirp."

As the United States is not directly affected by the domestic politics of Europe the important newspapers give more objective treatment to the news than is the case in Great Britain. They are informative rather than partisan, aiming at educative interpretation rather than comment, although the same cannot be said of the average presentation of news from the Far East, where United States interests are more directly affected. Inaccuracies in presenting foreign affairs are due more to misconceptions than to wanton interpretations, the angle of approach as seen from a Republic being somewhat different from that obtaining in an Empire. In dealing with affairs in their own country the American papers usually show the customary political tendencies common to domestic journalism, either supporting the Republicans or Democrats, the two main parties. Socialism has not yet emerged to its full stature, its belated development being due in no small measure to the prosperity which characterized the country until the slump of 1929. But idealists in socialism exist and are making their influence felt, but not through the existing press to any appreciable extent. Mr. Upton Sinclair, who finds a ready hearing in Russia, appeals mainly to the *intelligentsia* in his own country, although the inquiring mind of the average American encourages him to examine all kinds of political developments, even although it is frequently done somewhat superficially. The principal newspapers in their treatment of international affairs do so with great

intelligence, both in leading articles and special articles, which often delve more deeply into their subject matter than is the case with British newspapers, whose readers are too often credited with a fuller familiarity with the subject than is in fact the case. American journalism is thus more elementary in its presentation of material, endeavouring to give readers a simple exposition of the particular subject under consideration. This has advantages, and while there are reams of trivialities in many newspapers there is invariably a solid mass of news, discriminatingly treated and presented with judgment. In effect, the situation is much the same in both countries. Each has a popular press securing wide national support co-existing with a series of sober, independent journals which have an immeasurable influence upon public opinion. The great difference between the press of the two countries is that the popular press in America goes to even greater extremes than does its counterpart in Britain, while the responsible press interprets world affairs from a political angle quite different from that obtaining at home. The mentality of the two races is inevitably affected by the contrasting character of their political institutions.

It is fairly clear in both countries that the reader of the popular press buys his favourite newspaper either for its news or some special feature peculiar to the paper. Such readers are not necessarily influenced by the editorial opinions of the papers they buy. This is frequently proved in both countries when policies supported by the popular press are discarded without hesitation by the public, which must inevitably include the buyers of these particular newspapers. This implies that reasoned and mature opinion, which makes the principal independent papers so important to discriminating readers, unconsciously influences the community as a whole, particularly in times of national and international emergency. It equally implies that independent newspapers, operated and edited with a political or social purpose, more than justify their policy by counteracting the less critical judgments of the popular press, which after all is not intended to be anything other than it is—an entertaining *pot-pourri* of current and fleeting interest. Millions of electors in 1929 voted for the Labour Party although most of the electors at that time were reading Conservative newspapers which were urging an anti-socialist case. Other factors naturally contributed to the downfall of the Conservative government, not the least important among them being the independent judgment of some Conservative news-

papers in offering criticism of what was believed to be a defeatist policy of the Government then in power. Similarly, during the last Presidential election in the United States Roosevelt achieved an astounding victory in the face of strong opposition from the newspapers with the largest circulations. This tends to prove that in both countries it is mainly the readers of the more sober journals who follow their political inclinations in buying them. This is obviously not the case with the readers of the more popular newspapers. Mr. Harold Herd, who has analysed the influence of the British press in some detail, contends that the "newspaper that appeals to the reason rather than the emotions, and pursues a consistent, well balanced policy, exercises the surest influence in the long run. That is why *The Times* and the *Manchester Guardian* and other serious journals command so much respect from their opponents, as well as their supporters."

In helping to mould public opinion the press also reflects it, particularly in Great Britain where an innate conservatism exists. This has the effect of toning down extreme views and encourages the ever-increasing tendency to make an all-round examination of a subject. Extreme views either to the Left or Right are not favoured, either in the sober or the popular press, so far as Great Britain is concerned. This does not mean that papers of extremist tendencies are circumscribed by any special handicaps. You may buy either the *British Fascist* or the *Daily Worker* in Great Britain, although their counterparts are not so easy to find in the United States, where the established press is inclined to oppose the expression of opinion of an extreme character. In Great Britain, Fascism or Communism is given free field to those who are interested in either creed. It implies a toleration that is absent in many countries, and suggests that the British reader is quite ready to examine any political philosophy which arises, although he may be slow or unwilling to adopt it. This patent willingness to tolerate every point of view has undoubtedly augmented the influence of the press, and this feature will undoubtedly develop in the future, to the benefit of newspapers and readers alike. The weeklies, fortnightlies, and monthly journals indicate that there is a wide public awaiting the objective presentation of political and international information and the press of the future will be wisely guided if it recognises this and seeks to meet the demand.

There are two quite widely held views of the press in both countries, and they may be summarised in contrasting statements

that were made in reference to the British press by two prominent public men in Great Britain a few years ago. Mr. Neville Chamberlain, when Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1932, is reported to have said: "Taking the press as a whole, you cannot find any country where the press is superior to ours, either in quality or extent of its news or in its literary distinction or sense of responsibility . . . its high standard of ability, integrity, and profound patriotism." Against that we have the statement of Lord Baldwin, as Prime Minister in 1931: "What are their methods [the methods of the press] ? Their methods are direct falsehood, misrepresentation, half-truths, alteration of the speaker's meaning by putting sentences apart from their context, suppression." Now it is clear that while speaking generally of the press in Great Britain both of these appraisals cannot be correct. Each may be true of some sections of the press, but is certainly not true of all sections of it. These opinions therefore tend to emphasise my point, namely that newspapers are valuable in moulding public opinion only in so far as they are conducted and edited with a purpose which aims at the fair presentation of news and its just interpretation. As the late C. P. Scott, the famous editor of the *Manchester Guardian*, once remarked: "A newspaper is much more than a business, it is an institution; it reflects and influences the life of a whole community; it may affect even wider destinies. It is, in its way, an instrument of government. It plays on the minds and consciences of men. It may educate, stimulate, assist, or it may do the opposite. It has therefore a moral as well as a material existence, and its character and influence are in the main determined by the balance of these two forces. It may make profit or power its first object, or it may conceive itself as fulfilling a more exacting function." That I think summarises the philosophy which should govern the press. That moreover does summarise the philosophy which permeates the editorial policy of the important newspapers both in Great Britain and America to-day. It is true that some of the sensational newspapers have immense potentialities for mischief, particularly in the sphere of international politics, but it is equally true that the value and significance of these papers is in the main accurately assessed in authoritative quarters and among ordinary readers, both at home and abroad. Doubtless there are many who are influenced by the biased and ill-balanced interpretations of such newspapers, but they are not necessarily those whose

influence is other than negligible. This weakness is one of the inevitable prices to be paid for the liberty of the press. The fact nevertheless remains that those newspapers whose reasoned policy derives from an ethical and philosophical outlook on world affairs are the papers which have a powerful, and frequently a decisive, influence on general opinion. When public opinion is running strong in an unfortunate direction, such papers may stem it; when it is moving sluggishly they may supplement its flow. There are of course numerous occasions when public opinion itself sets the course for the press; in Britain recently there were the episodes of the Hoare-Laval agreement and the Abdication crisis, when the majority of the influential newspapers merely emphasised what the man in the street was thinking; in America there was the elimination of the Eighteenth Amendment from the statute book, the demand for which became imperative in the press when it was realised that the man in the street disliked the liquor laws. In influencing public opinion the provincial press exerts a notable influence and is extremely important as indicating the independent and simultaneous judgments of people widely apart, a genuine pulse factor which applies in both countries. Politicians and statesmen often profess to be uninterested in what the press may say about them, but such is not the case. Newspapers which retain their political independence may radically influence government policy in both countries. Such power must naturally be used with wisdom and judgment, and it is to the credit of both countries that each contains important newspapers which so use the power in their command.

THE DREAM SECTOR, L. OF C.

BY AUSPEX

A dream that is so vivid as to be virtually a reality has often inspired better writers than myself, so I make no apology for giving you this narrative. For me it has now become fact to all intents and purposes. I have been unable to separate the narrative from the many conclusions at which I have arrived in my semi-conscious or working moments, so you must have it all just as it tumbles out of my memory. You will not find the places I mention on any map, but I have drawn a sketch which is as accurate as I can remember. The great merit of this revelation is that the system used for the protection of this dream sector of a frontier line of communication has probably never been tried before in quite the same form; it is certainly different to any in use in Waziristan in 1937 and for that reason alone may be worthy of consideration.

The sector extended along a main road on both sides of Rustamabad camp and village, from the 25th to the 35th mile-stones, a defensive front of twenty miles. The situation which presented itself to the commander of the incoming garrison in mid-August was as follows: The Hajji, the leader and religious head of the opposition, had gone up into the Elburz plain west and north-west of Rudbar, where most of the tribes were wont to gather in the hot weather. The supplies and reinforcements, which the Hajji drew from the Shaitu Valley area, had to go round north and south of Rudbar. Through the sector which the battalion was to take over ran four of the favourite and most used of these routes from the Shaitu, all of them converging to the west of the main road on the Inzar Khel village of Barorogha, a hot-bed of wickedness throughout the operations.

The routes were:

1. By Juballi to Hatimbo, north-west of which village it joined a track from the Takki river to Barorogha.
2. By Sanni Algad to Barorogha Algad.
3. By Hatingmai Algad to Barorogha Algad or Faqiran.
4. By Muni Algad, east of the camp, to Barorogha Algad, or west of the camp to Rustamabad and Faqiran.

Supplies and reinforcements had, for months, been passing to and fro across this sector unimpeded, for there had been no troop activity at all between the hours of 2 p.m. and 7 a.m. as the road had been opened solely by columns operating from Rustamabad, unassisted by any sort of permanent piquets. These columns set out at about 7 a.m. daily and withdrew by about 2 p.m. Thus the sector belonged to the enemy for a half of each day and the whole of each night; in fact the Hajji himself had, a few weeks before, crossed the sector by the Barorogha Algad to get to the Elburz plain. A good bag to have made. Something drastic had to be done about this in spite of the fact that the incoming garrison was some two hundred rifles weaker than the outgoing one. It was obvious that by stopping all hostile movement across and along the sector, the garrison could exert a pressure on the Hajji far away up in the Elburz which might well have a big effect on the course of operations. This, then, was the new garrison's first object and it was certain that, in trying to attain it, they would have to set out on an offensive policy that would protect the road far better than even the strongest of defensive systems. So much for the higher tactics of the matter.

The local situation had been really bad for months. Earlier in the year, Rudbar had been cut off from the world for some weeks, the road torn up, bridges and culverts destroyed, and telegraph wire and poles torn down over great stretches. A small force had moved into Rustamabad in the early summer and had, with sappers, set to to repair the damage on the road. Night sniping of the camp at Rustamabad had been pretty regular; every now and then camp piquets were sniped by day; while small parties of tribesmen shot up the troops as they went out from Rustamabad to open the road. This road protection system was innocuous to the enemy for it gave him all he desired—the time, direction, method and destination of the daily movement. It was even obvious that the piquets must move to certain definite points. He needed to know no more and it was a tribute to his forbearance that troop casualties were not far greater. The local villagers were obviously just playing the fool in a most dangerous manner; the *khassadars* were to a great extent actively disloyal and taking part in this shooting by day and night. There was a secret bond between the local Shazi Khel and their

erstwhile enemies the Inzar Khel of Barorogha that neither would tell on the other. The result was that the troops were held in contempt and no local tribesman would give them a scrap of help or information. Most of these facts came out as the new garrison got the upperhand, but they acted from the first as though they knew them. To start with they set out to deal with the local pests and to prevent a single man moving by night or by day without their knowledge and except at the peril of his life if he were armed. As the country to the south of the road was extensive and thickly covered with scrub, the self-appointed task was no small one.

To attain their objects the soldiers had to have effective forces available at short notice at any spot in the sector and to know the country even better than the enemy. They set to work to build and man four strong piquets, each of which held in it a striking force of about a platoon in addition to a garrison of a machine-gun section or at least a machine-gun detachment. These piquets were heavily wired with two double aprons and trip wires between, the outer apron being thirty-five yards away from, and so out of bombing range of, the piquet. Beside these there were two "pin-points" piquets of fifteen men each and the usual camp piquets had a machine-gun and two gun numbers in them.

Before describing the system any further, I will make a few remarks about piquets. A piquet, with its garrison inside, is only effective at night up to the distance it can see to shoot. On a dark night, perhaps twenty yards; on a bright moonlight night up to a hundred and fifty or two hundred yards. So it is really not very effective. I term such a piquet a "pin-point" piquet. A piquet without a good wire fence is just a hostage to the enemy; unless sited on a precipice, it can, on any dark night, be bombed, rushed and overwhelmed by superior numbers with the greatest of ease while the garrison sleeps, provided the attack is a sudden one. Why this has not happened more frequently it is beyond me to discover. With sufficient wire, the attack can be checked and beaten off. No wonder some troops feel jumpy on dark nights in unwired piquets, for piquets cannot be concealed from the enemy. But in any case piquets should normally only be regarded as places of temporary rest. They should be looked on as bases for offensive patrols which creep out, sit up for attackers or snipers, kill, and return to rest. That is the way to handle

hostile night-birds. Such piquets can be termed "fighting piquets." They *may* be wired but must have more than one defiladed exit; "pin-point" piquets *must* be properly wired, even if the stay is only for one night. Fighting piquets must be active; theirs is the hard, strenuous and enterprising life that alone leads to success against the tribesman.

To return to my dream; all the machine-guns were out in piquets and none in Rustamabad camp. They had their night lines to sweep away any attack on the camp and to settle any snipers the patrols might conceivably miss. The camp was, contrary to ordinary practice, defended directly by fixed-line weapons enfilading its perimeter from the camp piquets, while the troops in camp made little attempt to defend those piquets with small-arms fire from the perimeter. The whole system of night defence in the sector was locked in by machine-gun fixed lines and by Vickers Berthiers wedged into ammunition boxes to give them their fixed lines. In fact the sector was, as I think is essential in all cases of piquet systems since the Pathan obtained small bore rifles and bombs, one big defensive locality. If only the troops had had light fixed mountings for their Vickers Berthiers that they could clap down on the parapets, how much easier it would have been. If only, too, their Vickers Berthier equipment had been made primarily for carriage on the man, its normal place, rather than on the mule and so unwieldy for the man, how much more easily these fighting patrols could have operated.

Machine-guns very seldom left the piquets; it was realised that their best role was defence, or at least a static role, and they were left to fulfil it. From the piquets they could help to cover the day movements of offensive patrols. In attack they would only have hindered the very mobile patrols and the central mobile column.

I do not like these heavy machine-guns in the battalion. They are too immobile, too wasteful of ammunition in action and too ineffective in attack. We need light fixed mountings for our excellent Vickers Berthier and we want two Vickers Berthier guns in the platoon and four rifle companies in the battalion. The light machine-gun is the most terrible and economical weapon that infantry possess. And it is a weapon with which the recruit can be quickly trained to become an

effective shot, more quickly than he can be trained with the rifle. Until we are rid of these heavy machine-guns in the battalion, commanders will never see the value of driving their light automatics right into the enemy's ribs. They will go on, as so many do to-day, sitting back on their machine-guns. And in a great war our rifle battalions will never get the men trained to replace casualties in their heavy machine-gun companies nor will the new machine gunners be interchangeable with rifle or light machine-gun men. It is a weak organization, the present one.

Down in the camp at Rustamabad were battalion headquarters, a rifle company as mobile column with mechanical transport, a mechanized field battery which was quite invaluable, hospital, and supplies. It should be noticed that most of the strength was *on* the hills and this, it seems, should almost be a principle these days whenever troops are actively engaged with biggish *lashkars*. If troops present a big packed target on low ground to an enemy, he can and will hit them. The tribesman has obtained a quite undeserved reputation as a good shot by being presented with packed targets down in the valley bottoms where the dust allows him to see his bullets strike by day, where the lights show him a big mark by night, and where he has probably often registered before troops arrive. He now has a small-bore, long-range weapon and no longer uses the *jazail* against which the big perimeter camps and the normal road-piquetting systems of to-day were designed.

In the hills, my dream piquets actually occupied the ground from which the enemy could shoot at the road. Thus, the road was at all times secure by day, without a single man being moved. An occasional patrol downwards to comb out the low, wooded, slopes by the road was all that might be required. So the piquet garrisons started with a sense of security and comfort that no other system could have given them. In this way they were always fit for offensive action.

In addition, a section of armoured cars ran in from Rudbar daily and operated in the area. To give them mobility, tracks were levelled out from the main road to overlook all nullahs on each side and for half-a-mile along the bushy Muni Algad plain. Thus, offensive patrols could be covered when moving up these concealed lines of advance by day, and the rationing and relief

of piquets could be watched by armoured cars. One-way motor roads for 30-cwt. lorries were cut by the garrison up to the bigger piquets so that watering, rationing, and delivery and removal of stores and kits could be done by lorry, saving many men-and-mule-hours of work. The cutting of these rough roads was not half the job nor did it ask for half the skill that the troops expected. Rocks were cracked by heating them, sluicing cold water over them and were then attacked with sledge hammers.

The battalion, with a strength of about six hundred, operated with three sections in the platoon. In this way the section commanders had good strong, effective sections, with plenty of manœuvring and hitting power while the light machine-gun sections were strong enough to carry ammunition and guns quickly over great distances. In the rifle sections, I noted that directly they thought there was an enemy about, the section split up into pairs of men, one working forward and his friend covering him and observing. The reason for this was that the pair of men is the smallest tactical unit in the infantry and that, since the battalion had to be thin on the ground against an enemy armed with small-bore weapons, the leading sections had to split into their smallest tactical units.

The sector was split into two sub-sectors, each under a company commander; the action of the whole co-ordinated and directed by a daily instruction issued by the sector commander. The piquets opened the road at all hours, often by night, remaining in concealed positions to catch any enemy party that might approach either before dawn or just after dawn to worry the convoys. Patrols frequently moved at night, evacuating their piquets and lying up in dead ground to hit at any one who might try to attack their piquet. They put out ambushes all over the place; sometimes combining and sometimes acting separately by day and by night.

Snipers were only of interest for the first week, for, on the second night, a patrol followed up a bunch of them to one of the villages and then, having got the evidence asked for, shot up the stragglers. Two more fracas of this sort with snipers, a few rounds from the guns, three graves dug in a nearby graveyard, and sniping ceased for good at no cost in life to the garrison. Later on, the Hajji sent a party down by night to get a message through to his friends. The party was caught by an ambush

dropped "on spec" by a daylight patrol, the messenger killed and his letter taken. Still later, sixty men of the garrison lying up at night smashed up a lashkar of between two and three hundred bent on mischief, inflicted many casualties, drove them off and drew themselves out at a cost of one wounded. The area was unsafe for the enemy; they dubbed the battalion the "Wazirwala Paltan" and kept as far away as possible. In this way the garrison got complete control by night of the sector and of the surrounding area so that not a man could move for fear of his life. But, above all this, was the very high morale engendered by surprising the enemy and by small successful affairs, and the initiative and efficiency born in Indian officers and N. C. Os.

The system was essentially one of dispersion but designed also to allow of concentration against the enemy when the troops had him at a disadvantage. At short notice three hundred rifles could be collected at any part of the sector. Thus, one largish gang, which shot at a light machine-gun section protecting the road was set upon by the nearest fighting patrol and pinned till reinforcements came up, slipped round behind the gang by a big detour, and then fell upon it from the higher ground. Had the movement come from one place, the enemy could have watched this concentrated effort; as it was, it fell from the blue upon him although the country held very little cover, and so created such an impression that no further attempt was made to meddle with the road by day. And this little fight takes one to a point of much interest and that is that nearly all commanders like to tie their infantry in to their machine-guns and guns. The garrison could never understand this. It preferred to cast its net wide, so wide that it could place some of its men in behind the enemy and utterly surprise him. Most commanders hate to have any detachment "out of their control," yet this battalion could not see how any really decisive act could in the ordinary way come about by day unless secrecy was observed and dispersion used. Until we get man-carried radio telephony sets—and the sooner that comes, the better—a detachment will always be out of control for some period or other of an operation.

Thus the whole policy of the sector was aggressive; the system was one of strong, though small, fighting patrols, sitting in piquets here and there on the enemy's ground, getting about

day and night at odd times, occupying the best positions before the enemy could get to them and knowing the hills and valleys far better than he knew them. The valley floors were patrolled by armoured cars. Behind these, to extend control and by sharp, unexpected, movements to make the enemy fear to move, a rifle company with mechanical transport had its centre at Rustamabad. In fire support was the mechanised field battery and the whole sector was resigned as one long defensive locality, locked in by fixed-line machine-guns and light machine-guns which had registered with indicator bullets. Main infantry and artillery arteries ran along the length with spurs off to all piquets. Lines were laid from the nearest piquet to the arteries along the *algad* bottoms, so that listening posts could tap in at night and report movement to the fighting patrols above them. There were never enough signallers in the battalion, so most riflemen were trained to Morse and in a very short time many were fit to operate at five or six words a minute and replace signallers in the less important places. It was found that Morse could be taught quite quickly and it had so many advantages over Semaphore that the regiment found it hard to see why Semaphore should ever be taught at all. It seemed archaic.

That is the way in which this dream sector was organised; its success was immediate and phenomenal. I will now record, as I said I would, some of the general conclusions at which I have arrived in my semi-conscious or working moments. Mules are nothing but a curse in battle and it should be absolutely forbidden to take them on a surprise nightmove. On the North-East Frontier in 1918-19 porters were used; they offer possibilities on the North-West Frontier too.

In the place of armoured cars we should have tanks. Armoured cars have too limited a capacity for an aggressive scheme of battle. One feels that perhaps we have not yet fully realised the immense value of armoured and mechanised forces on the frontier; infantry in armoured trailers or carriers; armoured artillery and tanks; all fed from the air whenever required, and invariably using close support and artillery co-operation aircraft. These will give us the strategical surprise we have never yet had in the frontier. If we do not get them, we will drop behind.

Light mortars too would be invaluable. They would give infantry twice the punch and would save a large number of

casualties. Incidentally they might well have saved the Guides at Pt 4080 in 1935. Infantry must have them. They close the fatal gap between the artillery and the light machine-gun and enable infantry to lift their enemy sky-high out of his cover instead of having to beat him down into it with the bullet. The bayonet is dead. Even at night men use the bullet in all their fights. We need a light rifle both on the frontier and in civilised warfare, with a sporting sight, a shorter sighted range, and a very light bayonet-dagger, for use principally in the hand and only to be fixed to the rifle in exceptional circumstances. The fixed bayonet, by day or night, gives the owner away. It is a bad, clumsy weapon, as dead as the cavalry sabre. Our rifle must be "quicker on the draw" than the enemy's. With the advent of the Vickers Berthier confidence in the rifle will wane unless the weapon is improved. It is at present difficult to shoot with and to handle and an unnecessarily great burden to carry about. Infantry shock is a fire shock, not a bayonet shock, and this has been so since the magazine rifle first appeared. This little bit of knowledge would have saved millions of lives in the Great War. Even now, how many people have this knowledge? The "Cult of the Bayonet" has sacrificed more lives in its rites than any other cult the world has ever known.

We must save life by getting a non-shining fitting for our web equipment; we must save weight by getting some sort of warm light waterproof cape and a light quilted bedding.

In this dream sector, as in other places in Waziristan quite recently, the system of piquetting on the move had proved itself to be unsafe and ineffective. Surely, it can be put into the category of methods that one only uses under exceptional circumstances, when no enemy or only a very occasional sniper is to be met. It is a narrow-chested way of trying to fight. The mountain warfare doctrinaires must be stopped from propounding it as a normal and good method. The Pathan's small-bore weapons killed it thirty years ago; it only suited the *jazail*. The nearer a commander can bring frontier warfare into line with modern warfare, the nearer he comes to success, for he will bring his superior firepower to bear to its maximum extent and at the right time. To do this he must throw his infantry wide so that all its weapons can come into action. And then, where the country prevents the enemy from seeing these wide movements by


day, he must make every use he can of his mobility and strength to envelop and to hit from behind. To do this, the men must be trained in secrecy of movement and to occupy a position by stealth. Mule-borne small-arms have no part in this. Surprise is the salt of battle; most of us pay lip-service to it, how many have the imagination and courage to apply it? Not those who direct movements to the enemy's front in broad daylight, and rely for safety on the insecurity of a nullah bed. Of all stupid ways of advancing or fighting, that of poking piquets of ten men or so up to right and left of one is the most senseless, unless perhaps the depths of nonsense can be plumbed by rushing along the path before those piquets get to their positions. The tactics of fear are far too prevalent; they are the one form of tactics that bring with them a certain and fatal risk, but it is futile to go to the other extreme of recklessness.

The scrub country of Waziristan is a godsend to a good tactician for it aids movement and hampers the enemy bullet. It is the friend of secrecy and of surprise. The army needs far more training than it gets in scrub and wood fighting. On the Frontier, whatever the nature of the hills, one seldom sees one's enemy in position, so one should manoeuvre to strike at ground in such a way that, if it is occupied, he will be surprised. Scrub-clad hills facilitate this by day and on moonlight nights. Heavy machine-guns, as usual, have no part to play.

Directly we go to war we have to eradicate most of the bad habits that our drill has inculcated. This is dangerous. Recent experience has only confirmed the opinion on drill expressed in the Army Quarterly in 1935. It must march with our tactics, no matter what the sacrifice to pageantry.

Lastly, which great soldier was it who said, "Read little, think a lot?"

Rough Sketch. L of C. Dream Sector



"GIVE ME FOUR YEARS' TIME"

BY BRIGADIER G. N. FORD, C.B., D.S.O.

To one who has not visited Berlin for some years the improved appearance of the younger generation is most striking. The cult of physical strength and of open-air exercise in the minimum of clothing is having a visible effect on the physique of the race, and this, in spite of a standard of living which is considerably lower than in England.

Prices are much the same, though many of the most common foodstuffs are either rationed or unobtainable; but the wages of all classes are lower, taxation is very heavy and so-called "voluntary" contributions to party funds, welfare work, air fleet and the like, swallow up a large proportion of what is left.

The Nazis make much capital out of the fact that figures of unemployment have fallen year by year, but this is hardly surprising in view of the enormous armament programme and of the numbers withdrawn from the labour market into the armed forces and labour camps. The dole to the unemployed is about half of that in England, so that there is certainly scope for welfare work to supplement it. The enthusiastic young Party official who shewed me what was being done in this direction—and the thoroughness of the organisation was impressive enough—assured me, of course, that all cases of hardship were inquired into by members of the Party and that they received liberal help in free clothing, fuel, and remissions of rent, according to their needs. Perhaps; though one can with confidence add—according to their proved loyalty to the Party.

From what I heard, there is much bitterness and discontent with the present regime among the older men, though there is, for obvious reasons, little overt sign of it; one makes sure that one is not overheard before voicing any grumble or criticism. But the younger generation appears either to be its enthusiastic supporters or to accept it as a natural phenomenon, as something that can no more be displaced than can the sun, moon and stars. And, short of a major disaster, military or financial, I am inclined to agree.

It must be admitted, however, that Berlin still manages to amuse itself. Questionable establishments, which were a feature

of its night-life a few years ago, have suffered an eclipse, and propriety is now in fashion among the smart set. At the other end of the social scale, every Saturday and Sunday, hundreds of thousands of holiday-makers pour out to the surrounding lakes and woods, where the younger members bathe and boat while their elders settle down to the serious enjoyment of eating and drinking.

They seem contented enough; a thrifty, industrious, law-abiding people, polite and helpful (though any suggestion of criticism may provoke an outburst of indignation), unimaginative, very fond of their creature comforts; one would say the last nation wantonly to disturb the peace of the world.

This is the appearance. What is the reality?

When Hitler first seized supreme power he said: "*gebt mir vier jahre zeit*,"¹ and promised the German people that they should then judge what he had done for Germany. His answer is exemplified in a remarkable exhibition. One enters an enormous hall, empty except for tables holding small models of the new Air Ministry with its 2,500 rooms, of the projected military schools for officers, and of various other military buildings. Along the whole length of the hall from floor to ceiling are set slowly-revolving frames carrying photographs of Hitler in all his multifarious activities: inspecting serried masses of troops, launching battleships, turning the first sod at labour camps, or being acclaimed by thousands of enthusiastic 100 per cent. Nordics. The procession of photographs seems unending and, as they are all enlarged to about five times life-size, one creeps about the hall feeling like Gulliver in the land of Brobdingnag, and almost sharing the reverential awe with which the German gazes upon his leader. And the whole time from the cinema in a neighbouring hall comes the strident voice of the Führer pouring out his unending speeches. This completes what one may call the personal appeal of the exhibition. The remainder is given up to more material things: to aeroplanes, guns, tanks, mechanised vehicles, submarines, to models of the new fleet, to models of the new strategic roads, to chemical substitutes for all that Germany lacks in raw materials—to everything, in fact, which will make her more formidable in war. This

¹ "Give me four years' time,"

is the only impression that the exhibition leaves and is intended to leave on the hundreds of thousands, from school children to old men, who pour into Berlin in special trains to see it—the glorification of Hitler, of war and of Germany's armed strength.

And as such, the exhibition gives a very true picture of what Hitler has indeed achieved. He found Germany sunk to the status of a second rate power; he has made of her perhaps the strongest, certainly the most feared nation in Europe—the most immediate menace to the peace of the world.

How has it been done, and what has been the cost in moral values?

Although the ideologies of communist and fascist are antithetical, their views on the virtues of orthodoxy are indetical, and they practise the same technique to attain it.

When Hitler was first made Chancellor in 1933 the Nazis formed the strongest single party in the Reichstag. They had, however, no clear majority, and an attempt to overthrow the constitution and to smash democracy must have resulted in civil war. So, on the eve of the new elections, they framed the burning of the Reichstag building, raised the cry that the communists had done it as a signal for revolution, arrested all their political opponents and stampeded the country into returning them to power with an overwhelming majority. As Gunther says: "this fire destroyed what remained of the German republic. It not only burned a public building; it incinerated the communist, social, democratic, catholic and nationalist parties of Germany."

Since then the Nazis have never looked back. The trades unions shewed no fight and were abolished without difficulty, and all suspected of opposition—and the air was thick with informers—disappeared into concentration camps.

Any sign of unorthodoxy was thus stamped out, but this was at best only negative. The positive problem to which the Government with German thoroughness now set itself was to breed orthodoxy; so to condition the German nation that there should be no danger of heresy because all would think alike. The striking success hitherto achieved is shewn by the only remaining concession to democracy: the periodical rite of voting confidence in the dictatorship, which results in overwhelming votes for Hitler. The story is told in Berlin—*sotto voce*—that someone was complaining of his bad luck. "I know that the present government

must be very popular because it tells me itself that 98 per cent. of the population votes for it; and it should know; it counts the votes. But I have no luck—I only meet the 2 per cent." A good tale, but it contains, I think, not much truth.

The three most obvious methods of producing orthodoxy lay ready to hand in the wireless, the press and the schools.

The wireless, being a government institution, presented no difficulty. We who are accustomed to the innocuous political pronouncements of the British Broadcasting Corporation are inclined to underestimate its value as an agency of propaganda; but it is a noticeable fact that, at the abortive Nazi *coup d'état* which resulted in the murder of Dollfuss, in Vienna in 1934, the first objective of the conspirators was the broadcasting station.

In addition to the ordinary household sets, all railway stations, public institutions and places of entertainment have their wireless and loud-speakers, which are compelled to relay, when ordered, any government pronouncement or speech. For instance, Goebbels recently delivered a bitter attack on the Roman Catholic Church. In the two hundred and fifty yards of the street in which I was staying no less than three loud-speakers were planted out in the road, blaring out his speech for two and a half hours.

The effect in forming opinion in times of crisis or public nervousness cannot be exaggerated.

The muzzling of the press was an equally easy matter. Certain painful examples had to be made and about one-third of the newspapers in Germany have ceased publication; but the survivors all purvey the same news and make similar comments on it. Some are more and some less violent; the weekly *Der Stürmer*, for instance, which is publicly displayed in the streets for all to read, specializes in anti-Jew propaganda, with illustrations to match. Foreign newspapers are confiscated if they contain a breath of criticism, and they would, of course, only reach a very small minority of the people in any case. The result is that the untravelled German necessarily bases his judgment of affairs on the facts and interpretations given him, which may vary from slight perversions and suppressions of truth to deliberate lies. This was especially noticeable in regard to the news from Spain; it was officially stated, for instance, that an international commission had found that the massacre and destruction at Guernica had been perpetrated by the Basque troops themselves; all eye-witnesses of

the reputed German aeroplane bombardment (including presumably *The Times* correspondent) were in Bolshevik pay.

So although the German realises that his own press is censored and biased, he has no means of forming an independent judgment; he is cut off from all moral and mental contact with the civilized and informed opinion of the rest of the world.

Control of the schools was only slightly more difficult. As everyone knows, education in Germany has been a model to the rest of the world, and her professors and scientists have for generations enjoyed a deservedly high reputation for scholarship, for fertility of invention and for devotion to their profession. Her system was always far more democratic than ours. With very few and unimportant exceptions there are no privately owned schools and no boarding schools. Children, whatever their parents' income and social status, mix in the same schools; and the fees are so low that a very large percentage of them can afford to continue their education up to the universities.

To-day the same framework remains—the same number of boys and girls pass through the machine—but the spirit of freedom and independence has vanished. Education exists to teach what the Nazis want taught. As the Minister for Education stated recently, Germany has no use for international science, for the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, or for anything that does not subserve the needs of the Nazi State.

The universities and schools were purged; hundreds of men and women, some of them of international reputation, were driven out of their jobs rather than consent to sacrifice their principles. Conformity has now been attained, but the loss to education is incalculable.

In addition to the above three channels of propaganda which the Nazis found ready to hand, other organizations for moulding opinion have been built up or developed since their advent to power. Chief among these are the various "youth movements" which catch the rising generation at its most impressionable age—the Young Folks from ten to fourteen; the Hitler Youth up to the age of military service; and the Youth Labour Service.

The two former are nominally voluntary, but failure to belong is found to be unwise. Superficially they resemble our Girl Guides and Boy Scouts, and much of the training is identical; but in fact the differences of outlook are fundamental. The Scout movement

is essentially international, it does its best to promote understanding and brotherhood between nations, and it is therefore—or should be—an influence for peace. The "Hitler Youth" is exclusively national, it is militaristic in outlook, and every peace organization is anathema to it. The leaders of a proscribed Youth Association were recently sentenced to heavy terms of imprisonment for having maintained affiliations with the international Youth League of Peace at Geneva. In addition to the usual Scout training the better educated boys, after they leave school, must join the Youth Motor detachments, which parade for about four hours a week after working hours and receive a very thorough training in the driving and maintenance of motor-cycles and cars.

The Hitler Youth is not, however, patently military as is the corresponding organization in Italy. It does not carry rifles, it is taught no exclusively military subject. But, as the Nazis themselves say, this is quite unnecessary. The complete suppression of individuality in devotion to the State, the glorification of force, the insistence on the Nordic's divine mission to rule the world, which are the essentials of Nazi philosophy, combine to produce an ideal subject for the military machine to work on when its turn comes.

The Youth Labour Service is especially interesting as being the only item of the Nazi programme which is original, and which does not owe its inspiration to Italy; and it is therefore worthy of more detailed examination.

Its official object is stated to be "to create new economic wealth, actual and potential, within the Reich, by drainage, irrigation, reclamation and cultivation of waste land, which could not be carried out by private initiative; and to train the younger generation to realize the vital importance of German soil to the German nation of the future."

Every young German, whatever his social status, his previous education or his parents' income, must attend labour camp for six months between his eighteenth birthday and his being called up for military service. Each camp consists of about 150 men under a few Nazi officers and N. C. Os. who constitute a regularly organised corps ranking with, but quite distinct from, the regular army. The boys live in hutted camps, which can be packed up and moved from site to site. They work for seven hours in winter or eight in summer including the march to and from their

work and a half-hour's rest for food; and after dinners at 2 p.m. there are organized sports and drill on alternate afternoons.

There are claimed to be some 200,000 young men throughout Germany attending each six-monthly tour of service, at a cost to the State of about 1s. a day, of which 3d. is given as pocket money.

I visited one such camp and found much in it that was attractive. The huts were well-found and comfortable, and the food arrangements seemed adequate. The work being carried out was the construction of a deep channel to drain land which had become sour from over-irrigation—very heavy physical work. The boys seemed to enjoy it, however. They worked stripped to the waist in small groups, each under its own leader—usually a thick-chested young agricultural labourer. No officer was present; only a few N. C. O's, who supervised and helped with a complete absence of interference and nagging. In fact, although it was obvious that no slacking was allowed, the relations between the staff and the boys, and between the boys themselves, seemed to be excellent.

I heard this confirmed by several young Germans, who said that there was no favouritism or bullying, no discrimination between classes, and that all were treated with the same sympathy and understanding. The boys' physique shewed the benefit of ample food, regular hours, hard outdoor exercise, and of the care which was obviously taken for their health. As regards the mental fare provided, I quote from the official pamphlet: "the training in National-Socialist principles permeates the service from early morning until bed-time;" and "every evening there is from one to two hours' instruction in politics along N. S. lines."

Our young German has now reached the age of about nineteen and should by this time be thoroughly well "conditioned." If he is lucky he may start his two years' service soon after finishing his labour camp, but the great majority are not called up until they are twenty or twenty-one. For those who are working for a profession the break in continuity must obviously have serious effects on their studies.

There are no exemptions from military service except on medical grounds, and no especially privileged one-year volunteers. All alike pass through the ranks. Officers and men are a well set-up lot, noticeably well-behaved, with no suggestion of truculence or swash-buckling. I did not see their barracks or training; but

I was told by young men who were still serving that the new barracks are excellent and have been built and furnished regardless of expense.

After completing his service the reservist comes up, of course, for periodical military training. In addition he has to belong to one of the soldiers' associations which meets about once a month for social intercourse—and for the maintenance of official touch with its members. When past the age for reserve service he joins the Veterans' Association which, by a pretty irony, is the only organization encouraged, or indeed permitted, to talk about international peace.

As regards entry into the officer cadre, a boy has to apply during his last year at school to the commanding officer of the unit which he desires to join. He is then invited to meet the C. O. and other officers, and is later interviewed by an expert committee of psychologists which reports its opinion to the C. O. The latter then decides whether or not he will accept the candidate, and his decision is final. If it is favourable, the embryo officer does his labour service, joins his unit for nine months' service in the ranks and is then sent to a military college.

Two other bodies deserve notice. The *Schutzstaffl* or "Black Shirts" are picked men, well-paid, enlisted for four years and exempt from conscription. They consist of the brigade of Hitler's personal bodyguard and of some twelve other battalions, all mechanised and equipped with machine-guns and light guns.

They constitute the striking force of the Nazi Party and are very smart, efficient, and entirely ruthless.

Since the removal of their leader, Roehm, the *Sturm Abteilung* or "Brown Shirts," by whose means the Nazis seized supreme power, have fallen from their high estate. Three years ago this organization was said to number two and a half millions; but now that it is largely unpaid, its popularity has decreased. Membership is voluntary and, to judge by appearances, consists of the least attractive elements of the population. Brown Shirt activities are spasmodic and ill-defined and appear to consist of obligatory attendance at Nazi celebrations and speech-makings and of much parading about in uniform on Sundays and holidays. The uniforms, of a rusty, khaki colour, are remarkable for their ugliness and slovenly appearance. For all that the organization remains a potential "army of the streets" in the event of trouble.

Dr. Robert Ley, chief organizer of the Party, has said: "We begin with the child when he is three years old. As soon as he begins to think, he gets a little flag put in his hand; then follows the school, the Hitler Jugend, the S. A. ¹ and military training. We don't let him go; and when adolescence is past, then comes the *arbeits front* ² which takes him again and does not let him go till he dies, whether he likes it or not."

On the forcible liquidation of the Trades Unions, the Labour Front was formed after Mussolini's model to take their place. Every industry and factory has its branch, and most of them claim to have 100 per cent. membership of all concerned—directors, managerial staff and workmen. Theoretically each of these three classes elects representatives to a joint committee, which decides all questions of wages and conditions of labour in the interest of the industry as a whole. In practice the men's representatives are selected, as in Italy, by the Party machine. Strikes are, of course, illegal. Membership of the Labour Front is nominally voluntary: how far it is so in fact Dr. Ley's remarks show. The loss of his job and the certainty of never getting another would be the least that would befall a refractory workman.

In the foregoing notes I have tried to give as objective a sketch as possible of present-day Germany. The Nazis boast that they are organizing the entire population, economy and ideology of Germany into a single, co-ordinated and disciplined machine. As one of their ministers has put it picturesquely: "a German has the right to individual life only when he is asleep; at all other times he is the soldier of the Fuhrer."

Side by side with this, the expenditure on war preparation has reached astronomical figures and shows no sign of decreasing.

Is it merely designed for self-defence, as the ordinary, unofficial German hopes and believes?

Hitler himself, when making speeches for foreign consumption, passionately denies that he wants a war—and perhaps he is right. "The Germans do not want war; all they want is the rewards of victory." Besides, he has for so long fulminated against the so-called encirclement of Germany and the imminent danger to her of Russian aggression that he may have come to believe it himself. It is a discouraging reflection on human

¹ Brown Shirts.

² Labour Front.

intelligence that propagandists first invent and then believe their own propaganda.

However that may be, Hitler's own views on foreign relations are on record for all the world to read. "Mein Kampf" was written some years ago, so that its programme of action would obviously need some modification of detail to-day. But, so far from its policy ever having been repudiated, millions of copies are still circulated under government auspices as the authoritative exposition of Nazi doctrines, to be studied by every German. A few quotations are sufficient to show what these doctrines are:

"In eternal warfare mankind has become great; in eternal peace mankind would be ruined."

"An alliance which does not include the intention of war is senseless and worthless."

"It is necessary to understand clearly that the reconquest of our lost territories can only be achieved by armed force . . . and through a well-sharpened sword. To forge this sword is the object of the people's domestic policy."

"Germany must of necessity win the place in the world that befits it, if it is led and organized according to these principles."

NOTE.—This article was written in July 1937.

PROPAGANDA

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL H. L. F. DIMMOCK, ROYAL ARTILLERY

Propaganda is a much abused word and is often used in a sinister sense to describe the efforts continually being made to upset existing institutions. Efforts to strengthen the existing social structure or to preserve established institutions are euphemistically called counter-propaganda, which really confuses the object with the means. Propaganda and counter-propaganda are similar means of furthering a set policy, propaganda being the direct means and counter-propaganda being a secondary method aimed against existing or anticipated opposition to the policy in question. In the sense in which we propose to consider it, propaganda may perhaps be defined as the art of influencing the mass mind by suggestion in order to propagate an idea or, at least, to infuse a spirit favourable to the propagation of an idea. It is an art that was used by the ancient Greek orators to sway the masses and it is one that the soldier cannot afford to ignore to-day, for the means of influencing the minds of a large number of people are much more numerous than they were and the most fantastic ideas can now be propagated with success. The enforcement of prohibition in America is a striking example of the way in which an educated people can be persuaded, under the nervous tension of war strain, to accept ideas which may eventually undermine the whole social fabric and to which they had previously been impervious. In war time appeals to the spirit of self-sacrifice latent in all gregarious creatures are frequently very successful, but legislation to control social behaviour and morals, while it is possible both in peace and war, is a dangerous form of control. Unless it genuinely accords with public opinion, it is apt to lead to worse abuses. A safer method is to raise the general tone of the public by precept, example, and propaganda and to regard legislation as a last resort. At home propaganda is continually used by statesmen and politicians to prepare the minds of the community to accept some distasteful policy. This is peculiarly difficult in matters affecting the pocket. In this respect it may be remarked that legislation aiming at the taxation of the richer members of the community always has some success in democratic countries where the protests of those affected are

swamped by the acclamations of those who escape. Abroad "open diplomacy" was regarded by many European politicians as a heaven-sent opportunity for disseminating their ideas, but it has not proved very effective. Few nations are interested in principles except when they favour their own ambitions, and the actions of even the United States of America are seldom as altruistic as the utterances of her public men. The reason for the failure of the League of Nations and the somewhat blunt methods of open diplomacy are therefore not difficult to understand. Hitherto the soldier has paid little attention to propaganda as a force because he has always felt that discipline and *esprit de corps* were more powerful factors in maintaining the cohesion and determination of an army. Yet the last war proved clearly that discipline and *esprit de corps* could be so undermined by enemy propaganda as to disintegrate an army with startling rapidity. That astounding personality Leon Trotsky used it not only for the purpose of establishing the communist regime in Russia but afterwards as a strategical weapon with which to defeat the various armies of "White Russia."

It has already been pointed out that the means of applying propaganda are more numerous than they used to be, but science has done more than multiply the means of application, it has also revealed the processes of the human mind, both conscious and sub-conscious. The soldier must study psychology not only because it enables him to train brain and muscles to work together effectively, but also that he may understand and foresee mass reactions to suggested concepts. The effectiveness of propaganda depends almost entirely on the proper application of psychological principles. The greater the tendency of humanity to herd together and to indulge its activities collectively, the greater is the need for its leaders to study psychology and to apply its principles. The suppression of individualism by custom and legislation, the factory, league football, dog racing, multiple stores and other movements are all combining to mould the mentality of the nation in such a way that the vast majority will eventually be incapable of individual action and initiative, and therefore the more susceptible to influence by propaganda. This tremendous power of controlling the morale of the masses (the word morale is here used in its strictly military sense) alters among other things the whole problem of Press control in war. But the problem of controlling the means of disseminating propaganda, of which the Press,

although admittedly the most important, is only one, will be discussed later. It is necessary first to consider the objects to be achieved by propaganda. Some of these have already been touched on, but undoubtedly the most important legitimate object is to create solidarity of opinion in support of a prearranged and considered policy.

Since force is still a dominating factor in international relations it will readily be appreciated that the principles of successful propaganda are similar to those of war. Foremost among these, as far as propaganda is concerned, is the principle of maintenance of the objective. The propagandist must know the end he wishes to attain and keep this constantly in mind, using every artifice to attain it. There will necessarily be failures due to the efforts of opponents and to the appearance of plausible alternatives, and these failures can only be kept within bounds if the propagandist refuses to be diverted from his set policy.

Propaganda must be regarded as a definite and effective weapon of war. Its uses may be briefly summarised as, firstly, to weaken enemy morale, secondly, to create a favourable atmosphere in neutral countries, and, thirdly, to improve the morale of the masses at home and strengthen them to resist enemy propaganda. The use of propaganda to weaken enemy morale will always be difficult, since enemy governments will be well aware of the danger and continually on the alert to counteract it. A democratic State is more susceptible to attack by enemy propaganda than is a totalitarian State, since drastic counter-measures, such, for instance, as an extremely harsh censorship or the rigorous control of the civil population, can be easily applied in the latter, whereas in the former their tactless application would be interpreted as an unjustifiable interference with personal liberty. To attain success it is essential to have a sound knowledge of enemy psychology. Propaganda is essentially a weapon of subtlety and, if used in an obvious way, its effect may be the reverse of that desired. The enlargement of a legitimate grievance is often a most effective method and was used by the Allies in the Great War when they tried to develop the existing grievances of the minorities in the Austrian Empire.

The influence of propaganda on neutral peoples can never be ignored. In the present war in Spain the art of propaganda has from the outset been more effectively developed by the Valencia Government than by the Insurgents. It contributed in no small degree to the success of the counter-attack at Guadalajara, while

its effect in neutral countries tended to render the Insurgent blockade of Bilbao ineffective.

As regards the use of propaganda to improve morale at home, it may on occasions be necessary even to inflame the mass mind. The slogan "poor defenceless Belgium" was extremely good propaganda in 1914, when few people realised that it was necessary for England to enter the war for her own defence and preservation. At the same time it must be remembered that to inflame the mind of the masses is a dangerous step to take unless control is effective at the same time, for a passionate mob may wreak vengeance in any direction. The crowd never thinks but is swayed by catch phrases. At any time it may turn against its own leaders.

Turning to the question of application, the most obvious means is the Press, but the methods used by the Press vary. In democratic countries individuals are inclined to read only those journals and publications which accord with their own taste, so that great skill is necessary. The poorest members of the community usually indulge in the cheapest literature and are of very limited mentality. Those on the illiterate border-line are also prone to have a pathetic faith in the printed word. "It's true enough! Didn't I see it printed in the paper with my own eyes?" With such, the method of *suppressio veri suggestio falsi* has considerable effect, but if used to excess it is eventually damaging to the periodical using it. Moreover, in a country where the Press is free, this method exposes the publishers to attack by their literary opponents. In a totalitarian State the result is rather to discredit the State in the eyes of the world; its internal effect is slight because readers are unable to form any unbiased judgment. Indeed, it is a principle of government in a totalitarian State that the masses shall not be encouraged to think for themselves or to form independent opinions.

A more subtle method of applying propaganda is by the manipulation of facts. There are always two sides to a controversial subject for otherwise it would not be controversial. A careful avoidance of false statements, and a skilful insistence on those facts which support the idea to be propagated have a very strong influence on a semi-educated public.

The use of sensationalism is a third method. A sensational occurrence may often be entirely distorted, or its sensationalism accentuated by a lavish seasoning of sentimentality. A minor grievance can thus be elaborated to appear as a gross injustice.

These and similar methods are commonly used by the subversive elements in any State. A section of the community can be stirred up to commit disorderly acts requiring the use of force for their suppression, thus creating opportunities for further propaganda. The acts of the "suffragettes" in 1912, the "civil disobedience" organised a few years ago by Congress in India are both examples of these methods. Skilful and timely exposure of motives and firm handling of the situation are the remedies usually most effective.

Next to the Press as a means of dissemination must be placed broadcasting, which is steadily becoming a more and more powerful force. The two means are co-related and interdependent, except that the Press expresses the views of every party and creed, whereas broadcasting organizations express the views of none, at least in theory. These commentaries are not applicable, naturally, in a totalitarian State. Anyone with leisure to listen to the discussions organised by the British Broadcasting Corporation will readily appreciate how effectively propaganda could be disseminated by the conduct in a biased manner of discussions on controversial subjects, because it is always possible to create an atmosphere of apparent impartiality.

The stage and the cinema, especially the latter, rank next in importance, and these too are co-related as means of disseminating ideas. The spy plays performed on the stage and the screen during 1914-1918 were unconscious propaganda and served as a reminder to many unthinking people to guard their tongues and be discreet. An unforeseen effect was to induce a craze for spy hunting in which many innocent persons suffered unpleasant persecution; but on the whole the results of such plays were good.

Lectures, discussion, and travel talks are other useful means of dissemination, which the propagandist should use to strengthen morale and solidarity. The pacifist elements in Great Britain during the war used them subversively with some success, and it will be essential in future to watch such activities and to arrange for the presence of skilled debaters and hecklers. On the other hand the lectures, arranged to prepare the minds of the rank and file for organised demobilization failed because the need to enlist the sympathies of a powerful Press was overlooked and the lectures were confined to the armed forces overseas. The result was that a newspaper campaign organised with a political motive entirely dissociated from the motives of those who had prepared the scheme for demobilization caused the complete breakdown of

the latter and necessitated the lavish application of the dole. We are still suffering from the disastrous effects of this failure, although the scheme as originally devised would have saved much loss and suffering and was a triumph of good staff work and planning.

Other methods of disseminating propaganda will doubtless occur to anyone studying the problem, but enough has been said to show how difficult and subtle is the manipulation of propaganda generally. Some of the methods explained above can be used to affect hostile communities, but they will usually require considerable modification if they are to be effective. As a preliminary it is generally necessary to create "cells" from which ideas can be inculcated upon a hostile people, but cells are not easy to organise and the agents employed run very considerable risks.

In conclusion it may be said that, although the soldier is not concerned in peace with civil propaganda or the political motives inspiring it, this does not imply that he ought to ignore its study and shun the devices used in its application. However distasteful it is to soldiers brought up in the old military tradition of regarding all political and social activities as outside their sphere of interest, it is essential to-day that there should be a branch of the staffs of the Defence Services in every country of the Empire whose sole duty would be the organization and study of propaganda and counter-propaganda. Reduced to its simplest elements the fostering of *esprit de corps* is a form of propaganda, but in the wider aspects of the subject the close co-operation of the intelligence service is necessary. Among the permanent forces of the Crown the fostering of *esprit de corps* should go hand in hand with measures to prevent the infiltration of subversive propaganda even in peace time. The one is as necessary as the other if the British Army is to remain the cohesive non-political entity which has for so long contributed to the stability of the British Empire.

CHAOS

We were discussing recently which foreign tongue was the most difficult to master. Russian, German, French, Magyar, Greek, Persian, Arabic, Chinese, Japanese—we ranged throughout the world. So fast and furious waxed the argument that I determined to approach other sources, and I have found my answer.

The poem below was written by a distinguished Dutch linguist and jurist, the late Dr. Nolst Frinite. Having read it, I have no doubt as to which is the hardest and most inconsequent language in the world; and I realise why I can never hope to master a foreign tongue. I have not yet learnt my own.

DE CHAOS*

*Dearest creature in Creation,
 Studying English pronunciation,
 I will teach you in my verse
 Sounds like corpse, corps, horse and worse.
 It will keep you, Susy, busy,
 Make your head with heat grow dizzy;
 Tear in eye your dress you'll tear.
 So shall I! Oh, hear my prayer,
 Pray, console your loving poet,
 Make my coat look new, dear, sew it!
 Just compare heart, beard and heard,
 Dies and diet, lord and word,
 Sword and sward, retain and Britain,
 (Mind the latter, how it's written!)
 Made has not the sound of bade,
 Say—said, pay—paid, laid, but plaid.
 Now I surely will not plague you
 With such words as vague and ague,
 But be careful how you speak,
 Say break, steak, but bleak and streak,
 Previous, precious; fuchsia, via;
 Pipe, snipe, recipe and choir,
 Cloven, oven; how and low;
 Script, receipt; shoe, poem, toe,
 Hear me say, devoid of trickery:
 Daughter, laughter and Terpsichore,*

*With acknowledgments to L'Orient and to Messrs. G. Kloff & Co., Batavia.

Typhoid; measles, topsails, aisles;
 Exiles, similes, reviles;
 Wholly, holly; signal, signing;
 Thames; examining, combining;
 Scholar, vicar and cigar,
 Solar, mica, war and far.
 From "desire": desirable—admirable from "admire";
 Lumber, plumber; bier but brier;
 Chatham, brougham; renown but known,
 Knowledge; done, but gone and tone,
 One, anemone; Balmoral;
 Kitchen, lichen; laundry, laurel;
 Gertrude, German; wind and mind;
 Scene, Melpomene, mankind;
 Tortoise, turquoise, chamois-leather,
 Reading, Reading, heathen, heather.
 This phonetic labyrinth
 Gives moss, gross, brook, brooch, ninth, plinth.
 Billet does not end like ballet;
 Bouquet, wallet, mallet, chalet;
 Blood and flood are not like food,
 Nor is mould like should and would.
 Banquet is not nearly parquet,
 Which is said to rime with "darky".
 Viscous, viscount; load and broad;
 Toward, to forward, to reward,
 And your pronunciation's O.K.
 When you say correctly croquet;
 Rounded, wounded; grieve and sieve;
 Friend and fiend; alive and live;
 Liberty, library; heave and heaven;
 Rachel, ache, moustache; eleven.
 We say hallowed, but allowed;
 People, leopard; towed, but vowed.
 Mark the difference, moreover,
 Between mover, plover, Dover,
 Leeches, breeches; wise, precise;
 Chalice but police and lice.
 Camel; constable, unstable;
 Principle, disciple; label;

Petal, penal and canal;
Wait, surmise, plait, promise; pal.
Suit, suite, ruin; circuit, conduit
Rime with "shirk it" and "beyond it",
But it is not hard to tell,
Why it's pall, mall, but Pall Mall.
Muscle, muscular; gaol; iron;
Timber, climber; bullion, lion,
Worm and storm; chaise, chaos, chair;
Senator, spectator, mayor.
Ivy, privy; famous, clamour
And enamour rime with "hammer".
Pussy, hussy and possess.
Desert, but desert, address.
Golf, wolf; countenance; lieutenants
Hoist, in lieu of flags, left pennants.
River, rival; tomb, bomb, comb;
Doll and roll and some and home.
Stranger does not rime with anger,
Neither does devour with clangour.
Soul, but foul and gaunt, but aunt;
Font, front, wont; want, grand, and, grant,
Shoes, goes, does Now first say: finger,*
And then: singer, ginger, linger.
Real, zeal; mauve, gauze and gauge;
Marriage, foliage, mirage, age.
Query does not rime with very,
Nor does fury sound like bury.
Dost, lost, post and doth, cloth, loth;
Job, Job, blossom, bosom, oath.
Though the difference seems little,
We say actual, but victual,
Seat, sweat, chaste, caste; Leigh, eight, height;
Put, nut; granite, but unite.
Reefer does not rime with "deaf",
Feoffer does, and zephyr, heifer.
Dull, bull; Geoffrey, George; ate, late;
Hint, pint; senate, but sedate;
Scenic, Arabic, Pacific;
Science, conscience, scientific;

* No, you are wrong. This is the plural of "doe".

Tour, but our, and succour, four;
 Gas, alas and Arkansas!
 Sea, idea, guinea, area,
 Psalm; Maria, but malaria;
 Youth, south, southern; cleanse and clean;
 Doctrine; turpentine, marine.
 Compare alien with Italian,
 Dandelion with battalion,
 Sally with ally; yea, ye,
 Eye, I, ay, aye, whey, key, quay!
 Say aver, but ever, fever,
 Neither, leisure, skein, receiver.
 Never guess—it is not safe;
 We say calves, valves, half, but Ralf!
 Heron; granary, canary;
 Crevice, and device, and eyrie;
 Face but preface, but efface;
 Phlegm, phlegmatic; ass, glass, bass;
 Large, but target, gin, give, verging;
 Ought, out, joust and scour, but scourging;
 Ear, but earn; and wear and tear
 Do not rime with "here", but "ere".
 Seven is right, but so is even;
 Hyphen, roughen, nephew, Stephen;
 Monkey, donkey; clerk and jerk;
 Asp, grasp, wasp; and cork and work.
 Pronunciation—think of psyche!—
 Is a paling, stout and spikey;
 Won't it make you lose your wits,
 Writing "groats" and saying groats?
 It's a dark abyss or tunnel,
 Strewn with stones, like rowlock, gunwale,
 Islington and Isle of Wight,
 Housewife, verdict and indict!
 Don't you think so, reader, rather,
 Saying lather, bather, father?
 Finally: which rimes with "enough",
 Though, through, plough, cough, hough, or tough?
 Hiccough has the sound of "cup"
 My advice is—give it up!

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Dated Lahore, the 31st January 1938.

SIR,

I have read with great interest the article "Education and the Indian Army" in your journal for July 1937.

I suppose it is because it was beyond the scope of his business that the writer has made no reference to the biggest handicap of all education in the Punjab—the neglect of the education of those who are to be the mothers of the officers and other ranks of the Indian Army.

If we could only get hold of them when they are little girls, educate and train them, our difficulties would be considerably reduced. As long as the mothers remain illiterate and untrained, whatever education we give to the children is largely wasted. The soldier slips back into the old life and ways as soon as he leaves the colours, and the school-boy slips back into illiteracy. No one can live permanently beyond the standard of his home, and that is why we see so many of our efforts ending in disappointment. We train school-masters, and we civilise recruits. When we visit them in their schools, or in their homes, we find that all our instructions have had no permanent effect.

The school-master is teaching in the same old routine manner, the old soldier's buttons are dirty, and his village is higgledy-piggledy.

If only the Army could open some King George's Royal Indian Military Schools for the daughters of its officers and men, the Punjab would soon be civilised.

I am not suggesting that the Army can do anything in the matter except what it is already doing, and doing splendidly, in the way of welfare centres and women's institutions in its regimental lines. But I do think that Major Richards would have been right and wise to have mentioned the extra handicap from which the soldier suffers, as he could then have claimed that the progress Indian Army education has made is not merely phenomenal, it is miraculous.

My fear, however, is that all the education that the Indian Army is giving will be no more permanent than what we are

giving to school-boys in civil life. The environment and the atmosphere of the homes are illiterate and anti-literate. There are practically no Roman Urdu books and newspapers for men and their families to read, and the combination of these two obstacles to permanent literacy will soon bury the soldier's newly acquired skill under the silt of village stagnation. It would be a very interesting thing if these soldiers could be tested five years after they have left the colours to see how many of them have maintained their standard.

Yours faithfully,
F. L. BRAYNE,
*Commissioner,
Rural Reconstruction, Punjab.*

REVIEWS

"THE 14TH KING GEORGE'S OWN SIKHS, THE 1ST BATTALION (K. G. O.) (FEROZEPORE SIKHS), THE 11TH SIKH REGIMENT."

BY COLONEL F. E. G. TALBOT

The Royal United Service Institution

This is a careful and painstaking history of a great regiment, and should be of considerable interest to those who know the unit.

Those who do not will be rather handicapped by the almost complete lack of illustrations, while all will miss the lighter touches which can do so much to make history live.

The accounts of the numerous campaigns in which the 14th Sikhs took part are well and clearly written while the many sketch maps illustrating the actions of the regiment are much above average.

A point that is well brought out by the history of this regiment is the weakness of the 1914 Indian Army organisation as a basis for expansion in war. The 14th Sikhs had 4,600 men through their ranks between August 1914 and September 1919, and of this number only 1,800 belonged to the regiment. The remainder came from five other regular battalions, the 1st Patiala Infantry and the Burma Military Police.

D. F. W. W.

"HORSEMEN ALL"

BY MAJOR-GENERAL GEOFFREY BROOKE, D.S.O., M.C.

(Constable & Co., Ltd., 12s. 6d.)

General Brooke has written this book, to use his own words, "for parents of the rising generation and young aspiring horsemen." The description is apt, for no parent could wish for a wiser or more sympathetic instructor and no child could fail to be interested by the fascinating way in which each stage of learning to ride is presented. The illustrations by Miss Pamela Searight are delightful, and each contains its lesson.

The author rightly lays stress on three points; the need for making friends with and understanding the pony; the need for

perfect confidence on the part of the child at all stages of his instruction, and the value of a hack in the country as a means of teaching children to appreciate nature. Unfortunately he does not touch on the problem of teaching children in India to ride; possibly because he does not believe in Nimrods and Dianas of less than eight years, and few English children remain in the tropics after that age.

While the book gives the impression of having been somewhat hastily edited—there are clumsy sentences and occasional lapses in grammar—we commend it unhesitatingly as the child's guide to riding.

E. S.

"THE ROYAL ENGINEERS IN EGYPT AND THE SUDAN."

By LT.-COL. E. W. C. SANDES, D.S.O., M.C., LATE R.E.

(*The Institution of Royal Engineers, Chatham. 18 sh.*)

Lt.-Col. Sandes is already well known as a military historian from his "The Military Engineer in India" to which the present work is no unworthy successor. The book is divided into two parts, of which the first deals with the achievements of Royal Engineers in campaigns in Egypt and the Sudan since the year 1800, and the second describes their work in various civil departments during the last half century.

Outstanding events in Egypt and the Sudan in the last quarter of the nineteenth century were so closely associated with the names of two great Royal Engineers, Kitchener and Gordon, that much of the book is in reality a general history of the two countries. The part played by other Royal Engineers, also, both in war and in the administration and development of the countries, was so important that there is no lack of interest either to the general reader or to the soldier or engineer.


To military readers the main interest will centre in the descriptions of the Tel-el-Kebir, Dongola and Omdurman campaigns. The campaign of 1882 in Egypt was an "Infantry war," but the author gives a comprehensive account of the fighting leading up to the decisive battle of Tel-el-Kebir, in paving the way to which an important part was played by a sapper, Lt.-General Sir Gerald Graham.

Like so many of the small wars in which the British Army has been engaged, the Dongola and Omdurman campaign of 1896 to 1898 provided far greater difficulties in the sphere of supply than in that of strategy and tactics. The greatest achievement of the campaign was unquestionably the construction of the desert railway from Wadi Halfa to Abu Hamed and beyond; and to Kitchener, an engineer as well as a soldier, the credit is mainly due. Kitchener's genius is well described by the author in these pages, which bring out clearly his strength of character, his capacity for selecting able subordinates, and his anxiety, almost a mania, for economy, which lasted until the end of his life.

Civil Engineering works in Egypt can challenge comparison with others in any part of the world, and the second part of the book gives a good account of the most important; the chapter dealing with irrigation, on which the life-blood of Egypt depends, is of special interest.

The book is written in an entertaining and eminently readable style, and the author is to be congratulated on his illustrations and sketch maps, which, though small in scale, are extremely easy to follow. The foreword is written by General Sir Reginald Wingate, himself a great figure in the history of Egypt and the Sudan, to whom Lt.-Col. Sandes acknowledges much help in the preparation of the volume.

P. R. A.



THE BATTLE OF SOBRAON, FEBRUARY 10TH 1846.

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EDITORIAL

Shortly after the German annexation of Austria three months ago, at a time when many Englishmen were both
Britain and War. perturbed and excited, the Prime Minister gave the House of Commons a calm and reasoned statement of the circumstances under which British arms might be used. He explained that while British foreign policy must always be directed towards the maintenance of peace, since peace was the greatest interest of the British Empire, there were definite circumstances under which we would fight. Firstly, we were committed to the defence of France and Belgium against unprovoked aggression in accordance with our existing obligations under the Treaty of Locarno, as reaffirmed in London in 1936; and we had treaty obligations towards Portugal, Iraq and Egypt which would lead us to fight if the occasion arose. Secondly, we would fight for the defence of British territories and the communications vital to our national existence. Thirdly, we would fight when we felt that war was the only alternative to abandoning all hope of averting the destruction of those things we hold most dear, our liberty and our right to live according to our own national standards. Fourthly, we might intervene as a member of the League of Nations for the restoration of peace and the maintenance of international order, if circumstances made such action on our part necessary and appropriate. But since the earliest days of the League it had been accepted that the responsibilities of member

states varied from one area to another according as their interests were more or less immediately involved. British policy could not take the form of a wholesale undertaking to engage in war unconditionally, instantly and wherever offences against international order were being committed. It had been contended that, for the sake of security, Britain ought to give a pledge of military assistance to France should that country ask for help in the fulfilment of her obligations under the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty, or that a similar pledge should be given directly to Czechoslovakia in the event of a forcible interference by Germany with her independence. To give such pledges of military support, Mr. Chamberlain explained, would be to remove the decision whether or not Britain should be involved in war from the control of His Majesty's Government, and that was not a position which the Government could accept in relation to an area where the vital interests of Great Britain were not concerned in the same degree as they were in the case of France and Belgium. But, he added, if war broke out it would be unlikely to be confined to those who had assumed obligations. It was impossible to say where it would end or what governments would be involved.

As regards present problems, the Government considered that now was the time when all the resources of diplomacy should be enlisted to keep the peace in Eastern Europe. The Government were glad to note, and in no way underrated, the definite assurances given by the German Government as to their attitude; and Britain would do all she could to help towards a solution of difficulties likely to cause trouble between Germany and Czechoslovakia. At the same time His Majesty's Government had decided on an acceleration of the rearmament programme and an increase in the strength of the Royal Air Force and the anti-aircraft defences of Great Britain.

That the Prime Minister's statement reflected a very large body of informed opinion was perhaps evidenced by the fact that the Opposition did not divide against the Government on this issue of foreign policy. What is still more important is that his speech received a warm welcome throughout the Empire and in most foreign countries. Neither in Paris nor in Prague was there a shadow of resentment at the refusal of the Prime Minister to commit Britain forthwith; on the contrary, in both capitals, the need of the British Government to retain its freedom of action was

understood, and the reaffirmation of existing pledges was appreciated. In Rome the speech met with Italian approval perhaps more on the ground that the British Government had again declared its determination to adhere to a policy of non-intervention in Spain, than on the refusal to undertake commitments in Eastern Europe. In Berlin the speech was accepted with reserve, but it was stated officially that Czechoslovakia did not present an actual or critical problem. Certainly a clear statement of British policy such as this can not fail to be of assistance to the cause of peace, especially when it is becoming more and more steadily backed by an increasing scale of armament, which it is recognized may well prove a tranquillising factor in the Europe of to-morrow.

* * *

For fifteen years after the signing of the Peace Treaties Czechoslovakia was regarded as one of the most stable and successful of the new states created out of the wreck of the Austrian Empire. As far as was known, the democratic constitution worked well, the country had strong defence forces—certainly strong enough for the conditions of that decade—and enjoyed a trade prosperity which was envied by many older states. Yet within a fortnight of the annexation of Austria, Czechoslovakia was rivalling Spain as the chief danger centre of Europe. The reason for this state of affairs did not lie in the fact that the Republic was encircled by German territory or that it was cut off from the sea and so could not export the goods on which it was dependent, but in the incorporation within its territory of three million persons of German stock. During the post-war period there is little doubt that the existence, let alone the well-being of this minority, had been largely ignored by the Allied Powers. It is difficult to believe that Sudeten grievances could not have been remedied if the Allies had paid more attention to the new states which they had created. That a solution may still be found within the Czech State is possible, but in view of Herr Hitler's declared policy of absorbing all persons of German stock within the Reich it is difficult to see how a permanent solution can be found without some surrender of Czech sovereignty or territory to Germany. If Czech and German could live amicably, side by side, their frontiers demarcated by a purely artificial line such as exists between the United States and Canada, there would be little reason for Dr. Hodza to oppose a surrender of Sudeten territory to Germany. Unfortunately there appears to be little

likelihood of a powerful democracy living in perfect harmony with a state whose leader has avowed intentions of acquiring dominance in Central Europe. To find an answer to the question whether the Sudeten Germans can be satisfied and yet remain citizens of the Czech Republic, one must turn to Herr Henlein's speech at Carlsbad. "If Czech statesmen want a permanent understanding with us Germans and with the German Reich," he said, "they will have to fulfil our demand for a complete revision of Czech foreign policy, which has hitherto ranked Czechoslovakia among the enemies of the German people." Herr Henlein went on to make eight demands on behalf of the German minority. He asked for equality of status between Czech and German, and a guarantee of that equality by the recognition of the Sudeten Deutsche as a legal entity; for determination and legal recognition of the German regions in Czechoslovakia and full autonomy for those regions; for legal protection for every citizen living outside the region of his own nationality, and the removal of injustices inflicted on the Sudeten Deutsche since 1918 and reparation for them; for recognition of the principle of German officials for German regions; and for full liberty to profess German nationality and political philosophy.

That there should be full equality between German and Czech is reasonable, as also are the pleas for German officials in German regions, legal protection for every citizen wherever he lives, and the removal of injustices. Recognition of the Sudeten Deutsche as a legal entity and autonomy in Sudeten regions may mean much or little according to interpretation. But the demand that the Sudetens should in future have full liberty to profess German nationality and German political philosophy can hardly be met if Czechoslovakia is to remain the sovereign state she is to-day. No civilised country could permit a section of its permanent residents to accept a political philosophy greatly at variance with the accepted philosophy of the state. The only practical consequence of the Nazi *Weltanschauung* would be an agitation for the incorporation of Sudeten provinces within the Reich. Because a solution to the Sudeten problem may prove impossible of attainment within the Czech State is, however, no reason why that solution should be sought by resort to war. It is one thing to wage war for an ideal or principle. It is another to fight solely to perpetuate what is admittedly an unfortunate state of affairs.

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**The War in
Spain.**

It is six months since we commented on the war in Spain. At the end of 1937, General Franco had reached a turning point in his campaign; he had conquered northern and western Spain, there remained Catalonia in the north-east and a substantial portion of territory extending from Madrid eastwards to Valencia. Three courses were open to him; he could invade either Catalonia or Valencia, or he could attempt to cut the coastal communications between these two parts of Government Spain. It was indicated at the time that he would probably adopt the latter course, if only for the reason that an advanced party under Colonel Rey was besieged in Teruel. The surrender of the Insurgents in Teruel was hailed as a Republican victory, the forerunner of a vast Government offensive in the spring. In fact it turned out to be no more than a local success. As soon as the weather permitted, General Franco was in a position to concentrate in eastern Spain a large force of seasoned troops and his offensive through the provinces of Arragon and Teruel had an immediate success. By April his troops had reached the Mediterranean seaboard south of Tortosa and closed communication between Valencia and Barcelona on the one hand and Madrid and Barcelona on the other. Moreover, a flank-guard has started operations in the Pyrenees with the object of closing the French frontier to the Catalonians.

The causes of the Republican reverse must for the present remain conjectural. The Government claimed that the Nationalists had been better supplied with men and material from abroad, but there is evidence to show that large quantities of war material from France, Russia and other countries had in fact been imported into Catalonia and Valencia during the winter; and it is interesting to note that few foreign troops were identified on either side during the Insurgent advance. The truth appears to be that General Franco had been manoeuvring on interior lines, with better trained and better led troops at his disposal. Nor had he had to contend with a firmly united enemy. The *Frente Popular* has never been a solidly democratic alliance. There have been divisions between the communists, the socialists and the anarcho-syndicalists, while the average, as opposed to the politically minded, Catalanian is war-weary and equally afraid of the communist from south-eastern Spain and the fascist from the western provinces.

General Franco has claimed that the war is as good as won, and, failing a great increase in outside aid to Government Spain, it appears that he has justifiable grounds for his announcement. Admittedly he has much to do in the purely military sphere; he has to complete the conquest of Catalonia, where fierce resistance is still to be expected; he has to take Madrid, where he has already suffered reverses; and he has to occupy the country between Madrid and Valencia. Even so these problems may well prove to be little more than the tail-end of a successful war. The true test will come when he has overcome all Spain. His reputation as a patriot and his prestige in the world will depend on what he manages to create as a result of his victory. Will he be able to construct, or will he prove again that it is easy to destroy, but hard to build? From behind the Nationalist front, one can get a fair indication of the future. Nationalist Spain is a dictatorship, with every power vested in General Franco. Despite this the General has presided for some time over a ministry on the democratic pattern. Each minister is the head of a separate department of state, and the ministry includes men as varied in their political origins as Senor Cuesta, a member of the Old Guard, Senor Suner, a leader of the Accion Popular, and Senor Redezno, a Carlist. The ministry is steadily evolving an economic organization and a propaganda of its own. It has repudiated Marxism on the one hand and capitalism on the other; there is to be no class war and no domination of one section of the people over another. And curiously enough, successive declarations have laid increasing stress on the importance of the Catholic Church in the national life. But, although General Franco's ministry bears some resemblance to a democratic executive, in fact it pursues its own course with little reference to the people: Perhaps this is inevitable during war time, but it seems reasonable to conclude that a dictatorship will be the only possible form of government for some years after the war is concluded and that that dictatorship will be based on the Falangists who have already become the strongest element on the Nationalist side.

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Interest in the Sino-Japanese struggle has during the last three months been confined very largely to events in
The War in China. Shantung and Kiangsu. It will be remembered that the plan adopted by the Japanese Higher Command, after the

fall of Nanking, took the form of a dual advance, from the north and south, on the line of the Tientsin-Pukow railway. The Japanese advance northward from Pukow soon came to a halt owing to the action of Chinese irregulars, who maintained a steady pressure against the Japanese lines of communication and necessitated the diversion of first-line Japanese troops to what were essentially internal security duties.

It was in the north, however, that the Japanese, despite the arrival of reinforcements from Manchuria, received their first serious reverse. Towards the end of March the Chinese launched a vigorous offensive north of Suchow. The Japanese had, it is believed, omitted to take adequate protective measures on their flanks and were forced to retire, leaving behind a quantity of arms and ammunition, some tanks and armoured cars. On 3rd April the town of Taierchwang, forty miles from Suchow, fell to the Chinese. But by this time the Chinese offensive had spent itself, casualties on both sides had been heavy, and fighting died down until late in April, when the Japanese renewed the attack. The capture of Suchow and the eastern half of the Lunghai railway in May brought the Japanese both military and political advantages. It has enabled them to use the Tsinpu railway throughout its length and to turn Haichow into a base for troops on the Lunghai railway. On the political side, territorial connection between the two Japanese controlled regimes at Nanking and Peiping may lead to the strengthening of each.

For all that, the campaign in Shantung must have been a severe disappointment to the Japanese. For two months a body of Chinese provincial troops not only held up a Japanese regular army, but counter-attacked several times with success and finally managed to extricate itself from the converging Japanese forces without excessive loss. At no time did Marshal Chiang Kai-shek have to call on his reserve of 300,000 men, who are training in the interior of China. The fact is that China has been displaying an unexpected strength, both militarily and politically. The Chinese Government has announced that it has material resources to carry on the war for another nine months and a sufficient reserve of trained man-power to defend Hankow. At a congress of the Kuomintang in April, a further vote of confidence was passed in Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, who was given dictatorial powers. Under the circumstances it is possible that he will be able to extend

operations sufficiently long to wear out the Japanese, who have still to consolidate the Lunghai railway before they can operate against Hankow—And the monsoon rains have broken.

On the other hand the setback in the north has certainly not damped Japanese ardour. There are indications of a national determination to prosecute the war more vigorously, and even moderate opinion in Tokyo appears to be veering in favour of an advance into the interior of China. A National Mobilization Bill to co-ordinate the activities of the nation with a view to providing uninterrupted services to the army has been passed by the Diet, and the inclusion of General Araki in the Cabinet almost certainly portends a more forward policy. Failing a settlement which commends itself to the army, the nation is preparing for a long war. In that case the outcome would appear to rest on two factors, the will of the Chinese to resist from a military point of view and their ability to do so from a material and financial standpoint. A factor which may influence the Chinese will to resist in the field is the decision of the Reich to recall the German military advisers, who had been employed to reorganize the Chinese army before the war and have since its outbreak been advising on the course of operations. It is noteworthy that those advisers, whose recommendations regarding the advisability of defending Nanking were not adopted by the Chinese, were actually given a measure of executive control during the operations at Suchow.

As regards material and financial factors, the position is too involved to justify any forecast of events, but the agreement recently concluded between His Majesty's Government and the Japanese Government regarding the servicing of foreign loans must to some extent strengthen Chinese credit. Under that agreement revenues collected at Chinese ports within Japanese occupation will be handed over to the Yokohama Specie Bank, by whom sums due on foreign loans and indemnities secured on the Chinese customs will be handed over to the Inspector-General of Customs. From many points of view the agreement is a satisfactory one. It not only protects legitimate foreign interests and removes a source of friction, but it lessens the chances of an arbitrary seizure of the customs by local Japanese commanders and preserves the integrity of the Customs administration with its international personnel.

It was British private enterprise which developed cable communication throughout the world, and in 1914 **Cable and Wireless.** not only were most of the important submarine cables owned by British companies but those companies were obtaining traffic at a remunerative level. It was not until 1924 that their prosperity was threatened by the development of beam wireless. So serious did the competition become, however, that an Imperial Wireless and Cable Conference was held in 1928 to consider what steps should be taken to save the overseas telegraph services of the British Empire. For strategical reasons alone it was clear that we could not afford to allow cable communications to be entirely ousted by the new invention, and the Conference recommended the merger of British cable and wireless resources in one company, Cables and Wireless, Ltd. The four beam wireless stations in the United Kingdom, which were owned by the Post Office, were leased to the company for twenty-five years, in return for which the company was to pay a beam rental of £250,000 and 12 per cent of any profits earned over and above a standard revenue, which was fixed at approximately 6 per cent of the company's capital. The object of the scheme was in fact to provide for co-operation between the governments of the Empire, for the maintenance and development of a great overseas cable and wireless system, and the operation of that system by private enterprise working under semi-public utility conditions. It was unfortunate that the company was formed just before the beginning of the economic depression, and its difficulties, due largely to over-capitalisation, have been extreme. It has managed to pay its beam rental regularly, but there have never been profits in excess of the standard revenue.

The policy inaugurated in 1928 has in recent years been endangered; partly because the operating company has never earned enough revenue to enable it to reduce telegraph rates to the extent that had been hoped; and partly owing to the threat of foreign competition on Empire routes, by the introduction of new direct wireless services competing with the company's system. To meet these difficulties a fresh settlement was announced in April. The new scheme provides for a standard rate throughout the Empire varying from 1s. 3d. a word for ordinary telegrams down to 5d. a word for letter telegrams. The company is relieved of its obligation to pay a beam rental; to that extent shareholders

will be better off, and in return the Government acquires a substantial holding of 9 per cent of the equity of the company.

The boldness of the move may readily be conceded and hopes may be built on the results which the Post Office has achieved from its analogous policy of reducing and standardising rates for inland communications. This judgment must, however, be tempered by the reflection that the measure is not only an offensive one, designed to meet foreign competition, but that it is also defensive. It is no coincidence that the steep cut in cable rates has come in the year in which the new Empire air mail services have been started. A part of the advantage which Cables and Wireless, Ltd., will derive from their lower rates will be in retaining existing traffic in the face of air competition. But, while the change remains financially a speculation, it is not one that can be viewed solely from that point of view. The cohesion of the Empire to-day depends on the good-will of its members, and that depends in its turn on mutual knowledge, of which cheap and rapid communication is a sure guarantee.

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The British South Africa Company received a Royal Charter to develop the territory of Southern Rhodesia as far back as 1889, but it was many years before the political federation of that country with the Union of South Africa was envisaged. Combination of some sort between Southern Rhodesia and the Union held the field, however, for some twenty years, until 1924 in fact, when the Union, shortly after Southern Rhodesia had been formally annexed to the Crown, prohibited the import of meat and scrap tobacco and placed restrictions on the import of Rhodesian cattle, thus dealing a heavy blow at the chief exports of the infant colony. While this action did much to destroy the economic basis of union, circumstances were tending to destroy the political and psychological bases. The dislike of official bi-lingualism and centralization of government, the fear of an inflow of poor whites, the manifestations, particularly the anti-British manifestations, of South African nationalism were steadily convincing the Southern Rhodesians of the need to pursue a destiny apart from the Union, and attention was turned instead to the prospects of amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In 1931, however, the British Government declared its conviction that amalgamation of the two Rhodesias was not yet practicable and was not likely to be practicable for some years.

Although the Government did not reject the principle of amalgamation, it repeated its declaration in 1935 and pointed to the sparsity of the European population north of the Zambesi and the problems of native development which still required that His Majesty's Government should retain direct responsibility for that area.

The announcement that a Royal Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Bledisloe has just sailed for Africa with a view to reporting whether any, and if so what, form of co-operation is desirable between the two countries, is of more than passing interest to the peoples of the British Commonwealth. The problem which the Commission has to solve is not an easy one. The difference in status between the two Rhodesias is as great as the difference in the conditions prevailing in the two countries. In the Northern territory the European residents have merely the power to elect unofficial members to the Governor's Council. Southern Rhodesia, though not yet included as a dominion within the implications of the Statute of Westminster, is nevertheless self-governing. Northern Rhodesia has, as the recent economic commission headed by Sir Alan Pim pointed out, only one economic resource—her copper industry. The land is not suitable for extensive settlement, certainly not by Europeans, the area is huge and anything but compact. The European population numbers only eleven thousand among a million and a quarter natives. Native services are backward and the country could not hope to enter a federation as an equal partner with Southern Rhodesia, which is essentially an agricultural country, suited to European settlement and possessing already a white population five times the size of her northern neighbour.

But there is no doubt that there is a strong feeling, headed by Dr. Huggins, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, in all the three territories in favour of amalgamation. The Commission will have to examine the arguments put forward to show that the situation has changed sufficiently since 1931 to justify political union. Even if the Commission reports against amalgamation for the time being, there is undoubtedly scope for closer economic and administrative working between the countries concerned. At present each has its own police, public works, agricultural and veterinary services, to mention only a few, and there is reason to believe that substantial economies could be brought about by some form of common public service.

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The statements relating to defence presented to Parliament in 1935, 1936 and 1937 dealt primarily with the circumstances which led His Majesty's Government to undertake an extensive programme of rearmament and the costs which it was estimated at the time would be involved. The White Paper laid before Parliament this year was a survey of the progress already achieved. It was not to be expected that a great rearmament programme could be carried through without some setbacks. Increased production was bound to make demands on certain types of material and skilled labour which could not be met at once, unless there was to be considerable interference with private industry. It is satisfactory to learn therefore that, although deliveries have not in every case come up to expectation, progress on the whole has been satisfactory and the rate of production is now rapidly expanding. Measures for the protection of the civil population against air attack took an important stage forward with the passing of the Air Raids Precautions Act, 1937, to which we referred in the January issue of this Journal. Local authorities have been made responsible for the preparation of schemes of passive defence, for which purpose they will receive technical guidance from the Home Office and financial assistance in respect of approved schemes from the Treasury. A training school for Air Raids Precautions officers of local authorities has been opened in London, and schools for air raid wardens and first-aid parties are being set up all over the country in increasing numbers. Most of the gas masks required to supply the needs of the civil population are already available and the balance will be produced by the end of the year. In the White Paper of 1937 it was explained that it was not then possible to determine the peak year of armament expenditure, but it was indicated that it would be imprudent to contemplate an expenditure of less than £1,500 millions. Last year expenditure on the Defence Services totalled £280 millions. This year expenditure is estimated at £350 millions and it is stated that, while 1939 may prove to be the peak year of expenditure, the rearmament programme as a whole will exceed substantially the original estimate.

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To turn to the Services individually, the net total of the Navy Estimates is £123,707,000, of which £30 millions will be met by borrowing from the Consolidated Fund under the Defence Loans Act of last year. The record of

The Navy Estimates.

progress made by the senior service is impressive enough if one is to judge by the figures of tonnage building at successive dates. On 1st January 1935 there were 139,345 tons on the stocks, a year later the figure had doubled and on 1st January this year it was just short of 550,000 tons, or four times as much as it was three years ago. Some sixty vessels of all classes are to be put into service during the year, while the programme of new ships to be laid down consists of two capital ships, one aircraft carrier, four large and three small cruisers, three submarines, three minelayers and a miscellany of small craft. Detailed plans are being worked out by the Admiralty and Air Ministry to give effect to the decision, taken last July, to transfer the administrative control of the Fleet Air Arm to the Admiralty. To keep pace with the growing strength of the fleet, personnel have had to be expanded at a steadily increasing rate, but there seems to have been little or no difficulty over recruitment.

That the estimates came in for singularly little criticism was due not only to the satisfaction which is generally felt with the progress made by the Admiralty, but also to the growing recognition that in the long run the security of the Empire depends, as it has done for centuries, on naval strength. Disquiet was, however, expressed by more than one speaker at the absence of destroyers from the building programme for the current year, and the adequacy of the armament of our latest cruisers was also questioned. Mr. Shakespeare, Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, explained that the reason why no destroyers were included in the 1938 programme was that, when the Admiralty had placed an order for the last flotilla of eight destroyers in completion of the 1937 programme, there would be no fewer than forty destroyers on the stocks. He went on to refer to the convoy system and to make clear the attitude of the Admiralty on a question about which there had been considerable misunderstanding. The danger to our shipping on trade routes might arise anywhere, but the nature of the attack would vary according to whether the enemy was dependent on bases and according to the distance of those bases from our trade routes. Throughout the long ocean routes the danger was likely to come from fast ocean raiders, but when our merchant ships were confined in narrow waters they might well be open to attack by submarines and aircraft. It was clearly impossible to design a single vessel combining all the characteristics required to meet such diverse forms of attack. Two conclusions arose from a consideration of the danger and the means.

of meeting it. In the first place the protection of merchant ships sailing individually against a full scale attack was clearly impracticable, although some measure of safety could be secured by a system of routeing. In the second adequately escorted convoys would be the surest means of protection from intensive and persistent action by submarines, aircraft and surface vessels. As regards air attack it might be argued that aircraft would find it easier to locate convoys rather than individual merchant ships. That might be true, but it was easier to protect ships in convoy than isolated ships. Attacking aircraft would come under the intensive fire not only of escort ships but of such merchant ships as were defensively armed. To deal with attack in narrow waters from aircraft or submarines the escort ships must therefore be of moderate speed, equipped with strong anti-aircraft armament, and able to detect, hunt and sink submarines. These characteristics were being combined in a type of escort vessel of which we already had a number, and of which the earlier ones were being rearmed. To strengthen the anti-aircraft power of the convoy, the Admiralty proposed a steady programme of conversion of old cruisers of the "C" and "D" classes to anti-aircraft vessels. Plans for the co-operation of shore-based aircraft as convoys approached our shores had already been worked out with the Air Ministry. Admiralty policy could be summed up as follows: Different areas of the world would require different treatment according to the scale and nature of the attack to which they might be subjected, and to the density and importance of trade in those areas. Where trade was of great importance or density and was liable to attack by surface vessels, submarines or aircraft, the Admiralty view was that suitably escorted convoys would provide the best means of defence. Where trade was sparse or scattered, or was unlikely to be attacked by enemy forces, its safety would be sought by dispersion and evasive routeing, combined with such patrols as circumstances required. The Admiralty recognised that convoy might be necessary as early as the outbreak of war and they were ready to put it into operation, where and when required.

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The Army Estimates for the current year amounted to £106,500,000 of which a little over £21 millions are to be met by appropriations in aid from the Consolidated Fund. The increases over last year's expenditure are accounted for mainly by the provision for warlike stores, supplies

**The Army
Programme.**

and transport, various works services of considerable magnitude, and the additional allotments made to the Territorial Army and Reserve Forces. Although there is no material increase in the establishment of the Army, as there is in the case of the other two Services, certain readjustments of personnel between arms have been effected. By the end of 1938 the fifteen cavalry regiments on the British establishment will consist of twelve mechanized and three horsed regiments. The Royal Engineers are to transfer their responsibility for anti-aircraft and coast defence searchlights to the Royal Artillery, which will be reconstituted in two separate branches. Of the four new infantry battalions and the two new army tank battalions referred to in the White Paper for 1937 two infantry battalions and one tank battalion have already been raised. During 1938 the second tank battalion, but not the remaining infantry battalions, will be formed.

The improvement in recruiting which became evident last August has continued fairly steadily and there appears to be a growing appreciation among the recruitable population of the importance of the army and the advantages it offers. Even so, the Regular Army was 1,200 officers and 22,000 other ranks below establishment on 1st April and some 32,000 men are expected to leave the Colours during the course of the year. A more cheerful picture is, however, presented by the Territorial Army, the strength of which has increased by 1,176 officers and 16,514 other ranks during the past twelve months. The growth of national interest in the Territorial Army has indeed been a great one and may be attributed largely to the improvement in the status of, and conditions of service in, a force, the importance of whose role in the defence of the country can hardly be overestimated, and is certainly becoming better understood.

The period through which we are passing is one of major military reorganization, comparable perhaps with the Cardwell and Haldane eras, and we have summarised some of the many reforms being introduced into the army in some miscellaneous notes which will be found at the end of this journal. The real interest in the Army programme for the year lies, however, less in the reforms themselves than in the new conception of the way in which the Empire should apply its military strength, a conception which the Secretary of State for War defined with the force and clarity we have learned to expect from him.

Introducing the Army Estimates, Mr. Hore Belisha said that the fact that the number of British units to be stationed in India was predetermined produced an element of rigidity in the strategical distribution of units at home and abroad, and affected the organisation of the army and the terms of service and amenities of the soldier. To examine these questions, discussions between the War Office and the India Office would be initiated under the auspices of the Prime Minister.

He went on to establish an order of priority of the roles of the British Army. The first purpose of the army was home defence. In preparing the army for war the menace of air attack was a primary consideration. On the outbreak of war, defence against air attack might be the primary requirement. In this respect home defence was in the first category of importance and in a form unknown in 1914. The priorities in home defence were in order: air defence, internal security which had assumed a wider scope in the light of air raid precautions, and coast defence. Second in importance to home defence came the discharge of British commitments overseas, including defended ports on the trade routes. The size and type of garrisons were being made to conform with the principle that each one, where communication could be interrupted, should be maintained at a strength adequate for its responsibilities at the outbreak of war. Third in importance came the provision of a strategic reserve. The uses to which such a reserve might be put were, firstly, to serve as a reinforcement, wherever required, for internal security; secondly, to help the defence against external attack of those territories for which we were responsible overseas; and, thirdly, to co-operate in the defence of the territories of any allies we might have in case of war.

A description such as this of the role of the British Army, disclosing both the responsibilities of our military forces at home and the need for a fresh distribution of those forces throughout the Empire, emphasised the way in which factors had changed since 1914. It was no longer intended to have a fixed type of division, but two types and variations within each. One type would be a motorised division based on the light machine-gun; the other a mechanized armoured division based on the tank. The first type might consist, when used for internal security operations such as the recent operations in Palestine, of six battalions with the ancillary troops necessary for their maintenance and communication. In war, it might consist of nine battalions with artillery

and other arms according to need. Light machine-gun battalions would each have fifty Bren guns, some of them carried in armoured carriers. A heavy machine-gun battalion per division would be retained as Corps Troops. Another development would be in the Royal Artillery, where the fire unit would in future be twelve guns instead of six. The object underlying all these changes was to provide a flexible organisation at home capable of providing a greater number of divisions, better suited than existing divisions to meet the varied commitments which might devolve upon us. Smaller divisions were easier to manage, to move, to supply and to transport, important considerations for a country which had to operate overseas.

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The Royal Air Force estimates for the year, allowing for £30 millions to be met by appropriations in aid, **The Royal Air Force.** amounted to £102,720,000, five times the expenditure of 1934. During the last three years the strength of the metropolitan air force, which inevitably occupies a place of paramount importance, has been increased from fifty-two to one hundred and twenty-three squadrons, and now comprises sixty-eight bomber, thirty fighter, fifteen general reconnaissance and torpedo bomber, and ten army co-operation squadrons. This large increase in the number of home defence squadrons and the training and reserve organisations which have had to accompany them has necessitated an extensive reorganisation of the Royal Air Force system of command and administration. The responsibilities of the former Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Air Defences of Great Britain, have been divided between an Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief in control of the striking force and an Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief in command of the fighter and army co-operation squadrons; the latter also being in charge of the country's ground defences, comprising anti-aircraft, searchlight and balloon barrage units.

The programme authorised in March 1936, the main features of which were the re-equipment of the Royal Air Force with more powerful types of aircraft and the provision of reserves on a comprehensive scale, required the provision of aircraft, engines and equipment on a scale at that time substantially in excess of the maximum capacity of the industry. To meet these demands it was decided to make use in peace of motor car manufacturing firms which were allocated to the Air Ministry for production in

war. The establishment of two aircraft and six engine shadow factories, which followed the adoption of this policy, was intended to serve two main objects: to provide for the production of those war reserves of aircraft and engines which were beyond the capacity of the aircraft industry proper, and to afford training in the manufacture of aircraft and engines of the utmost value to firms which would be allotted to the work in emergency. In the statement accompanying the Air Estimates for 1938, it is stated confidently that the shadow factory scheme gives promise of proving highly successful. As a result of the measures decided on two years ago a great extension of capacity has already been effected. The number of persons employed in the aircraft industry has increased from thirty thousand in 1935 to ninety thousand to-day.

As regards newly formed squadrons the provision of aircraft fell into two distinct phases. The first phase called for the provision to these units of sufficient service aircraft to enable them to train. It was the second phase, that of rearming with modern and more powerful types, which met with difficulties. The process of rearming proved slower than had been hoped owing to three factors: the need to construct new shops and to supply the jigs and tools necessary for large-scale production; the fact that the decision to expand coincided with far-reaching developments in design; and the shortage of draughtsmen and skilled labour. These difficulties have now been largely overcome and rearming to the scale laid down two years ago will be substantially completed this year.

On the personnel side the expansion programme has necessitated an average annual entry into the Royal Air Force of 1,500 pilots and 13,000 airmen during the last three years, as compared with 300 pilots and 1,600 airmen in pre-expansion days. The majority of new pilots have entered under the short service scheme, but the cadet college at Cranwell has been expanded to capacity and there has been an increase in the grant of permanent commissions to candidates from the universities and the Dominions.

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In spite of the statement which accompanied the estimates and the categorical assurance of the Under Secretary of State for Air that there had been no mismanagement over the air expansion programme, the House of Commons refused to accept the position as satisfactory. The debate on the estimates was undoubtedly influenced to some extent by the recently published Cadman Report, which had shown the demand for an enquiry into the

state of civil aviation to have been justified. But military and civil aviation are not entirely analogous and the Cadman Report admitted that the neglect of civil aviation might well have been due to the concentration of the Air Ministry on rearmament. The real ground for the anxiety expressed by members in air matters was not that the programme planned two years ago, under which the Royal Air Force first-line strength was to reach 1,750 machines by March 1939, was unlikely to be fulfilled, but that the programme itself had long been out of date and that the production plans of the Air Ministry were not of the kind that would lend themselves quickly to a further large increase on mass production lines. Mr. Baldwin, it was recalled, had given a firm assurance that Britain would build to at least air parity with the strongest European Power within range and there was evidence to show that we were falling behind in this matter of air parity, despite the 1936 programme. Despite the persistent demand for it, the Government was probably justified in refusing to permit a second enquiry into conditions at the Air Ministry, but the announcement that a British air mission was to be sent to the United States and Canada to purchase aircraft and the plans which were soon afterwards published for a second large increase in the Royal Air Force indicated that the House of Commons had been right in refusing to accept the Air Estimates, as they were originally framed, with complacency.

In May Lord Winterton announced a revised programme of air rearmament to be carried out by March 1940. The first-line strength of the Royal Air Force was to be raised to 2,370 aircraft at home, 500 aircraft in the Fleet Air Arm and 490 aircraft in squadrons overseas, a total of 3,500 machines. This second expansion would require another 40,000 officers and men during the next eighteen months. The earlier expansion programme had been designed to create a reserve of productive capacity which could now be brought into use. To this end a new Supplies Committee would be created at the Air Ministry to bring into closer relationship the research and supply branches, to simplify the financing of orders, and to maintain continuous consultation with the aircraft industry.

AN OPERATION IN THE VICINITY OF SPINWAM—

20TH OCTOBER 1937

By LIEUT.-COLONEL C. J. WOOD, M.C.

The operation described in this article took place in the neighbourhood of Spinwam, a post seventeen miles north of Mir Ali on the motor road which connects the Tochi valley with Thal in Kurram. The country in the vicinity of the Mir Ali—Spinwam road, for the first four miles after leaving Mir Ali, consists of a series of low knife-edge ridges rising to between two and three hundred feet. These terminate somewhat abruptly in the Sheratala Plain, some ten miles in length, and varying up to eight miles in breadth. Towards the north or Spinwam end of the Plain, the high ground closes in on the west and eventually the road passes over a massive known as the Tabai Narai, which rises about a thousand feet above the level of the surrounding country. The road then descends to the Kaitu valley, across which lies Spinwam Fort. The only water near the road, except at Mir Ali and Spinwam, is one small well.

The road had been in fairly constant use since July. A civilian mail van ran daily and there were bi-weekly military convoys to the Spinwam Scouts' Post, which was at the time garrisoned by a company (less one platoon), 3rd/7th Rajput Regiment and one Post 4.5" howitzer. One military convoy had been fired on from the high ground to the west in August, otherwise there had been no incidents. Between July and October opportunity had been taken by the commander and staff of the 9th Infantry Brigade, which was located at Mir Ali, to carry out frequent reconnaissances of the area over which subsequent operations took place. During the first fortnight of October, the presence of the Faqir of Ipi near the country of the Madda Khel Wazirs, combined with propaganda spread in neighbouring areas by his brother Sher Zaman, had an unsettling effect amongst the less stable elements of the tribes in North Waziristan. In particular, there was deterioration in the area of Spinwam, owing to the reappearance there of two notorious hostile leaders, by name Gagu and Ghazi Mullah. They both owned property in the neighbourhood, and incited the tribesmen to revive hostilities.

At this period the main concentration of troops in Waziristan was in the country south and west of the central Waziristan road, the troops being employed on road construction and the protective duties connected with it. The 9th (Jhansi) Infantry Brigade with six battalions under command, was responsible for protecting over fifty miles of road between Saidgi and Razani, as well as providing escorts when required for convoys from Mir Ali to Spinwam in the north and to Biche Kashkai in the south. The only troops available for immediate operations in the vicinity of Spinwam were one rifle company and one machine-gun platoon, employed normally for the defence of Mir Ali, and one section of light tanks. Other sectors on the lines of communications had similar reserves which could only be moved away by day, as they were needed for camp defence by night.

The effect of the propaganda previously referred to soon materialised. Early on the morning of 15th October a hostile *lashkar*, estimated to number between a hundred and fifty and two hundred men, compelled the *khassadars* to leave their posts in the vicinity of the Tabai Narai on the main road some four miles south of Spinwam. At the same time the tribesmen blocked the road with large boulders and effected two demolitions which rendered it impassable even to light tanks. The immediate problem was to induce the *lashkar* to remain in the neighbourhood of the Tabai Narai while sufficient troops were concentrated to reopen the road to Spinwam and at the same time to engage the *lashkar* successfully in battle.

Consequently on the morning of 15th October the available company and machine-gun platoon of the Mir Ali Garrison (3rd/7th Rajput Regiment) were despatched in lorries, together with a section of light tanks, with instructions to reconnoitre the enemy position. They were to withdraw if opposed. To augment the column some workmen of the Military Engineer Services were sent out in case the *lashkar* had moved away. Fire was opened on the column as it approached the Tabai Narai, so it withdrew to Mir Ali.

Information was now received that the hostile tribesmen had taken over and garrisoned two *khassadar* posts, near Pt. 2695. As an act of defiance they were displaying a white signal for the benefit of aircraft. The next night more *khassadar* posts on the Sheratala Plain south of Tabai were attacked and burnt. Hostile

activities extended as far south as the central Waziristan road, where Tori Khel *khassadars* on duty were threatened.

On 16th October, a company of the 4th/6th Rajputana Rifles was brought in by lorry from Tal in Tochi and sent out along the Spinwam road towards the Tabai Narai with orders to ascertain the strength of the *lashkar* and where it had prepared a position. By drawing fire it was hoped to ascertain the enemy's dispositions so that some indication could be obtained as to his probable plan if he were attacked. In this the company was most successful. The men debussed and were engaged by the tribesmen in the foothills on the low ground. As they withdrew the tribesmen closed in on their flanks, one piquet having difficulty in withdrawing. The original estimate of about two hundred hostiles was confirmed.

From the information now available, and from previous reconnaissances it was decided that at least three battalions would be required to reach Spinwam and a further additional battalion for subsequent operations in that neighbourhood. It was known that various reliefs were due to take place between Razmak and Bannu, and permission was accordingly obtained from Force Headquarters for two battalions to be moved earlier than had been intended and for them to be detained at Mir Ali *en route*.

A third battalion was obtained by temporarily thinning out the Damdil section, placing the whole of the 3rd/1st Punjab Regiment into piquets and withdrawing the 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment to Mir Ali. The fourth battalion materialised by retaining the reserve from Tal at Mir Ali, and arranging for one battalion, the 2nd/6th Rajputana Rifles, less a company from Kohat, to move to Thal in Kurram, and thence to Spinwam. All available mechanised artillery, amounting to one and a half howitzer batteries and one 18-pr. battery, was withdrawn from the brigade sector.

News was received from local sources that the hostiles in the neighbourhood of Spinwam did not anticipate that more than one infantry battalion could be sent against them. They were convinced they had already driven back that number during the operations of 15th October and 16th October. Their tails were up.

In the meantime, as already mentioned, the propaganda was affecting the *khassadars* on the central Waziristan road and

information was received that there were seventy armed tribesmen in the vicinity of Nitasi, four miles south of Mir Ali, where there were houses of several well-known hostiles. It was decided therefore to stage a minor operation with the object of destroying these houses at Nitasi and at the same time distracting the enemy's attention from the impending operations towards Spinwam. This was successful; local friendlies at Nitasi, wishing to secure their own property, ensured that there was no opposition.

On the afternoon of the 19th October, a light tank section conveying unit commanders carried out a reconnaissance of the Tabai Narai and drew fire, showing that the *lashkar* was still in position.

By the evening of the 19th, the troops shown in the Order of Battle had concentrated at Mir Ali.

It was decided to advance to Spinwam on the 20th with the objects of driving off the hostile *lashkar*, inflicting as much loss as possible on it, and repairing the road. Permanent piquets were to be established at Pt. 2695 and at the Tabai Narai. On arrival at Spinwam, camp was to be established as a base for further operations in the area.

To give effect to these intentions an assembly area was selected at Pt. 2119 at which the troops were to concentrate.

To cover the route to this point the 3rd/7th Rajput Regiment (less two companies) moved out from Mir Ali and by 3 a.m. had occupied piquets up to Pt. 2047, the existing *khassadar* posts on the route being found deserted.

The remainder of the troops moved to the assembly area in three columns:

- (a) A marching column comprising the 2nd/11th Sikh Regiment, the 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment and a section 22nd Field Company Sappers and Miners, accompanied by all animal transport of the brigade. This column left Mir Ali at 2-30 a.m. and reached the assembly area about 5-30 a.m.
- (b) A fast mechanical column, including Headquarters, 9th Indian Infantry Brigade with artillery and infantry reconnaissance parties moving in M.T., and escorted by one section 9th Light Tank Company. This left Mir Ali at 5-30 a.m. and arrived in the vicinity of Pt. 2119 by 6-10 a.m. by which time it was beginning to get light.

- (c) A slow mechanical column comprising the artillery and the 1st/17th Dogra Regiment, escorted by armoured cars of the 7th Light Tank Company, reached the assembly area and had debussed by 6-30 a.m. There was a bright moon and driving lights were not used on vehicles.

The brigade commander carried out a short reconnaissance and decided to advance on a two battalion front. He gave out verbal orders to the assembled commanders. On the right the 2nd/11th Sikh Regiment was allotted as objective the ridge east of Pt. 2695 to the *khassadar* post lying south-west of that point, whilst on the left the 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment was to occupy the foothills about Pt. 3130 and the ridge running thence north-east to Pt. 2300. When these objectives had been occupied the 1st/17th Dogra Regiment was to advance in the low ground between the battalions on the right and left flanks and seize the high ground about Pt. 2703 and Pt. 2706.

The 4th Field Battery (How.) was to support the advance of the 2nd/11th Sikh Regiment on the right; the section 7th Field Battery the advance of the 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment on the left and the 66th Field Battery (How.) was to be prepared to support either flank as required.

The 9th Light Tank Company (less two sections) was in the first place to protect the deployment of the 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment, and then to move to the right flank and patrol the area of Zara Mela. It was anticipated that the ground on the east would prove unsuitable for tanks to move direct to Spinwam by that route.

Leaving the assembly area at 7 a.m. the 2nd/11th Sikh Regiment reached the nala north of Shamiri where the commanding officer made his reconnaissance and issued orders for the attack on the objective. At 8-12 a.m. the attacking troops came under well aimed fire from tribesmen who were estimated to number a hundred and fifty men on this flank. They had occupied skilfully concealed positions on the sides of the hills from which they could bring fire to bear on an advance by the main road and on the intervening spurs; caves and boulders were utilised as cover, and fire positions were so well concealed in the shade and at the foot of cliffs that they provided practically no target to artillery or aircraft. The Sikhs, however, pushed up the ridges with great determination; by 8-55 a.m. aircraft reported that tribesmen were with-

drawing eastward by the Sarwek Nala, and fifteen minutes later the battalion had reached its final objectives, with a loss of three killed and ten wounded. The tribesmen left twelve dead bodies and eight rifles on the ground passed over by the Sikhs. During the mopping-up process two wounded tribesmen concealed in a cave were captured with their rifles.

The advance of the 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment on the left flank began simultaneously with that of the Sikhs. Shortly afterwards fire was opened on them by tribesmen disposed in small groups on a hill feature as shown on the sketch. This feature was captured at the cost of one British officer, Major J. Moriarty, and three Indian other ranks wounded, and opposition was thereafter limited to sniping at long range.

By 8 a.m. two companies of the 2nd/6th Rajputana Rifles in lorries and one section of the 11th Light Tank Company arrived at Kaitu Bridge, having come from Thal in the Kurram, seventeen miles to the north. The light tanks then patrolled the road near the bridge and moved up the Kaitu Nala to Shadi Khel village, but it was impracticable to use them towards the objectives of the troops from Mir Ali owing to the danger of their coming under the fire of our own artillery.

At about 9 a.m. the 1st/17th Dogra Regiment, who were then at Pt. 2140, advanced to the final objectives, Pts. 2703 and 2706, which were reached without opposition by 11-15 a.m. Meanwhile the company of the 4th/6th Rajputana rifles, working under sniping fire, had cleared the first road block and then set to work to assist the section 22nd Field Company, Sappers and Miners, to repair the motor road.

There was now some delay owing to the difficulties presented by the ground on which the two permanent piquets were being established near Pt. 2695; the site for the piquet at that point was on a cliff the only approach to which lay by a difficult track from the northern side. By 2-15 p.m., however, the work was completed, and the piquets were established and provided with reserves of food and water. The advance of the main body to Spinwam was then resumed; sniping at long range only was encountered and all troops were in camp near Spinwam Post by 6 p.m.

Our own casualties during the day amounted to three Indian other ranks killed, and one British officer and fifteen Indian other ranks wounded. Tribal casualties included twelve dead left on

the ground and two wounded prisoners. In addition twenty-five were estimated to have been seriously wounded. These operations had an excellent effect on the situation in the area, the bulk of the hostile *lashkar* dispersed, and efforts by its leaders to revive opposition met with no response. On the 21st and 22nd October the demolition of six towers and twenty-nine *kots* was carried out in Spinwam and Datta Khel with no regular opposition although there was some sniping. On the 23rd October troops returned without incident to Mir Ali, which was reached at 3 p.m., the seventeen-mile withdrawal from Spinwam having been carried out in nine hours.

In conclusion attention is drawn to a few points which may be of interest in considering the operation. In the first place, the time necessary to concentrate the column. The necessity for the concentration of a force equivalent to an infantry brigade and attached troops became apparent on the evening of 15th October, but the force was not actually concentrated until the evening of 19th October. The limiting factors were the necessity of moving animals from other sectors of the line of communication by march route to Mir Ali, and the diversion of mechanical transport from a prearranged programme to move two infantry battalions with animals from Razmak to Mir Ali.

Actually, for the move from Mir Ali to the place of assembly it was found necessary to have three columns. The distance from Mir Ali to Spinwam was seventeen miles, a long way to march in a day and participate in an engagement with the enemy on the way. Though it was desirable to move everyone by mechanical transport there were not sufficient lorries available for anything like the animals which had to accompany the column. Therefore, a marching column which comprised the animals with the bulk of the infantry as escort, had to leave at 2.30 a.m.

The timing of the mechanised reconnaissance column was determined by the necessity for getting the artillery to their battery positions and ready to open fire as soon as light permitted. The guns could be expected to move at 12 m.p.h. and so the reconnaissance column which comprised reconnaissance parties escorted by light tanks moving at 20 m.p.h. had to leave just before them. Passing would have been impracticable on account of the narrowness of the roadway and the dust. The reconnaissance parties left at 5.25 a.m., and the guns with an infantry escort five minutes later.

The lorries subsequently returned to pick up baggage and piquet stores from Mir Ali, which they left again at 8 a.m. and

passed through to Spinwam as soon as the road was mended and considered safe.

All the artillery with the column was mechanised, and being field artillery it fired heavier shell than is normal in frontier warfare; but the communications between the observation post and the battery presented difficulties. In normal warfare forward observation officers and their parties can move comparatively freely, but in frontier warfare, once a F. O. O. party leaves with the infantry headquarters with which it is co-operating, it is difficult for it to move to another unit, supplement its signal communications or salve its material. Perhaps a portable wireless is the solution, carried on mules which would normally accompany the infantry. In any case, it was found that infantry, accustomed to operate with mountain artillery, found working with the heavier artillery difficult, especially when the gunners engaged their targets at 4,000 yards.

The light tanks proved most useful, but their movement was limited by two factors. It was anticipated that the enemy withdrawal when it started would be to the east, *i.e.*, to the village of Datta Khel where Gagu had a residence. Unfortunately, the tanks from Mir Ali found the ground to the north of the Zara Mela impassable, and could not get into position to intercept movement between Tabai Narai and Datta Khel. The other limiting factor was political. The tanks from Thal were not permitted to move beyond Shadi Khel as it was not desired to draw in any tribesmen, at that time peaceful, from the west.

The presence of the company headquarters tanks provided means of wireless communication to sections. This was essential, and a welcome change from previous experiences.

The chief difficulty throughout the operation was the maintenance of efficient intercommunication. This difficulty must be expected when a column is hastily collected, and has been accustomed to working under very different conditions. In frontier operations commanders of sectors on the lines of communication never seem to have a spare man. Everyone is fully occupied with genuine lines of communication tasks. Nevertheless too much emphasis cannot be laid on the necessity for troops keeping in practice for more mobile operations, even if this can only be managed by the frequent relief of troops stationed on the lines of communication.

APPENDIX "A"

ORDER OF BATTLE

Concentrated at Mir Ali by 19th October 1937

Brigadier E. P. Quinan, C.B., O.B.E., A.D.C.

Headquarters, 9th (Jhansi) Infantry Brigade and Signal Section.

Headquarters, 4th Field Brigade, R. A.

4th Field Battery (How.), R.A.

One section 7th Field Battery, R.A.

One section 66th Field Battery (How.), R.A.

7th Light Tank Company, R.T.C. (less 1½ sections) (armoured cars).

9th Light Tank Company, R.T.C. (less 2 sections).

One section 22nd Field Company, Royal Bombay Sappers and Miners.

One W/T "C" Set, R.C.S.

Cable detachment, R.C.S.

One Company 4th Battalion (Outram's) 6th Rajputana Rifles.

2nd Royal Battalion 11th Sikh Regiment.

3rd Battalion 15th Punjab Regiment.

1st Battalion (P. W. D.) 17th Dogra Regiment.

Mir Ali Garrison

3rd/7th Rajput Regiment (less two companies).

Spinwam Garrison

One company (less one platoon) 3rd/7th Rajput Regiment.

One Post Howitzer 4.5".

Kohat Detachment.

At Thal on 19th October.

2nd/6th Rajputana Rifles (less one company and one M. G. Platoon).

One section 11th Light Tank Company, R.T.C.

One "C" Set W/T, R.C.S.

Royal Air Force

One flight, No. 5 (A.C.) Squadron, one flight, No. 20 (A.C.) Squadron and one flight, No. 1 Squadron Indian Air Force co-operated from Miranshah with an R.A.F. liaison officer and R/T tender attached to Brigade Headquarters.

APPENDIX "B"

SECRET.

Copy No.

19 Oct. 37.

9 Inf. Bde. Operation Order No. 12

Ref. Map N.W.F.P. Sheet Nos. 38 K/8 and L/5 1" to 1 mile.

Information

1. Hostiles have occupied the Khassadar Posts in the vicinity of Pt. 2695 (4079) and blown two culverts at 404788. They have been occupying high ground in the vicinity of TARAKAI (3576) TABAI (4177) and Pt. 2700 (4175). Their numbers are estimated at about 200.
2. SPINWAM Post (4484) is garrisoned by one coy. less one pl. 3 Rajput and one Post Gun.
- 2 Raj. Rif., less one coy., and one Sec. 11 Lt. Tanks are co-operating from the North.

Intention

3. 9 Inf. Bde. and attd. tps. will concentrate in the vicinity of Pt. 2119 (3974) preparatory to an advance on SPINWAM.

Method

4. 3 Rajputs accompanied by Political Representative will relieve Khassadar Posts and piquet the road up to incl. Bridge at 2047 (Se. 3769) by 0300 hrs. 20 Oct. At daylight they will establish a post at 383694. These piquets will remain in position until Sec. 66 Fd. Bty. has passed on its return to MIR. O. C., 3 Rajputs, will give the orders to withdraw.

5. *Marching coln.*

Comdr. Lt.-Col. B. W. KEY, M.C. 2 R. Sikh.

Tps. 2 R. Sikh.

3/15 Punjab.

One coy. 4 Raj. Rif.

One coy. 18 Fd. Amb.

All animal tpt.

S.P.—RZK Gate, MIR. Time—02.30 hrs. 20 Oct.

6. Marching coln. will take up position of readiness by 06.00 hrs., 2 R. Sikh about Tree 404739.

3/15 Punjab astride the road about Pt. 2119 (3974). Bn.
H.Qs. on inner flanks.

7. Animal tpt. (except for 2 R. Sikh and 3/15 Punjab) and 18 Fd. Amb. will halt at road crossing the NULLAH at 389724, escorted by one coy. 4 Raj. Rif. When halted all tpt. will be kept off the road.

8. Units will detail two men to accompany each led mule.

9. *Tank Coln.*

Sec. 9 Lt. Tanks will escort Bde. H.Q. to vicinity of Pt. 2119 (3974). Recce parties 4 Fd. Bde. and 1 Dogra will accompany this coln.

S.P.—RZK Gate. Time—05.25 hrs. 20 Oct.

Speed—20 m.p.h.

On arrival at Pt. 2119, Sec. Lt. Tanks will take up position protecting the front and left flank of 3/15 Punjab.

10. *M.T. Coln.*

Comdr. Major R. B. SEED, 1 Dogra.

Tps. 4 Fd. Bde.

Sec. 7 Lt. Tanks.

One Sec. 22 Fd. Coy. S. & M.

1 Dogra.

Heavy Lorries Bde. H.Q. and Sig. Sec.

S.P.—RZK Gate. Time—05.30 hrs. 20 Oct.

Speed—12 m.p.h.

11. Roads allotted to S.P.—1 Dogra through Supply Depot.

4 Fd. Bde.—The MALL.

7 Lt. Tanks—Punjab Rd.

S.S.O., MIR, will control traffic in the vicinity of RZK Gate.

12. Comdr., M. T. Coln., will arrange for Arty. to move at head of coln. with only small escort.


13. 1 Dogra and one Sec. 22 Fd. Coy. S. & M. will debus in vicinity of two trees 391732.

14. As soon as tps. debussed lorries will return MIR with escort one sub. sec. 7 Lt. Tanks.

15. One sub. sec. 7 Lt. Tanks will remain in Arty area for close escort duties and will return MIR with sec. 66 Fd. Bty.

16. No lights will be used by mechanical vehicles. Marching coln. will show no lights nor will fires be lighted before 06.30 hrs. 20 Oct.





Adm.

17. *Transport.*

- (i) A.T. Units will send guides to 18 A.T. Coy. at 01.30 hrs. 20 Oct. A.T. carts may be drawn and parked in unit lines overnight.
- (ii) M.T. Allotment—see Appendix. "A" M.T. for kits and followers will arrive in unit lines at 17.00 hrs. 19 Oct. and will remain there till called for on 20 Oct. at approx. 08.00 hrs.
- (iii) Baggage lorry coln. will proceed under orders Staff Captn. 20 Oct., but Not before 08.00 hrs. Orders of march: Escort one sub. sec. 7 Lt. Tanks.

Camp colour parties	2
Ammunition	7
Camp wire and water stores	3
Kits and followers	21
Supplies	18
Baggage lorries mech. units	—
Piquets 2 R. Sikhs	5

- (iv) All lorries (less those for 1 Dogra) will NOT park on any camp roads overnight 19/20 Oct.

18. *Amn*

Amn. guard 1 Dogra will report 3 Rajput Quarter Guard 07.00 hrs. 20 Oct.

- 19. Camp colour parties and police will report Quarter Guard 3 Rajput 08.00 hrs. 20 Oct.
- 20. 22 Fd. Coy. S. & M. will detail 6 men as water party, who will travel direct to SPN with the water stores.

Intercomn.

- 21. 9 Inf. Bde. will open on road at 389,735 at 06.15 hrs. Bde. Sig. Officer will detail one R/T set to each Inf. Bn.

Popham Panel will be used by Bde. H. Q.

- 22. ACK.

Issued to Sigs. 17.10 hrs.

(Signed)

Maj. B.M. 9 Inf. Bde.

RUSSIA AND THE EAST

BY MAJOR G. E. WHEELER.

"The policy of Russia . . . is practically unaffected by the life of man and the lapse of time—it moves on as it were by its own impetus; it is silent, concentrated, perpetual, unbroken, it is therefore successful."

—Lord Rosebery.

"So far from regarding the foreign policy of Russia as consistent, or remorseless, or profound, I believe it to be a hand-to-mouth policy, a policy of waiting upon events, of profiting by the blunders of others, and as often committing the like herself."

—Lord Curzon.

"You should not take a fellow eight years old
And make him swear to never kiss the girls."

—Robert Browning: *Fra Lippo Lippi*.

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Rather more than five years ago, in an article published in this journal,* the present writer discussed certain aspects of Soviet oriental policy. That article, which was largely based on personal observation and experience, aimed only at a brief study of Russian activities in the Middle East under the auspices of the Soviet régime. A certain crystallization in Soviet Eastern policy which seems to have taken place during the past few years, now makes it possible to view Russian activities in Asia as a historical whole without any special reference to one or another régime or period, and though such a task cannot properly be performed within the scope of a short article, it may be possible to pass in dispassionate review the salient events of a problem of unusual interest and complexity, and to attempt some explanation of their significance.

Like many other questions on which accurate and unbiassed information is difficult to obtain, the question of Russia's designs in Asia is one around which a storm of controversy has raged for many years. A great number of books has been written on the subject. Some of them extol and others vilify Russian methods in Asia; to some the Russian menace appears of gigantic importance, while others scoff at it as being either chimerical or not worth consideration. A haphazard selection from such books leaves the reader in a state of total bewilderment. Russia seems to have

* "Side-lights on Soviet Oriental Policy" (*United Service Institution of India Journal*, July 1932).

no clear history and few public records to aid an impartial examination of her aims and policy.

Before attempting to arrive at any coherent idea of Russia's position in Asia it is essential to grasp four facts which are often ignored or glossed over:

- (a) The Russians are not by origin an Asiatic people. The Slavs had their origin in the Carpathian Mountains and the history of Russia is the history of the gradual spread of the Eastern Slavs over the great Eurasian plain as far as the Pacific Ocean. This expansion was inevitable.
- (b) The Russians were never absorbed by the Tartars. "Scratch a Russian and find a Tartar" is a catchpenny phrase which never had any real meaning. Inter-marriage between Russians and Oriental peoples was practically confined to the Cossack settlers. At the present day about 80 per cent. of the population of the Soviet Union is purely Slav (Great Russian, White Russian and Ukrainian). The remainder consists of Turkomans, Jews, Tartars, Georgians, Armenians, etc., none of which peoples represents more than 3 per cent. of the total population, now reckoned to be over 150 millions.
- (c) There are not and never have been two Russias, Russia in Europe and Russia in Asia. No such division has ever been known to the Russians. Between the Baltic and Black Seas and the Pacific there are no natural boundaries which could have limited the expansion of the Russians from west to east. To the south, however, Russian expansion is limited by a chain of mountains, deserts and inland seas, *i.e.*, the Caucasian Mountains, the Caspian Sea, the Ust Urt Desert, the Kizil Kum Desert, the Hindu Kush, the Pamirs, the Tian Shan Mountains, the Gobi Desert and the Khingan Mountains.
- (d) Though the Tartars neither absorbed the Russians nor intermingled with them their invasions and temporary domination of the Russian people are of the first importance in a study of Russia's relations with Asia. Long before Russian lands became the objective of the organised invasions of Genghiz Khan and Tamurlane, at the very dawn of Russian history, Turko-Mongol tribes had begun to settle round the

Dnieper Basin. The movement of these tribes towards the west was the result first of large-scale military operations by the Chinese and Persian empires and later of the Moslem domination of Central Asia in the VIIth century. Thus, when the originally peaceable Slavs wandered east into the Dnieper Basin and began the history of the Russian people they found themselves in close proximity to wild and predatory Asiatic tribes who constantly threatened their existence. Their struggles with these tribes were followed by the organized Mongol invasions. The final overthrow of the Tartar Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan in 1556 brought the Russians to the Ural Mountains and it is from this date that Russian expansion in Asia may be said to have begun.

The key to Russia's Asiatic orientation can be found in an early event of Russian history. In 1147 when George Dolgoruki founded a military colony on the site of the present Moscow he unconsciously changed the political centre of gravity of the Eastern Slavs. Had the centre remained at Kiev, Russia might early have become associated with the comity of European states. "The geographical position of Moscow," says Bury, "determined the current of Russian history." The vast distance of Moscow from the frontiers of the nearest western State and its situation in country devoid of geographical frontiers made expansion inevitable and was also the reason for Russia's isolation from Europe from the XIIIth to the XVth century. This fact, no less than the period of Tartar supremacy retarded the march of constitutional freedom in Russia and ensured that great spread over Asia which so alarmed the Western world and at one time threatened to be limitless.

The final removal of the Tartar yoke was immediately followed by the conquest of Siberia. It is important to notice that the first movement of expansion was due east along the line of least resistance. It was not a realization of imperialist policy but the result rather of private commercial enterprise backed by the military force of the Cossacks. Before proceeding further a word must be said about these remarkable people who played an extremely important part in the expansion of Russia. They were originally men of roving disposition who preferred an adventurous to a settled life. Settling on the outskirts of Russian lands they came into close contact with Tartar raiders and eventually were employed as a kind of irregular frontier police. In time they formed themselves into large communities settling permanently in the open

steppe which they had helped to reclaim. The first and largest of the Cossack communities was that of the Cossacks of the Don. From this community others were formed by the more restless spirits following the tide of commercial exploration. The names of the various Cossack "hosts" tell the story of Russian expansion: Don, Terek, Kuban, Ural, Orenburg, Semirechinsk, Transbaikal, Amur, Ussuri. Even up to the Great War the Cossack hosts retained a measure of independence and privilege. They have at times developed unruly and brigandish tendencies but the value of their services during the Russian expansion to the Pacific can hardly be overestimated.

The story of the Russian conquest of Siberia is a romantic one. The promoters, as it were, of the Siberian venture were a family called Stroganov who in 1558 were granted a tract of land on the Kama river just west of the Urals. From here, with the assistance of Don Cossacks, they pushed across the Urals into Siberia where the first important centre to be established was Tobolsk. As early as 1586 a constant flow of peasants, runaway serfs, adventurers, Cossacks and merchants began to filter into Siberia. From Tobolsk the Yenissei was reached in 1620 and, to the south, the Russians came into contact with Jungaria, the present Sinkiang. Yakutsk was founded in 1632 and Irkutsk in 1651 and from these two centres exploration was carried out in all directions. In 1645 the Arctic Ocean was reached. Finally, Kamchatka was discovered in 1697.

After the first determined resistance of the Kirgiz leader, Kuchum Khan, the opposition met by the colonizers was not great. The difficulty was not to advance but to hold what was captured against the natives who greatly outnumbered the invaders. The solution of this difficulty was found in the creation of chains of blockhouses. With the influx of settlers from Russia the numerical superiority of the natives decreased and security achieved with the result that by 1710 the Slav population of Siberia had risen to 250,000.

The conquest of Siberia brought Russia into direct contact with China. Relations were at first merely commercial: the Chinese bartered textiles, silks, gold and silver against hides and foodstuffs. Political issues eventually arose over the spheres of influence which both countries wished to exercise in the three buffer states of Jungaria, Mongolia and Manchuria. Various attempts by Russia to establish diplomatic relations broke down over the question of the "Kotow" or bow of servility which China, who regarded all foreigners as barbarians, was wont to exact from

foreign envoys and which successive Russian ambassadors refused to perform. Matters at last came to a head on the Amur river. Prolonged operations eventually found the Russians established in Albazin and the Chinese at last signified their wish to negotiate a settlement of the frontier question. Conversations took place at Nerchinsk where a Treaty was signed in 1689. The frontier was fixed well to the north of Mongolia and no Russian colonists were allowed to settle south of the Amur river. China was granted a free hand in the buffer states of Jungaria and Mongolia. In return for all this China was opened to Russian trade. As a result of this treaty, the first ever signed by China with a European power, the two countries remained at peace with each other for over two centuries.

The appearance of the Russians on the shores of the Caspian Sea in 1556 brought them quickly into touch with the Central Asian states which represented the relics of Tamurlane's empire. During the reign of Ivan the Terrible, envoys appeared in Moscow from Bokhara and Samarkand and mutual trade concessions were agreed upon. Proper diplomatic relations were not, however, established with Bokhara until the middle of the XVIIIth century when a Russian embassy was established there. In 1644 the secretary of the Russian envoy in Bokhara succeeded in reaching Balkh, then an important city and capital of an independent state in north Afghanistan whose frontiers marched with the Mogul Empire. This was the prelude to the first Russian Embassy to India sent by Tsar Alexis in 1675. This embassy was a failure, for Aurungzeb considered, and not without reason, that the only object of the Russians was to get money out of India. There were no questions to settle and no grievances to adjust. The presents of sables brought by the Russians were confiscated, valued at a low price by merchants and the cash value, less a special customs duty, paid to the incensed envoys. The embassy left India in 1678 without having accomplished anything.

More important at this time than her relations with Central Asia and India were Russia's relations with Persia. As in China and India the first attempts at establishing diplomatic contact were a failure. "Some trouble," writes Prince Lobanov Rostovski, "arose over customs duties." According to Sykes the matter seems to have been that Shah Abbas, the then Persian ruler, regarded the "embassy" as a commercial venture attempting to evade customs duties under the cover of diplomatic privilege. There is little doubt that he was partly right, for at this period Russia's foreign activities were almost entirely in the hands of merchants. Never-

theless trade between Russia and Persia seems to have developed rapidly and by 1670 there was a colony of Persian merchants in Moscow.

Russian territorial "designs" on Persia do not seem to have entered the head of the Government until the accession of Peter the Great in 1689. This extraordinary man early conceived the idea of establishing trade relations with India. His first plan was to conquer Khiva and from there to investigate a route to India presumably along the valley of the Oxus. The total failure of the expedition despatched under Prince Bekovich Cherkassky in 1717 caused him to try another alternative. Already in 1708 and 1716 embassies had been sent to Isfahan without, however, any conspicuous success. The second ambassador, Artemii Volynski, furious at the treatment he had received at the hands of the Persians, recommended to Peter that war was the only way to bring Persia to her senses. Accordingly, in 1723, when the war with Sweden was over, Peter invaded Persia and easily defeated her. Persia ceded Derbent, Baku and the provinces of Gilan, Mazenderan and Astrabad. This nearly led to war with Turkey and Prince Lobanov Rostovski relates that the British Ambassador in Constantinople tried to persuade the Turks that war with Russia would not be a dangerous project as a revolution against Peter the Great was on the point of breaking out. The present writer has not, however, been able to discover the source of this information. Later, during the reign of Anne, Russia's Persian conquests were handed back to Persia for the simple reason that the climate was found to be unsuitable for Russian colonization.

Not only the Middle East but the Far East entered into the vast purview of Peter the Great. As a result of his perfervid and infectious energy considerable advance was made by Behring, Spanberg and others in the realm of Arctic and Pacific discovery. Relations with China were further improved and a permanent embassy established in Peking. Yet Peter's energies were principally directed towards the west and "his great achievement," writes H. A. L. Fisher, "is that, clearly apprehending the superiority of the west, he succeeded by the effort of a lifetime, and in the teeth of violent prejudices, in lifting his country on to a palpably higher level of civilization." Himself a typical Russian, he ignored and even trampled upon the national susceptibilities of his people. His contempt for Russian and admiration of foreign institutions were almost equally profound and it has long been the opinion of many Russian historians that he stifled the expression and development of the Russian national character. His attempt to

change Russia's orientation and to bring her on to the level of Western European states came too late and his apparent successes now seem too many to have been largely spurious or superficial. However great, indeed, the effect of Peter the Great's reforms may have been on governmental institutions and on the position of Russia *vis-à-vis* Western Europe, it is doubtful whether they affected the tide of Russian expansion in Asia to any important degree. The conquest of Central Asia was of course facilitated by the existence of a regular army the formation of which had been one of Peter's greatest works, but the enterprise, determination and above all imagination which have throughout characterized Russian expansion have little to do with the efforts of this or that Tsar. It is not unreasonable to suppose that these qualities are natural to the Russian character when it is allowed to develop untrammelled by artificial Western growths. Whatever objections there may be to the present régime it does, by virtually isolating the people from Western European culture, give the Russian character a chance to develop on its own lines.

At the death of Peter the Great (1725) the southern frontier of the Russian Empire stretched from the Altai Mountains, along the Irtysh River to Omsk. From Omsk it reached the Yaik or Ural river and then along the Yaik to the Caspian Sea. To the south of this line roamed the nomad hordes of the Baskhir, Kirgiz and Kalmyks all of whom constantly encroached on Russian territory. During the reign of Catherine II, attempts were made to stabilize these nomads by peaceful methods. Education was encouraged and teachers were brought from Moslem colleges in Kazan, for the Russians had made the mistake of thinking that the Kirgiz were Moslems, whereas they were, in actual fact, pagan Shamanists. The result of this missionary campaign was that the Kirgiz embraced Islam thus eventually making a tiresome addition to the Moslem minority in Russia. Of more importance than these cultural attempts was the advance of Russian influence in the Central Asian states of Khiva and Bokhara.

The principal events of the XVIIIth century which affect this narrative are the conquest of the Crimea and the annexation of Georgia. Between 1768 and 1791 Russia fought two wars with Turkey and in both she completely defeated the Turks on land and sea. War was in both cases declared by Turkey and historians generally agree that the right was on Russia's side. The Tartar Khanate of the Crimea had, up to this time, been a dependency of Turkey and Russia was subjected to constant loss and irritation from Tartar incursions, which on one occasion reached as far as

Voronezh and which the Turks made no attempt to control. The principal results of the two wars were the complete annexation of the Crimea by Russia and the establishment of Russian power along the whole northern coast of the Black Sea. "The conquest of the Crimea," writes Nevill Forbes, "may be regarded as having been legitimate in the interests of civilization: it was necessary to the free development of the Russian people, which was unquestionably of superior 'cultural' value to the Tartar races which dominated the coasts of the Black Sea."

In the annexation of Georgia, too, Russia can to a great extent be exonerated from the charge of imperialistic greed. In 1783 King Irakli II of Georgia fearing Persian aggression had asked for Russia's protection and agreed to recognize her suzerainty conditional on the support of Russian troops. That same autumn two Russian battalions and a battery of guns arrived in Tiflis and in 1784 a Proclamation of Suzerainty over Georgia was published. Later, however, the troops were withdrawn until 1795 when the Persian Army invaded Georgia and captured Tiflis. After a gallant struggle the Georgians recaptured the city, but it was only the timely appearance of a Russian force which caused the Persians to retire. In 1800 the crown of Georgia was offered by King Giorgi XIII to the Tsar and accepted. "Russian intervention," writes Prince Lobanov Rostovski, "undoubtedly saved the Georgians from complete extermination."

The foregoing narrative has, from considerations of space, been condensed and staccato and, from the point of view of the reader, very probably dull. Some sort of survey of Asiatic Russian history up to the end of the XVIIIth century was, however, necessary to form a background for a study of one of the main topics of this article—the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia. The writer does not mean to suggest that Russian expansion in Asia was or is bound up with Anglo-Russian rivalry. Indeed, up to the end of the XVIIIth century, if there were any alarm in the mind of the British Government at Russia's expansion it seems to have been unjustified. If Peter the Great's commercial designs on India were known of at the time, it was only much later that they can be found as an integral part of that great Russian plot to seize India which Russophobes have exposed with such remarkable dexterity. It has been said above that Russian expansion was scarcely affected by Peter the Great. This statement the writer believes to be strictly true, but a rider must be added to the effect that the new interest in European politics which Peter the Great stimulated in the minds of his countrymen and particularly of the "dvorianstvo" or nobles

was to a great extent responsible for the birth of Anglo-Russian rivalry. A sinister indication of this interest can be found in that clause of the Treaty of Küchük Kainarci which recognized Russia as the spiritual protector of all orthodox subjects of the Sultan. From this, as will presently appear, serious trouble arose.

Prince Lobanov Rostovski maintains that British apprehension with regard to Russian designs in Asia was first aroused by Peter the Great's invasion of Persia in 1723. The fact that the present writer has failed to find any confirmation of this statement may merely be due to chance or to his lack of skill in research. There is no mention of such apprehension in the better known histories which he has consulted. It seems, indeed, that up to the end of the XVIIIth century the feelings of England towards Russia had been of the friendliest description and she even welcomed her entry into the comity of nations: politically, as a potential counterpoise to the aggrandizement of France. "I am quite a Russ," wrote the elder Pitt to Shelburne in 1773; "I trust the Ottoman will pull down the House of Bourbon in his fall." Fox, who was in office when Russia annexed the Crimea, cordially approved of it and would have been glad to form an alliance with Russia and the Northern Powers.

The first British statesman to be assailed by misgivings on the score of Russia's advancement was the younger Pitt. With the conversion of the Black Sea from a Turkish to a Russian lake the whole position in the Near East changed and Russia began to play a prominent, almost a dominant, part in the Eastern Question. In 1791 when Pitt vainly attempted to excite the alarm of the House of Commons over the question of Russia's advance in South-Eastern Europe he referred to the words used by Montesquieu, with strange prescience, in 1734, "*L'Empire des Turcs est à présent à peu près dans le même degré de faiblesse où étoit autrement celui des Grecs: mais il subsistera longtemps. Car si quelque prince que ce fût mettoit cet empire en péril en poursuivant ses conquêtes les trois puissances commercantes de l'Europe connoissent trop leur affaires pour n'en pas prendre la défense sur-le-champ.*" Pitt saw that it was preferable to shoulder the awkward commitment of bolstering up the effete Ottoman Empire than to allow Russia to establish herself at Constantinople. He proposed to the House that Britain should make a naval demonstration in the Black Sea but, although the motion was carried, the majority did not reflect the general tenor of the debate. Hansard reports Fox as insisting that Russia was "our natural ally" and that we had encouraged her "plans for raising her aggrandizement upon

the ruins of the Turkish Empire." Lord Fitzwilliam said that "no ill consequence was likely to arise from Russia's keeping in her hands Ochakov and Akerman." Pitt deferred to public opinion and no demonstration was made.

It is not surprising to find that Russophobia literature makes great play of Tsar Paul's ill-fated Indian expedition in 1801. Furious at the lack of British and Austrian appreciation of Russia's efforts in Italy under General Suvorov the half-mad Tsar threw himself into the arms of his late enemy, France. At first in collaboration with Napoleon and later on his own account he planned an invasion of India and a force of 22,000 Don Cossacks actually marched for Orenburg with India as its ultimate objective. The force was recalled on the assassination of Tsar Paul and the expedition can hardly be considered as anything more than the irresponsible act of a demented autocrat. The present writer has been unable to find any confirmation of Prince Lobanov Rostovski's statement that the expedition of Paul I "was considered by the British as a substantiation of their fears and a proof of Russia's designs upon India." It seems, indeed, that all through the Napoleonic wars the British Government did not regard Russia's "designs" with very great misgiving. Even the Tilsit rapprochement between Napoleon and Alexander I which virtually handed over Constantinople to Russia failed to make much impression and Russia's subsequent volte face and defeat of the Grande Armée on the retreat from Moscow elicited considerable enthusiasm from the British public. This is not to say that Russia had no "designs." She most undoubtedly had a defined policy of gaining control of the moribund Turkish Empire and later of establishing herself at Constantinople. The point is that little real evidence can be adduced to show that, up to the end of the Napoleonic wars, Anglo-Russian rivalry had reached a serious stage either over the Eastern Question or in the Middle East. Only in Persia had the interests of the two Powers been found to cross each other and then only, as it were, by chance. The object of the four British missions sent to Persia between 1800 and 1810 was to combat French rather than Russian influence. Indeed, the defeat by General Gudenich of a Persian army under French officers caused the rapid decline of French influence in Tehran and made possible the visit of Sir Harford Jones with his important gifts of a magnificent diamond and a subsidy of £120,000 a year. Sykes says that this subsidy was to continue so long as Britain was at war with Russia. Lobanov Rostovski maintains that it was conditional on Persia remaining at war with Russia. Whichever may be the truth it does not appear

that any of the British missions regarded Russia as the main enemy. Peace between England and Russia was signed in 1811 and Sir Gore Ouseley, the British Ambassador in Tehran, ordered British officers to leave Persian service. He acceded, however, to the Persian request to retain Christie and Lindsay who in 1812 virtually led a vast Persian army against a Russian force at Aslanduz. In spite of the valiant efforts of these officers the Persian force was defeated. The Russian army was at that very moment engaged in turning the tide of the Napoleonic campaign in Russia!

The part played by Russia in what is commonly called the Eastern Question is, properly speaking, outside the scope of this narrative and only a brief mention of it need be made. J. A. R. Marriott summarizes the Russian connection with the Eastern Question as follows: "The problem of the Black Sea; egress therefrom, ingress thereto; the command of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and, above all, the capital problem as to the possession of Constantinople" Russia's "natural impulse towards the Mediterranean; her repeated attempts to secure permanent access to that sea by the narrow straits; her relation to her co-religionists under the sway of the Sultan and more particularly to those of her own Slavonic nationality." It is unnecessary here to attempt a recapitulation of the events surrounding Russia's endeavours to realize the above mentioned aspirations. They have been described in detail in many histories and notably in Marriott's "Eastern Question." What is more important from the point of view of this narrative is to decide when Anglo-Russian rivalry took on a definite shape and what were the underlying causes of that rivalry. Of neither of these matters is it easy to speak with precision. The writer has tried to show that up to the end of the Napoleonic wars Russia was not regarded by Great Britain as a potential enemy or rival in either Europe or Asia. She had materially assisted to bring about the downfall of Napoleon and at the close of the war was still sufficiently powerful to command respect. The character of Tsar Alexander I, at once idealistic and shrewd, was attractive to the British and it almost seems as if it were not until the formation of the Holy Alliance that serious doubts began to assail the British people and government as to the integrity and good-will of Russia. The Holy Alliance appeared to Castlereagh, and also to Metternich, as an undesirable exhibition of misplaced religious fervour which probably had a sinister ulterior motive behind it. Metternich's description of the Holy Alliance as a "sonorous nothing" seems, however, to fall short of the truth. In welcoming the "*Christian*

nations" of Europe into one fold of mutual esteem and confidence Alexander was believed to be unmistakably announcing his intention of overthrowing the Ottoman Empire and the events which followed certainly seemed to bear this out. Yet neither here nor for many years was Russian action based upon any considered policy. It was dependent entirely upon the will of the Tsar and mental tergiversations assailed Alexander with bewildering frequency. He was by nature a liberal and shared with the majority of his countrymen a genuine sympathy for the Christians under Turkish suzerainty. It is highly probable that he knew of and countenanced the activities of numerous Russian agents in the Christian provinces of Turkey. But on the outbreak of the Greek rebellion in 1820 he at first disavowed any connection with the leader of the revolt, Hypsilanti. The fact was that Alexander had recently come under the influence of Metternich who had persuaded him temporarily that the Greek revolt was one more manifestation of those dangerous revolutionary ideas which threatened to overthrow legitimist government in Europe. What followed is a tangle of cross-purpose and misunderstanding. Alexander's position as head of the Orthodox Church proved stronger than Metternich's influence and in 1821 Russia came into the field as the acknowledged champion of Greek independence. And so, under the enthusiastic tutelage of Lord Byron, was England, and the student of history is treated to the astonishing spectacle of Great Britain and Russia vying for the honour of sponsoring the Greek revolt. For the British Foreign Secretary Canning, though a member of a Tory government was, writes Fisher, "an exponent of that new type of popular and liberal diplomacy which since it descended to Palmerston, an adoring disciple, was for nearly half a century a thorn in the flesh of continental autocrats."

Canning died before the Battle of Navarino in 1828 and Wellington who openly disagreed with his predecessor's policy caused the King to make what was tantamount to an apology to Turkey. Henceforward Great Britain's relations with Russia were characterized by unrelieved opposition. Nicholas I who succeeded Alexander I in 1825 was considered to be an opponent of all liberal thought and institutions. He was popularly described by Tennyson as "the o'ergrown barbarian of the East" and the British Government and people agreed in thinking that nothing good could come out of Russia. Such sentiments made possible the prolonged retention at Constantinople of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe who can with reason be regarded as one of the principal originators of the useless and dangerous Crimean War.

Further east events were occurring which fitted in well with anti-Russian feeling. After the conclusion of peace with Russia in 1828 Persia wishing to compensate for her losses in another direction and perhaps, *certainly* according to some, on the advice of Russia decided to lay siege to Herat. This city, however, ably defended under the direction of the British subaltern Pottinger, resisted all attacks. It may well be that this was the first genuine sign of Russia's attempts to oppose Great Britain in the Middle East for, as Lobanov Rostovski writes, once British opposition to Russia in the Near East had become chronic "a vicious circle was created, the British finding confirmation of their suspicions in the events which occurred, and consequently opposing Russia all the more violently, and the Russians in their turn, infuriated at this opposition where they had historic claims and the British had none, consequently became the more aggressive further east where the British were more sensitive for the security of India." Many years later, in 1889, the situation was admirably and succinctly appreciated by Lord Curzon. "To keep England quiet in Europe by keeping her employed in Asia, that, briefly put, is the sum and substance of Russian policy."

Lord Palmerston went to the Foreign Office in 1830. During the tedious years of his office as Secretary of State for War he had found relaxation in the company of the beautiful Princess Lieven, the wife of the Russian ambassador. This clever and patriotic lady laboured hard to impress Palmerston with the just nature of Russia's aspirations and the nobility of her fellow countrymen. The result of her efforts seems to have been, however, that her pupil entered the Foreign Office rather as a Russophobe than a Russophil and seems to have been more ready to exaggerate Russia's power and ambitions than approve her claims to sympathetic consideration. Whatever his real sentiments, Palmerston arranged the early recall of the Lieven family and shortly after the disappearance of his first teacher in diplomacy, he took up the Russian question in earnest. In 1836 he appointed McNeill, a well-known Russophobe, to Tehran and in the same year wrote a letter to Lord Auckland, then Governor-General in India, pointing out the need of counteracting "the progress of Russian influence in a quarter which, from its proximity to our Indian possessions, could not fail if it were once established, to act injuriously on the system of our Indian alliances and possibly to interfere even with the tranquillity of our own territory." Auckland was to take what action he thought fit when he should feel that "the time had arrived at which it would be right for you to interfere decidedly in the affairs of Afghanistan."

Quite apart from any Russian machinations the situation in Afghanistan at this time was far from satisfactory. After the murder of Nadir Shah in 1747 Ahmad Shah Durani had established a power which stretched from the Oxus to the Sutlej and the Indus and far into Persia. This power decayed under his successors, Timur Shah and Shah Shuja and a period of anarchy ensued. The upshot of this was that in 1830, Dost Muhammad of the Barakzai family had established himself at Kabul while Kamran of the Sadozais ruled at Herat. The Indian provinces with Kashmir and Peshawar had been entirely lost. The Persian expedition against Herat greatly alarmed Dost Muhammad who feared the next Persian objective would be Kandahar. He therefore gave considerable attention to the proposal of British and Russian envoys who appeared in Kabul in 1837. Russophobe literature seems to convey the impression that the appearance of Lieutenant Vitkevich was one of the reasons which prompted England's action. In actual fact he arrived in Kabul after Alexander Burnes and only began to have dealings with Dost Muhammad when Burnes' project for the grant of a subsidy to Afghanistan and partial cession of Peshawar by Ranjit Singh was repudiated by Lord Auckland. The sequel to these Russian gambits was that Vitkevich was recalled by the Russian Government who denied having entrusted him with any official mission. On this Vitkevich committed suicide. Burnes fared no better. He was murdered in Kabul and, according to Kaye, his despatches were intentionally mutilated in India in order to make him appear responsible for the failure of the mission followed as it was by the unparalleled disaster of the First Afghan War.

Whatever the justification for British alarm it is perfectly clear that the steps taken to counteract Russian activity did not improve the situation in the slightest. That the Russian Government had at this time formulated the vast scheme for which the Russophobes give it credit must be regarded as extremely doubtful. That they instigated the Persian expedition on Herat is certainly highly probable and Prince Lobanov Rostovski's argument that if the Russians had desired the capture of Herat by Persia the presence of a small Russian force would have ensured it is really too thin to be accepted. But the idea of "strong action in Afghanistan" when the Sutlej was still the frontier of British India and Russia had not begun the conquest of Khiva seems to have been one of the wildest notions that ever entered the head of a British Government.

Leaving Anglo-Russian rivalry more or less firmly established in Europe and the Middle East some reference must be made to Russia's continued expansion in the Far East and Arctic regions. Like the British Empire the Russian Empire owed much of its far-flung acquisitions to the initiative of merchant-adventurers. Of the exploits of Russian pioneers very little is generally known with the result that the persistence of Russian colonization and culture is largely ignored by Western European historians. Apparently, during the reigns of Catherine and Paul, preoccupation in Europe caused a falling-off in the interest taken by Russia in the Far East but, as early as 1803, organized expeditions began to press forward to new fields of discovery. The Russian colony in Alaska was firmly established in 1804 and, in searching for a possible source of supplies for this colony down the coast of America, San Francisco was reached and in 1811, with the consent of the Spaniards in California, a chain of Russian settlements was established in the Californian coast and remained there for ten years. The rapidly increasing importance of trade in these distant lands aroused great interest in Russia and their inaccessibility by any existing land or sea route caused eyes once more to be turned to the question of navigating the Amur River. This was contrary to the existing Treaty of Nerchinsk, but the situation suddenly became acute on the outbreak of the Opium Wars (1841-1842) between Great Britain and China. The capture of Hong Kong and the establishment of British commercial influence in the Yangtse valley caused grave disquietude in the minds of Russian statesmen who prognosticated an attempt on the part of England to gain control of the mouth of the Amur River and thus make Russia's position on the Pacific impossible. "There appears to have been as much ground for these apprehensions as for British suspicions of Russian designs on India."

To protect Russian interests in the Far East a remarkable man Nikolai Muraviev was appointed Governor of East Siberia. Muraviev was a man of great foresight, ability and of an independent will which frequently found itself opposed to the more moderate aspirations of the Government. To his forceful forward policy which amounted to an arbitrary violation of the Treaty of Nerchinsk, the Chinese appeared to be either complacent or indifferent. Profiting by the disorder following on the Sino-British war of 1856-1857 Muraviev concluded with China the Treaty of Aigun which gave Russia all the country on the left bank of the Amur and the right to use the Amur, Sungari and Ussuri rivers for the purpose of navigation. The successful

mediation of Russia after the occupation of Peking by an Anglo-French force in 1860 paved the way for the Treaty of Peking which gave to Russia the whole of the Ussuri region down to the sea and preferential trading rights in Mongolia and Sinkiang.

The final phases of Russian expansion in Asia were the conquests of the Caucasus and Central Asia or what is now known as Soviet Turkestan. A number of clear and fairly accurate accounts of these operations are available and a reference to any of them will serve to refresh the reader's memory on the dates of the various advances. Until 1860 the Russian forward movement did not excite any particular comment from Great Britain though apprehension had long been felt as to the ultimate effect which these advances would have upon India. In 1864 Count Gorchakov felt it necessary to issue his famous note in which he discussed the whole problem which resulted from civilized states finding themselves in proximity to wild and unsettled tribes. Drawing parallels from other parts of the world, he pointed out that when frontier tribes are of necessity subdued, "they in their turn are exposed to the aggression of more distant tribes and hence the frontier line must be expanded until it comes into contact with a regularly organized state." He went on to indicate the line which Russia proposed to consolidate and beyond which she did not "intend" to advance. Subsequent advances to the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan raised howls of execration from the Russophobes and the Russian Government was stigmatized as hopelessly perfidious and incorrigibly "Asiatic."

That the Russian Government did from time to time give specific undertakings to refrain from further advance in this or that direction and subsequently repudiated them cannot, of course, be denied. With regard to the general principles enunciated in the Note, however, some notice must be taken of Russia's retort that the expression of an intention does not imply a fixed undertaking for all time. There are two other points not always taken into account: there is nothing to prove that the Russian Government was not sincere in its belief that the Khanates of Khiva, Bokhara and Kokand were "regularly organized States" whose frontiers might constitute the limit of Russian expansion. That they subsequently proved to be no such thing and that their turbulent state rendered further advances necessary was an example of a phenomenon common enough in India, America and elsewhere. Secondly, commanders on the spot often on their own initiative carried out operations which were highly distasteful and embarrassing to the Government. Thus, on receiving news of a

concentration of Kokandians at Tashkent, Colonel Chernayev attacked without orders. Having failed to capture the city the first time he attacked again, this time successfully but in direct defiance of the Tsar's orders. Time and recent history have possibly made people less censorious of failures on the part of Governments to realize their declared intentions and of late actions far more high-handed than Russia's advances in Central Asia have failed to elicit one quarter of the same protest and alarm.

In 1865 Turkestan was declared a frontier province with Tashkent as its capital. The policy of the Russian Government with regard to Central Asia was at this time by no means clear. The hands of the Cabinet were to a great extent forced by the vigorous and often high-handed line taken by men like Kauffmann, Chernaiev and Skobelev. The many assurances given by Russian diplomats regarding the cessation of further operations were, it may be believed, given in good faith, but such assurances were treated by local officials and commanders with a mixture of indifference and contempt. They trusted to their own local knowledge and instinct to tell them when and where to stop and it must be admitted that, on the whole, they appear to have been right. When the Khanates of Khiva, Bokhara and Kokand had been successfully brought under Russian suzerainty there still remained the resistance of the Tekke Turkomans to overcome. At the time these people were probably the most warlike people in Asia not excluding the Pathans, and the problem as to whether they should be humoured or conquered at all costs was one which it required the independent resolution of men like Kauffmann and Skobelev to solve. After General Lomakin had with heavy losses failed to take the Tekke stronghold of Geok Tepe, Skobelev was placed in command and took the fortress by storm after a siege of twenty-three days. The limits of Russian expansion had now (1881) at last been reached and her frontiers marched with those of Persia, Afghanistan and China.

The conquest of Khiva, the capture of Geok Tepe and the eventual voluntary capitulation of Merv were events which profoundly disturbed the British Government and public. A long memorandum handed by Sir Edward Thornton, ambassador in St. Petersburg, to M. de Giers, the Russian Foreign Secretary set forth with telling clarity the numerous assurances given by the Russian Government and by the Tsar which had, with hardly an exception, been repudiated or disregarded. The memorandum, however, was not a prelude to any firm action and ended, moreover, on a weak and unsatisfactory note, the ambassador merely saying: "I have the

honour to convey to Your Excellency His Lordships (Lord Granville's) hope that an early opportunity will be taken of communicating to Her Majesty's Government the proposals which the Russian Government may have to make to them, in order to provide against the complications which this further extension of Russian sovereignty in the direction of the frontiers of Afghanistan may give rise."

"My only surprise," wrote Lord Curzon, "is not that Russia invented the pleas, or gave the undertaking, but that England, with childlike innocence, has consented time after time to be gulled by the same transparent device;" and later, "The fact remains that in the absence of any physical obstacle, and in the presence of an enemy whose rule of life was depredation, and who understood no diplomatic logic but defeat, Russia was as much compelled to go forward as the earth is to go round the sun; and if any have a legitimate right to complain of her advance it is certainly not those who alone had the power to stop her, and who deliberately declined to exercise it."

Now that Central Asia had been conquered without rousing England to resolute action de Giers permitted himself to make a definition of Russian policy to Baron Staal, the Russian ambassador in London. This is quoted as follows by Lobanov Rostovski:

"This position . . . is purely defensive, considering that we have neither the intention nor any interest in menacing England in India. But it gives us a base for operations which if required can become an offensive one." And again, "England could strike us everywhere with the aid of continental alliances, whereas we can not reach her anywhere. A great nation cannot accept such a position This has led us to build for ourselves in Turkestan and the Turkoman steppe a sufficiently strong military position. . . . We are satisfied with this defensive position."

Russia had good reason to be satisfied with her position. Central Asia was subdued for ever. Even the Revolution gave rise to no revolt of any importance.

Quite apart from the threat which Russia's Asiatic expansion was believed by the Russophobes to imply, Russian methods of conquest in Central Asia were subjected to grave criticism. A discussion as to whether the massacre of 8,000 Turkomans is more cruel than, for instance, a systematic attempt to starve a whole nation to death would tend to become metaphysical and therefore useless for the purpose of the present narrative. But it may be of some interest to quote without comment some remarks of General

Skobelev during two interviews which he granted to the British journalist Charles Marvin.

"In your official report of the siege," said Marvin, "you say that during the pursuit after the assault you killed 8,000 of both sexes."

"That is true," observed Skobelev, "I had them counted. The number was 8,000."

"This statement," I continued, "provoked great comment in England, for you admit your troops killed women as well as men."

Skobelev replied: "It is quite true. When the dead were counted, women were found among them. It is my nature to conceal nothing. I therefore wrote, in making the report, 'of both sexes'."

On Marvin's remarking that it was the great defect of our last Afghan war that we entered the country without a policy, and never applied his principle (and Wellington's) of hitting the enemy as hard as possible, Skobelev said: "Those executions of General Roberts at Cabul were a mistake. I would never execute an Asiatic to strike terror into his countrymen, because you are sure to fail. Whatever punishments you resort to, they can never be so terrible as those inflicted by a Nasrullah, or any other despotic native ruler; and to these crueller punishments the natives are so accustomed, that your milder ones produce no effect. Then, worse than this, the execution of a Mussulman by an Infidel provokes hatred. I would sooner the whole country revolted than execute a man. If you take a place by storm and strike a terrible blow, it is the will of God, they say, and they submit without that hatred which executions provoke. My system is this—to strike hard and keep on hitting till resistance is completely over, then at once to form ranks, cease slaughter, and be kind and humane to the prostrate enemy. Immediately submission is made, the troops must be subjected to the strictest discipline; not one of the enemy must be touched."

During the second interview Skobelev said:

"In dealing with savage tribes the best plan is to fight as rarely as possible; and when you do fight, to hit as hard as you can. By incessantly attacking them, you teach them the art of war. Your policy is the same as that which we pursued in the Caucasus, and has had similar results. Prince Bariatsky, however, replaced it with a fresh policy. Wherever he advanced, he stopped and made roads to the point, and fortified it. In this manner, in course of time, we were able to put down the lawlessness of the tribes."

It is doubtful whether such views as these were ever placed on record by the Russian Government or whether indeed they would ever have been officially subscribed to. They are illustrative

of the independent attitude of the real builders of the Russian Empire, an attitude strikingly similar to that shown by many of the pioneers of British power. Another example of this independent attitude is the action taken by General Kauffmann in Sinkiang in 1871. Alarmed by the apparent cognizance given to the upstart Yakub Beg by both the British and Turkish Governments and by the actual presence of a British mission in Kashgar, Kauffmann occupied the Mijart Pass and, when Yakub started to extend his power to the Tarantchi sultanate of Kulja, General Kalpakovski was ordered to occupy that city, one of the most important in Sinkiang. Russian troops remained in occupation of Kulja for ten years until 1881 when Chinese territory was evacuated under the terms of the Treaty of St. Petersburg. It appears that the original occupation of Kulja was ordered by Kauffmann without the knowledge of the Russian Government who were mystified and embarrassed by such dangerous tactics. Faithful, however, to a system from which they have scarcely, if ever, deviated the Russian Government proceeded to back up Kauffmann's action, however unexpected and distasteful it might have been to them. When after ten years the Russian force was eventually withdrawn it was by no means under compulsion from China, but simply because it was not then Russia's wish or intention to remain in Sinkiang. It is interesting to observe that Peter Fleming while describing, in "News from Tartary," the long-standing and sinister desire of Russia to establish herself in Sinkiang omits all mention of the occupation of Kulja and seems to wish his readers to believe that the first Russian soldiers in Sinkiang were the White Russian refugees fleeing from the Red Armies.

The story of Anglo-Russian relations with regard to Afghanistan is not one which reflects much credit either on Great Britain or on Russia. Russia on more than one occasion was guilty of bad faith. England very frequently showed weakness which, as the ex-Kaiser used to say, though not the same as treachery often produces the same results. Both nations displayed considerable ignorance of each other's nature and an almost chronic misunderstanding of each other's intentions.

The first apprehension and alarm caused by Russian advances in Central Asia between 1860 and 1870 were somewhat allayed by the Granville-Gorchakov agreement of 1873. By this instrument the Russian Chancellor formally declared that "the Emperor looked upon Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere within which Russia might be called upon to exercise her influence." Such a declaration was of particular importance in view of the presence at

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Samarkand of Abdur Rahman. Grave doubts had assailed the mind of the Government of India regarding the relations between the future Amir and General Kauffmann. These relations were, in actual fact, of the most correct description, Kauffmann having informed both Abdur Rahman and Shir Ali that Russia would not interfere in Afghan affairs. A copy of his letter to Shir Ali in this sense was in 1879 found by Lord Roberts in Kabul among other less reputable documents. The agreement like some others made with Russia did not have the desired result. The Russians considered that Britain's object had been to tie their hands in the Middle East in order to pursue her policy of supporting Turkey at the expense of Russia. The treacherous intrigue conducted by General Stolyetov's mission to Kabul can be compared with Fra Lippo Lippi's excursion on to the titles in Browning's famous poem. Morally it was indefensible but there may have been some extenuating circumstances.

Stephen Wheeler in his "Ameer Abdur Rahman" has referred to the fact that the Russian Government "argued that we (Great Britain) were bound by engagements entered into with them, if not with any Afghan ruler, to respect Afghan independence." This was denied by Lord Salisbury in December 1878, but in 1885 Lord Granville referred in a letter to agreements with the Amir "binding Her Majesty's Government to regard as a hostile act any aggression upon his territory." "The fact," writes Stephen Wheeler, "that no such agreement . . . was in existence, detracts somewhat from the importance of the Foreign Minister's observation." It also suggests the fallible and brittle nature of agreements entered into with a country like Russia over such questions as that of Afghanistan.

Up to 1895 the northern frontier of Afghanistan was the subject of almost perpetual disputes between the British and Russian Governments. In 1883 Abdur Rahman, then Amir of Afghanistan, had annexed the small principalities of Roshan and Shignan extending from the Pamirs across the Panja or Upper Oxus. His claim to this territory was supported by the Indian and at first by the British Government. A strenuous protest against this annexation was made by the Russian Government on the ground that it was contrary to the 1873 agreement. This was denied by Lord Granville and the matter remained unsettled until 1895 when the British Government formally admitted the justice of the Russian claim. "Why," writes Stephen Wheeler, "this admission was not made when the dispute first arose is best known to our diplomatists. Nothing was gained by the delay, which on the contrary, caused an

immense amount of needless friction and avoidable irritation." The existence of this unsettled dispute did not tend to sweeten the work of the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission. The blame for the Panjeh incident has never been finally apportioned, but it may well be that if a greater measure of mutual confidence and understanding had existed between British and Russian officers the incident might have been avoided. The Panjeh affair was, incidentally, another instance of drastic action taken by local commanders without the knowledge or approval of the Russian Government. "There is reason to believe," wrote Curzon, "that . . . it was an impromptu on the part of Komarov and Alikhanov that burst with as much novelty upon the Foreign Office of St. Petersburg as it did upon that of Whitehall."

During the XIXth century, the most important period of Russia's expansion, the country had been ruled by Tsars of outstanding personality. Inefficient and inadequate as absolute monarchy had clearly become for a country of Russia's extent, the determination and ability in their different spheres of Nicholas I and the three Alexanders had made for the continuity of foreign policy. The character and abilities of Nicholas II would be regarded as inadequate and unsatisfactory in a county churchwarden. Amiable and kind-hearted, he was highly susceptible to influences of the most pernicious kind and "the Court," writes Lobanov Rostovski, "became a happy hunting ground for all kinds of adventurers for occultists and cranks, including a Frenchman from Lyons, a Buriat quack doctor and the notorious Rasputin, to much more dangerous speculators and promoters." Such a state of affairs was fatal to a vast country like Russia where economic conditions were in a state of flux and where there was a steady undercurrent of revolutionary ideas. The Tsar listened more and more to the advice of worthless counsellors and at length appears to have come completely under the influence of one Bezobrazov, a captain of cavalry and of Admiral Abaza. These persons proceeded to exploit a timber concession granted by the King of Korea in 1896 and this resulted in Russian troops being sent into Korean territory. It was the last of a series of reckless and unwarrantable actions taken without the knowledge of the people and against the advice of responsible ministers, and it precipitated the Russo-Japanese War.

The war with Japan was a most disastrous undertaking of which the history is well known. The Russian people were unanimously opposed to the war. The administration of the army was riddled with corruption and the commanders selected were

extremely disappointing. The results were bound to be unfavourable and were made doubly so by selecting the most unsuitable moment to ask for an armistice, that is, when the army now under General Linevich was in better condition and when the Japanese were just beginning to show signs of war-weariness. It needed all the genius of de Witte to secure the comparatively favourable terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth.

The attitude of Great Britain towards Russia during the Russo-Japanese war was unsympathetic and not without reason. A spirited attempt to exploit this feeling was made by Kaiser Wilhelm II. Harold Nicolson recounts how the Tsar showed Lord Carnock a personal letter received from the Kaiser which contained the following passage:

"An excellent expedient for cooling British insolence would be to make some military demonstration on the Perso-Afghan frontier, where they think you powerless to appear with your troops during the war. Even should your forces not suffice for a real attack on India, they would do for Persia which has no army; and pressure on the Indian frontier from Persia will have a remarkably cooling effect upon the hot-headed Jingoës in London."

The advice was not taken by Russia.

The disastrous consequences of the Russo-Japanese war made the Russian Government lend an attentive ear to British proposals for an agreement which would lay the ghost of Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Middle East. To formulate such an agreement was the principal task of Sir Arthur Nicolson (afterwards Lord Carnock) on his appointment as British ambassador to St. Petersburg in 1906. Nicolson was admirably suited for such a duty. He was a man of great experience and, having been minister in Tehran, was well acquainted not only with the views of the Government of India on such questions as that of the Persian Gulf but also with the reports, both real and exaggerated, of Russia's designs in the Middle East. His character was at once firm and conciliatory; his mind shrewd and sympathetic. In his admirable book "*Lord Carnock*," Harold Nicolson gives us his father's impressions on taking up his appointment. "Personally," the ambassador recorded in his narrative, "I was most anxious to see removed all causes of difference between us and Russia. I considered that many of these differences were caused by simple misunderstanding of each other, and because each country attributed to the other plans and projects which in reality were not entertained." The convention after innumerable difficulties patiently and skilfully circumvented by Nicolson, was duly signed and

ratified. It dealt with Anglo-Russian relations with regard to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet and was, as Harold Nicolson says, "a masterpiece of drafting."

The Anglo-Russian Convention was prepared with sympathy, knowledge and understanding. It was fiercely criticized by Lord Curzon as a surrender to Russia. Faithfully observed by Great Britain, it was recognized neither by Persia nor by Afghanistan and it was not observed by Russia. At the time the Foreign Office had expressed some doubts as to whether any useful purpose would be served by concluding an agreement of such far-reaching nature with a government that was neither friendly nor stable. Influences were at work not unlike those which assailed Fra Lippo Lippi as he "leaned out of window for fresh air." Russia's imperialist policy had almost become a perquisite of an ever-growing class of business adventurers and it needed something more than an agreement to stop their ambitious designs in Persia and the Middle East generally. They seem to have ignored Afghanistan as, at that time, not being worth the trouble.

From the Anglo-Russian Convention to the Revolution no striking changes in Russian Eastern policy can be observed. A confidential memorandum written to the Tsar in 1916 by General Kuropatkin and subsequently published by the Soviet Government is, however, worth quoting from Lobanov Rostovski. Kuropatkin, though an unsuccessful commander-in-chief, was an acknowledged authority on Eastern affairs:

"I take the liberty of expressing the opinion that the necessity of making secure the enormous state border of Turkestan after the end of the Great War . . . will demand a definite decision with regard to Persia which should be equal to the greatness of Russia. It appears to me that the return to Russia of the provinces of Astrabad, Gilian and Mazanderan, the heritage of Peter the Great, is imperative, as well as the establishment of a Russian protectorate, with British consent, over northern Persia with Tabriz, Teheran and Meshed.

With regard to Afghanistan, there appears to be no necessity for an alteration of the existing border, but an alliance with England enduring also in peace, ought to enable us to modify the attitude of Afghanistan and the Afghan Government, which has been hostile and undignified for Russia, and open the Afghan market for us. At present Afghans have free access across the Russian border, whereas Afghanistan is closed to Russians. Apart from this Russia ought to secure full control over the waters of the Amu Darya, the Murgab and the Tedjen within Afghanistan,

and finally with British consent, Russia ought to connect by railroad through Afghanistan with India.

As for China, the danger menacing Russia in the future from that empire of 400,000,000 people is not to be doubted. The most vulnerable point on the Russian border, as 800 years ago, will be the Great Gateway of the Nations, through which the Hordes of Chengiz Khan invaded Europe. So long as Kulja will remain in Chinese hands, the protection of Turkestan against China will be a matter of great difficulty and will require considerable military force. It is impossible to leave this gateway in the hands of the Chinese. The alteration of our frontier with China is absolutely imperative. By drawing the border line from the Khan Tengri range (27,000 feet high and the highest in the Tian Shan Mountains) in a direct line to Vladivostok, our frontier will be shortened by 4,000 versts and Kulja, northern Mongolia and northern Manchuria will be included in the Russian Empire."

During the early days of Soviet power attempts were made to achieve some part of the above quoted programme. In his previous article the present writer was at some pains to explain what he considered to be the history of Soviet oriental policy from the Revolution up to 1931 and how the Soviet Government failed in the first place to appreciate the situation with regard to Middle Eastern nationalism. It is unnecessary to recapitulate this but a word may be said here about two important matters which were omitted from the previous study, namely, Soviet policy in the Far East and the application in Turkestan of the principle of federation.

The Soviet Government did not fully establish its authority in Asia until 1922. Up to 1920 it was believed in Western Europe that a "front" could be created in Siberia to stem the tide of communism. Admiral Kolchak was at first aided by the presence in Siberia of the Czech and later of Japanese, American, British and Italian troops. In September 1919 there were 60,000 Japanese troops in Siberia. The position was enough to appal the stoutest-hearted revolutionary but determination aided a good deal by circumstances and dissension among its enemies enabled the Soviet Government gradually to fight its way to the Pacific and it was finally established in Vladivostok in November 1922.

While Soviet Russia was, as it were, on probation *vis-a-vis* the Middle and Far East, she was ready to make considerable concessions to Eastern nationalist feeling. In 1919 she had declared the complete abandonment of her rights to the Chinese Eastern Railway—a somewhat meaningless act as the railway was actually under

the control of an Allied Commission. As the position of the Soviet Government became more assured, they again wished to control this railway, but relations with China had become strained owing to the practical establishment of Soviet rule in Outer Mongolia. From 1924 onwards strenuous negotiations resulted in agreements with the Peking Government and with Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian war lord, who was virtually independent of Peking. At the same time the Soviets conceived the plan of associating themselves with the Chinese revolutionaries as represented by Sun Yat Sen and the Kuomintang whose stronghold was in southern China round the city of Canton. Soviet military and financial aid gradually gave rise to a war between north and south in which the Soviet-trained armies at first gave a good account of themselves. Soviet progress had, however, been too swift in China. They had, as elsewhere, underestimated the inherent resilience of the middle-class intelligentsia who, while ready to accept Soviet material aid, greatly feared the anarchy which might ensue from too deep a draught of the heady wine of revolution. These sentiments were reflected in the opposition led by Chiang Kai-shek against the left wing of the Kuomintang and, in the revulsion of feeling which followed, a wave of anti-Sovietism spread over both north and south and Soviet citizens were everywhere expelled or ill-treated.

These events coincided with a lessening of Soviet influence elsewhere in Asia, but the high-handed action of Chang Tso-lin and his son in Manchuria caused the Soviet to send troops into Manchuria in 1929. These troops easily defeated the Chinese and Soviet prestige rose accordingly. Profiting by Soviet example Japan later proceeded to overrun Manchuria with results which are well known. The Soviet reaction to this and to recent events in China testifies to the truth of Lobanov Rostovski's statement that "the longer Soviet Russia is able to keep out of actual hostilities, the stronger her position will be because of . . . the inevitable exhaustion of the contending parties."

Before the Revolution, government in Russia was centralized to an impossible extent. The dangerous results contingent on the granting of wide powers to men like Muraviev and Kauffmann have already been noticed in this article. The possibilities and indeed the necessity of some form of federation were more than once considered by pre-Revolution statesmen, but it needed the powerful stimulus of revolutionary ideas to bring such a plan to fruition. In the Declaration of November 1917 the equality of all nationalities within the Union was announced and this with occasional lapses is the basic principle on which the U. S. S. R. has

been built up. Of the 174 different races who are citizens of the U. S. S. R. the peoples of Turkestan form important and distinct elements and a genuine attempt to sort them out seems to have been made. Turkomans, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kirghiz are represented by four republics to which those races have given their names and when their former backwardness is considered, it must be admitted that astonishing progress has been made in inculcating a spirit of nationality. It should be noted, however, that in each republic the controlling officials are all members of the Communist Party and in the great majority of cases are Russians or at any rate Slavs. Yet the encouragement given to local peoples to take an active part in government, the campaign against illiteracy, the exploitation of agricultural and mineral resources, the improvement of communications and hygiene must be regarded as a real effort and not merely dismissed as a Soviet scheme for sucking the life-blood of subject peoples. These reflections will be highly objectionable to those who believe the Communist Party to be solely a power for evil, but it should be recognized that were at any time the control of the Communist Party to be relaxed the application of some other principle might become necessary to avoid anarchy or absorption by neighbouring States of the new national republics.

An attempt to summarize Russia's activities in Asia would hardly be complete without some remarks, conjectural though they may be, on the potentialities of Russia's future position in Asia. The first two quotations at the head of this article give some idea of the wide divergence of views on the subject of Russian foreign policy as a whole. Since the Revolution two other important schools of thought have come into being; these may be described as the "Brave New World" and "Foul Baboonery of Bolshevism" schools. Then there is the dismissive generalization that all Russians are orientals which recalls the story of the old gentleman who, when asked his view as to the most southerly limit of the negroid races, replied, "I suppose you mean niggers, Sir. Well, I don't know where they end but I know they start at Calais." It is useless to attempt to understand Russia without realizing that her position in the world is unique. No other nation has straddled east and west in the same way. No other nation answers so fully to the description of Eurasian. Historians of the future will no doubt regard with surprise our sharp distinction between east and west, but for us the difference looms very large and in Russia where the two are fused as a result of the inevitable easterly expansion which has been outlined above, we try vainly because too

literally, to orientate ourselves. Experts on Europe and Asia exist everywhere in profusion, but the cult of Eurasia is a new one to the understanding of which the social and political isolation of the Soviet Union has not contributed. Soviet efforts to publicize the Union have had on the whole little appeal either to Western Europe or the East. Their accounts of their progress, which is actually impressive, are usually written in a style at once so turgid and so euphuistic as to be almost unreadable.

However distasteful, however dull the methods and mentality of Soviet Russia may be to Western Europe or the older East, there is no doubt that the force of socialism, communism, Marxism or whatever the real essence of the Soviet regime may be, does constitute a revivifying influence which may be the beginning of a general fusion between East and West. Great, almost unbelievable progress has been made in Turkestan and the Far East and observation of that progress and the study of Soviet methods should be of the utmost importance to Great Britain who is also working for the advancement of Eastern peoples, though admittedly from a different angle. Anglo-Russian disagreement in the East has for many years lain dormant but over the Hindu Kush there still hangs an atmosphere of suspicion which can only be dispelled by better understanding and closer intercourse. This is beginning in the West where monstrous allegations and fantastic fears are less common than before, but the recent trials in Russia where mention was made of a British intrigue to create a buffer state out of Uzbekistan show that in the East the same mistrust exists as in the darkest days of Anglo-Russian rivalry. There is, however, this important difference: formerly it was England who suspected the intentions of Russia, now it is Russia who is nervous or alleges that she is nervous for the security of her frontiers against British intrigue. Such a state of affairs is deplorable and is likely to grow worse rather than better unless a determined effort is made to improve relations and mutual understanding. It has been the object of the present article to show that in the past misunderstanding and ignorance have often been the principal causes of friction. There is a grave danger that those causes still remain.

(In compiling material for this article the writer, while freely consulting all the better known histories, has made considerable use of Prince A. Lobanov Rostovski's "Russia in Asia," George Vernadski's "History of Russia" and Stephen Wheeler's "The Ameer.")

THE MORTAR ON THE FRONTIER

By "AUSPEX"

This article is written in order to plead the urgent necessity for a mortar or similar weapon to accompany infantry in frontier fighting. The mortar is already accepted as a vital weapon for civilised warfare. In that field no better example of its right and effective use can be cited than the fighting by the New Zealanders about Beaumont Hamel in March 1918, which was admirably described by Captain G. H. Clifton, M.C., of the New Zealand Staff Corps, in the Royal United Service Institution Journal of November 1935. Mortars have, indeed, been used in frontier warfare. They were used in 1918-19 on the North-East Frontier but, although I was there myself, I have no record at hand of their effectiveness. To judge, however, by a close acquaintance with the mortar in somewhat similar country round the Caspian, I find it difficult to imagine a weapon better suited to dig a savage enemy out of his rocks and stockades or for general offensive use in that thick country in which the attacker's bullet is so seldom vouchsafed a target on which to play. Most of us still believe in the power of infantry, given favourable ground, to decide an issue offensively in circumstances where tanks cannot do so, provided always that a suitable form of support is at hand. On the North-West Frontier of India it is usual for us to act offensively and we have to rely for the purpose mainly on infantry. It is appropriate therefore to consider first whether the supporting weapons at present available to the infantry are wasteful or inadequate in the hills.

Everyone will admit that artillery is a most valuable auxiliary in frontier fighting. We never like being without its support if there is any likelihood of a stiff fight in front of us. The Mohmand operations of 1935 and the recent Waziristan campaign were, naturally, to a great extent fought on artillery. But artillery fire, however carefully it is arranged, does fail one. The Guides at Point 4080 in the Mohmand operations were left without support because the forward observation officer was badly hit and his signaller rolled, wounded, down a precipice with the telephone. Some of us have experienced the feelings of a battalion commander who has had to send a company forward to take a hill without artillery

Note.—There are several types of 2-inch mortars which would be invaluable to the infantry. These throw an H.E. or smoke bomb of about two pounds up to a range of 500 yards. The weights of the mortars vary from 12½ to 22 lbs according to the design and can be carried by one man.—Editor.

support because, by zero hour, the battery had been unable to get its forward observation post installed. Often the ground has been such that not one of the flat-trajectory supporting weapons could help the company in any way, but nevertheless the company has had to go on in order to protect the flank of a neighbouring unit. Further, it often happens that artillery cannot open fire because they are unable to see the forward troops or because the target is too close to those forward troops for safety. And if good infantry are doing their work, as they should in reasonably favourable country, neither the artillery nor the enemy should be able to see much of the forward elements. These disabilities we suffer from even with the very highly trained and experienced gunners of to-day. What of the gunners of a Great War period?

It frequently happens that artillery expend as much as four hundred shells in a single frontier action lasting only a few hours. The cost in money is enormous; the weight to be carried in shell alone is about four tons, more if 6" howitzers are used, and four tons represent the equivalent of fifty infantry mule loads. And most of this shell is expended in searching for a fluid enemy who is occupying no definite position. Forward observation officers are bold men, but it is wasteful to try to keep them up with the leading platoons where they can see their enemy but where their chances of surviving are not too good. Their communications may be long and precarious and, should the most vital of all—the telephone wire—be interrupted, tedious work and much delay are needed to effect a repair. The infantry have good cause to be grateful for the skill and devotion of the artillery, but it would be irrational not to realise the latter's difficulties.

Here, then, briefly are the disabilities under which artillery labours in mountain warfare. The weight of its shell is high in proportion to the killing or neutralising it does; its eyes are often too far back to render the infantryman the service he needs, when he needs it; its communications are precarious and may fail, and have failed, at the crucial moment; the number of equipment and transport animals it employs is very high in proportion to its effectiveness, and this factor limits the number of guns that can be taken on column; fear of damaging their own infantry often keeps guns silent when they should be active; and finally one more limitation may be added, that of the immobility, when compared with the foot soldier, from which every mule-borne or wheel-borne weapon must suffer in frontier country.

And now for the medium, mule-borne, machine-gun. It can be quickly dismissed as a direct supporting weapon in the attack. It has already been segregated from rifle battalions in the army at home, and it is not a weapon that the infantry can always, or even nearly always, use in the attack on the Frontier since it suffers from certain limitations.

Immobility.—Frequently it cannot accompany infantry by night owing to the noise involved and the difficulty of getting it over rocks and nullahs and up slopes in the dark. Even by day the movement of mule-borne machine-guns across country is slow and requires reconnaissances; by themselves the guns are too heavy for man-handling up steep slopes.

Vulnerability.—Machine-guns mean a great string of mules. Their flat trajectory necessitates a commanding position, which is often difficult to reach and which usually exposes the guns to fire and gives away the movement of other troops.

Flat trajectory.—The flat trajectory of the machine-gun makes close overhead covering fire difficult at all times and makes it impossible to get at an enemy behind cover or just over the crest of a hill. The question of crest clearance is always present, and of all parts of the world where this problem occurs the Frontier is about the most difficult. That is precisely why the howitzer ousts the gun in hill warfare.

Ranging.—It is seldom easy to spot the strike of machine-gun bullets at anything over six hundred yards. This is one reason why there is often an undue expenditure of ammunition; another is that the machine-gun tends to be used as a searching weapon, presumably because it cannot keep up with the leading troops who alone can see the enemy. One might add that a very small inaccuracy on the part of the range-finder throws rounds clean off the target.

The result is that infantry who have been taught to rely on this unreliable weapon to get them on have been fast losing their ability to use their own weapons and can hardly get on at all unless artillery come to their aid. The British Army bases its infantry fire power on the light machine-gun, not on the medium gun; yet we have not the need for the medium gun that armies in Europe have, where they are more likely to have to sustain a long defensive.

To turn to the rifle grenade. As a supporting weapon, to give infantry the opportunity to advance from even three hundred yards against their enemy, it is useless. The effective range of the rifle grenade is two hundred yards. Infantry know that against the fire of an alert and active enemy they cannot, with the aid of their small arms only, hope to close to two hundred yards except at immense cost. Thus they seldom hope to be able to bring the rifle grenade into effective use in the attack. The grenade is nothing more than a very poor compromise between the accurate and specialised weapon represented by the mortar and nothing at all. Besides its lack of range, the rifle grenade suffers in other respects, from its inaccuracy and from the fact that it is regarded as, and is in truth, a weapon which infantry can only occasionally use. Thus it is kept back with the reserve small arms ammunition and, if not issued along with discharger cups before the action, is not there when it may be needed. This fact alone shows that there is not much confidence in its value. The grenade is not an essential weapon. In mobile or semi-mobile warfare it will not reach the forward troops at all unless it is distributed before the action, and then it may have to be carried round for days by a much encumbered rifleman without being used. Not only is it essentially not an all-purposes weapon, but it destroys the rifle from which it is fired and so disarms another man. On the hillside it has an unpleasant habit of rolling and bouncing before it bursts.

Lastly the light machine-gun. This is an excellent weapon on which infantry fire power must be based; but, in itself, it is merely a mobile attacking weapon with a flat trajectory and often has to be helped forward by the high-angle fire of other weapons.

From this brief examination it is obvious that Indian infantry do not possess the supporting weapon they require for attack in the frontier hills. The weapon that they need so much is one that will fulfil the following requirements:

- (a) It must be a weapon that is always needed, not one that is parcelled out on occasion only. No one, after all, has the time to think whether the occasion is there or not, least of all a busy battalion or company commander.
- (b) It must have a high trajectory in order to dig the enemy out from where the bullet cannot get him and to clear with safety the heads of attacking infantry.

- (c) It must be reasonably invulnerable. That is to say it must be capable of being tucked away from view and yet brought close enough to the enemy to allow its commander to see his target and the infantry he is supporting.
- (d) It must be light and mobile so as to be there where and when it is wanted.
- (e) It must have an effective range of over five hundred yards in order that it can reach the enemy without itself being destroyed; and it must be accurate.
- (f) It must produce a burst on which it is easy to range and it must burst on percussion so as to avoid rolling down on to attacking troops.
- (g) It should be capable of producing smoke so as to allow the leading infantry to get forward after it has had to cease fire for safety reasons.

At present a light mortar of some sort is the only weapon that answers these requirements. Its introduction into the Indian Army would cause a great change for the better in infantry tactics and would make that arm far more independent of the artillery and therefore more enterprising and effective in the attack. Indian infantry tactics have not changed appreciably since the last war, but they should change considerably if infantry is to be expected to act with full effect in the frontier fighting of to-day and in the great war of to-morrow. The stagnation has been due primarily to the lack of a proper weapon of accompaniment for the infantry. The light mortar should furnish that requirement.

It may well be argued that to introduce the light mortar will only mean a further complication of weapons and that there will not be the transport available in battalions to carry mortars and their ammunition. This matter of further complication of weapons need not worry us if we remember that the medium machine-gun will have been removed from rifle battalions and that the light mortar will also do away with the need for rifle grenades. The medium machine-gun complicates training and has a harmful effect on it. A non-commissioned officer or man who has spent his time in the support company has to be tactically retrained on his return to a rifle company, for the support company battle is more of a battle drill than a battle of tactical manœuvre. To make a good machine-gunner is a prolonged process; the heftiest

and most intelligent Indian soldiers are employed in the support company and, if we are acting rightly, they will usually be fully trained riflemen with a reasonable educational qualification before they go to that company. In other words, those who go to the support company will be men of four to five years service; the best men in the battalion, yet those most seldom used in action.

The light mortar is a simple weapon the details of which can be quickly taught. With proper carrying equipment it should not require the strongest men in a battalion to shift it about. Its introduction would lead to less complication in weapons and training than is the case to-day with the support company, and we should very soon be able to set free a considerable amount of mule transport. The departure of the medium machine-gun into units of its own would diminish the total number of those weapons in the army. A further saving of mules could be got by putting the light machine-gun, its ammunition and equipment, on to the personnel of the section. The six riflemen of the section can, with proper carrying equipment, carry them over long distances and for long periods, if they are relieved of their packs and some of the articles therein. The packs of the four light machine-gun sections with two light fixed-line tripod mountings a company can be carried on one company mule, thus freeing three mules for other purposes. With the elimination of medium machine-gun mules and this saving on the present light machine-gun mules, a large number of animals would be set free for the reserve ammunition of the mortar and for additional light machine-guns which many of us would like to see in rifle battalions. That is, if all these animals are necessary and if trucks are found not to do the work equally well. War establishments at present provide for thirty-seven men in the four sections of a platoon. Working on three sections to the platoon, as at home, a reasonable margin would be left from which to find light mortar men.

Whether the mortar should be a platoon or a company weapon can be settled in a very short time by sending it to a battalion on the Frontier to be tried out. It seems as though one should favour a platoon mortar, for it will be on the spot with the leading troops at all times. The Italians have, I believe, a little weapon of this sort; we may need a slightly bigger or smaller one, so let us try out any type that is not more than a reasonable load for two men. Again one feels that we should favour a one-man

load, as being more mobile and less conspicuous, but one must see the weapons on the ground with their ammunition in order to decide. They are cheap, far cheaper than our mountain artillery and should often save that arm being needlessly used in battle. They will of course never supplant artillery whatever the form that arm may take in the future; each has its role.

A last word. It is on the outbreak of a minor war obviously far easier to scale down one's organisation and training to something more primitive than it is, on the outbreak of a great and vital struggle, to scale up from a primitive to a high organisation and a high standard of training. If the Great War impressed no other lesson on us, it certainly impressed this.

South of the Caspian is a wooded country of high hills. In 1920-21 we used the old Newton mortars in those parts and used them effectively even under most difficult circumstances. Of several occasions perhaps this one is the most telling example. A company went out at night to reconnoitre and report on a bridge and the strength of its garrison if it were held. It took with it two mortars to support it in case of trouble, but its orders were that it should not get heavily involved. As the party neared the bridge, the mortars got into position in the dark behind a steep bank ready to open on the buildings on the far side of the stream. Half the company had crept across the bridge when the enemy opened a murderous fire on them from three sides. Within a few seconds the mortars shells were crumping among the buildings. The forward platoons rallied and drew out with only a few casualties. Without these mortars those men could never have pulled out of the hornet's nest into which they had thrust. Infantry reinforcement across the bridge was impossible and the stream was broad, muddy and unfordable.

We all see battle with a different picture in our minds according to the situation from which we have beheld it. The picture that the infantry officer has is one of dogged fighting with every weapon he has at hand and of heavy and often needless casualties to his men suffered for lack of the one weapon that can give an enemy the sudden jolt that will enable his men to reassert their superiority.

INDIAN STATES FORCES

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR ARTHUR M. MILLS, K.C.B., D.S.O.

Somebody once made the statement that "one half of the world has no idea how the other half lives." Whether this is an accurate generalisation I do not know, but it is probably true to say that eighty per cent of the Army in India have no knowledge of what Indian States Forces are, or of the part they fill in the scheme of things. It is in the hope of supplying this deficiency that I have written this article.

From time immemorial all the bigger Indian States have had armies, often commanded by French and British freelances of adventurous disposition, whilst the smaller ones have been content with feudal retainers for the personal protection of the ruler. Gradually, as the *Pax Britannica* spread throughout India, and the sovereignty of the various states was guaranteed by treaties or engagements with the British Government, the necessity for these armies disappeared. But for their own purposes, personal, processional, ceremonial, and to a certain extent imperial, many rulers retained some of their forces and modelled them more or less on the Army in India. It has been remarkable how in every emergency the ruling princes of India have been the first to place the services of their troops, the resources of their states and in some cases their own services at the disposal of the British Empire. How frequently these offers were accepted may be gauged from the fact that even prior to the Great War the campaigns in which units from Indian States took part comprised the Laswari Campaign of 1803, the first and second Afghan Wars of 1837 and 1879, the first and second Sikh Wars 1845-46 and 1848-49, the Indian Mutiny, the Hunza Nagar Campaign 1891, Chitral 1895, the North-West Frontier of India and Tirah 1897, the China War 1900-01, and Somaliland 1903.

The help afforded us in the Mutiny by the States of Bahawalpur, Bikaner, Jind, Kapurthala, Nabha and Patiala may well have saved the situation. It was not until 1887 that the idea was first mooted that units likely to be offered by states for imperial service should be trained under the supervision of British officers. In 1889 an Inspector-General of "Imperial Service Troops" was appointed, with a staff of British officers to assist him. In 1895 the Government of India sanctioned a free initial issue of arms to

Imperial Service units, but these arms were to be maintained and replaced at the expense of the Indian States concerned.

Between 1888 and 1907 the number of troops offered as Imperial Service Troops by various states reached an approximate total of four companies of Sappers and Miners, two mountain batteries with a depot, fourteen regiments of cavalry with three independent squadrons, three camel corps regiments, thirteen infantry battalions with a depot, and seven transport corps. The greater proportion of these were used overseas for service in the Great War, 1914—18, and some of them were employed on the Indian frontier. As this is not intended to be a history of the Imperial Service Troops, I will only say that in the main, and considering all handicaps and lack of adequate pre-war training, they did well. There were some units who were consistently good throughout the war, and who gained a reputation which any unit might have envied.

In 1920 a committee was formed to enquire into the future of the Imperial Service Troops. Without going into any detail it is sufficient to say that the great change, as always in our army, was to be in name. These troops were no longer to be known as Imperial Service Troops, but as Indian States Forces, which perhaps describes their position more accurately. They were to be divided into two classes, "A" and "B," dependent partly on their organisation and partly on whether they were to be offered for service outside the state (Class "A"), or retained entirely as internal security troops (Class "B").

Class "A" units were organised similarly to the Indian Army, armed with high velocity rifles and, in most cases, with machine-guns. A number of these units are earmarked (called Earmarked Units or "Emus" for short) for active service with His Majesty's forces on mobilization, and there is no doubt that a large number of non-earmarked Class "A" units would also be offered on the outbreak of war for active service as was done in the Great War. Class "B," intended only for internal security within the state, were to be armed with .303" * E.Y. (O.) rifles, but no machine-guns. The initial issue of arms to both classes of units was to be free, but the maintenance and replacement of them was to become the responsibility of the Indian State. As a rifle is not immortal it was obviously only a question of years before the States would have

* Note.—Nobody seems to know the meaning of these mystic initials, but I believe they are an abbreviation for Emergency Rifles: these are accurate up to 500 yards and cost Rs. 37-8-0 each. They are not to be confused with the E. Y. rifles used for firing rifle grenades.

paid for all their rifles by way of replacements. The scheme was based on a policy of "Let 'em all come; the more the merrier." No minimum numbers were laid down, and no stipulations were made as to conditions of service, barracks and efficiency. The consequences of the policy were not foreseen. The rush to take advantage of the offer of free rifles was great. Small states who had never before thought of having a regular army hastened to raise one or two platoons in order to get the rifles. The liability undertaken by the Government of India for arming all and sundry was unlimited. The pace became too hot, and at last in 1932, owing to the financial depression, the Government of India called a halt, and stopped the free initial issue of arms. Since then new entrants to the scheme have had to pay for their rifles. At the present moment there are forty-nine states in the Indian States Forces scheme and their armies vary in strength from the equivalent of a division, such as in Hyderabad, Gwalior and Kashmir down to two platoons, and even one platoon which by no stretch of ingenuity can be made to fit into any scheme of defence although they are useful for internal security within the state. In the majority of cases the troops are well housed, well clothed and equipped, but the variations are great. Most states are now coming into line on such matters as pensions at twenty years service, clothing allowances, ration allowance and central messing; and in some the barracks are better than those provided for the Indian Army.

The horse artillery batteries are armed with 18-pr. guns, the mountain batteries with 2.75" guns. In Bikaner there is an unique force consisting of a 2.75" battery and two squadrons with a machine-gun section, all mounted on camels, which would be exceedingly useful in desert warfare. All Class "A" infantry battalions are on the pre-1929 model of the Indian Army, with four rifle companies and one machine-gun group.

The total number of troops under the Indian States Forces scheme is about 52,000. They comprise eleven regiments, sixteen squadrons and eighteen and a half troops of cavalry; two horse, three mountain and one camel, batteries of artillery; one company and eight sections of sappers and miners; twenty-nine battalions, seventy companies and fourteen and a half platoons of infantry; and twenty-two troops of transport. Of the above sixteen and a half units are earmarked for employment with His Majesty's Forces on mobilization. These units will be accompanied in war by the appropriate number of special service officers* from the Indian

* Five special service officers to a battalion, four to a cavalry regiment, three to a battery, two to a field company and one to a transport unit.

Army to advise and help. As the education and training of the State officers increase, the need for these special service officers will automatically decrease. In peace, training is carried out under the supervision of a Military Adviser-in-Chief and a staff of sixteen British officers as assistants, all of whom are lent to the Political Department for a term of four years. In addition there are officers, whose services are lent to a particular state for a term of years, and retired officers who have taken service with a state on leaving the regular army.

The Military Adviser-in-Chief is in civil employment and works directly under the Political Secretary to the Government of India, not, as many people think, under the Defence Department. All questions of policy are submitted to the Political Department, important decisions in connection with the Indian States Forces being communicated to governments and *durbars* by the Political Department through political channels. Correspondence on other matters, including training, organisation, and administration of the Indian States Forces is carried out direct between the headquarters of the Military Adviser-in-Chief and the nine Military Advisers' Circles. Military Advisers themselves correspond direct with commandants of States Forces, or with state governments and *durbars*.

The Military Adviser-in-Chief, to whom only the more important matters are referred, is left free to do his proper work of supervision of training. This entails some eight months touring all over India, as the parish extends from Kashmir in the north to Travancore in the south and from Kathiawar in the west to Tripura on the Assam border in the east. It is only possible for the Adviser-in-Chief to see the larger states some three times, and the smaller ones twice during a four years tenure.

India is divided into nine circles (see sketch map), and the number of officers allotted to each is dependent on the number of states and the size of their armies:

(1) The largest circle is the Punjab, which comprises seven states—Chamba, Jind, Kapurthala, Kashmir, Nabha, Patiala and Rampur. These have between them a total of thirty-three units. There is one military adviser in charge, with two assistant military advisers, one for cavalry and the other for infantry. The headquarters is at Ambala.

(2) The Central India Circle is the largest in actual area of ground to be covered and has nine states—Benares, Bhopal, Datia, Dhar, Gwalior, Indore, Panna, Rewa and Tripura with a total of twenty-five units. For this circle there is one military adviser, and

one assistant; one or other of whom must be a cavalryman. The headquarters is nominally at Agra (for income-tax purposes), but actually at Gwalior.

(3) The Rajputana Circle has eight states in it—Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kotah, Mewar and Palanpur with a total of twenty-three units. This also has only two officers: the military adviser with headquarters at Bharatpur, and the assistant military adviser (cavalry) at Jaipur.

(4) The Southern India Circle has four states—Hyderabad, Mudhol, Mysore and Travancore—with a total of nineteen units. The military adviser has his headquarters at Hyderabad, and his assistant is at Bangalore.

(5) The Kathiawar Circle has six states—Bhavnagar, Dhrangadra, Junagadh, Kutch, Nawanagar and Porbandar with a total of twelve units. For these there is one military adviser, generally a cavalryman, with his headquarters at Rajkot.

(6) The Gujarat Circle consists of six states—Alirajpur, Baria, Baroda, Idar, Rajpipla and Ratlam with a total of nine units. For these there is an assistant military adviser with his headquarters at Baroda.

(7) The Camel Corps Circle, which consists of three states—Bahawalpur, Bikaner and Loharu, has a total of nine units. This too is an assistant military adviser's appointment with headquarters at Bikaner.

(8) The Sapper Circle deals with Faridkot, Malerkotla, Mandi, Sirmoor, Suket and Tehri-Garhwal. This has sixteen units in it. Suket has only a small infantry detachment, but owing to its proximity to Mandi it is included in this circle for the sake of convenience. There is an assistant military adviser, a Royal Engineer officer, in charge, with headquarters at Roorkee.

(9) Then there is the Artillery Circle which deals with the batteries in Bikaner, Gwalior, Hyderabad and Kashmir; a total of six batteries. This is a military adviser's appointment and his headquarters is at Ambala. And last but not least comes the Technical Adviser for Signalling, an assistant military adviser who does nearly as much touring each year as the Adviser-in-Chief. And the signalling in the Indian States Forces is generally of a high standard.

The assistant military advisers in sole charge of the Gujarat Camel Corps and Sapper Circles are given the honorary title of military adviser.

As regards pay, military advisers, who are majors, draw Rs. 300 a month over and above regimental rates and assistant military advisers, who are captains, get either Rs. 200 or Rs. 150 a month in addition to regimental rates, depending on whether they have under or over fifteen years' service. The military adviser for Sappers and Miners and the Technical Adviser for Signalling, both of whom are captains, draw Rs. 1,355 a month if married, and Rs. 1,210 a month if they are bachelors.

Officers on the Military Advisory Staff must be good regimental officers, good trainers, keen on their job, likeable, with a genuine sympathy for Indians, and with a sense of humour and proportion; men who can be trusted to do a job of work on their own and to run a real live show. Unless an officer can gain the confidence and liking not only of the troops, but of the ruler, he will do little good. Gone long since are the days when a tour with the Indian States Forces was looked on as four years leave on full pay. Military advisers have a full day's work and more if they are going to pull their weight. But nobody on the Advisory Staff has any executive authority, hence the necessity for a strong sense of humour and proportion.

The work consists in arranging for camps of exercise, in periodical visits to states to judge and supervise the state of training or to hold classes for squadron and company commanders or non-commissioned officers. On these occasions officers are guests of the state, and it is a point of honour that this hospitality is never abused. In addition they have a considerable amount of office work in connection with the training and administration of the States Forces.

Officers can go on recess for two months in the hot weather to any place within forty-eight hours recall of their headquarters. This is not counted as privilege leave, which can thus be accumulated. But no long leave is allowed during the tenure of the appointment.

Some of the larger states have "Lent officers," that is, serving officers of the Indian Army, who have a whole-time appointment with the state concerned. At the present time there are only four such officers. They are valuable, but their cost is heavy as not only has the state to pay the officer his pay of rank plus 25 per cent. extra, but it also has to pay contributions to the Government of India on account of pension and passages. The cost to the state for a "lent" major works out to over Rs. 2,000 p. m.

Finally comes the retired officer whose services are obtained by a state to train and administer its troops. Prior sanction for

employment has to be obtained from Government. The sanction, when given, is in most cases only for a year at a time, but so long as the officer is doing good work and his services are required an extension of tenure is rarely withheld. Here too the old idea that the states were a dumping-ground for impecunious and inefficient relatives is dead. The pay given by the states varies from very good to adequate: it is free of Indian income-tax and is in addition to an officer's retired pay. The greatest care is taken to fit a square peg into a square hole. A retired officer must be keen on his job, and be not only a satisfactory administrator but a good trainer. At one time some of these officers had an idea that all that was required of them was two to three hours work a day on an office stool, and that all the training of the troops should be done by the Advisory Staff. This is not the case. A retired officer must be able to work in with the latter, who after all are the staff officers of the Military Adviser-in-Chief, and merely trying to carry out his policy. It is impossible for a retired officer to adopt a "hands-off" attitude as has been attempted on occasions in the past. An officer who is not prepared to go all out had far better keep away and look for a job elsewhere. At the moment there are a number of retired senior officers of the Indian Army serving with States and doing excellent work in the improvement of their troops. They materially lighten the burden of the Advisory Staff in this respect.

The training of the troops for work in the field is improving year by year, and the old idea that a straight line at a march past is the hall-mark of good troops is a thing of the past. Units of the Indian Army help by taking State officers and non-commissioned officers for attachment for periods up to six months. These attachments are much appreciated and are arranged by advisers direct with headquarters of districts. Vacancies are allotted at the various Army Schools—the Small Arms School, Machine-gun School, Physical Training School, Signal School, Educational School, Veterinary School, Artillery School, and the Equitation School; and it is hoped that in the near future four vacancies a term will be granted at the Kitchener College, Nowgong, for State candidates, to prepare them for entrance to the Indian Military Academy. If this can be arranged it will help to solve the problem of selection. It is most desirable that the full number of vacancies at the Indian Military Academy—ten per term—should be taken up, but the fees for the full course are heavy, and in the smaller states there is little scope and prospect for a highly trained officer.

Military advisers run courses for various military subjects, and

co-operation between states is improving. In Gwalior for instance there is a very good musketry course based on the Pachmarhi model, which representatives from all the states in the Central India Circle attend. In Kashmir there has been an excellent training school for the last fifteen years which trains unit instructors and holds three months courses in physical training, weapon training, Lewis gun, machine-gun and section training, and a five months educational course. The standard of physical training at this school is so high that students from it are accepted by the Indian Army Physical Training School without first attending a preparatory course at district headquarters. Hyderabad have now adopted the same system, and are making a success of it.

Every year a Senior Officers' School is held on the same lines as the Senior Officers' School at Belgaum. All the instruction is in English, and lectures are given by experts in their own subjects. The officers attending it are not always very senior, and they go to it more than once. But it gives them the opportunity of meeting officers from other states and of broadening their outlook. And if it does nothing else it does increase the military knowledge of the Military Adviser who runs it.

Every year, more and more States Forces troops are attached to regular formations for training. During 1937-38, the Jodhpur Sardar Risala was attached to the Meerut Cavalry Brigade (at a cost to the state of some Rs. 30,000), the Patiala Rajindra Lancers to the Meerut Division, the Bhopal Sultania Infantry to the Mhow Brigade, and the Hyderabad cavalry regiments to the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade. The Gujarat Circle held a small camp at Sant Road in connection with the battalion training of the 5/7th Rajput Regiment. While co-operation of this kind is invaluable to Indian States Forces, regular formations often find an Indian States Forces unit a useful addition to their strength during collective training and manœuvres.


The troops of Jaipur and Alwar held a week's manœuvres on the Jaipur boundary with great advantage to both. These manœuvres were run entirely with local resources. And so was the camp at Rajkot for the troops of the Kathiawar Circle.

All the batteries have their annual practice camps, and have reached a very reasonable standard of efficiency. It is a pity however, that the four mountain batteries cannot be armed with the 3.7" howitzers in place of the 2.75" gun. It is a question of expense but, if they were rearmed, they would form an even more valuable addition to the artillery strength of the army than they do at present.

INDIA BY I. S. F. CIRCLES.

Scale 1:17,500,000.

Miles 0 100 200 300 400 500 Miles



The troops are invariably keen and eager to learn. In the majority of cases the material is excellent. The weakness at present lies in the State officers, but they are improving. To-day there is much less nepotism than there was and there is a higher conception of the duties, responsibilities and privileges of an officer. The younger ones are generally well educated, and quite a number now go up for the regular army promotion examinations.

In some States there is a good opening for English-speaking pensioned Indian officers of the Indian Army to act as company commanders until such time as the young entry have more experience. They can be of great use in tactical training provided they are efficient and keen. There are at present several of them doing very good work.

The present situation may be described by the analogy that the tools are good but the carpenters are weak. We want to improve the carpenters.

I think it is probably true to say that the present state of discipline and training in the majority of States Forces units is considerably better than it was at the beginning of the Great War. And it would not take many months of intensive training, helped by suitable special service officers, to fit these troops to take their place alongside units of the Indian Army.

For the right type of officer, service on the Military Advisory Staff is extraordinarily interesting, with plenty of work, plenty of responsibility and plenty of sport; in fact, all the things which make life amusing and worth while. He will receive great hospitality, and he will make friendships which will last him his life time. It is remarkable how not only the troops, who are only too anxious to learn, but also their rulers, respond to keenness and enthusiasm.

Once more I want to emphasize that nothing but the best is of any use to the Indian States Forces, if they are to be trained up to the ideal; that is to the standard of the Indian Army.

THE ORDNANCE SERVICE IN WAZIRISTAN, 1937

BY MAJOR M. GLOVER

For previous campaigns on the North-West Frontier no statistics of the expenditure of equipment, clothing, and ammunition have been published. As a number of officers have only a small conception of the amount of ordnance stores that are required in modern war, this article has been written with the object of giving officers of staffs, units, and other services some details of the responsibilities and duties of the Indian Army Ordnance Corps in the operations in Waziristan in 1937. These operations did not involve fighting on the large scale of the 1919—21 operations in Waziristan, but give an indication of what is required for fighting on even a moderate scale. Accurate records were kept of all issues made to troops from the commencement of the operations on 10th March, and these have been consolidated up to 30th September. Figures quoted in this article apply to this period of six and a half months.

The strength of the forces in Waziristan varied from time to time, but in round figures the average number of personnel, for whose maintenance the Indian Army Ordnance Corps was responsible, amounted to 54,000. The main units which comprised the force were:

- 2 Cavalry regiments.
- 5 Field batteries.
- 11 Mountain batteries
- 6 Light Tank companies.
- 36 Infantry battalions.
- 12 Companies Sappers and Miners.
- 7 Signal units.
- 2 Motor transport companies.
- 9 Independent motor transport sections.
- 15 Animal transport companies.
- 46 Supply units.
- 7 Field ambulances.
- 2 Labour companies.
- 4 Road construction battalions.

The Assistant Director of Ordnance Services, Wazirforce was responsible for all the Ordnance arrangements in the Force. There was a deputy assistant director of Ordnance •Services

(D.A.D.O.S.) with each division and a brigade ordnance warrant officer with each brigade. In addition, it was necessary to appoint a D.A.D.O.S. Lines of Communication to deal with units which did not form an integral part of a division.

Until the 1937 operations, the Ordnance field organisation, apart from mobile workshops which are dealt with separately, consisted of railhead ammunition depots, railhead Ordnance officers detachments and tent repair units. This organisation was found to be rigid and uneconomical in personnel, and a new organisation based on the home one was tried out successfully during the operations and is now being introduced into war establishments. This new organisation consists of a number of Ordnance field companies, each of which has a company headquarters and a number of sections. The company headquarters co-ordinates the working of the whole company and operates the main field depot. Sections are of three types, general duties, tent repair and oil cooker repair. General duties sections carry out the main duties connected with stores, ammunition and salvage; they assist in the main depot and operate subsidiary depots. The duties of the other sections are as their titles imply. Sections are sent forward from arsenals as required, and the organisation is thus elastic and capable of adjustment according to the situation.

All Ordnance installations in the field other than workshop units are now called Ordnance field depots. This nomenclature is similar to that in use in the other services and, it is considered, is a simpler arrangement for the rest of the army than the old titles. In 1937 the main Ordnance field depot was at Bannu (railhead), and all stores despatched to the theatre of operations passed through this depot. Small field depots were established at Dosalli and Razmak, where a number of important stores were held for rapid issue to the troops.

The system of supply of Ordnance stores and clothing is as follows: Divisional units submit indents through the brigade Ordnance warrant officer, one of whose main duties is to assist units in the preparation of indents. The indents are approved by the D.A.D.O.S. and are then passed to the Ordnance field depot for compliance. In the case of units on the lines of communication, the indents are approved by the D.A.D.O.S. Lines of Communication. Stores are despatched with supply columns and are normally received by units within a week of the despatch of the indent. The supply of ammunition is of course automatically carried out as laid down in Field Service Regulations.

Articles rendered unserviceable or no longer required by units are returned to the nearest Ordnance field depot or to the brigade Ordnance warrant officer, empty returning transport being used for the purpose. On receipt by the depot returned stores are immediately sorted into three categories: unserviceable, repairable and serviceable. Unserviceable stores are broken down, the serviceable and repairable components being salvaged. Repairable stores are either repaired in Ordnance mobile workshops or sent back to arsenals. Serviceable stores are absorbed into the stocks of the depot.

All equipment and clothing taken into the field must be serviceable and have a remaining life of at least three months under field service conditions. The replacement issues, therefore, in the early stages of a campaign may be few, but will increase rapidly after two months. In peace the Indian Army Ordnance Corps provides for a total of some 350,000 personnel. This total includes the Royal Air Force in India, Indian States Forces, certain militias, military police and other auxiliary corps in addition to the regular army. It is interesting to compare the average issues of certain articles in peace to 54,000 men for six and a half months with the issues made to a force of the same number under active service conditions in Waziristan over the same period.

Article.	Peace issues to 54,000 men in 6-1/2 months.	Issues to force of 54,000 men in Waziristan in 6-1/2 months.
Water-bottles	... 2,000	... 4,679
Web equipment belts	... 1,800	... 4,931
Haversacks	... 1,150	... 4,024
Mess tins	... 1,050	... 3,857
Nosebags	... 3,600	... 8,892
Collars	... 750	... 1,083
Girths	... 700	... 1,318
Helves for pickaxes	... 1,050	... 4,065
Ground sheets	... 4,350	... 3,806
Khaki drill shorts	... 13,000	... 50,804
Worsted socks, pairs	... 60,700	... 111,100
Boots	... 8,000	... 14,612
Flannel shirts	... 10,250	... 47,102

From the above figures it will be seen that there is no uniform relation between issues in peace and issues under war conditions. The difficulties, therefore, of calculating extra requirements for mobilization and for minor operations will be appreciated.

The actual supply of stores and the assessing of the cost of the extra equipment required were, moreover, complicated in 1937 by certain factors. During minor operations pressure cannot be brought on the trade to give precedence to military needs to the same extent as would be possible after mobilization. In 1937 firms were approaching normal conditions after years of depression and civil demand was increasing. This not only affected the time taken by the trade to supply but accounted for considerable fluctuations in price.

As regards ammunition, the expenditure in operations on the North-West Frontier is always small in comparison with a campaign against an organised enemy. The following details of ammunition expenditure may be of interest (numbers of guns and rifles are shown in brackets):

6-inch howitzer (2)	...	88 rounds.
3.7-inch howitzer (48)	...	11,086 rounds.
4.5-inch howitzer (14)	...	1,218 rounds.
18-pounder (10)	...	520 rounds.
Vickers guns (484)	}	...
Light automatics (469)		
Rifles (25,073)		759,723 rounds.
Grenades	...	1,079
Guncotton	...	8,548 slabs.

Altogether 2,357 tons of Ordnance stores and clothing and 696 tons of ammunition, including R.A.F. bombs, were forwarded from arsenals and passed through the Ordnance field depot at Bannu.

To carry out all the duties in connection with the maintenance of the force in equipment, clothing and ammunition, the personnel of the Indian Army Ordnance Corps employed in the theatre of operations consisted of seven officers, forty British other ranks, thirty-four Indian clerks and store-keepers, and seventeen followers, making the remarkably small total of ninety-eight persons in all. The above figures include officers and clerical establishments, employed at Force and divisional headquarters and warrant officers with brigades, but do not include the personnel of the Ordnance mobile workshop. In addition personnel of labour companies were attached to depots for loading and other duties.

The Ordnance mobile workshop, of which the total establishment is forty-eight, carries out all second line repairs; that is to say those repairs which units with their hand tools cannot effect and

which do not merit being sent back to arsenal for a major overhaul. The workshop has two technical lorries on its establishment and requires three 3-ton lorries to move its personnel, tents and stores. Some details of the items repaired by the mobile workshop are as follows: artillery equipments, rifles and pistols, machine-guns, range-finders, dial sights, binoculars, visual, line and wireless signalling equipment, oil cookers, stretchers, water stores and saddlery.

An Ordnance mechanical engineer from the mobile workshop visits regularly all units in the war area, inspecting equipment and thus obtaining early information of defects in design. It is his duty to devise means to overcome such defects quickly and to report to Army Headquarters through departmental channels the nature of the defects and his recommendations to overcome them. If new items of equipment are considered by the General Staff to be urgently necessary experimental items are made up in Ordnance mobile workshops and put into use, pending their production in numbers by Ordnance establishments in rear.

During the 1937 operations the Ordnance mobile workshop was situated at Bannu. A few fitters were sent forward to Dosalli and Razmak to carry out repairs to oil cookers and small arms. From a departmental point of view the location of the workshop at Bannu was unsound, as time and transport were wasted bringing repairable stores back to Bannu and sending them forward again after repair. It was decided, however, by the General Staff that space in perimeter camps was too restricted to allow of the workshop being moved forward.

Everyone is apt to take things for granted, when all goes well. From all reports the Ordnance arrangements in the operations of 1937 worked smoothly and well. If the supply of stores was taken for granted by the other branches of the Army, it is hoped that this article will help them to appreciate the efforts of the Indian Army Ordnance Corps in the field.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF
MILITARY AND AIR FORCE LAW—AND ON
COURTS-MARTIAL

BY BRIGADIER L. M. PEET

There are three preliminary points on which it is desired to lay emphasis before embarking on the substance of this article. Firstly, there is no intention of worrying the reader with the presentation of a number of rules culled from books on military or air force law to which officers have access, and which they can read for themselves, but rather an attempt has been made to explain the reasons for such rules, and the general principles underlying them. Secondly, I would sound a note of warning regarding the tendency to destructive criticism of military and air force law. It is of no practical use to criticize the law and maintain that a strict observance of it is detrimental to discipline or that its interpretation by the authorities, who have to interpret it (*i.e.* the Judge Advocate-General's Department and staffs), is too narrow. The law is the law, whether it be military or civil, and everyone has to obey it and make use of it for the purpose of maintaining discipline and punishing crime. It should not be looked upon as an arbitrary code of rules to be followed when considered suitable, or to be ignored when it doesn't seem to apply to a particular case or difficulty. Thirdly, knowledge of the law and compliance with it are essential if justice is to be done and discipline maintained; without such knowledge on the part of commanding officers and members of courts-martial, there is grave danger that the ends of justice may be defeated and a guilty man escape with disastrous results, sometimes, to the discipline of the unit to which he belongs.

In these democratic days there is a feeling against military and air force law as being too great an interference, in time of peace, with the liberty of the subject, even though special codes may be required in time of war. So, if the powers given by such laws are misused, the hands of those who would abolish or at any rate modify them will be strengthened. This is especially the case as regards the trial of civil offences by court-martial.

The subject of military and air force law, even when these terms are restricted to the administration of the law by courts-martial, covers so much ground that it is difficult to do more than

give outlines of the main principles to be followed in administering it. This difficulty is all the greater in India where we have to deal with several codes of law; for soldiers mainly the British Army Act and the Indian Army Act, which differ in many respects in scope and arrangement, as well as in the law contained in them; for airmen mainly the Air Force Act and Indian Air Force Act, which are also very different. For officers serving in Burma there are the Burma Acts, which as time progresses will tend to differ more and more from their British and Indian counterparts. These codes also, it must be remembered, import, to use the legal expression, a considerable number of the provisions of the civil law of both countries, that is to say, their respective laws of evidence and their respective criminal laws or penal codes, and, to a limited extent, their codes of criminal procedure.

Now every officer of the Army, and especially every comparatively senior officer, is liable to serve as president or member of a court convened under the Army Act or the Indian Army Act and occasionally under the Air Force Act; and officers of the Royal Air Force may have to serve on courts-martial under the Air Force Act or Indian Air Force Act or Army Act and possibly administer the Indian Army Act as well. For example, an army officer of the British Service may have to sit on a court-martial under the Indian Army Act, and an Indian Service officer may have to sit on one under the Army Act, and similarly as regards the Royal Air Force. Further, many units of the British Army still have as integral portions of their establishment personnel subject to the Indian Army Act—not merely as followers, as in the old days, but as combatants. Therefore, for example, the commanding officer of a British unit is expected—quite apart from his liability to serve as a member of a general court-martial or district court-martial under the Indian Army Act—to have sufficient working knowledge of that Act to enable him to hold a summary court-martial thereunder. In the Indian Army, of course, the summary court-martial is the rule and the district court-martial is the exception. In the Indian Air Force, there is no court corresponding to the summary court-martial, nor indeed as yet is there a Manual of Indian Air Force Law. As the Indian Air Force Act and Rules differ considerably from the Air Force Act and Rules and from the Indian Army Act and Rules there is liable to be considerable misunderstanding at a trial under the Indian Air Force Act.

Now, the use of the expression a “working knowledge” is not meant to suggest that officers are bound to study their manuals of law continually, and to know them as thoroughly as they know,

for instance, the training manuals of their respective arms. That would be asking too much, since, when all is said and done, though the administration of a service law is an important part of the duty of an officer, it can hardly be considered as important as that of training his men for war, and in these days of comparatively little serious crime it is not a duty which an officer is very frequently called on to perform. But, since this duty or liability exists, it is necessary that officers—and especially senior officers—should have a working knowledge of all codes with which they are concerned to the extent of being able to find their way about the different law manuals.

It would be of little practical value to run through the procedure of a court-martial, referring to every possible incident which might arise during the course of a trial, and to show where the law relating to that particular point is to be found. It appears better to invite attention to the commoner incidents or difficulties that arise, those in which experience shows that courts most frequently go wrong, and to endeavour to show how to deal with these difficulties or avoid falling into the commoner errors. It is not proposed to deal with each Act separately or to discuss the differences between them, whether of procedure or of substantive law. The differences, though many, are not very great and, generally speaking, the basic principles are the same, especially as regards the method of conducting a trial and the admissibility and amount of evidence required to prove the charges laid against an accused. Remarks will therefore, so far as possible, be confined to what is common to all the Acts, and to all descriptions of courts-martial.

To start with, it is necessary to get down to bed-rock and consider what law is and why we are bound by it. I do not propose to wander off into a dissertation on the origins of law, the moral sanction for it, and so on. I merely want to emphasize the point that, if anybody breaks the law, whether it be the law that forbids murder or the law that says a witness must be sworn before giving his evidence, it is asking for trouble, though the nature of the trouble varies from a liability to be hanged to a liability to be censured for carelessness or even, in an extreme case, for causing a miscarriage of justice.

The law that we are concerned with at present consists essentially of two parts and it is important to keep the distinction clear in one's mind. They are the prohibition and punishment of certain acts, which are termed offences or crimes, whether military or civil, and the code of rules relating to the method by which

those crimes may be punished. Both these are equally inflexible, in the sense that it is just as much a breach of the law when unsworn or inadmissible evidence is admitted, as when a murder is committed. Of course, the breach is not such a serious one, but nevertheless it is a direct breach and, if it is the breach of a rule that goes to the merits of the case, it is sufficient to nullify a court's decision thereon and, in effect, to take away all powers of punishment, since officers, when serving as members of a court-martial, are only permitted to exercise those powers in accordance with the law, and not arbitrarily in accordance with their own ideas of what constitutes justice.

It is a fallacy to think that a court-martial is merely a court of justice and not a court of law. It is every bit as much a court of law as the Court of King's Bench in England or the High Court in India. Military courts no less than other judicial tribunals are bound and restricted by the statutory law from which they derive their jurisdiction, and material infraction of such law destroys their legal existence and nullifies their procedure, a matter which cannot be affected by any consideration of mere expediency. Of course, the ideal is a court that administers justice in accordance with the law that rules its deliberations, and this is what officers should strive to achieve—neither overriding the law where it is thought that it tends to defeat the ends of justice, nor on the other hand allowing a too narrow interpretation of the law to blind one to the interests of justice.

It must be realised that law, meaning thereby both its penal provisions and its code of rules for the proceedings of courts, has been created in two ways; first by actual statutes passed by the legislature, and secondly by the decisions of judges and other authorities in the past. Indian law is mainly codified, while English law, unfortunately, is mainly uncoded, though nowadays the tendency is more and more to crystallize the common law, as the uncoded portion is called, into the form of statutes. Even statutes and codes however cannot be made exhaustive in the sense of covering every possible contingency, for their wording may sometimes be open to doubt and argument. And therefore the substantive law itself is fortified and amplified by the authoritative decisions of those who have had to interpret it in the past, and we are bound by these interpretations just as much as by the substantive law. This will, no doubt, appear academic and abstruse to many officers, who are little concerned with a dissertation on the fundamental principles of law, but are ready enough to learn something that may be of practical use in the troublesome busi-

ness of administering law and justice. General principles have, however, been pointed out so far with the object of trying to emphasize the importance of two things: firstly, that one cannot, even in the interests of justice and discipline, override the law from which one derives jurisdiction—even in minor matters; and secondly, that a court-martial is bound, just as a civil court is, by precedent—that is to say, by rulings and interpretations of superior courts or authorities competent to give such decisions or rulings.

Now, the reader will be impatient to ask how an officer, who is not specially trained in law, is expected to know all these rulings and decisions or to discover where they are to be found. The answer to this is that the greater part of them are to be found either in the notes in the manuals, in the chapters on ordinary law contained in the first part of the manuals, in King's Regulations, or in the various Notes on Military Law published in pamphlet form for the use of officers. This brings me to another main heading, *viz.*, in what the law consists and where it is to be found.

The term "law" in its widest sense includes statutes such as the Army Act and the Air Force Act, rules of procedure made under the authority of a statute, and regulations such as King's Regulations or Regulations for the Army in India. As regards the respective values of these from the legal point of view, naturally the Acts themselves are the most sacred, being substantive law; next come the rules of procedure, since they are made under the sanction of the law; and after these come regulations which are not, strictly speaking, law at all, either original or derived, but merely executive orders by the heads of the Services, to be obeyed and complied with as a matter of discipline and not of law. It is curious that courts-martial are inclined to invert the order given above and to treat regulations and orders as more sacred than the law itself. This, while a most praiseworthy attitude of mind in an officer in that it shows his reverence for the orders of his superiors, is not correct from a legal point of view, since the orders of the highest authorities cannot avail to override the law, which is supreme as representing the decisions of the whole nation formulated and passed by the Houses of Parliament or by the legislatures in India and assented to by the Crown.

Thus, if there should be a conflict between the substantive law, the rules of procedure and regulations, the law must prevail and from this it follows that we can postulate certain axioms:

- (a) A breach of substantive law is fatal to the validity of a trial.

(b) A breach of a rule of procedure is fatal to the validity of a trial if such rule reproduces a definite provision of law or if the accused is prejudiced by the breach.

(c) A breach of regulations is only fatal if the accused is prejudiced by the contravention of the regulation.

To illustrate this, examples from the Army Act and military regulations will be taken.

Breach of substantive law

On the trial of a field officer a subaltern sits as member of the court. This is contrary to the statute* and is fatal to the trial. It is immaterial that no other officers were available, that the subaltern was a barrister, or had more service than the captains on the court.

Breach of a rule of procedure

In a small station the convening officer considers it necessary to hold immediate trial of a soldier, though only officers of the same brigade of artillery are available as members of the court. He directs the convening of the court accordingly, but omits to state his opinion in the convening order. This is a breach of a rule of procedure† which reproduces a definite provision of the law and is fatal to the trial.

But a court-martial is convened for the trial of a major, the court being composed of a colonel, two lieutenant-colonels and four majors. Unknown to the convening officer or the court, but known to the accused the latter is promoted lieutenant-colonel just before the trial. He does not challenge any of the members. The composition of the court is also a breach of a rule of procedure‡, but the trial can be upheld, as the accused must be considered to have waived his right to be tried by officers of equal rank, since he made no challenge.

Breach of a Service regulation

A company commander sends up a man of his company before the commanding officer who remands him for trial by court-martial. The company commander by virtue of a brevet becomes officer commanding the station, with a warrant to convene a district court-martial, and convenes the court for the trial of the accused. This is a breach of King's Regulations§ and the trial will be quashed on the grounds of prejudice to the accused, who

*Army Act 48 (7).

†Rule of Procedure 20 (A).

‡Rule of Procedure 21 (B), which does not reproduce a specific section of the Act.

§King's Regulations 633 (b).

has not had his case investigated by an impartial convening officer. The trial was legal and the accused cannot be tried again.

On the other hand the president of a general court-martial is a lieutenant-colonel. It is discovered after trial that a colonel had actually been available to sit as president. This is equally a breach of King's Regulations,* but will not upset the trial as it cannot be held that the accused has been prejudiced thereby.

Further, as supplementing the Acts, the rules of procedure and the regulations, we have, as has already been indicated, a number of hints, explanations, or interpretations contained in the several chapters in the first part of the manuals, the notes to the sections of the Acts and the rules of procedure, and the notes and circulars on law issued from time to time by Service headquarters, both in England and in India. This brings one to a series of points on which the greatest emphasis is laid, the first duties that a court should carry out before they proceed with a trial. These duties may be summarised as follows:

- (a) The charge or charges must be read carefully to see that they agree with the wording of the Act in question and the specimen charges in the manuals.
- (b) A reference should then be made to the section or sections of the Act under which the charges are laid and to the chapters at the beginning of the manual to see if they make any special reference to the particular offence or offences.
- (c) If the court is then in doubt as to whether the charges are correctly framed, the case should be referred back to the convening officer.

This duty is only part of the preliminary duties enjoined upon a court and if the appropriate rules† are complied with before the actual trial is commenced, there will be *very* few cases in which a court's decisions will be nullified by the proceedings not being confirmed, or their being quashed after confirmation. It follows that in a complicated case a court may with advantage spend an hour or two carrying out these duties before calling the accused before them for trial.

Before dealing with the duties of the court at the trial itself, a few words about the preparation of the case for trial are necessary. The duties of a commanding officer in this connexion are

* King's Regulations 658 (a).

† Rules of Procedure 22 and 23.

Indian Army Act Rules 31, 32.

clearly laid down in the various manuals* and it is the duty of the court to ascertain, so far as it can, that these rules have been complied with. Further memoranda for the guidance of the court itself are given on the following pages of the various manuals.

In the first place, it is a commanding officer's duty to satisfy himself, before applying for a court-martial, not only that there is a *prima facie* case against the accused, but that the summary of evidence contains all the evidence that is needed to prove the proposed charges. He is not doing his duty if he merely orders an officer, probably his adjutant, to take a summary of evidence and frame charges and then forwards them to the convening officer without satisfying himself that the evidence is sufficient, if un rebutted, to prove the charges.

The convening officer too has to satisfy himself that there is a *prima facie* case before he orders trial; and he also should, therefore, make certain that the summary of evidence contains all the available evidence. If it does not (*e.g.*, if a witness who will be called or a document which will be required at the trial is not at the time available) the commanding officer should explain this in forwarding the application for trial. The commonest cause of delay in arraying a court-martial arises through the submission of an incomplete summary of evidence.

A summary of evidence should present the case exactly as it will be laid before the court; it is more than a preliminary investigation. It is, or should be, a "dress rehearsal" of the prosecution side of the trial. It is further required for four purposes: to let the convening officer know all the facts of the prosecution case and to enable him and his staff to check the proposed charges; to inform the accused of what he has to meet and enable him to prepare his defence; to enable the court, in a doubtful case, to test the credibility of a witness; to be read as evidence if the accused pleads guilty.

It is clear, therefore, how important the summary of evidence is, and that, to quote a dictum on the subject, "a bad summary of evidence usually means a bad trial." The Memoranda at page 401 of the Manual of Indian Military Law as to how to take a summary of evidence applies to all trials. If there is no summary of evidence, which is sometimes the case on active service or at a summary court-martial, the court must, of course, take and record sworn evidence in the ordinary way, *i.e.*, as on a plea of "Not Guilty."

* Manual of Military Law, pages 763—766.

Manual of Air Force Law, pages 550—553.

Manual of Indian Military Law, pages 404-405.

As regards the framing of charges before trial, there are certain golden rules, which, as the charge-sheet is the second most important document at a trial, should be borne in mind by everyone who has anything to do with the framing or checking of the charges:

- (a) The statement of offence *must* follow the exact wording of the Act; it cannot be varied to suit circumstances; except in the particular places where the Act allows for such variations.
- (b) The particulars *must* contain every element or averment necessary to constitute the offence.
- (c) A charge, however simple, should never be framed without referring to the notes in the Manual, the Second Appendix to the Rules of Procedure and the Specimen Charge-sheets appended thereto.
- (d) The charges should be as simple as possible and should contain nothing that there is not a fair certainty of proving if the defence produces no evidence.
- (e) Charges should not be multiplied; nor should one transaction be split up into its component parts and a separate charge framed in respect of each part.
- (f) Care should be taken over charges which involve legal technicalities; charges such as burglary, forgery or fraud in which case advice should be sought from the J.A.G.'s department.
- (g) Care is necessary to avoid traps like that contained in Section 15 (2) of the Army Act, which involves absence from a parade ordered by a commanding officer. Before a charge is laid under such a section, it must be ascertained that the section is applicable and that all the ingredients of the charge can be proved.

It is not proposed to deal in detail with the procedure at a trial, but some of the important points on which courts are apt to go wrong will now be referred to. Reference has already been made to the importance of the charge-sheet and attention is now drawn to the other document on which the legality of the trial depends—the convening order. The issue of a convening order is no mere formality—it alone gives an officer power to sit on a court and to punish in accordance with the Army Act.

Therefore no officer can sit on a court who has not been appointed in the convening order, either by name or by rank and unit, and if the court is not composed as directed in the convening order, it is absolutely essential to have some written authority from the

convening officer amending the composition as laid down therein. One would think this was a matter of common sense, but apparently it is not so, as courts go wrong over this matter almost more often than they do over any other. There should be no alteration in a convening order, and certainly no court has any authority to make an alteration.

It is not necessary to say much about the other preliminary proceedings of the court, with the exception of the arraignment of the accused and recording his pleas. When there is no judge advocate at the trial, it is the duty of the president, and a most important duty, to make quite sure that the accused understands the charges laid against him. In the first place, it is only fair to the accused, and in the second place, if he pleads guilty, it is a necessary part of the compliance with the Rules of Procedure* the provisions of which are perfectly clear. If the charge, with all that it involves, is fully and properly explained to the accused, it can very rarely happen that it subsequently becomes necessary to alter the plea to one of "Not Guilty" and to try out the case; still more rarely will it happen that proceedings have to be quashed after trial on the ground that the accused's statement in mitigation of punishment negatived his plea. In this connexion it should be remembered that the accused's statement must be acted upon as if it were true, whether a court believes it or not.

To turn to the prosecution and to correct one or two false impressions, which appear to have crept in. The first duty of a prosecutor is to prosecute and he is guilty of a grave neglect of duty if he fails to make his case complete or to prove facts on which the charge depends. It is not, of course, right for a prosecutor to take an unfair advantage of his position or to endeavour to obtain a conviction at all costs, for example, by eliciting evidence which he knows to be inadmissible, with the object of prejudicing the court against the accused, and it is the clear duty of the court to stop him at once if he appears to be doing this. But he is responsible for bringing before the court the whole of the facts on which the charge or charges depend, and he is guilty of neglect of duty if he fails through carelessness to make his case complete. In this connexion there arises an interesting question as to which there is a good deal of doubt and room for a considerable difference of opinion. It is frequently said—and quite correctly—that members of a court should not in any way assist the prosecutor in making good his case; this would be to depart from the attitude of strict

* Rules of Procedure 35 (B).

impartiality enjoined on them by the law and by their oath. But, it is submitted, they will not be departing from that attitude if, in a case in which they are satisfied that evidence exists to prove a certain fact, they call the attention of the prosecutor to the fact that he has omitted to prove that fact, even though it may be a fact which is essential to the establishment of the charge.

The greatest error a prosecutor can commit is to fail to cross-examine an accused. Such a procedure is equivalent to an acceptance of the accused's story by the prosecution, and if this rebuts the prosecution case, the result must be an acquittal, or quashing of any conviction.

Finally a reference is necessary to the question of addresses by the prosecutor or the defending officer, as to which there appear also to be some misconception. The general rule is that each side is entitled to address the court *twice*; once at the commencement of the proceedings of that side and once at their conclusion. The first address of each side is merely for the purpose of outlining the case which that side is endeavouring to prove; in it no facts should be referred to which will not be proved by evidence and no arguments should be used. If, for example, the prosecutor in his first address refers to facts which do not appear in the summary of evidence, the court should stop him and ask him how he proposes to prove them, and, generally speaking, should make him confine his address to facts which are strictly relevant to the charges.

The second address of each side is mainly for the purpose of summing up and clinching the case which that side has been endeavouring to prove, and is often, especially in cases resting on circumstantial evidence, of the very greatest importance. In it the prosecution, or the defence, may use arguments and make submissions to the court as to the bearing of particular portions of the evidence, and may endeavour to show, for example, why one witness should be believed in preference to another.

It is often essential for one side or the other to piece together the evidence pointing to or disproving a certain fact, so that the court may be able to see it in its true perspective, and a case may often fall to the ground if the prosecutor fails to do this. In this second address also it is open to the prosecutor, in special cases, to press for a deterrent sentence, though, in doing so, he must not refer to facts which are not in evidence before the court, unless they are facts which are within the *general military knowledge* of the court—not their special local knowledge. Similarly the defence may, even if it has endeavoured totally to disprove the

charges, advance reasons why the court should, even if they convict, take a lenient view of the transaction. There is nothing inconsistent in this, though of course it rather tends to weaken the defence case, as amounting to an admission that there *is* a doubt, and it is usually better to reserve such remarks till after the finding. Thus it will be seen how important these addresses may be in a doubtful case and it is hoped that their scope and utility has been explained.

It is proposed in a later article to discuss the various reasons for which the proceedings of courts-martial are most commonly quashed.

SHOOTING IN KENYA

BY CAPTAIN W. J. M. SPAIGHT

The following notes are based on experience gained on a solitary two months leave shoot in Kenya in August and September 1936. The primary objective was elephant, so I had proposed to go to Uganda, where the cost of a licence, £15 for two elephants, was within my rather limited means.

On arrival in Nairobi I discovered that the programme had been drawn up on an obsolete time-table and that there was no boat across Lake Kioga for twelve days. This loss of time, combined with the probable costs of an enforced stay in hotels, necessitated an alteration in plan. On the advice of Captain Ritchie, the Chief Game Warden of Kenya, I decided to shoot in Kenya and gamble on paying for the cost of the licence by the sale of ivory. After all arrangements had been made it was found that twenty-eight days could be spent on the shooting ground. Twenty-one of these were used up in shooting an elephant and getting the tusks back to the railway. The shooting ground was then changed with lion as the primary objective. In this I was not successful, although ten varieties of antelope were obtained.

The Voyage

The B. I. run a fortnightly service, each way, between Bombay and Mombasa. The sailings are such that the full sixty days of one's privilege leave can be spent ex-India. All the boats are modern and the standard of comfort compares favourably with first class on the P. & O. A sixty-day return ticket first class costs Rs. 500. The boats also carry second class passengers, but second class accommodation is not normally used by Europeans. Alternate boats call at the Seychelles Islands and stay long enough for passengers to get several hours ashore. Mombasa is the only convenient port in East Africa for short leave. From Mombasa there is a good rail service to most parts of Kenya and Uganda, but connections to Tanganyika are indifferent.

Arrangements in India

No passport visa is necessary but passengers to East Africa are required to have a recent vaccination certificate, which must be

counter-signed by the Cantonment Health Officer. Several certificates, signed by one's commanding officer, to the effect that the bearer is a serving officer, should be taken. On production of these certificates at the railway offices at either Mombasa or Nairobi the bearer can purchase railway tickets at half fare—either first or second class—to any station on the Kenya and Uganda Railway. Second class on the K.U.R. is good and comfortable; any berth can be booked and bedding can be hired.

Kit.—All equipment can be hired from *safari* firms in Nairobi, but it is cheaper to take everything from India. A double-fly 40-lb. tent, full camp kit, bedding roll, cooking pots and arms were taken; the only cost being extra-luggage charges on the Indian railways. The K.U.R. have a rule whereby any reasonable amount of luggage can be taken into the compartment; this does not count against the free allowance, which is deducted from the weight of packages placed in the guard's van.

Customs.—Duty at 33 per cent. of declared value is charged on all arms imported into Kenya. This is refundable on export, when the receipt for duty paid must be produced. Before leaving Bombay it is necessary to get an export certificate from the customs for all arms taken.

Ammunition should be bought in Kenya, where costs are about the same as in India. All types can be obtained in Mombasa or Nairobi. Ammunition taken into the country is charged 33 per cent. duty, which is not refundable if any is exported.

Clothes.—Most of the shooting grounds are high and sufficient bedding and clothes for an Indian plains cold weather shoot should be taken. On account of the prevalence of thorn-bush slacks are preferable to shorts. A topee and glare glasses are necessary. A mosquito net was taken but was only used when sleeping on the ground, as protection against crawling insects. In Uganda a net would be essential. Medical stores are cheaper bought in India. A good type of shooting boot, with dubbed uppers and uskide soles, can be bought in Nairobi. Clothes are of little importance in Kenya. Store suits and dinner jackets are optional and tail coats quite unnecessary.

Shooting Grounds

It is possible to shoot in Kenya, Uganda or Tanganyika on two months leave. All these have, however, separate shooting rules and licences. Uganda is said to be, on the whole, unhealthy, with

very thick bush and a comparatively small variety of game. If a selection of the more common antelope, with the chance of a lion and a buffalo are required, Kenya appears to be the best.

All three territories reduce their fees for a full licence in the case of serving officers. The full Uganda licence is £5, Tanganyika £15 and Kenya £20. These all include lion and buffalo and the Tanganyika licence includes a rhinoceros. Elephant are an extra on all three. An extra can only be purchased by a full-licence-holder. Other extras are rhinoceros, giraffe and ostrich.

Kenya has a twelve-day licence, which can be post-dated to the day from which shooting will actually commence, this includes one lion and a buffalo. There is also a cheap Private Lands licence, but it is improbable that lion would be got on private land, though buffalo is possible. Lions certainly visit private land but the residents do not wait for visitors to come and shoot them.

Arrangements in Kenya

Nairobi is the best place to get one's outfit in and is also central for all shooting grounds. The head Kenya Game office is located there and its officers are only too willing to assist in the selection of a locality to suit individual requirements. Anyone going to shoot in Kenya, without ready-made plans or introductions to residents, is strongly advised to consult the Game Warden before pushing out into the blue.

Servants.—English-speaking cooks and bearers can be engaged at 50s. a month, or less. The head waiter of a Nairobi hotel found me a Zanzibar boy who successfully combined the duties of cook and bearer at this wage.

A good gun bearer can be found at about 80s. a month. Great care must be used in the selection of a gun bearer. It is best to ask the advice of the Game Warden. In any case local advice should be obtained before a man is taken on; members of certain tribes are considered unsuitable. Most of the good gun-bearers are permanently retained on the pay list of the big *safari* firms or by white hunters. It is improbable that a gun-bearer will be able to speak English. For elephant a tracker is necessary, the gun-bearer cannot track and perform his duties efficiently. The tracker should be found locally after the shooting ground is reached; wages are about 30s. a month.

Porters can be found anywhere, the normal wage is 15s. a month. All servants expect to receive food (*Posho*—a coarse

maize flour) and a small ration of cigarettes should also be supplied. The superior servants expect to be given a blanket or a pair of shoes each, the cost working out at about 5s. to 10s. a head.

Provisions.—*Posho* can be bought for the boys at any village shop, but all European foods must be taken from one of the big towns. Tinned foods are expensive. Drink and cigarettes cost about the same as in India. African servants cannot make *chappattis*; so unless one is prepared to eat bearer-made scones or take an oven to make bread, biscuits must be bought. Ryvita is expensive but a hard ration-type biscuit, as used by the King's African Rifles, can be obtained cheaply from a confectioner's shop in Nairobi.

Transport

A reasonable lorry can be hired from about £15 a month. To obtain a driving licence a local driving test must be passed, neither Indian nor English licence-holders are exempted; the fee for the test is 20s. and the licence costs 10s. Petrol is about sh. 2/50 a gallon but the price increases with distance from the railway.

Porter *safaris* are cheapest for short trips but it must be remembered that food must be carried for all the men, so several porters will be employed in carrying their own food. After buying the Kenya licence (£45) I found that I was unable to afford either of these methods; so, on the advice of the Game Department, I worked from the railway, employing porters by the day to move the camp away from the railway when necessary. I found that by moving on a light scale—inner fly of tent and sleeping on the ground—a five-day trip could be done on four porters.

Hotels

There are several excellent hotels in Nairobi, the charges being in the vicinity of 20s. a day. The Queen's Hotel was found to be good and considerably cheaper, as it is used more by residents than by visitors.

Shooting

In the open country the bright light and absence of features make one tend to underestimate distances. The common antelope of the plains are easy to approach, up to a distance of about two hundred yards, but a close shot is difficult to get. The oblique approach march is the best method. It is similar to black buck shooting and not very exciting.

The bush animals are hard to get. Two days were spent in shooting a gerenuk and all attempts to get a lesser kudu failed, though several were seen within easy range when tracking elephant.

Lion eat carcasses and the normal method is to shoot an antelope or a zebra and to stalk the kill at dawn. Owing to the open nature of the country and the presence of carrion eaters lions normally lie up on the kill. As, however, lions rarely hunt alone, unless several animals are placed for them, they may eat up all the kill and leave the vicinity before dawn. This was discovered by bitter experience. A Coke's harte beeste was killed within half a mile of camp, four lions came on to it about one o'clock, cleaned it, then roamed round the camp until about four o'clock making nasty noises. A 40-lb. tent does not seem very secure when it is too dark to shoot and several lions are grunting within fifty yards. Kills should be placed near water. The lion, to a certain extent, hunts by scent and if a lorry is available it is a good idea to tow the kill around in a large circle before tying it down.

Elephant, whatever they may have done in the past, live in thick country and are found by tracking. An elephant walks at five miles an hour and once disturbed may go as far as twenty miles before stopping. An elephant feeding makes such a noise that it is doubtful if he could hear any sounds made by a man approaching. Great care must be taken not to allow the elephant to get the wind. The shot is taken at very close range, but the thick bush makes shooting difficult. The heart is located lower in the body than one might expect. The brain shot is best but requires steady nerves and good shooting. The spoor of a warrantable bull is about two feet across.

In thick thorn country rhinoceros were found to be a curse. They are stupid animals with bad eyesight and bad hearing but with a good sense of smell. When disturbed they rise with loud grunts and charge into wind. All natives appear to be very frightened of rhinoceros and on hearing one grunting or crashing about in the bush will normally throw their loads and run. It was found that if an unseen disturbance of this nature was piqueted, with rifle at the ready, the porters were reassured and could be moved out of wind complete with their loads.

When, however, a rhinoceros was seen nothing could prevent them climbing into the nearest tree or bush—with a glorious disregard for thorns and fragile articles in the loads. The need to

shoot in self-defence never actually arose but the day a rhinoceros charged and hit the tracker's fez, he had dropped it as he got into the bush, it was a near thing.

Weapons

The Game Department say that nothing under a .400 bore should be used on elephant. A .450/400 double barrel, a .350 Magnum and a shot-gun were taken. Owing to the long ranges at which one is tempted to shoot at antelope a small bore rifle is undesirable; with the .350 Magnum it was found that no antelope once hit got away. The shot-gun was most useful for the pot. Only fifty 12-bore cartridges were taken and these were sufficient to keep the camp supplied with either francolin or guinea-fowl for the whole four weeks. African birds prefer running to flying and many were shot on the ground; all were shot near camp.

Localities

The areas visited lay between Mtitoe Andie, Kenani, Tsavo and Voi. Porter trips were done up the Tsavo River and down the Voi River. After securing the elephant the Taveta line, towards the Tanganyika border south of Kilimanjaro, was visited. This was the theatre of operations in East Africa in 1915 during the early stages of the advance on Tanga. There is an Indian Army war memorial at Maktu and a live service .303 round was picked up near Mbuyuni, on the scene of an engagement. It must have been nice country for the German withdrawal, but most unpleasant to advance through.

General

The currency of the country is shillings and cents. 20s. are £1; there are 100 cents to the shilling. The general language is Swahili, but it was found that for actual shooting a few words out of a Swahili phrase book, bought in Nairobi, sufficed.

Many of the railway employees, guards and station masters, are Indians, with Sikhs in the majority, and a knowledge of Urdu was helpful. The K. U. R. allow holders of first or second class tickets to travel in the guard's van of goods trains and holders of third class tickets can travel in empty goods vans. Thus, while passenger trains were few and far between, it was found possible to move up and down the line, frequently, in goods, engineering

and water trains.

There is a scarcity of villages in the shooting districts, so labour and supplies must be obtained near the railway. All settlers were found to be most hospitable and helpful. Information regarding shooting was hard to come by, except from the Game Department. This was due to the fact that the fitting out of *safaris* is a local industry and anyone running his own show is looked upon, in the towns, with suspicion.

While it is probably best to employ a white hunter, if after dangerous game, it is certainly expensive. The cheapest white hunter expects a minimum of £50 a month, with all found for the duration of the *safari*. Moreover, maintenance costs would be increased and it would probably be necessary to take two lorries instead of one.

Conclusion

A trip to East Africa is an enjoyable way of spending two months privilege leave. The climate is pleasant, the inhabitants helpful and pleased to meet people from India.

If one wants to shoot, and is prepared to run a *safari* in the same style as an Indian shoot, there is no reason why an African shoot should be much more expensive than one in Kashmir. The following is a brief summary of my own expenses:

Railway fares on the K. U. R. at half-fare concession 2nd class £5; servants £10; provisions £15; hotels £5; *bakhsheesh* £5 (for elephant); licence £45 (full licence £20, one elephant £25); incidentals £10 (taxis, tips and drinks); return fare B. I. steamer Rs. 500; Indian Railways Rs. 150.

Credit for sale of tusks (148 lbs. of ivory at just over 7s. to the lb.) after paying selling commission £55.

Therefore the total cost of the trip came to approximately Rs. 1,300.

OPERATIONS IN THE LOWER SHAKTU VALLEY—


16TH—18TH NOVEMBER 1937

BY MAJOR T. H. ANGUS

The Fakir of Ipi had moved to northern Madda Khel limits in October and had established himself near the Durand Line. At the end of October the 1st Infantry Brigade, less one battalion which was in Bhattani country, had been moved to Mir Ali and the 9th Infantry Brigade had been concentrated at Miranshah. The presence of these troops in the area had a steadying influence on the local tribes and the possibility of the Faqir's presence causing a considerable influx of trans-border tribesmen into Waziristan appeared remote. Any further movement against the Faqir might have driven him into Afghanistan and involved us in hostilities with such powerful border tribes as the Ghilzais so, as his presence was doing no great harm, he was left sitting on his mountain top.

By the second week of November the roads that had been under construction from the Sham Plain to Razmak, Sorarogha and Biche Kashkai were completed. The camps established for the building of these roads had been evacuated and Scouts Posts were being established at Gharlom and Biche Kashkai. This freed a number of troops who had hitherto been engaged in building and protecting the new roads and it was decided to send columns into certain areas which were known to have harboured hostiles throughout the year. These were the Jaler Algad and the Lower Shaktu. Accordingly, on November 12th, the 1st Infantry Brigade, less one battalion, moved from Mir Ali to Biche Kashkai, where five platoons of Tochi Scouts were already established, and the 9th Infantry Brigade moved from Miranshah to Boya in the Tochi Valley. On November 13th the 9th Infantry Brigade moved on from Boya to Damdil *via* the Mot Narai, a route which had been used regularly by large numbers of hostiles, and next day searched the Jaler Algad in co-operation with the 1st Infantry Brigade from Biche Kashkai. That night both brigades were concentrated in Biche Kashkai.

There were two possible routes from Biche Kashkai into the Lower Shaktu. The first by the new road to Mazai Raghza and thence by a known good track to Pasal and the second a more direc



The SHAKTU Tangi looking East. Camp site occupied night 17|18th November in foreground on right of nala.



route up the Pasta Algad and into the Shaktu, east of Mandewam. Little was known of the second route but local information was to the effect that it was regularly used and was passable for animals. Air photographs confirmed these reports and the route was selected as being more direct and much shorter.

The operation in the Shaktu Valley was to be carried out by the 1st Infantry Brigade with one battalion of the 9th Infantry Brigade to replace the battalion in the Bhittani area. The order of Battle is given in an appendix. The 9th Brigade, with one section of the 9th Light Tank Company and five platoons of Tochi Scouts under command, left camp at first light on 16th November to piquet the first part of the route. The 1st Brigade left camp at 7.45 a.m. The 9th Brigade met no opposition and managed to piquet further forward than had been anticipated. This gave the 1st Brigade an excellent start and left only about 3,000 yards of route to the Shaktu. This 3,000 yards was through very narrow, winding *nalas* and eventually rose steeply to a small *kotal*, whence it dropped fairly easily to the Shaktu. The sappers had to put in some quick intensive work but there were no major difficulties and the transport animals moved slowly but steadily. The piqueting was not difficult as the forward piquets of the Tochi Scouts on the left dominated that flank right down to the Shaktu. The provisional camp site for the night was near Mandewam but as the leading troops reached the Shaktu a very good camp site was found immediately opposite where the route joined the main valley and about $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles east of Mandewam. The brigade commander decided to use this site as there was no particular reason for going to Mandewam and any shortening of what would be a long and difficult march the next day was all to the good. Accordingly the advanced guard crossed the Shaktu and the camp site was secured by about 1 p.m.


The local inhabitants had been warned of the columns and when we entered the Shaktu we found about seventy of them (Mahsuds) collected near the camp site. These were interviewed by the political officer and seemed friendly and well disposed. The peaceful atmosphere did not last long, however. The 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment had been ordered to establish a camp piquet on the north bank of the river about 1,000 yards east of camp. The ground here slopes up fairly gently at first from the

river, then steepens rapidly and finally becomes an almost perpendicular cliff. Some half dozen enemy were ensconced among the cliffs and opened fire on a covering party of the 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment, wounding two. The machine-guns with the covering party supported by artillery fire from camp kept the enemy quiet and the piquet was successfully established with no further casualties. Later a party of the 1st/6th Gurkha Rifles covering the building of a piquet west of camp had one man killed by a solitary sniper. During the night there was slight sniping. A party of about half a dozen opened up about 10 p.m., but as they were obliging enough to sit on one of the artillery night lines they were soon silenced.


Before describing the events of 17th November it is advisable to give a general description of the country. The reader will note the big bend in the river around Arap Kot.

The country west of the bend is not unduly difficult but the difficulties begin at the bend. The right bank of the bend is dominated by the precipitous Babar Kunati range some 1,800 yards away. Beyond Arap Kot and a few hundred yards before the river turns east the left bank becomes a precipice about 100 feet high and extending for about three quarters of a mile. From the top of this cliff the hill rises steeply for 1,000 feet from the *nala* bed. The difficulties then decrease until the Shaktu *tangi* is reached. The *tangi* is formed by the river breaking through the Babar Kunati range. On the south bank of the *tangi* there are two distinct ranges. The west slope of the western range is difficult but not insuperable; the top is a knife edge, and the eastern slope is a smooth rock face almost perpendicular and quite impracticable. The eastern range is not so difficult but can only be approached by a very wide detour to the south or by moving through the west end of the *tangi*. The western range is higher than, and to some extent dominates, the eastern one. The north bank of the *tangi* is steep and difficult but not impracticable.

The immediate object on the morning of the 17th was to discover whether it was possible to make a track across the Arap Kot peninsula and thereby avoid the big bend in the river and save piqueting. It had been intended to carry out a reconnaissance the afternoon before under cover of the 3rd/15th Punjab piqueting party, but when the latter became involved with the enemy the



The SHAKTU Tangi looking West.



reconnaissance had to be cancelled. The advanced guard and piqueting troops (1st/6th Gurkha Rifles and 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment) therefore left camp before dawn to secure a position to cover a reconnaissance for this track. The position was secured by 7 a.m. without opposition but the reconnaissance showed that it would take most of the day to make a track fit for mules and camels. Accordingly the advanced guard moved forward and seized the right bank of the Shaktu north of Arap Kot while the South Wales Borderers, who were at the head of the main body, moved along the *nala* piqueting the right bank from the junction of the Shaktu and Sheranna Algads to join up with the advanced guard. There were a number of *kirrie* flocks, women and children on the lower features of the right bank of the bend and the local inhabitants seemed quite friendly. The piqueting around the bend was therefore confined to the lower features and troops were not sent to the top of the Babar Kunati. The transport and the rear guard followed the South Wales Borderers by the *nala* route and the latter cleared Arap Kot without incident.

In the meantime, however, the advanced guard had met opposition. The nature of the left bank where the river turns east was such that it could not be piqueted from the south nor from the west. A company of the 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment moved forward under the cliff until they came to a climbable spur. They seized this and then attacked the cliff from the east securing a position which dominated the whole length of the cliff. This attack was opposed by enemy estimated at thirty men, but owing to good covering fire, use of ground and, above all, the speed with which the movement was carried out no casualties were sustained. The advance then continued until 1 p.m. when the leading troops had reached a point about a mile from the *tangi*. Route piquets and the leading troops were now under fire from the high ground on the south bank. The South Wales Borderers had already moved up to the advanced guard as piqueting troops and only three platoons were left available for piqueting until other piquets withdrawn by the rear guard had rejoined. The Brigade Commander after a reconnaissance came to the conclusion that two battalions would be required to secure the *tangi*. Since these could not be made available it was obvious that the objective for that day, namely Karkanwam, could not be reached. Orders were therefore issued for camp to be made in the *nala* bed about 1,500

yards from the west end of the *tangi*, the site selected being defiladed from the high ridge on the south. Work on camp piquets began at once and the sniping soon extended to all sides including long range fire on the camp site. It was particularly heavy against the South Wales Borderers who were establishing piquets south of the camp. The enemy on the flank were originally on the top of the Babar Kunati Range, but were seen to be working forward closer to the covering parties. Work on piquets on this flank was then suspended for a time while an artillery and machine-gun plan was prepared. Fire was then opened on the known enemy positions by one and a half batteries of artillery and eight machine-guns, ably supported by the close support aircraft with bombs and machine-guns. This had the desired effect; several enemy were seen to be hit and the sniping on this flank ceased except for a few desultory long range shots. All camp piquets were successfully established. There was some slight sniping during the late evening but none during the night; presumably the enemy were occupied in removing their casualties.

Our destination next day was to have been Jani Khel, but as opposition was anticipated at the Shaktu *tangi* it was altered to Rocha, which was some three and a half miles closer. On the 17th November the 9th Infantry Brigade had moved from Biche Kashkai to River Camp near the Seine Gorge in the Khaisora Valley. On the 18th they were to move south as far as Pt. 3,007 and cover the left flank of the 1st Brigade from that point back to Rocha. This meant that once the Shaktu *tangi* was secured little further opposition was to be anticipated. The plan for the advance was in two phases. In the first phase the 2nd/6th Gurkha Rifles on the right and the 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment on the left, each supported by one mountain battery, were to attack the *tangi*. In the second phase the 1st Battalion, the South Wales Borderers with the 13th Mountain Battery in support were to pass through the west end of the *tangi*, seize the east end and then piquet up the right bank of the Shaktu, while the 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment moved along the high ground on the left bank to meet the 9th Infantry Brigade. The 1st/6th Gurkha Rifles with the 19th Mountain Battery in support were to be rear guard.


The first phase began at first light and all objectives were taken without opposition. The 1st Battalion, the South Wales Borderers then moved forward under cover to the west end of the

tangi, while the commanding officer carried out his reconnaissance. The right flank was still the dangerous one. The 2nd/6th Gurkha Rifles had secured the western ridge of the two ridges south of the *tangi* but owing to the nature of the ground could not move forward to the eastern ridge which had to be taken by the South Wales Borderers. The entrance to the *tangi* is only 15 yards wide but immediately opens up to about 50 yards. A platoon of the vanguard had moved forward into *tangi*, another platoon was on its way to piquet the eastern ridge on the right bank and another to the eastern ridge of the left bank when the enemy opened fire. A few seconds before fire was opened the intelligence officer of the South Wales Borderers had reported enemy. No enemy had been seen, but he had spotted a loophole through which he could see daylight. Suddenly the daylight was blotted out and he reported enemy. The first burst of fire caused casualties in the vanguard platoon and in the piquet moving out to the right. A platoon of machine-guns in action just west of the *tangi* opened fire on the enemy positions, firing through the entrance to the *tangi*. A section of the 13th Mountain Battery was close behind and the battery commander was with the officer commanding, South Wales Borderers. He realised that he could best support the advance by direct fire over opened sights. He brought his guns into action under cover, ran them forward into the mouth of the *tangi*, which was still under fire, and opened rapid fire with shrapnel. This prompt and efficient support enabled the platoon on the right to continue its advance which had been slowed up by the enemy fire although not completely stopped. Eventually it reached its objective having had one man killed and four wounded, including the platoon commander. The action of this platoon and of the artillery undoubtedly saved what might have been a nasty situation. There were probably between thirty and forty enemy immediately opposite the leading troops of the South Wales Borderers with as many more farther along the ridge to the south. They were very strongly placed behind solid rock faces with narrow fissures which had been filled with stones to make loopholes. They must have been caught unprepared as they allowed the leading troops to move into the *tangi* and almost half way to their objectives before opening fire. Had they opened fire immediately the first troops moved through the entrance casualties must have been much higher. As it was, when the platoon reached its objective on the

right, the enemy had to withdraw to the south or across the Karesti Algad.

The South Wales Borderers then continued their advance through the *tangi*. The enemy again opened fire from the right bank of the Karesti but withdrew rapidly when attacked by one company of the South Wales Borderers. By this time the South Wales Borderers had all been used up, but it was found possible to withdraw the 2nd/6th Gurkha Rifles (less one company) and send them forward as advanced guard. There was no further opposition to the advance and interest became centred on the rear guard (1st/6th Gurkha Rifles) who had been having an anxious time. No camp piquets could be withdrawn during the first phase as both batteries of artillery were needed to support the attack on the *tangi*. In addition to the enemy opposing the advance through the *tangi* there were between fifty and a hundred enemy in small parties actually engaged in sniping the camp piquets. As soon as the 19th Mountain Battery was free to support the rear guard all camp piquets west of the camp site were withdrawn with only two casualties. The rear guard then stood on a line through the camp site until transport was clear of the *tangi* when it continued the withdrawal. The 2nd/6th Gurkha Rifles and the 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment had difficulty in withdrawing some of their piquets over the *tangi*, partly owing to the terrain and partly due to heavy sniping. However, the enemy made no effort to follow up closely, thanks possibly to two close support aircraft, which had no difficulty in spotting the enemy once he started to move forward and whose support during the withdrawal through the *tangi* was invaluable. The remainder of the march, once the *tangi* had been cleared was uneventful and the rear guard arrived at Rocha at 6-30 p.m.

The main lesson of the operation seems to be that a Brigade Group cannot cover more than five to six miles in a day through difficult country and during a season of short hours of daylight. On November 17th the distance covered was six and a half miles, the leading troops left camp in the dark and it was dark before all piquets were established at the next camp and all covering parties in. Even this distance was only possible because the route was down a broad *nala* bed; the transport moved on a broad front throughout the march and the total length of the column from vanguard to rear party was never more than two miles. This



meant that never more than two miles of route was piqueted at one time and that piquets withdrawn by the rear guard were able to rejoin their unit rapidly and become again available for piqueting.

The value of speed and perseverance on the part of the troops was also well exemplified. The rapid movement of one company of the 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment on the 17th enabled them to secure a difficult objective against opposition with no casualties. Again on the 18th the rapid movement of the platoon of the South Wales Borderers in the *tangi* saved them initial casualties and the perseverance which took them to their objective undoubtedly saved further casualties.

Another lesson seems to be that for an operation of this nature a Brigade Group should include three mountain batteries. During the early part of the 18th the rear guard was unsupported by artillery because both batteries were needed to support the attack on the *tangi*. A third battery may not always be essential; on the other hand it will always be most useful and on occasion the lack of it may jeopardise the success of the operation.

ORDER OF BATTLE

Commander—Brigadier R. D. Inskip, D.S.O., M.C.

H.Q. 1st Indian Infantry Brigade and Signal Section.

13th (Dardoni) Mountain Battery, R.A.

19th (Maymyo) Mountain Battery, R.A.

Section, 4th Field Company, K.G.O. Bengal Sappers and Miners.

1st Battalion, South Wales Borderers.

1st/6th Gurkha Rifles.

2nd/6th Gurkha Rifles.

3rd/15th Punjab Regiment (attached).

19th A.T. Company, R.I.A.S.C.

33rd A.T. Company, R.I.A.S.C.

Detachments, 1st, 7th, 10th, 32nd and 40th A.T. Companies, R.I.A.S.C.

Supply Issue Section.

Company, 10th Field Ambulance.

9th Field Post Office.

THE GAINING AND MAINTENANCE OF CONTACT UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS OF WAR

By LT.-COL. O.G. BODY, D.S.O.

The conditions in which approach and contact are effected under modern conditions of war have led to a certain confusion of thought regarding the employment of advanced troops generally. Mechanization, wireless and the aeroplane have rendered obsolete the old fashioned conception of the approach, with the main body covered by advanced guards stumbling into action where chance and the men's dinner hour dictated; and it is time to do some hard thinking to ascertain exactly where these new conditions have landed us.

Closed marching columns such as we have previously known must now go by the board. Formations must begin to shake out into varying degrees of deployment much farther back from the enemy than they used to do. Advances will normally take place in a state of semi-deployment. March tables with accurate timings at the starting point, worked out to the nearest minute and based on road spaces, can no longer be contemplated. Roads will be allotted to certain units at certain times—higher formations simply allotting the roads and instructing subordinate formations and units to be clear of such and such a point at such and such a time. Advances made under these conditions will require reconnaissance and search much farther ahead than formerly. In situations where we previously required our foremost fighting detachments to penetrate, say, five or six miles ahead of our horsed and foot columns, we shall now require contact twenty to thirty miles ahead of our faster moving mechanized columns.

We finished the war of 1914-18 with our ideas on this question much the same as they were at the outset. Our minds were set on trench warfare, and the manuals which appeared directly after the war incorporated no new ideas on the subject. Yet there was some experience on the various fronts which might well have altered the picture. That experience, such as it was, pointed to the fact that protective detachments seldom effected contact, but that contact was normally made by special mission detachments—a very different story. Air Forces had introduced a new factor.

Deployment took place earlier, and before firm contact was established. At Mons, for example, our army was fully deployed and in its defensive position. Its deployment was not covered or preceded by advanced guard actions in the true encounter battle style. Special mission detachments (the cavalry division) were out in advance of the British Expeditionary Force, but they were not in any sense advanced guards. Indeed, it is difficult to find any true example of the approach march developing into "head on" advanced guard fighting in any of our Great War histories. Either one side or the other had assumed its defensive attitude long before firm contact was established. Contact by special mission detachments acting in advance of the advanced guards was the order of the day, and the necessity for detailing and strengthening such detachments was certainly evident as the result of our war experience. Our post-war manuals did not establish this doctrine as they should have done, and the same old picture of first contact which had been handed down to us from the Napoleonic wars remained.

The distinction between special mission detachments operating in advance of armies and advanced guards proper requires to be very distinctly emphasized. Successive training manuals have stressed it, but the two roles are constantly muddled in practice. The difference is this. An advanced guard has the sole functions of protection and local reconnaissance and is tied to the body it is covering. A special mission detachment is sent forward to seek out the enemy regardless of its own main body, and having found the enemy is tied to the enemy forces; or alternatively it is sent forward to seize and hold important tactical features, and is similarly tied to those features. Our training manuals have constantly warned us that troops sent out to seek the enemy or detailed to occupy and hold ground must be relieved of protective duties, although their action may of itself provide some degree of protection to the main body advancing in rear. The duties and functions of special mission detachments operating in advance of main armies and those of advanced guards proper have been constantly confused in our post-war training, and they bid fair also to confound the doctrine which is being evolved to govern the gaining of contact with the mechanized forces which we are now learning to handle.

Certain changes soon began to appear in our post-war manuals as regards the employment of advanced guards. The most important change was in the employment of the cavalry allotted to the

advanced guard commander. This body was previously sub-allotted to the vanguard commander in the normal course of events, but it now tended to come directly under the advanced guard commander as advanced guard mounted troops.

It was frequently employed as a special mission detachment operating in advance of the vanguard; the vanguard sub-unit remaining in certain cases the only true protective body to the main guard. This development had a tendency to alter the whole function of advanced guards, and indeed the Force commander has tended more and more to use his whole advanced guard as a special mission detachment operating ahead of his main body. This tendency has been reflected in Force orders, where the custom has sprung up of detailing an advanced guard to definite bounds on definite timings. An advanced guard so encumbered should surely be relieved of its role of protection; it is in fact no longer an advanced guard in the true sense of the word, but a special mission detachment ordered to seize and hold.

The Air factor and the increased speed at which armies move necessarily mean that commanders concerned with an approach must have a longer reach in advance of the main fighting and marching formations, and a protective detachment in the nature of an old fashioned advanced guard is too closely tied to the main body it is protecting to provide timely and adequate information on which to effect deployment. Much more attention must now be paid to the details of command and organization and the allotment of roles to the special mission detachments operating ahead of the advanced guards. These detachments should not be charged with the duty of protection, although their movements may confer varying degrees of protection. It may well be that special mission detachments have been so well ordered, that the armies advancing in rear can advance with no protective detachments out at all. Certainly the greater the allotment of the one, the less the necessity for the other. The trouble has been that the two functions have been continually confused and for that reason the duties have not been successfully discharged.

When following an enemy in close contact, the necessity for pushing out strong fighting patrols along the whole front is fully appreciated, but these fighting patrols are in no sense protective; they are offensive contact patrols sent out to gain and keep contact at all costs. Armies should be so covered whatever their state of deployment; that is to say there should be adequate provision of detachments whose sole duty it is to gain contact at the earliest

possible moment and keep it, and in addition there should be purely protective detachments charged with the role of protecting the advancing columns and gaining time for orderly deployment.

In the past during the approach the roles of reconnaissance and protection have often been assigned to one and the same body. Reconnaissance is protection in a certain degree but the conditions of modern warfare entail sending farther afield for information, and in between the areas in which the reconnoitring detachments are operating and the main bodies are advancing there is a wider and therefore more dangerous gap in which local protection must be provided. The nature of this latter protection will depend as it always has done on visibility, the nature of the terrain, the attitude of the local inhabitants and in particular on the strength and location of the special mission detachments already out. Thus there will become a tendency for the roles of protection and reconnaissance to be divorced one from the other and for each to be assigned to a separate and distinct body.

An article appeared in the September 1937 volume of the "Royal Engineers Journal" entitled "The Problem of the Encounter Battle as affected by Modern British War Establishments."* This article requires to be read and re-read by every student of tactics. It certainly makes us think in conditions of time and space applicable to modern conditions of gaining contact. An interesting picture is presented to us in diagram "A" of that article, which may well provide the basis for hours of discussion. The diagram in question is produced below.

DIAGRAM "A"

TACTICAL APPROACH—CONTACT NOT YET GAINED

One Reserve M.T. Coy. Available.

Forward troops, covering the	Div. Cav. Regt.
forward move of the Divi-	Medium Arty. (with air obser-
sion and operating in accord-	vation providing C.B. protec-
ance with the Div. plan.	tion during the advance).
	One Fd. Bde.
	One M.G. Bn.
	One Fd. Coy.
	Motor ambulances.

*By Brigadier B. L. Montgomery, D. S. O.

DIV. H.Q.

Moving by bounds well in Div. Engineers (less one Fd.
 rear of Div. H.Q., essential Coy).
 recce elements being forward Div. Arty. (less one Fd. Bde.).
 as desired. One M.G. Bn.
 "A" Inf. Bde. with two sections "B" Inf. Bde. with two sections
 Reserve M.T. Coy. Reserve M.T. Coy.

REAR H.Q.

"C" INF. BDE.

This gives the new picture towards which we are tending. It makes an interesting comparison with the old fashioned divisional marching column parcelled out as vanguard, main guard, main body and rear guard.

There are many points which may be criticised here. Divisional headquarters is far forward and all the divisional troops are ahead of the Infantry Brigades. This all looks dangerous in the face of a determined and equally mobile enemy.

Diagram "B" of the same article, however, gives a more normal picture. This inserts one infantry brigade ahead of divisional headquarters, and brings back the medium artillery behind divisional headquarters. These points, however, are matters of detail which it is not proposed to criticise. What is really important is the function of the body labelled "Forward troops." Is this body intended for reconnaissance and information only? Has it protective duties to perform? Is it in the nature of an advanced guard, or has it the function of a special mission detachment? "Operating in accordance with the divisional plan" will necessitate its function being carefully explained in orders. In fact the designation "forward troops" carries with it no implied role, but one varying in accordance with the divisional plan—that in itself is a new and difficult idea to get hold of.

The author states "a commander must decide before contact is gained how he will fight the battle—only thus will he force his will on the enemy." Surely this is a tactical heresy—plans cannot be made before contact or before the reactions of the enemy are known. Surely we still want something in the nature of the old advanced guard to hold the ring and allow a commander time to make his plan after contact has been established.

The writer concludes the article as follows: "for many years the composition of an advanced guard has been based on an infantry unit or formation, that is a battalion or a brigade. We

are a very conservative army and probably the only way to get rid of this misconception would be to abolish the term advanced guard. This would be excellent It is felt that if we could get rid of the terminology which has been used in our army for generations, the army as a whole would find less difficulty in adapting itself to the new conditions which now confront it."

A new terminology comes easily only to those who have invented it, and we had far better stick to terms which are well understood; only so will orders be readily grasped. The article in question would have been more readily understood and appreciated had the old fashioned nomenclature been adhered to. The function of an advanced guard has been understood from time immemorial, and its role is definitely incorporated in our manuals, and while so incorporated there can be no fancy ways of using it.

We have certainly got to develop new methods and learn a new technique. What is required is a new picture in our manuals. The picture of an advanced guard establishing first contact should no longer be presented. There must, under modern conditions of war, be special mission detachments operating under the orders of the force commander well ahead of the advanced guards, and their duty will be either to "seize" or to "seek." On to these forces the main responsibility for the successful approach and deployment has been shifted. The employment and function of such detachments should now be stressed as all important.

Fronts will be served by two separate screens--contact screens and protective screens. Their function must be kept distinct as the two roles can no longer be assigned to one and the same body. The picture of a force advancing head on to the enemy with purely protective advanced guards ahead of it should be regarded as a tactical crime. The usual advanced guard schemes so hackneyed in tactical exercises without troops and promotion examinations must be supplanted by an entirely new picture with the bulk of the information coming in from the air and from special mission detachments operating ten to twenty miles ahead of the advanced guards.

Advanced guards will still be required for the immediate protection of the advancing columns and for the purpose of giving time to the Force commander to make his plan, but the role of the advanced guard has declined in importance, and our manuals give that body a prominence which it has long outlived.

"FRENCH LEAVE"

BY MAJOR A. E. SWANN, R.I.A.S.C.

France is a country we are too apt to hurry through. It is so near England that *en route* to and from the East we are usually disinclined to linger: we satisfy ourselves with a meal and a little shopping in Marseilles or Paris and with what can be seen of the country from the windows of the Rapide or the P. & O. Special.

Nevertheless I have always felt that some day France must be more thoroughly visited and have more than once thought of a leisurely motor tour. But for some years the French exchange has been a little discouraging and it was not until the franc commenced to tumble headlong that I felt the time was ripe and the trip must be delayed no longer. So we went. We proposed to stay for about six weeks. But, as the French say, "Appetite comes with eating" and those six weeks lengthened out into four and a half months. Those who are concerned with the problem of making both ends meet on furlough rates of pay in Europe may be interested to read some of the details.

The business of travelling to and from the Continent with one's car has latterly been much simplified and cheapened. Until fairly recently the Automobile Association used to require a deposit of £50 in cash before they would issue the necessary touring documents to enable one to take a car abroad without paying duty. All that is changed now. Touring papers, available for a year's travel in as many countries as may be desired, can be procured at short notice for about £2-10-0. The cash deposit may be replaced by either a banker's guarantee or an insurance policy costing a nominal amount. A further policy is required to cover the value of the duty in any country through which one may be travelling. This is necessary in case the car should become a total wreck and consequently unexportable, when customs duty in the particular country in which the accident happened would have to be paid. Both these policies are arranged by the Automobile Association and in my case the cost of the two amounted to 7/6. Most British insurance companies allow three months free touring cover in Europe, including the steamer journeys across the

Channel, without any additional premium, providing they are notified in advance. If longer cover than three months is required a small additional premium will normally secure it. So much for the formalities. All that is required of the passenger is to fill up one or two forms and sign a cheque.

But not only is the procedure simplified and cheapened but the actual cost of taking the car over to the Continent is about half what it used to be a few years ago, and there is now no necessity to remove petrol, providing shipment is effected by one of the special car-carrying vessels or cargo boats. These improvements are due to the salutary competition put up by the Townsend Ferry. The cost of taking a car over from Dover to Calais or *vice versa* by this ferry steamer or by the Southern Railway "Auto-carrier" or cargo boat is £2-17-0 for a moderate sized English car, plus 12/6 for each passenger accompanying. You can fill your tank on the quayside before embarking and can take with you a spare tin of engine oil, without being penalized by the French Customs. And you can drive away from Calais with very little delay and practically no fuss or bother. The French authorities seem to be specially kind to British tourists. Possibly they are told to be.

There is no need for anyone who can drive on the left of the road in India and England to feel the slightest qualm about driving on the right and overtaking on the left in France. It is entirely automatic and one gets into it immediately. In fact, on the whole, driving in France is a good deal easier than in England for the very simple reason that there is a great deal less traffic. The road signs are good and most of us know at least enough French to be able to interpret such warnings as "Ralentir" or "Stationnement interdite." English, having become what Esperanto was intended to be, will serve for most necessities; a knowledge of French is of course an advantage and will add to the pleasure, but it is not essential. Amongst the useful little things which the A. A. give you is a pamphlet of sentences and expressions in the principal European languages arranged in parallel columns. In emergency you have only to find the phrase and point to the correct column. The answer will become intelligible with the aid of signs. The French will not laugh at the foreigner's lame efforts to make himself understood. They are naturally

polite and inclined to be helpful; and besides they have a fellow feeling about languages.

Other things which the A. A. give you include a touring map, showing all the principal main roads, and their foreign touring handbook, which contains a great deal of concise information about various countries and a list of recommended hotels in the towns and villages marked on the A. A. map. These hotels may be relied upon to adhere—approximately—to the prices given in the book; but it is prudent to confirm the point before marching up to one's room. They will be found to represent a high standard in their various grades. The A. A. grant their hotel sign sparingly and their representative visits each hotel recommended. They might reasonably adopt the Shell slogan and say, "You can be sure of an A. A. hotel."

Nevertheless a much larger selection of hotels and restaurants in a great many more places is available in that incomparable little book, the "Michelin Guide." This costs 25 francs and is packed with useful information; no motorist in France should be without it. There is a map of each town, even the smallest; generous concise notes on each place showing the sights to be seen and allotting stars in the order of their importance. Hotels and restaurants are graded as to price and full details of rates, accommodation, taxes, etc., are given. And there is an ingenious and most useful system of allotting stars to certain restaurants and hotels for the standard of meals and wines provided. One star will represent food which is considered to be above the average of the district; two stars will signify that it is much above the average and that it is worth while to make a detour in order to eat there: whilst the very rare distinction of three stars will indicate that this is one of the best restaurants in all France, famed far and wide amongst gourmets for the excellence of its cuisine. In these particular starred hotels and restaurants, their special dishes and recommended wines are mentioned, so that the traveller is left in no doubt as to what he should order if he wishes to judge whether the stars are merited or not. The stars are allotted sparingly. In many small towns there may be not a single starred hotel or restaurant, whilst others may have several; hotels with two stars are quite rare, and those with three will only be found in the areas specially noted for gastronomical marvels, such as Paris or the Lyonnais country.

And now a word with regard to French roads. I have heard them described as "atrocious," "scandalous" and so forth. They are nothing of the kind. On the whole they are fairly good and occasionally very good. The "routes nationales"—corresponding to the English A roads—will take you to most places in France and will be found to vary from fair to very good; the "routes des grandes communications"—corresponding to English B roads—are also usually very fair, though often somewhat narrow. The remaining roads, over which it is very rarely *necessary* to travel, are often really bad and usually very narrow. On the whole the roads do not reach the same high standard as the English roads; but they are steadily improving with increasing motor traffic and they are good enough to make quite high average speeds fairly safe. They are certainly far better than the average of Indian roads. Generally speaking you can travel faster in France than at home because there is so much less traffic. And it is just this absence of traffic which makes French motoring so attractive—I almost said restful—after the eternal scurrying on our English roads. "Restful" would hardly have been the correct word; for the horn plays a very prominent part in French motoring. Most motorists use it freely and in sheer self-defence you are forced to do likewise. If you fail, your Gallic opposite number will assume he has a clear road and will probably corner fast on the wrong side; which isn't funny at all, particularly if you are on a mountain road or negotiating a curve on one of the Corniches of the Riviera. The movement for silent motoring will presumably alter this in a few years as traffic increases. Silent zones have already been attempted on the Riviera. But until these become general, and French motoring psychology changes, silence is definitely dangerous!

Petrol is a little more expensive in France than in England, but even so one is not so badly fleeced as in India. Prices vary slightly for different grades and areas, but the best spirit costs about two shillings to two and twopence for five litres or one gallon. Many of the French brands contain a proportion of dehydrated alcohol which the A.A. does not consider suitable for all English cars; it may therefore be wiser to stick to one or other of the best known types. Shell, Standard and Esso (Ethyl) can all be obtained from pumps in most localities; the last is an excellent spirit for performance, acceleration and mileage. Other

safe petrols are Azur and Energic. As in England most petrols are stocked in two grades, the cheaper being described as "tourism" whilst the first grade article is called "super-carburant." Naturally the latter gives better performance and mileage and it is not true economy to buy the cheaper for the average British car. A still cheaper grade of fuel exists classified as "poids lourds;" this should be given a very wide berth. Engine oil is quite expensive—about twenty-two francs for a tin containing a litre. Well equipped garages and good mechanics will be found in plenty, and the small routine attentions normally necessary cost less than in England. Washing or greasing each cost about 12 francs, approximately 1/7.

Really good food, excellently cooked, and well equipped small hotels exist everywhere and prices are far lower than in England; average living expenses for a *couple* touring in France will be easily covered for an expenditure of £1 a day. It is possible of course to spend much more, but quite unnecessary to do so. De luxe hotels exist in the larger towns where prices are high, but for the figure I have named one can live at least as comfortably and feed a good deal better than in the average provincial hotel in England. There will always be central heating and running hot and cold water in the bedroom and, of course, electric light. Meals will vary but they will usually be interesting, copious and well cooked and sometimes they will be a feast for an epicure if one uses one's "Michelin Guide" with skill and discrimination.

The rough estimate given above will be sufficient to cover the ordinary local wines, and these will usually be found to be good. Most hotels and restaurants have their own special "Vins du pays"—not necessarily the "vin ordinaire"—which they serve at much lower prices than those figuring prominently in wine lists and these are the wines which the average Frenchman asks for on all ordinary occasions. It is a fairly safe rule to follow the lead of the Frenchman in the matter of food and drink. The Englishman who does so runs little risk of being exploited. Those who cannot exist without bacon and eggs or whisky and soda may not, however, enjoy the same immunity. The way to get the best out of a holiday across the Channel is undoubtedly to eat and drink as the French do and to sample all the local dishes and wines. Even the inoffensive and clean-feeding snail should not

be shunned. If he is well cooked—and he usually is—he is delicious. And some of the very inexpensive local wines, even some of those served without ceremony as "*vin ordinaire*" are better than many for which high prices are charged in England or India. And far more amusing in France than just that humdrum whisky and soda.

The mapping out of a tour is a matter which will vary considerably with individual tastes. Personally I had no very clear cut ideas as to a programme and preferred to drift about without any definite prearranged plan. Vaguely I felt that Normandy and Brittany ought to be seen; also the Paris Exhibition. Then I felt that a little mountain scenery might be pleasant, followed by a spell on the Riviera as winter approached and culminating in winter sports somewhere or other when the snows should arrive. All these things were actually accomplished; but there is still a great deal more left to do which some would prefer to substitute for my itinerary. The Chateaux de la Loire, the Côte d'Argent, the Pyrenees, the Massif Central and the Vosges could not be included, nor could the Alps or the lakes be sufficiently explored, whilst the Lyonnais country—where the food and the wines are so seductive—had to be rushed through. Such as it was, however, our itinerary proved to be great fun. I do not propose to weary the reader with a description of what we did and saw, as I feel that most people would prefer to work things out for themselves; but appended to this article will be found a short tabulated note of the various places in which we halted, showing the hotels and restaurants of which we had personal and usually pleasant experience.

The question of cash requirements for a tour of this sort can be handled in various ways. Possibly the most convenient method is to go armed with a sheaf of sterling travellers' cheques, or to have supplies of these forwarded periodically. They can be exchanged at most banks and at many hotels and any English bank can supply them. Another method is to take a circular letter of credit in sterling from one's home bank. This will be easily negotiable in any French town, but usually the procedure involves a somewhat tedious wait of a quarter of an hour or so in the French bank before all the formalities are completed and one can emerge with one's quota of francs. Another objection is that one normally has to pay for the whole amount of the letter of credit

in advance, which is often inconvenient. The system I employed was to take a letter of credit for £50 as a reserve and to ask my English bank to arrange with a French bank to cash my cheques up to a certain amount each month. This arrangement in the first instance was made with the Société Générale at Morlaix, as our tour was commenced by a fairly lengthy stay in Brittany. On leaving the Morlaix neighbourhood I asked the bank there to transfer the instructions to a centre near our next halting place, and so on throughout the tour. This arrangement worked admirably and involved very little trouble. One always had the comfortable feeling that in the event of any temporary hitch the letter of credit was available.

In our case a good deal of time was spent in the Jura, close to the Swiss frontier, and during the winter sports season we crossed into Switzerland. Frontier formalities are very simple for holders of the A.A. International Travelling Carnets, the Swiss being eager to encourage touring motorists. Petrol is about the same price as in France—taking the French exchange at 150 francs to the pound and the Swiss at 22—but the foreign touring motorist can get a refund of about one-third of his petrol costs on finally leaving Switzerland if he takes the trouble to get his petrol purchases duly noted each time on the form given him at the time of entry. Generally speaking expenses in Switzerland are quite 50 per cent. higher than in France. Winter sport is better organized and the foreign tourist, particularly the British tourist, is specially catered for; but in France the snow conditions are similar and if one does not insist upon highly organized winter sports, with English instruction classes, a pleasant winter holiday is possible there much more cheaply than in Switzerland.

Another area of cheap petrol supplies is the "zone franche" around Geneva, which is French territory. Here petrol is obtainable at somewhere between a half and two-thirds of the French prices and the motorist carrying international papers is under no restriction as to the extent of his purchases in this area. Swiss and French motorists passing in and out of the zone are strictly limited to the purchase of an amount of petrol which they can consume within the zone, but international motorists may pass the Customs barriers into and out of the zone as often as they please without any check as to the quantity of petrol carried. This appears to be a deliberate policy and it was, in fact, a French

Customs official who first informed me of it. This "zone franche" is a relic of a long-standing agreement between France and Switzerland, the object of which was to permit the city of Geneva to obtain its essential supplies from contiguous and almost encircling French territory, without liability to French taxes thereon.

Elsewhere in France there are no petrol concessions for foreign motorists as a normal thing; but during the period of the Paris Exhibition those who took their cars to the capital could obtain six free petrol coupons (of a total value of 360 francs) exchangeable for petrol at any petrol station in France except in the "zone franche." These coupons could each be exchanged at intervals of not less than five days. The concession has now been withdrawn but would probably be reintroduced if it were decided to reopen the exhibition in 1938.

The estimate given of normal touring expenditure in France does not apply to a stay in Paris, where living generally is far more expensive than in the provinces. It is, however, a good deal less expensive than London at the present time. Driving one's car in Paris is not an unmixed joy and unless one is very familiar with the city it is not recommended. The simplest plan is to garage one's car after arrival at one's hotel the first day and to leave it there until the day of departure, using taxis, the "metro" or busses in the meanwhile. To drive without strain in Paris one requires not only a thorough knowledge of the city and its one way traffic routes, but also to possess the psychology of a French motorist. Without this one can never feel certain whether the other car is bluffing or not and it is difficult to decide when to give way and when not to. Other large French towns such as Marseilles and Lyon call for care, but are scarcely comparable with Paris; even in Paris any competent driver will doubtless be fully able to cope with the situation, but he is unlikely to find that doing so adds materially to the pleasure of his holiday. It is less simple, for instance, than driving in London.

Looking back on this "French Leave" I feel that for the average of forty pounds per month which it cost for two people it was excellent value. It was a leisurely peregrination, without arduous long runs, averaging a little under 2,000 miles per month. Nevertheless we saw a good deal, made many interesting contacts and savoured a hospitality and a friendliness far exceeding our expectations. The tales one has heard of the exploitation of the British

tourist in France proved groundless as far as our experience went. On the whole we lived well and comfortably at a figure which would have sufficed for little more than bare necessities in England.

While the franc stays at anywhere near 150 to the pound sterling a motoring holiday in France should remain an attractive financial proposition as well as an enjoyable experience. It is certainly something worth doing at least once and now is the time to do it, whilst the exchange is favourable.

LIST OF HALTS, WITH HOTELS AND RESTAURANTS VISITED

All the hotels and restaurants mentioned below were found to be good, both as regards accommodation and food. The grades and prices vary: as a guide to these I have allotted stars to each, three stars indicating the highest, two the medium and one the lowest prices. All are, however, reasonable; comfortable but not luxurious. Unless otherwise indicated the service charge is 10 per cent.

<i>Town.</i>	<i>Hotel or Restaurant.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
BRITTANY—		
Primel-Tregastel (Finistere)	.. Grand Hotel de Primel* (Poupon Freres)	Small family hotel. Open summer season only.
Morlaix (Finistere)	.. Hotel de L'Europe***	
Audierne (Finistere)	.. Hotel de France.**	
Quimper (Finistere)	.. Hotel du Parc**	.. Outstanding for both comfort, food and price.
Camaret s/Mer.	.. H. de la Pointe des Pois**	Fine situation, secluded, private access to sands. Tennis.
Cancale (Ile et Vilaine)	H. des Parcs*	.. Fine view of Mont St. Michel. Speciality: Oysters.
Mont St. Michel	.. H. Poularde (Chevallier)***	Rather expensive but good.
NORMANDY—		
Caen (Calvados)	.. H. des Gourmets**	.. Very good food, price very moderate.
Rouen	.. Hotel Dieppe.**	
Montreuil s/Mer. (Pas-de-Calais)	.. Hotel de France*	.. Old coaching inn dating from 1640. Cheap, simple and good.
Amiens (Somme)	.. Hotel de L'Univers***	Food outstanding. Excellent still champagne at 10 francs per flagon. Service 12 per cent.
	Hotel Carlton**	.. Service 12 per cent.
Epernay (Marne)	.. Hotel du Chapon Fin*	Food outstanding. Try "Coq a la Bouzy." Excellent brut champagne and still, both very cheap.
Fontainebleau (Seine-et-Marne)	.. Hotel du Palais***	.. Excellent in every way. Service 12 per cent.
Avallon (Yonne)	.. Hotel Morvan.*	
Beaune (Cote d'Or)	.. Hotel de la Poste***	.. Very renowned cuisine and wine.
Lons-le-Saunier (Jura)	.. Hotel du Cheval* Rouge*	.. Food outstanding, also wine. Ask for "Mousserons a la creme."

<i>Town.</i>	<i>Hotel o' Restaurant.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
Les Rousses (Jura)	.. Hotel de France*	.. Small, simple hotel at 3,500 feet, near Swiss frontier. Good winter sport centre.
St. Claude (Jura)	.. Hotel de France**	.. Cuisine locally renowned.
Dole (Jura)	.. Grand Hotel***	.. Service 12 per cent.
Castellane (Basse-Alpes)	.. Restaurant Bon Accueil*	.. Food widely renowned and very cheap. Excellent Vin d'Alsace.
Cannes (Alpes Maritimes)	.. Hotel Victoria*** (Rue d'Antibes)	.. Very well run, near sea, food outstanding. Service 15 per cent.
La Napoule (Nr. Cannes)	.. Hotel Beau Rivage**	Fine situation on front. Adjoins Golf.
Hyeres (Var)	.. Hotel Central*	.. Excellent food.
Cassis (B. du Rhone)	.. H. de la Plage*	.. Fine situation and view. Good for a seaside summer hotel.
Marseille (B. du Rhone)	Brasserie de Verdon.*	
Marseille	.. Brasserie de Verdun,*** 23 R. Paradis Restaurant Isnard,*** 4-6 R. Thubaneau.	Food outstanding.
Lyon (Rhône)	.. H. des Beaux-Arts***	Very central. Has no restaurant, but near "Filet de Sole." Service 12 per cent.
	Rest. "Filet de Sole"***	.. Excellent food and wine, and prices reasonable for a place with its reputation. Try Frogs' legs here (Grenouilles).
Avignon (Vauchuse)	.. Auberge de France**	Excellent food and vin ordinaire (Chateauneuf du Pape).
Valence (Drome)	.. H. de L'Europe.***	
Gex (Ain)	.. H. de Commerce.*	
Divonne les Bains Ain	.. H. de la Truite*	.. Food justly renowned, especially trout. Near Golf. Local vin thoiry is very good. Open Easter to Xmas only.
Morez (Jura)	.. H. des Deux Gares.* H. de la Poste.**	
Calais	.. Rest. "Faisan Gris."***	
Meximieux (Ain)	.. Rest. Mantrand*	.. A very simple village restaurant but astonishingly good.
Rumilly (Hte Savoie)	Cheval Blanc*	.. A simple old-fashioned inn, but very good food and wine.

MISCELLANEOUS SERVICE NOTES

The Army in England.

COMMANDERS COUNCIL


Regular conferences between the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Commanders of the 1st Class Commands in England have started. The formation of this Commanders Council is intended, as the Secretary of State for War recently explained, to associate officers in command of war formations more closely with the control of military policy.

ARMY COUNCIL STANDING COMMITTEE

The regular members of the new Standing Committee of the Army Council consist of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the Adjutant General and the Quartermaster-General, other officials being co-opted as required. The Committee is to be responsible for the conduct of, and advice to the Secretary of State on, day-to-day matters of army administration, so relieving the Chief of the Imperial General Staff from all detailed work.

THE GENERAL STAFF

The General Staff at the War Office has been reorganised as follows:



A new section of the General Staff is being established to study the practice and lessons of modern warfare.

THE ROYAL ARTILLERY

1. *The Field Branch and the Coast Defence and Anti-Aircraft Branch*

Numerous changes in the organisation and duties of the Royal Regiment of Artillery have been announced. The Regiment is to be divided into two branches, a Field Branch and a Coast Defence and Anti-Aircraft Branch. The former will comprise horse, field, medium and mountain brigades and batteries, artillery survey units and the 1st Heavy Brigade of the Field Army. The latter will include all heavy brigades and batteries, other than those of the field army, coast and anti-aircraft artillery and, in due course, coast and anti-aircraft searchlight units, which are to be gradually transferred from the Royal Engineers to the Royal Artillery. This division into two separate branches will not be applied to the Territorial Army for the present.

2. *The Field Brigade*

The next important change is the reorganisation of the field artillery brigade itself. Hitherto the fire unit has been the battery of six guns, and it has been found not only that the brigade of four batteries, all of them on a mechanized basis, is cumbersome as regards movement on roads and across country, but that four batteries of six guns do not lend themselves to the application of rapid and accurate concentrations of fire as well as they might. The field brigades of the Regular Army are therefore being reconstituted to consist of a regimental headquarters and two batteries, each of three four-gun troops. The new organisation is designed to increase the volume of fire controlled by one headquarters. Not only will the new regiment be more flexible than the old field brigade but a reduction in personnel and vehicles will be effected. The artillery troop will be reduced to a very simple organisation and will contain enough personnel to man one O. P. A high proportion of the ammunition will be centralized at battery headquarters, which will also be responsible for fire control and survey. Regimental headquarters will be responsible primarily for tactical, as opposed to technical, control. Further advantages are that the four-gun fire unit is more easily manœuvred and more readily sited on the ground than was the old six-gun battery, while the organisation generally should enable reinforcing artillery to be absorbed with a minimum of dislocation.

A further change is that communications within the regiment will become a responsibility of the Royal Artillery, who will take over the work hitherto done by the Royal Corps of Signals in providing communication down to the headquarters of fire units. This is a minor change, but it is one that may prove of advantage in the handling of technical messages relating to artillery.

Royal Horse Artillery brigades are being reorganised on similar lines.

THE LONG SERVICE SOLDIER

In 1937 the experiment was introduced of offering a limited number of reservists the opportunity to rejoin the Colours and to serve on for a pension. Three thousand men accepted the offer. It has now been decided to extend the experiment by the introduction of long-term enlistment for twelve years with the Colours and the option, provided the soldier is of good character, of extension to twenty-one years and pension. The measure is a notable break-away from the tradition of the present century and will be watched with interest throughout the army.

WARRANT OFFICER—CLASS III

The proposal to create a new rank of Warrant Officer, Class III, will improve the prospects of both officers and other ranks. The reduction of intake of officers from Woolwich, Sandhurst and the universities should permit of a stricter selection and so lead to improved quality. At the same time the subaltern will obtain relatively greater chances of rising to command his regiment and the keen, educated soldier will have one more opening among the commissioned ranks. The decision postulates, of course, acceptance of the principle that warrant officers can be relied on

to carry out, in peace and war, duties which have until now fallen to the lot of the officer. Warrant Officers, Class III, will command platoons and equivalent units, and it is assumed that they will be granted limited financial and administrative powers, such as will empower them to handle cash, manage small accounts, conduct drafts and take charge of range practices.

THE COURT-MARTIAL SYSTEM

The Secretary of State for War announced in March that Mr. Roland Oliver, K.C., had consented to be chairman of a committee to enquire into the existing system of trial by court-martial in the army. The terms of reference to the committee are as follows:

"To examine the existing system of trial by court-martial under the Army and Air Force Acts and matters incidental thereto, and in particular to consider whether it is desirable and practicable that a person convicted by court-martial should have a right of appeal to a civil judicial tribunal against his conviction, and to make recommendations."

The committee has already started work.

DISTURBANCE ALLOWANCE

The grant of a disturbance allowance, foreshadowed by the Secretary of State for War when he introduced the Army Estimates, was announced in a special Army Order dated 30th March. Married officers over thirty years of age, who are ordered to a new station and who are not provided with furnished quarters, will be granted an allowance of £20 towards the incidental expenses of the move, provided the duration of the stay in the new station is likely to exceed six months. Similar allowances will be granted to officers rejoining for permanent employment from half-pay, retired pay and the Regular Army Reserve of Officers. Soldiers on the married quarters roll will be granted a disturbance allowance of £5 on change of station and on the same conditions.

TATTOOS AND SPORT IN THE ARMY

A move has been made both to reduce the number of displays and competitions open to army sports teams and to curb a tendency which has been manifest in the army during recent years towards professionalism in sport. The number of competitions open to teams from commands other than the command in which the competition is held will be reduced.

As regards tattoos generally and the Aldershot Tattoo in particular the Secretary of State for War stated recently that he had an open mind on the subject. Some alleged that it was a waste of time. Others pointed to the training provided in the movements of large numbers of men with exact timing, to the advertisement value of the tattoo, and to the sums it raised for Army charities. Whatever may be the outcome of this movement, it is fairly certain that while feeling in the army itself on the subject of military displays and sport probably varies from unit to unit, no regiment is prepared to sacrifice an excessive amount of time to these events at the cost of its training for war.

The Army in India

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

A Chiefs of Staff Committee was set up in March. The members are the Chief of the General Staff, the Air Officer Commanding the Air Forces in India and the Flag Officer Commanding, Royal Indian Navy. The Committee's terms of reference are to consider and report on such matters of policy or operations concerning the defence of India as may be referred to it by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. As a general rule, all inter-service committees in India will report to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which will in turn obtain the orders of His Excellency on their conclusions and recommendations.

ACTIVE AIR DEFENCE COMMITTEE

In order to ensure co-ordination in regard to the active air defence of India, including the defence of her main seaports, a sub-committee has been formed, provisionally, to consider active air defence measures in India. The committee consists of representatives of Army Headquarters, the Royal Air Force in India, and the Royal Indian Navy and will sit under the chairmanship of the Air Officer Commanding the Air Forces in India. The conclusions of the sub-committee will be submitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

MANOEUVRES, FIELD FIRING AND ARTILLERY PRACTICE BILL

A bill to provide facilities for manœuvres, field firing and artillery practices has received the assent of the Governor-General. The provisions of the bill are similar to those of the Military Manœuvres Act and the Military Lands Act in the United Kingdom. Authority to permit manœuvres to be carried out over private land has been vested in Provincial Governments, who will notify to the public the area in which manœuvres are to take place.

MILITARY COMMANDS IN INDIA

Changes in the organisation of certain military commands and districts were announced in April and May.

1. *Western Independent District*

In the first place the Western Command in India will be abolished on 1st November 1938 and replaced by a Western Independent District with headquarters at Quetta. The new district will comprise the same area as that for which the present Western Command is now responsible, and will include the Sind Independent Brigade Area which will lose its independent status. At the same time the 2nd Indian Division, as such, will be abolished, and the units now in Baluchistan will be allotted to covering troops, brigade and district troops as follows: A Zhob Brigade Area will replace the present Zhob (Independent) Brigade Area; Covering Troops brigades stationed at Kila Abdullah and Quetta will take the place of the present 4th and 5th Indian Infantry Brigades; A Sind brigade Area will replace the Sind (Independent) Brigade Area; and the balance of troops in the 2nd Division will, with a few exceptions, become district troops.

2. Lucknow and Meerut Districts

In the second place the present Lucknow District, which has its headquarters in Lucknow in the winter and Ranikhet in the summer, is to be raised to the status of a first class district from the 15th October. It will include the 6th (Lucknow), 8th (Bareilly), and 9th (Jhansi) Infantry Brigades, and the Allahabad Brigade Area and will undertake the work involved in the mobilization of the 3rd Indian Division, at present a responsibility of the Meerut District.

On the same date Meerut District, which is at present a first class district with headquarters at Dehra Dun, will be reduced to second class status and will, in its new form, include the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, the 7th Indian Infantry Brigade and the Delhi Brigade Area, the latter losing its independent status.

3. Other changes

Incidental results of the above changes will be the conversion of one Army Troops Company and one Divisional Headquarters Company of the K.G.O. Bengal Sappers and Miners into a field company, and the conversion of the 2nd Indian Divisional Signals into Western (Independent) District Signals and two independent sections which will form a General Headquarters Reserve. More important still, a brigade of covering troops will be formed by 1st November at Thal in Kurram.

4. Practical effect of the reorganisation

These changes will result on paper in the reduction of the field army in India to three divisions instead of four; in practice they will mean a much more efficient force. It will become possible to bring the 4th Indian Division up to scale in staffs, equipment and transport, without losing efficiency in the area at present controlled by Western Command. Moreover the reorganisation does not involve any appreciable change in the peace location of troops, and it is estimated that a small financial saving will be effected.

WEAPON TRAINING AND MECHANIZATION

The Government of India has sanctioned the amalgamation of the Small Arms School and the Royal Tank Corps School in India. The amalgamation took place on 1st April this year when the two schools were combined under the commandant of the Small Arms School, who is now designated Brigadier, Weapon Training and Mechanization. The Brigadier, Weapon Training and Mechanization, has a second grade General Staff officer and a small staff to administer the Small Arms School at Pachmari and the Small Arms and Mechanization School at Ahmednagar. The Small Arms School at Pachmari will train personnel of British rifle battalions, Indian mixed battalions, Indian cavalry and Sappers and Miners. The Small Arms and Mechanization School at Ahmednagar has been divided into a Driving and Maintenance Wing, consisting of an Instructor's Group and a Driver Mechanics Group; an Armament Wing consisting of a Ground Weapons Group and an A.F.V. Group; and a Vehicle Park and Workshops. The School will train personnel of British cavalry and Indian armoured car regiments in the A.F.V. Group.

THE STAFF COLLEGE

1. *The new courses*

Considerable changes are to take place in the training of officers for staff appointments. In the past both British and Indian Service officers have graduated from Camberley and Quetta after a two-year course, the annual output of the two colleges being sixty officers of the British Service and twenty-four officers of the Indian Army. The changes now being made are designed to secure an increased supply of officers trained to fill junior staff appointments and improved selection of officers for first grade staff appointments.

Under the new scheme Camberley and Quetta become what may be termed junior wings of a composite staff college, the senior wing of which will be at Minley Manor, in Hampshire. The courses at Camberley and Quetta will be reduced to one year but the number of vacancies will be increased to a hundred for officers of the British Service at Camberley, and to fifty-six for officers of the British and Indian Services at Quetta. Officers of the British Service in India may be selected to attend either the course at Camberley or the course at Quetta, but vacancies at Quetta only will be open to Indian Army officers.

On completion of their one year's training, graduates will be eligible for appointment as second and third grade staff officers. After holding a staff appointment for three years, a proportion of these officers will be selected to proceed to Minley Manor for the senior staff course. Officers of the Indian Army will be eligible to attend the course at Minley Manor, where twelve Indian Service vacancies will be available annually, since there will be no equivalent school in India.

2. *Reduction in age limit*

Consequent on the policy of reducing the age at which officers are to be selected for command and higher appointments, there will be a gradual reduction in the age at which officers will be permitted to attend the entrance examination for Camberley and Quetta. The scaling down of age limits has been fixed so as not to inflict hardship on any officer who has seriously contemplated competing for the Staff Colleges during the next few years. At present an officer has to be under 34 years of age on 1st March of the year of examination. The scaling down of this age limit is shown below:

<i>Year.</i>	<i>British Army.</i>	<i>Indian Army.</i>
1939	... 32	34
1940	... 32	33
1941	... 30	32
1942	... 30	31

3. *Increased entry by nomination*

Officers wishing to enter the Staff Colleges at Camberley and Quetta will have to qualify in the entrance examination as before, but there will be a relatively larger number of nominated, as opposed to competitive vacancy, officers. Of the fifty-six vacancies at Quetta, thirty will be available to Indian Army officers, fifteen being filled by competition and fifteen by nomination from amongst those officers who have qualified at the entrance examination. Of the hundred vacancies at Camberley, seventy-five will be filled by nomination.

4. *The Entrance Examination*

Alterations are also being made in the form of entrance examination. The first strategy and tactics paper will be more broadly framed than hitherto and candidates will be permitted to illustrate their answers to the questions set from any of the campaigns laid down in the syllabus. The military law paper will be abolished. These changes relate to the 1939 examination. Further changes applicable to subsequent examinations will be announced later.

5. *The period of change over*

Certain special measures to tide over the period of change during the next two years are being taken. Officers at present in the junior division at Quetta will become the first "one year" course and will graduate from that college in December 1938. The twelve Indian Army vacancies at Minley Manor in 1939 will be filled from among those officers who are at present in the junior division at Camberley and prove themselves suitable, the balance of vacancies being allotted among the present junior division at Quetta. The latter division will, however, remain eligible for selection to Minley vacancies in 1940.

Of the ten British Service officers now in the junior division at Quetta, five will attend the Minley Manor course in 1939 and five in 1940.

FOUR-WHEELER LORRIES

Trials of four and six wheeled vehicles were carried out recently in Eastern Command, where the conclusion was reached that the modern four wheeled vehicle will fulfil nearly all the requirements of a cavalry brigade motor transport company. For the future therefore the six wheeled vehicles in that unit will be limited to one 3-ton workshop lorry, one 30 cwt. breakdown lorry, four 30 cwt. lorries for first-line repairs and four 30 cwt. lorries for reconnaissance.

VICKERS BERTHIER ANTI-AIRCRAFT MOUNTINGS

With the object of testing the Vickers Berthier light machine-gun in a heavy role a limited number of Bren tripods have been issued to troops for trial. Pending the final selection and provision of a tripod for use with the Vickers Berthier, bayonet type anti-aircraft mountings are being issued to cavalry and infantry units this summer.

AUSTRALIAN HORSES

Owing to the mechanization of certain units in India, it has been decided not to purchase horses from Australia during the next three years.

SEPOYS' PENSIONS

A pamphlet compiled in English, Urdu, Hindi and Gurmukhi has been issued to military pensioners in the Punjab. A copy of the pamphlet is in future to be given by commanding officers to all Indian soldiers going on pension. The pamphlet is not to be regarded as an authority, but it is intended as a guide to pensioners and contains the general conditions regulating the grant of pensions and the procedure laid down for their payment.

GRATUITIES AND PENSIONS FOR INDIAN COMMISSIONED
OFFICERS

The rates of retiring and disability pensions and gratuities admissible to Indian commissioned officers, other than Indian Medical Service officers holding commissions in the Indian Land Forces, were published in May. Gratuities varying from Rs. 13,250 to Rs. 18,250 will be admissible to officers retiring with between ten and fifteen years service. Ordinary pensions have been devised on similar lines to British Army pensions and will consist of a service element of Rs. 1,800 a year, rising by Rs. 180 a year for every year over fifteen, and a rank element. Maximum pensions for a captain will be Rs. 3,600, for a major Rs. 5,400, and for a lieutenant-colonel Rs. 7,200.

ARMY IN INDIA RESERVE OF OFFICERS

The conditions of service for future entrants to the Army in India Reserve of Officers are to include a liability to be called to military service in the event of the Government of India deciding that a state of emergency has arisen or is imminent. Officers who already hold commissions in the Army in India Reserve of Officers are unaffected by the decision, but may accept the liability voluntarily.

SCHOLARSHIPS AT BRITISH ARMY SCHOOLS

Five scholarships for boys and four for girls are available for competition among pupils of British Army Schools in India. The scholarships are worth Rs. 480 per annum for boarders and Rs. 240 per annum for day scholars and are tenable for three years. The age of the child must not exceed eleven years on the last day of February of the year preceding the examination. Details regarding methods of application to enter a child for the examination can be obtained from District and Area Education Officers.

TENURE OF STAFF APPOINTMENTS

Following the changes made at home, it has been decided to reduce the tenure of second and third grade staff appointments in India from four years to three. The change applies to all officers who took up permanent staff appointments after the 1st January 1938.

EMPLOYMENT BUREAU FOR RETIRED OFFICERS

The attention of officers retiring from the Indian Establishment is drawn to the fact that an employment bureau for retired officers of the Regular Army exists at 72 Red Lion Street, High Holborn, London, W.C. 1. Registration for employment cannot be effected until the applicant has been interviewed. The Air Ministry will not consider applications from officers desiring employment under that department until the officer has actually retired.

TRAVELLING CONCESSIONS IN INDIA

The use of Form D (railway concession voucher) has recently been extended to Majors and Lieutenant-Colonels and equivalent ranks in the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force and Royal Indian Navy. This concession has been accepted by the members of the Indian Railway Conference Association solely on the grounds that it will prove justified from the commercial point of view; it has, therefore, been limited to a period of two years, at the end of which time the question will be reviewed. The continuance of the concession beyond 1940 is dependent on the increased use of first class carriages by the officers affected.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

A first-hand description of Napoleon

SIR,

In the year 1806 there appeared in a new magazine called the *Monthly Anthology*, which was published in Boston, New England, a letter which had been sent from Paris to a friend of the writer's who was living in Boston. It contains a lively account of what the writer thought of both Napoleon and his wife, and being intended only for the eyes of the person to whom it was addressed, it has all the ease and unrestraint of a chat between friends, and therefore may be taken as a faithful sketch of the world-famous figure about which so much, both true and untrue, has been written.

The letter is dated "August 16, 1805"—just ten years before the battle of Waterloo. It runs:

"Since I wrote so plentifully by the Anacreon, you need not expect much more very soon; though, while the subject is fresh, why should I not tell you about the wonder of the age, Le Grand Napoleon, or Napoleon le Grand? I will set down just what trifles I observed.

The first time I saw him was at a review, which is usually on Sunday. I was stationed in a balcony, and with my opera glass determined to watch the movement of every muscle. The troops, all cavalry without the yard of the palace, were drawn up in several lines in the Place Carrousel. Within the iron-railing, or court, were the consular, now imperial, footguards. I could not help observing that the cavalry was much better mounted and equipped than I expected. They were in all about 5,000. They kept no order in the lines 'till the trumpets announced that his little majesty was mounted on his white Arabian. At that instant I looked towards the court, and saw a little fellow galloping at full speed through the lines, attended by a Mameluke, and half a dozen officers covered with lace and plumes, who with much difficulty kept pace with him. He now sallied forth into the square, and was soon stopped by a crowd of women and men, who were waiting to present their petitions. I was a little surprised to see him so willing to expose himself. He was within a few paces of

me. He immediately dropped his reins and took the petitions, which were thrust upon him with very little ceremony. Some he instantly handed over to his officers, and others he read with much apparent interest, frequently conversing with the petitioners, and looking with an eye which is not easily described, nor to be observed, indeed, without some dread.

He sat on his horse in the posture of a man who was absorbed in a thousand reflections, and with a *hollow stomach* as children call it, as if he had not eaten for a month. He was dressed in a blue coat with broad white facing, and little buttons, and buttoned close up to the chin, without showing any linen; a pair of white breeches and black boots; and above all a small cocked hat, no trimmings, but with a little sneaking cockade (the last fragment of the revolution!) on the top edge. He has a face rather handsome, that is the features are so; the lower jaw and chin somewhat large and full. His teeth are fine. His complexion is neither sallow nor unhealthy as has often been said: it is of that fairness which Mr. M. . . . has. His hair is black, and cut all away from the ears, without whiskers. His eyes shew much of the white: the pupil being large, and the iris very small; they have a bright, darting, and fierce look. All around they are literally black and blue as if he had not slept but thought and studied night and day. There is, on the whole, a look of great energy, and none of any amiable quality: less of the sun-burnt warrior, than of the student of *genie*. After resting an hour in reading petitions, he suddenly snatched up his reins, regardless of what was about or before him, and dashed on in full gallop. He rides very badly, with short stirrups, which throw him continually on the back of his saddle. Every motion is so quick, so "militaire," that there is neither grace nor dignity in his deportment; nothing but his face is imperial, and that will rank very well with the Cæsars; there is much of the Roman in it.

Now you shall have him in another light, at the theatre, where he is always much exposed, though, as he sits low in the box, if he were a little taller, he would be much more so. When he enters, he is so quick, that he is always seated before anyone is aware of his august presence. A faint applause is attempted, and he half rises, which puts an end to it. During the performance, he looks continually towards the stage, now and then casting a glance at his chained tigers in the pit, turning his eyes in a sly way without

moving his head. He continually picks his nose like an irritable man, takes snuff, and then Frenchman like, blows his trumpet. He has a fine high forehead, that is, it is rather narrow, but the distance is great between his eyebrows and the hair, which grows far from the face. His hair is totally neglected, cut rather short. I have frequently been at the theatre when, in the old plays of Racine and Corneille, there have been very severe allusions to his situation, his usurpation, etc., which probably the audience applauded in old times, but they are now sure to receive them with instantaneous and loud applause. He however only runs his forefinger under the end of his nose: "Kick if you will, but I have ye fast enough."

A new play, however, called "Henry VIIIth" came out, which he attended, as he often does a first representation: it contained a continual invective against him, and he instantly ordered the piece to be suppressed. You may ask, how they dared bring it forth? Why he might with more safety imprison every man in Paris than encroach upon the liberty of the stage: it is a Frenchman's birthright, I may say. It is the school in which they all receive their principles; and, where twenty-eight are opened every night, you may imagine it to be the substitute for both school and church.

To continue my subject: when Bonaparte rises to quit the theatre, he turns to the audience, shews a fine row of teeth (what a tiger's grin!), makes several quick bows and disappears. A few voices immediately, as ordered, sound forth the *Vive l'empereur!* and a few clap their hands; but I never yet have witnessed anything but a cold indifference in any audience. The French are very quick and unanimous; and could he once excite them to applaud him, it would pervade the whole audience, and there would be no end to their enthusiasm."

So ends what is perhaps the most outspoken and unbiassed pen portrait of Napoleon now extant. One is glad that the writer next turns his pen to an equally discerning and trenchant portrait of the Empress Josephine.

Yours faithfully,
N. G. GANE.

11th June 1938.

DEAR SIR,

May I trespass on your valuable space to record my appreciation of Auspex's article "The Dream Sector," which appeared in the April number of the Journal. Knowing as I do that the sector was no dream but a very live reality, as many a Wazir and Mahsud found to his cost, I feel that all soldiers whose lot it is to serve at frequent intervals on the North-West Frontier owe the author a deep debt of gratitude for his vigorous and stimulating paper.

In Frontier warfare, as in all kinds of warfare, there must be some degree of uniformity in the tactics practised, but any methods, such as those described by Auspex, which allow us to introduce the element of surprise into a form of warfare, which perhaps above all others is liable to become rigid and stereotyped, should surely be welcomed and adopted by all of us whenever circumstances permit. Having had experience of similar methods on the lines of communication in the Mohmand affair of 1935, I am myself in no doubt as to their efficacy and one can only hope that their value may not be lost in the future. I enclose my card and remain,

Yours truly,

PUNJABI.

REVIEWS

HISTORY OF THE BOMBAY ARMY

BY SIR PATRICK CADELL

(*Longman's*, 18s.)

In reading this book, one feels that it is remarkable that the story of the Bombay Army has for so long remained unrecorded. Sir Patrick Cadell deserves the gratitude of the Army in India for the manner in which he has filled this gap in its historical records, and for the thorough and painstaking research which he has given to his task.

Until the overthrow of the military power of the Marathas, the Bombay Army was confined to a coastal role, and so had little share in the decisive victories of Plassey, Wandewash, Assaye and Argaum. Its record, however, during the growth of British power in India was one of which any soldier would be proud, and was emblazoned by such honours as Mangalore and Seedaseer. The end of Maratha domination saw the Bombay Army committed to a continental role, which culminated in the conquest of Sind, and participation in the First and Second Afghan Wars.

The Bombay Army could point with pride to its constant loyalty, and its freedom from the stain of insubordination. It stood the test of 1857, and provided units to help secure the Punjab, assist at the capture of Delhi, and form the bulk of Sir Hugh Rose's force during the campaign in Central India. Its tradition was Pride of Regiment, as opposed to the Pride of Caste of the Bengal Army. Sir Patrick Cadell traces the history of the Army through its early days, its struggles against financial disabilities, its days of expansion, to its mergence in one Army of India, and he carries the story through the Great War, where old units of the Army upheld their glorious traditions in all theatres of war, to the present day. The history shows that the Bombay Army produced, in its time, the first British Corps, the first artillery unit, the first mounted European soldiers, the first organized body of Indian soldiers, and the first pioneers, in the Company's service. To complete the history its units have now provided the first Indian armoured car regiments. The Bombay Army can also claim the first officer of the Indian Army to be awarded the Victoria Cross, and the first Indian soldier to receive a similar honour.

The history ends on a note of regret that some classes which helped to write these stirring pages now find no place in the Army. They must, however, appreciate that the demands of finance outweigh military worth.

The book is most attractively produced with really excellent appendices. It would have been preferable, however, for the expression "beat up" to have been omitted from what must become a standard work.

This history should find a place in every unit, and more especially in those units which claim descent from the Bombay Army.

D. R. B.

HINTS TO TRAVELLERS

ELEVENTH EDITION, VOLUME II.

Organization and Equipment; Scientific Observation;

Health, Sickness and Injury

This publication of the Royal Geographical Society would make a good present for every subaltern coming out to India. It would help him in his shooting trips. It would teach him what he ought to know about disease. But, chiefly, it would provide him with alternative interests to the more stereotyped forms of recreation, and so encourage that interest in a country and its inhabitants from which alone can real benefit from sojourn in any land be obtained.

The book divides naturally into three parts. The first twelve chapters deal with the organization and equipment of an expedition; the next seven with subjects for scientific observation, such as anthropology, geology and natural history. The last two chapters contain excellent instructions for the preservation of health, the treatment of injuries, and the diagnosis and treatment of disease.

It is, naturally, the first and the last of these which will be of most use to the soldier. But all make very interesting reading. The experience gained on many recent expeditions is given in note form on every subject that can be imagined—feeding, clothing, tents, transport, camp equipment, preparation, leadership, photography and others. No attempt is made to lay down a uniform doctrine or procedure. Opinions on these matters differ; and the reader is rightly left to choose the advice which best fits his own circumstances and is given the references by which he can, if necessary, proceed to a more detailed study of his subject.

The ground covered is world-wide. Perhaps chief emphasis is laid on Polar and Himalayan Travel, because this has lately received most attention, followed by the desert problems of Arabia, Sudan and the Sahara. The book is therefore peculiarly useful for India, and will be of great benefit to regiments or individuals who are planning Himalayan treks.

Admittedly, much of the subject matter is concerned with large and expensively equipped expeditions which are not normal for the soldier. But it is easier to select and to discard, than to amplify; and the present tendency towards small, inexpensive parties, who are largely prepared to live as they go, is, very properly, held up as an example. Here lies a paradox, for the book must concern itself intimately with modern scientific organization and equipment. And yet it is clearly more in sympathy with the simpler, possibly more old-fashioned, methods of travelling than with the highly organized, up-to-date circuses with which the illustrated press have made us familiar. Indeed, in some ways the most remarkable chapter is that on communications.

"These large expeditions demand of the leader all that he has. Day and night he is chained to the wireless . . . at the cost of his strength. The modern technique, the relentless tempo, the continual change of plans conditioned by radio: all these tired him with their merciless monotony."

And so the soldier, off on two months' leave, and intent on placing himself beyond reach of telegraphic recall, may safely turn to this book for encouragement and help.

G. W. W.

SUPPLY IN MODERN WAR

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL G. C. SHAW, R.A.O.C.

(*Faber & Faber, Ltd.* 12s. 6d.)

The problem of supply in war, so often dismissed as a dull subject, has in reality a fascination all its own. Moreover, without a satisfactory solution to this problem, success in battle will be sought in vain. There is little doubt therefore that Colonel Shaw's book will not only capture the interest of his military readers, but will also encourage their study of this most vital aspect of strategy and tactics.

In the first part of the book, supply systems from classical times down to the Italo-Abyssinian War of 1935-36 are described


and carefully analysed. With the help of this historical background, the author deduces certain unchanging principles and lays down the fundamental requirements of forces in the field. Throughout the ages, a cycle of efficiency and deadlock can be traced—the evolution of a complicated administrative machinery, which gradually stultifies the demands of mobility and surprise, until a new and better system restores a balance.

We have to-day reached a stage where supply “instead of holding her rightful position as the handmaiden of battle, has become war’s mistress.” It is indeed difficult to believe that the existing supply layout can survive modern air attack. And so, once again, history is repeated, and our administration defeats its own object. The time has come in the light of modern achievement to produce a better answer.

It is on these lines that doubts are cast on the wisdom of our present policy. The author is a wholehearted supporter of “mechanization” as opposed to “motorization.” Undoubtedly he feels that we are not moving fast enough in that direction. Perhaps there is justification for: “nor will it be easy . . . to change the mental outlook of the soldier, bred for more than half a century amidst traditions of elaborate detail, lengthy preparation and cumbersome movement; nor for him to divest himself of the accustomed fetters of administrative tyranny.”

The second half of the book contains many interesting and challenging suggestions. Comparatively small mechanised forces, maintained permanently on a war footing, are advocated on the grounds that mass mobilization is no longer practical politics. Dispersion is the keynote for supply—mobile convoys operating from mobile bases. Comment is made on our failure to profit from the many obvious lessons in the economy of personnel provided by civilian practice, as even in peace time the soldier is inflicted with unnecessary domestic drudgery. And a plea is put forward for the restoration of those traditional qualities of frugality, hardiness and endurance, which are obscured by the luxurious conditions of our peace manoeuvres. It would be interesting to see how far Colonel Shaw’s ideas could be applied to the Army in India, where the supply problem has always been paramount.

G. B.



THE ASSAULT AND TAKING OF SERINGAPATAM, MAY, 1799.

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EDITORIAL

We dealt with the Eight Demands made by Herr Henlein, the Sudeten leader, at Carlsbad in our last issue. In reply to those demands the Czech Government outlined proposals which took the form of three draft statutes. A Nationalities Statute embodied a more liberal interpretation of rights which minorities already enjoyed and confirmed the principle that every national group should have schools in proportion to its numbers. Amendments to the Languages Act were drawn up to remove German grievances and allow minorities to use their own tongue in business with State officials. But an Administrative Reform Bill was by far the most important of the measures put forward by the Czech Government. This last bill was designed to provide for a considerable decentralization of the work of Government by the creation of four provincial diets in Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and Ruthenia. Each diet was to be composed of *curias*, or sections, representing the nationalities involved. In Bohemia, for instance, the *curia* was to be Czech and German; in Moravia, Czech, German and Polish; in Slovakia, Slovak and Hungarian; and in Ruthenia, Ruthenian and Russian. The members of each diet were to be elected by direct vote, and the diet was to have an executive committee of twelve members on which nationalities would be proportionately represented. As regards

powers, diets were to control every detail of provincial administration and have also the right to object to legislative measures of the central government affecting the welfare of the local population, but questions of defence, finance and foreign policy would remain in the hands of the national government at Prague.

Such were the initial proposals of the Czech Government and, from the start, they met with little response from the Sudeten leaders who maintained, not entirely without reason, that they consisted of concessions which had long been withheld and no longer went far enough. The amendments to the Languages Act were admitted to contain useful provisions, but the Administrative Reform Bill was stigmatised as being wholly inadequate and likely to create more problems than it solved.

While negotiations for a settlement were in progress, the Sudeten leaders, acting—it is believed—on instructions from Berlin, submitted a fresh series of fourteen demands. These did not receive the publicity which was given to the Carlsbad demands, but undoubtedly went a great deal further and practically amounted to a demand for a self-governing German state within Czechoslovakia, a proposal which Dr. Benes and Dr. Hodza had frequently stated they could not entertain.

It was to find a way out of what was rapidly becoming a deadlock that Lord Runciman left for Czechoslovakia at the beginning of August. His mission, an unofficial one, had the concurrence of Berlin and Prague and the well-wishes of almost every other government in Europe. The possible gains for peace were enormous. So also were the difficulties, which daily became clearer. In the first place, there were the immediate differences between the Germans and the Czechs; the Germans holding out for a degree of autonomy which in effect approached secession, the Czechs going far in conceding local autonomy within districts and wide measures of decentralization. Then there were the problems of race inseparable from a state consisting of half a dozen different nationalities, Czechoslovaks, Germans, Hungarians, Ruthenians, Jews and Poles. Lastly there was the problem of the relations of the Czech State as a whole with its neighbours, and particularly with Germany. Lord Runciman's task was far more than the immediate settlement of Czech Sudeten disputes. Not only had he to find a way by which all minorities in Czechoslo-

vakia could be satisfied within the framework of a democratic constitution, but a means by which the relations of the State with her powerful neighbour could be placed on a footing of permanent friendship.

At the beginning of September, when Lord Runciman had been barely a month in the country, events took a sudden turn for the worse. The change was heralded by a chorus of indignation and hostility in the German Press and increased reluctance on the part of the Sudeten leaders to entertain any proposals, adequate or inadequate, for a settlement. The fact was that what had started as a local quarrel was rapidly developing into a major dispute likely to embroil Europe in war. Herr Henlein, Dr. Kundt and other Sudeten German leaders who might have been prepared to settle their differences with the Czechoslovak Government in view of the latter's great concessions had ceased to count. It was no longer a question of what Dr. Hodza would offer or Herr Henlein accept, but whether Herr Hitler, urged forward by the unrest in Germany which had been showing itself for the first time since the Nazis came into power, would risk a war which he knew might involve the great nations of the world. The German Army, though not officially mobilized, stood for practical purposes at war strength. Men, women, vehicles and material had been conscripted and commandeered for manœuvres on an unprecedented scale and intended to last for a period of weeks, not days. Across Germany's western frontier, all leave had been stopped in the Services in France, reservists called to the colours and the Maginot Line manned.

It was in these circumstances, on the eve of Herr Hitler's speech at Nuremburg, that Great Britain indicated that it would be impossible for her to stand aside if war broke out. Either the warning came too late or it was couched in language that was not forcible enough. German demand followed German demand with startling rapidity only to culminate in an ultimatum to Prague of extraordinary severity. Possibly the clear desire of the German people to avoid war and the news of the mobilization of the British Navy may have caused the Führer to hesitate at the last moment, but the major credit for the avoidance of war must be given to the untiring efforts of the British Prime Minister and

the calm dignity with which the Czech Government faced an intolerable and unprecedented situation.

It is impossible as yet to judge the agreement reached at Munich in true perspective. That there will be many searchings of heart and wide divergences of opinion is inevitable and time alone will show whether or not Britain was justified in the course she took.

* * * *

There have been increasing signs of late that responsible circles in the United States of America are no longer **Anglo-American Relations.** content to remain indifferent to political developments in Europe. Shortly after the tense situation which occurred between Germany and Czechoslovakia last May the *New York Times* devoted a leading article to the subject of America's attitude in the event of war between the democratic and totalitarian states. "The aggressor nations will make a mistake," it wrote, "if they assume from our unwillingness to pledge ourselves to a specific course of action that it is safe to leave us out of their calculations. We shall be fully prepared, if war envelops Europe, to choose the side of the democracies." More pertinent perhaps was the recent speech of President Roosevelt while on a visit to Canada. "We are no longer a far away continent," he said, "but have become a consideration to every propaganda office and every general staff. The United States will not stand idly by, if Canadian soil is threatened."

It would be unwise to assume from either of these pronouncements, still less from the speeches of Mr. Cordell Hull who, for long, has been a voice crying in the wilderness of American isolationism, that any marked change in the foreign policy of the United States is likely. They constitute, nevertheless, a very definite warning to aggressors that Americans will fight, if occasion demands, despite their ingrained hatred of war. They do more; for they indicate both the need for and the possibilities of a true Anglo-American understanding.

Under the circumstances the appeal made in the House of Lords, during the debate on the Finance Bill, that a settlement of the American debt should not be consigned to the category of permanently impossible ideals should have aroused approval among

thoughtful men on both sides of the Atlantic. The atmosphere for a re-opening of the question has been unfavourable for some years and, indeed, Lord Stanhope, on behalf of the Government, did indicate that there is little prospect of immediate negotiations for liquidation of the debt being started. Officially, of course, the door is still open, as is evidenced by the half-yearly reminders from the United States of the sums owing and the British acknowledgments thereof.

But the fact is that there has been so much popular misconception on the subject ever since the Balfour Note, which inferred that America lent the money to Britain because her credit was better than that of her allies, that negotiations for a settlement would be a delicate matter. Actually there were two categories of borrowing from America. Prior to the entry of that country into the war, loans were raised in the ordinary way from the American people, and undoubtedly much of the money so obtained was used for the benefit of Britain's allies, particularly Russia. But these loans have all been repaid and are no longer a controversial matter. After the entry of America into the war, borrowings took the form of loans from the United States Government and were utilised by a joint purchasing organization acting on behalf of the allies as a whole.

In previous wars loans advanced by Britain to her own allies had always been written off as subsidies made in a common cause, and this was the basis of the proposal made in the Balfour Note which stated that Britain was prepared to cancel her claims to reparations from Germany and to debts due from other allies, if America would, in her turn, cancel the sums owing by Great Britain to her. But American opinion not only refused to admit the thesis that inter-allied debts and reparations formed parts of an indivisible problem, but was hurt by attempts to belittle the war effort put forth by the people of America.

In the meantime arrears of interest have brought the total of the British debt in the books of the United States Treasury not only to a figure far in excess of the original debt but one that is impossible of repayment. Under the Johnson Act of 1934, Great Britain suffered the unprecedented experience of being stigmatised as a defaulter. The only possibility of repayment now would be

for the United States voluntarily to forgo the interest agreed to under the Balfour Note. Even so the capital due for repayment would be extremely large, though perhaps not impossible of liquidation. Since this is now the only major problem dividing the two English speaking nations, almost any reasonable solution, even one involving heavy sacrifices on both sides, would undoubtedly meet with the approval of the peoples of both countries.

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The White Paper issued in London in July contained not only a review of the labours of the Non-Intervention Committee over the last two years but a detailed plan for the withdrawal of foreign volunteers in Spain, a plan, moreover, to which twenty-six governments had unanimously agreed.

Non-intervention is essentially a departure from pre-War practice. It was then usual to supply arms and munitions without restriction to belligerents, whether in a civil war or a war between states. The belligerent could search vessels suspected of being engaged in arms traffic, but the neutral stood to do an extremely lucrative business. Two years ago most European countries reached an agreement by which they undertook to "take the profit out of war" by refusing to deliver munitions to either side in Spain. Unfortunately, by the time the agreement was reached, a substantial measure of material help had already been given to both Republican and Nationalist parties in Spain, and the Soviet ambassador made it clear that his government could not consider itself more limited as regards intervention than any of the other participants. Since 1936, despite a tacit acceptance of the principle that non-intervention is desirable, there have been continual efforts on the part of outside nations, with the exception of Britain, to check the aid rendered by the various governments interested in the outcome of the Spanish struggle and to ensure that material supplied to one side was counter-balanced at once by material supplied to the other. Great Britain alone has remained impartial, although there have been, and still are, Englishmen who are fervent partisans of the Republican and Nationalist causes; and it has been largely, if not entirely, due to British efforts that the war has been kept localized.

Until recently the work of the Non-Intervention Committee could only have been described as restricting, not abolishing intervention. It was a great step forward, therefore, when twenty-six governments agreed on the details of a comprehensive plan for the withdrawal of foreign volunteers in Spain. In brief, it was proposed that two international commissions should proceed to Spain to count the foreign combatants and, when that had been done, there should begin a systematic withdrawal according to a fixed time-table. When 10,000 combatants had been withdrawn from the side found to have the fewer, and a proportionately larger number from the other side, both Republican and Nationalist parties would be granted belligerent rights; but the withdrawal itself was to go on until, it was hoped, no foreign soldier remained on Spanish soil. Even so the belligerency was to be a limited one, for the governments were agreed that no further arms or munitions should be exported directly or indirectly to Spain.

In view of the facts that the twenty-six States represented on the Non-Intervention Committee had declared the plan to be both practical and desirable and that it had been accepted immediately and unreservedly in Barcelona, General Franco's somewhat tardy reply, which was hedged about with so many restrictions as to be tantamount to rejection, can only be described as a deplorable development. And it is difficult to see why the General should object so strongly to certain features of the scheme. The Insurgents cannot be left any worse off as the result of withdrawal, and the opinion is widely and authoritatively held that the grant of belligerent rights would, if anything, help the Insurgent cause, since General Franco has the more effective means of enforcing a blockade. Moreover, both parties in Spain have repeatedly declared that their ultimate aim is Spain for the Spaniard, not for the foreigner. Had the scheme received General Franco's approval, the commissions might have been in Spain this month and most foreigners would have been evacuated by the end of the year. The Spanish problem settled, the only remaining hindrance to the putting into effect of the Anglo-Italian agreement would have been removed.

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After a number of sittings *in camera*, the Technical Commission under the chairmanship of Sir John Palestine.

Woodhead, held its first public inquiries in Palestine in June and has now left the country. The Commission has been concerned less with policy than with questions of fact, questions such as the economic and social consequences of partition, the number of immigrants which the proposed Jewish State can bear and the possibilities of development of waste areas in Palestine and Trans-Jordania.

Meanwhile the situation in Palestine has been steadily deteriorating. When troops and police occupied Galilee and Samaria in May, the larger bands of terrorists were forced to split up into small bodies. Since then there has been a pronounced increase in the number of incidents, and little, if any, reduction in their seriousness. To counter the actions of terrorists, and more particularly to impede the traffic in arms from Syria and Lebanon, the Government decided, on the advice of Sir Charles Tegart to construct a wire fence along a portion of the Palestinian frontier. The decision aroused considerable feeling, some of it based on the fact that the fence would be an obstruction to legitimate trade, but for the most part systematically fostered by the Arabs. And it was unfortunate that the construction of the fence considerably outstripped the erection of the blockhouses which were a necessary part of the plan of defence.

An important cause of the recent disturbances has been the reprisals undertaken by the Revisionist Jews, a small body of extremists, opposed to partition and not recognising the control of the more moderately inclined Jewish Agency. The arrival of two battalions of infantry and a regiment of armoured cars from Egypt did much to get the situation in hand in the towns, but not in rural areas, where the difficulties of the troops have been increased by the fact that the available police are far too few and its Arab element unreliable. As a result the prestige of Government in the countryside has tended to decline.

Then there is the fact that diplomatic representations to Paris with a view to obtaining the extradition of the Muftie of Jerusalem have, so far, met with no success. The Muftie is still at Beirut and has been influential in securing the establishment of various

"Committees of Palestine Defence" in Cairo, Baghdad and Damascus with the object of disseminating propaganda and collecting funds for the Arab cause. Those committees have obtained, and are still obtaining, considerable support from the peoples of neighbouring countries but during the last few months the enthusiasm of the governments of such countries for the cause of the Palestinian Arabs appears to have been on the wane; whether as a result of the Muftie's relative lack of success, a suspicion that funds are not always devoted to the purpose for which they have been collected or a realization that Britain not only cannot, in the long run, be coerced, but is the one power which may yet stand between the Middle East and dictators, is not known. But it is probable that all three of these considerations are slowly having their effect between Suez and India.

While interest in the Arab cause has been decreasing abroad, the Muftie's own position, as titular head of the Arabs in Palestine, has become increasingly difficult. Hitherto he has been able to embarrass the Government in Palestine in a hundred different ways without actually bringing about an armed insurrection. Now, however, Jewish and Arab tempers are near breaking point, indeed there is probably no moderate Arab feeling left, and the Muftie may find his hand forced. That either Arab or Jew can gain anything from actual insurrection is of course impossible, but until the influence of the Muftie is eliminated, the activities of Revisionist Jews brought under control and terrorism eradicated the situation must remain extremely grave. Certainly no lasting settlement can be achieved while these factors remain.

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During August, while the fear of a major war in Europe was steadily increasing, two notable steps were taken **The Balkan and Little Ententes.** by certain small powers in the cause of peace. On 1st August an important agreement was signed at Salonika between Dr. Kiosseivanoff, Prime Minister of Bulgaria, and General Metaxas, Foreign Minister of Greece and President, for this year, of the Permanent Council of the Balkan Entente. The agreement emphasised the desire of Bulgaria on the one hand and the Balkan Entente, composed of Rumania, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece, on the other for co-operation and peace. The Balkan Powers renounced the application of the military clauses of the Treaty of

Neuilly, so freeing Bulgaria from the severe disabilities imposed on her in 1919, and agreed to the remilitarisation of the areas on each side of the Turco-Greek and Turco-Bulgarian frontiers. Although the agreement appears at first sight to do little more than permit an unlimited measure of rearmament and fortification, it is essentially a contribution to the cause of peace, for it means that Bulgaria's neighbours are so confident of her peaceful intentions that they are prepared to surrender advantages substantial to themselves, but which have long rankled in Bulgarian minds.

The second step towards political appeasement relates to the conference at which, after a year of negotiation, a non-aggression pact was signed between Hungary and the nations of the Little Entente—Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania. It is true that final agreement has not yet been reached on all outstanding questions in the Danube region, but these questions have been discussed in detail and it is hoped that a solution to them will be found before long. This latter pact has, in one sense, been facilitated by the German annexation of Austria which ended Magyar hopes of a Hapsburg restoration, an event which would never have commended itself to the nations of the Little Entente. Whether the result of the conference will be to weaken German influence in the Danube basin has yet to be seen, but the agreement should relieve Czechoslovakia from the fear of attack on her southern frontier.

It will indeed be a turn of the wheel if European peace is brought about by the action of Balkan countries.

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In our last issue we recorded that the Japanese armies in north China were pressing westwards along the
The War in China. Lunghai railway and the fall of Chengchow, the junction of the Lunghai and Pinghan lines, seemed imminent. On the 11th June the southern bank of the Yellow River was breached at a number of places. Whether the banks collapsed through lack of maintenance, were damaged by Japanese shell fire or, as the Japanese state, deliberately cut by the Chinese army is not known. But there is certainly nothing improbable about the Japanese version, since the loss of life and the suffering which the breach has entailed would have counted for little with the Chinese in comparison with the resulting delay to the Japanese forces.

Within a week Japanese operations in the north had been brought to a complete standstill, and there the position remains. The Japanese Higher Command was forced to transfer its main weight to the Yangtze valley. Here, too, the rate of advance gives some indication of the difficulties experienced by the Japanese and the steadily increasing resistance of the main Chinese armies. Hukow was taken on the 5th July, but Kiukiang, fifteen miles further up river, held out for another three weeks. The Japanese forces took, in fact, a little over six weeks to push eighty miles up river, and that in spite of the easing of their supply and reinforcement problem as a result of the greater carrying capacity of the river compared with Chinese railways. The probable explanation of this slow advance is that mine-sweeping had to be undertaken, the weather was abominable and disease, particularly cholera, rife in both armies and among the civil population.

To capture Hankow is now the declared policy of the Japanese Government. The town is important politically, commercially and strategically. For months it has been the virtual centre of Chinese rule; it is the most prosperous town in central China and the Yangtze valley terminus of railway communications with the Chinese armies in the north and Canton in the south. That the Japanese will be successful in their new venture, we have little doubt. They have already taken Kiukiang, the first key to the prepared lines of defence covering the capital. A more interesting matter for speculation is whether Marshal Chiang Kai-shek will defend Hankow to the last round and the last man. He may well prefer to keep his field army intact and defend the town merely for a reasonable period. By withdrawing he would avoid the loss of much war material, no longer easy to replace, and force the Japanese to maintain large numbers of troops in the interior of China for an indefinite period, which is probably the last thing the Japanese Government desires. A strategic withdrawal is possible in two directions: to the north-west with the object of bringing the Chinese armies closer to Soviet aid, or to the south, towards Kwantung and Kwangsi, which have always been strongholds of anti-Japanese feeling.

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During the early part of August attention was focussed on the frontier clash between Soviet and Japanese troops. The facts

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of this incident appear to have been as follows. About the middle of July Russian troops occupied a ridge on the Soviet Manchukuo border, south of Hunchun. One of the features of this ridge overlooks Possiet Bay, a potential Russian submarine base, on the one side and the defences of the Korean port of Rashin on the other. Attempts were at once made by the respective governments to solve the matter by diplomatic action, but the Japanese forces on the spot became impatient and decided to eject the Soviet troops. This led to hostilities and the Soviet detachment was reinforced from the Far East Red Army. On 30th July the Japanese launched an attack on the heights which they occupied next day. From that time until the truce, which came into force on 11th August, the Russians staged a series of counter-attacks which achieved a measure of success, but failed completely to dislodge the Japanese.

During the negotiations M. Litvinoff insisted that the map attached to the Sino-Russian treaty of 1886 should form the basis of discussion and that a condition of the granting of a truce should be a return of the disputed ridge to the Russians, while the Japanese ambassador in Moscow pressed for the restoration of the position obtaining at the beginning of July. It was eventually agreed that the troops should remain in the positions held at midnight on August 10th pending the demarcation of the frontier by a commission of two Russians, one Japanese and one Manchukuoan representatives.

If the incident did nothing more, it at least showed that neither the Soviet, with one eye turned towards events in central Europe, nor Japan, with her hands already full in China, wished to embark on a major war. It showed even more clearly the truth of the statement which was stressed by Major Nicolls in his lecture* before the United Service Institution that the struggle in the Far East is not only a Sino-Japanese struggle, but a triangular fight between Russia, China and Japan.

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The last few months in Waziristan have been chiefly notable for the activities of the Shami Pir, the operations against the Faqir of Ipi's *lashkar* in the Kharre area, north of Datta Khel and the raid on Bannu.

During June a serious situation arose in south Waziristan owing to the presence of Saiyid Muhammed Sadi of Damascus, a cousin of ex-King Amanullah's queen Souriya. This man, locally

* Reproduced in this issue.

known as the Shami Pir, had entered Waziristan earlier in the year ostensibly to settle tribal religious questions and blood feuds. It was not long, however, before he aroused the suspicions of the Afghan Government who asked for his removal. That the Afghan Government were justified in their suspicions that the Shami Pir's real object was to raise a force of Mahsuds and Ahmedzai Wazirs with a view to joining the Ghilzais in a revolt in the Kandahar Province was proved when he moved towards the Durand Line on the 23rd June. Vigorous political and air action was at once taken by the Government of India and troops were moved from north Waziristan towards the danger area. The Shami Pir's following began to disperse and on the 27th the Pir arrived at Wana, where he agreed to cease his activities against the Afghan Government and to return to his home in Syria.

The operations in the Kharre area, to which the Faqir of Ipi had withdrawn when he was ejected from Madda Khel country, arose as a result of the attacks on Datta Khel fort and the Faqir's continual efforts to instigate serious offences. The operations were undertaken by the 3rd Indian Infantry Brigade and the Razmak Brigade and resulted not only in the dispersion of the hostile *lashkar*, but in the infliction of a larger number of casualties than usual. The Faqir's cave area was thoroughly searched, and stores, ammunition and other belongings which had been abandoned by the enemy were destroyed or removed.

The raid on Bannu, which was made by a force of some two hundred men on the evening of the 23rd July, was one of the most daring of its kind. And it was remarkable that the first intimation received in Bannu City that a hostile force was on its way from tribal territory was given by three lorry drivers of the Frontier Constabulary, who happened to be walking on the Kurram bridge. Timely information could, undoubtedly, have been given by the inhabitants of the countryside which the tribesmen had to traverse during their approach. The fighting in the city lasted for an hour after which the tribesmen were ejected, but not before they had succeeded in setting fire to a considerable area.

In comparison with recent months, August and the first half of September were a period of relative quiet. Minor offences continued, mostly in north Waziristan and the Kohat District, but their number tended to decrease. This improvement is probably due to two factors, the approach of colder weather and the consequent desire of the tribes to move down to the lower valleys

which they know can easily be denied them, and the fact that the Faqir of Ipi has been, more or less, on the run since his eviction from the Kharre area. But it would be premature to anticipate any permanent improvement in the situation or to hope that there will be no recrudescence of trouble before the spring. The situation in Waziristan is still much too unsettled for that.

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The announcement of new terms of service for officers in all the three Defence Services was a natural corollary to the progressive improvement which has been apparent for some years in the conditions of service of the men.

**New Terms of
Service for Officers**

The lot of the average Army officer was perhaps worse than that of officers in the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force for a variety of reasons. The Royal Navy had been reduced relatively less than the Army since 1918, and for years the Admiralty had sternly wielded an axe which, while it was hard on many deserving officers who found themselves no longer required as they neared middle age, nevertheless improved the prospects of those who remained. The Royal Air Force, though grievously reduced in post-war years, adopted a policy of granting large numbers of temporary commissions, so improving the chances of promotion for its permanent officers. But in the army stagnation prevailed. That that stagnation was due in part to the large numbers of officers who entered the Service during the war is undeniable; but it was due far more to a regimental system which produced the most extraordinary anomalies in promotion and to the fact that the proportion of junior to senior officers in the Army was far higher than in either of the other two Services. In fact, it was calculated that the chances for a subaltern to reach the rank of colonel were about half of those of the midshipman to reach the rank of captain.

The most welcome change introduced by the Admiralty will be the abolition of half pay for captains and flag officers, a practice which has borne heavily on many officers in the past. At the same time, flag officers will be retired as soon as it is certain that they will not be re-employed, instead of being allowed to remain until their next promotion and draw the pension of a rank in which they have never served. But increased rates of retired pay come into force with this provision, thus bringing naval pensions into line with those in the other Services.

In the Royal Air Force, promotion of flying officers of the General Duties Branch to flight-lieutenants after two years' service in the rank will be the standard practice in future. Improvements have been made in the scale of pay of squadron-leaders, wing commanders and air commodores. In the case of the two latter ranks these improvements have been accompanied by the withdrawal of command pay, which only a few Royal Air Force officers were ever able to draw, and by an extension of the allowances granted to station commanders in aid of the expenses of official entertainment to which they are put. Half pay has been abolished in the Royal Air Force, as it has in the other Services, and the maximum ages for retirement have been brought into line, rank for rank, with those in the Army.

The prospects of the average British Army officer have been greatly improved under the new conditions introduced by the Secretary of State for War. A reduction of the age-limits means that those who are capable of filling the higher ranks will reach them earlier, to their own advantage as well as that of the country. At the same time the security of tenure of the average officer is considerably improved by the fact that he will be assured of at least ten years in the rank of major, with an adequate, if small, pension on retirement from that rank.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of the reforms is the assistance offered to parents who cannot afford the fees charged at Woolwich and Sandhurst. In future it will be possible for a cadet, whose parents are in straitened circumstances, to pass through the colleges without any charge being made; while, to meet the need of the officer on being commissioned, there will be available one hundred post-commission scholarships of £20 a year, tenable for three years. Whether this sum of £20 a year will really suffice in the case of an officer with no private means remains to be seen, but the step is undoubtedly one in the right direction; and it is a useful aid to the main object of the reforms—that of enhancing the efficiency of the Army as a whole by offering better prospects.

THE SINO-JAPANESE STRUGGLE

A lecture given before His Excellency the Right Honourable the Lord Brabourne, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., M.C., Acting Viceroy and Governor-General of India and the members of the United Service Institution of India by Major J. E. H. Nicolls, M.C., on 21st July 1938. The lecturer was introduced by Major-General C. J. E. Auchinleck, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., officiating Chief of the General Staff.

YOUR EXCELLENCY, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

I hope I shall not disappoint you when I say that in this lecture I am going to devote very little time to the actual war that is now in progress between Japan and China. Most of the time I shall devote to a study of the main events in the Far East during the last forty years, so that you may see the present war in its true perspective as a stage in a struggle for supremacy that has now been going on for half a century. I have a great deal of ground to cover and therefore must omit an enormous amount of detail, but I hope, none-the-less, to give you a connected and impartial outline of the main issues. I propose first of all to say something about Japan and the Japanese, then to give you a brief sketch of Chinese history since the Boxer rising and to discuss the principal events in the foreign relations of Russia, Japan and China as they have affected the Far Eastern situation. Lastly, I shall give a very brief description of the present war together with a few comments.

The modern era in Japan dates from what is known as the Meiji restoration in 1868, when the policy of isolation which had been practised for two and a half centuries was abandoned and a deliberate programme of westernization adopted. As regards the Meiji restoration all that need be said is that it meant the restoration of absolute power to the Emperor and the end of a system that had obtained for some hundreds of years by which the Government of the country was in the hands of the head of the predominant clan or group of clans. The Japanese are an intensely proud race but they are also a race of realists. They realised that a policy of exclusion could not be maintained and that the only way to get on terms with the foreigner was to attain his standards and to equal him in every way in proficiency. Japan, therefore, set out deliberately to learn all that the West could teach her and to adapt to her own use all that she found worth while in

foreign civilization, science and industrial practice. The result, as you know, has been one of the most extraordinary transformations in history.

Now I want to revert to this pride of race that the Japanese have to such a marked degree. The first Emperor is claimed to be descended from the sun-goddess and the whole Japanese nation feels itself to be extracted from rather more than mortal clay. The indigenous religion of Japan is called "Shinto," which means the "way of the gods" and the Japanese have also a code of chivalry known as "Bushido" which means the "way of the soldier." It is not very easy for us to appreciate the intense racial pride of the Japanese, his veneration for his Emperor who epitomises for him all his ideas of patriotism, and his narrow but compelling ideas of personal honour. None-the-less we must accept the fact that these things exist and we must realise and respect the strong individualism that actuates him once his conscience is aroused. It is this personal attitude towards public affairs that makes it equally imperative and honourable to the Japanese in certain circumstances either to take his own life or that of his opponent.

From this I can turn to the system of government in Japan. While superficially some of the elements of democracy are present, the government is really modelled on the pre-war Prussian system. The Emperor is supreme and sacrosanct. All authority is derived from him. The cabinet is nominated by him and is answerable to him and not to the elected parliament. The heads of the Fighting Services are also directly responsible to the Emperor without even the Cabinet interposing. This position of responsibility is acutely felt by the Services, which accounts for their frequent and what seems to us unwarrantable interference in politics. The Army, and the Navy too for that matter, looks on itself as literally responsible for the welfare of the whole nation and the more extreme elements, whom we generally refer to as the Young Officers class, are apt to regard the intrusions of politicians, financiers and liberal thinkers in affairs of State as little short of blasphemy. It is the conviction of many Japanese, and this is not confined to the military class, that it is their destiny to control and lead the other races of Asia. In these circumstances it is easy to realise how intensely repugnant to the Japanese must be the creed of communism, both in its essence and also because of its victory, in one case temporary and in the other apparently permanent, over the despotisms in Germany and Russia, which the Japanese political structure so closely follows.

I have not the time to describe the struggle that has developed in recent years between the extremists and the more moderate democratic elements. But it is worth noting that this struggle has been not so much on questions of principle as on methods of procedure. In foreign policy particularly there has been no great divergence in aims. What divergence there has been has taken place over the means of attaining those aims.

There is one more point to note in connection with Japanese politics. While in the broad division of opinion between the extremists and the moderates, the Services are on the whole more identified with the former, there is at the same time a division of opinion between the army and the navy. The former pins its faith to conquest on the mainland as the solution of Japan's problems, while the latter advocates economic expansion, and probably political domination, in the zone between Hong Kong and Australia. The present war is very much the Army's "show" but if they fail to deliver the goods, there may be a revulsion in favour of naval thought. The adoption of the navy's policy would affect us very closely.

Now let us consider the factors that have determined Japan's policy during the last forty years. Broadly speaking there are three: the problem of security, the economic problem and what I will call the spiritual factor.

The problem of security is easy to comprehend. The Russo-Japanese War was for the Japanese a war of self-preservation. They had and still have good reason of their conviction that Russia is their inevitable enemy and that there can be no peaceful development between the two nations. The acquisition of Manchukuo did something to remove the threat but the danger of a combination between China and Russia still existed and has been responsible for Japan's policy of infiltration into Inner Mongolia and domination of the provinces of North China. I need not labour the point, but it is well to remember that the Japanese feel very strongly the danger of their position. They feel about Manchuria in much the same way that we have felt for centuries about the Low Countries.

The economic issue is also tolerably straightforward. Japan's population has been expanding rapidly for years. At the same time she has deliberately turned herself into an industrial nation. While she is still able to feed herself from her own resources she can only equip herself in the fullest sense of the word by maintaining her various industries. To do that she requires cheap raw

materials and large markets in which to sell finished products. As a country she is notably deficient in most valuable raw materials and must sell widely in order to buy what she needs for the support of her economic structure. She has from the start been in competition with the established industries of countries with far greater resources than her own. The protagonists of conquest in China maintain that China can supply many of the needed raw materials and a vast market for Japan's manufactured goods. Much the same arguments were put forward to justify the Manchurian adventure.

Thirdly, there is what I have called the spiritual factor. This is far more difficult to define or to assess in its influence on Japanese policy. It is perhaps enough to say that the conviction held by many Japanese that it is their destiny to assume the leadership of Asia, their collective sense of superiority and their individual sense of honour combine to produce a mental background and an attitude of mind which, other things being equal, will decide their reactions in any given situation. The spiritual factor explains, I think, why subordinate Japanese so often take the law into their own hands regardless of the wishes or policy of their government.

I am inclined to think that the economic issue, important as it is, is easily overshadowed as a factor in Japanese foreign policy by the question of security and the spiritual factor, both of which are closely related. The Japanese being as they are, I feel that the policy they have followed abroad has been inevitable. Whatever we may think of their methods and however easy it is to say what they ought to have done in a given situation, we must bring ourselves to realise that, whether we like it or not, they have acted consistently, in the only way, broadly speaking, that a nation with their traditions, outlook and convictions could have acted.

I cannot attempt to generalise about the Chinese as I have just done about the Japanese. In race, language and customs there are great divergences between the different parts of China. Like India the country has suffered great invasions and like India it has always absorbed its conquerors in time. But the people are not homogeneous and that explains why, in contrast to Japan, their renaissance has been stormy in the extreme.

The outcome of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 was a great shock to the Chinese and resulted in a number of movements in the direction of governmental reform and westernization. The Boxer rising in 1900 was the culmination of these movements,

with a predominating anti-foreign bias added. After its suppression the reform movement, now sponsored by the Imperial Government, continued at a rate that was too fast for the country and not fast enough for the democratic intelligentsia. The first serious revolutionary society was founded by Dr. Sun Yat Sen in Canton in 1905. The Chinese Revolution which followed was precipitated by a chance occurrence in Hankow in the autumn of 1911 and was a haphazard affair which might easily have been suppressed at the start. It was in fact well on the way to failure when the revolutionaries, almost inadvertently, captured Nanking and, feeling that they ought to do something about it, proclaimed a republic with Sun Yat Sen as provisional president. A collapse on the Government side followed and the boy-Emperor abdicated. Sun Yat Sen had a much clearer appreciation of the realities of the situation than his supporters and, realising that too rapid a transition was impossible, arranged for the substitution of Yuan Shihkai, the ablest statesman of the old regime, as president. But there was naturally a great divergence between the latter's ideas of government and the socialist theories of the extreme republicans. Yuan Shihkai proved the stronger and maintained a qualified dictatorship until his death in June 1916.

There was already a distinct cleavage between South China which was republican and North China which tended towards militarism and the restoration of the monarchy or at least of a dictatorship. A period of complete chaos followed Yuan Shihkai's death. In the north various factions struggled for supreme power, one of the outstanding figures being Chang-Tso-lin, Governor of Manchuria. In the south the republicans were not only unable to influence affairs north of the Yangtze but were hopelessly divided among themselves, Sun Yat Sen being hard put to it to maintain his control. Looking round for outside help he found the Great Powers, with the exception of Russia, absorbed in their post-war problems. Russia offered assistance and the offer was accepted. A Russian mission was sent to Canton and under the organising genius of the notorious Borodin soon gained ascendancy over the Kuomintang or republican party. It was the Soviet aim to work for communism and the expulsion of foreigners through the Kuomintang, and Great Britain in particular was singled out for attack. Sun Yat Sen's death in 1925 removed the last check on Bolshevik ascendancy. Strikes, boycotts and murderous attacks on foreigners became the order of the day. The student class provided the ringleaders in all these disturbances, which were especially frequent in Shanghai. A competent observer described

the anti-British movement as "the most perfect and complete attempt of one nation to destroy the influence of another without warfare in the whole of human history."

In August 1925 Chiang Kai-shek, who had been with the revolutionary party throughout and had received military training in China, Japan and Russia, made his first public appearance on the scene. At the time he was president of the military College near Canton. The assassination of the communist finance minister in Canton led him to take control of the Kuomintang and to a purge of the moderate elements. Borodin became his political adviser and in addition he had a Russian Chief of Staff. Russian ascendancy had about reached its peak.

The Nationalists now felt that the time was ripe to extend their rule over the rest of China and an advance to the Yangtze was decided on. North of that river various warlords were still jockeying for power and it did not seem probable that they would be able to present a united front. The campaign commenced in July 1926. The Nationalist armies carried all before them and in September Hankow was captured. In Hankow a deliberate and very dangerous attempt was made to embroil the British. The Concession was invaded and only extreme forbearance on the part of the British defeated Borodin's manoeuvre. The British Government followed a policy of conciliation and showed itself ready to negotiate concessions with the Nationalist Government. These overtures were looked on as a sign of weakness and did nothing to stop the anti-British movement.

In March 1927 the Nationalists captured Nanking and there occurred massacres and outrages perpetrated against foreigners. You will remember that the situation was so dangerous that we had to send a division to Shanghai and other nations followed suit.

Meanwhile Chiang Kai-shek had decided to break with the Communists and he came to Shanghai to enlist the support of "Big Business" to this end. In this he was successful, even the student classes coming over to his side. A vigorous anti-communist purge commenced and the Russian Mission was expelled.

Chiang Kai-shek now turned his attention to the north, where Chang Tso-lin was a virtual dictator. To cut a long story short, Chiang Kai-shek, assisted by the defections of various warlords, was completely successful by the summer of 1928. Chang Tso-lin retired to Manchuria where he lost his life in a bomb outrage on arrival at Mukden. The new unity of China was signalled by the formation at Nanking of the First National Government on

October 10, 1928. This unity was, however, entirely superficial. There was deep hostility to Chiang Kai-shek below the surface in many quarters and it was not long before it took concrete form. By May 1930 the Nanking Government was practically bereft of supporters and a civil war broke out which lasted six months and cost 150,000 casualties. Although Chiang Kai-shek was finally victorious, he was not able to subdue the South where a rival national government was proclaimed at Canton early in 1931.

Let us now pause for a moment and attempt to sum up the situation in 1931. For fifteen years China had been devastated by civil wars and impoverished by industrial disturbances and the exactions of militarists. Never in the worst days of the Manchus had there been such destitution and chaos. Although now the Kuomintang was at last more or less supreme, the political balance was still unstable and there was no probability that the exhausted country could look forward to a period of settled government. Anti-foreign disturbances were still commonplaces, while the Government was breaking all records in the matter of the unilateral denunciation of agreements. The conciliatory policy of Great Britain and America was construed as abject weakness and the position of foreign interests had become desperate. The Chinese Government had even gone so far as to promulgate a decree abolishing extra-territoriality from January 1, 1932 and in this decree the British and American Governments looked like acquiescing. Then literally as well as figuratively came the bombshell of the Mukden incident on the night of September 18, 1931. By the following morning Mukden was under Japanese military control and the whole outlook for China changed. Before going on to deal with those events, it may be noted that the decree abolishing extra-territoriality was withdrawn in December. China now needed friends.

In considering events in the Far East, we shall be wrong if we look on them purely as a Sino-Japanese issue. We must remember that the contest is a triangular one and has been in progress for at least fifty years. Russia has intermittently followed a forward policy in eastern Asia for centuries, but in this review we need not go further back than 1860, in which year a treaty was negotiated between Russia and China which gave the former what is known as the Maritime Province and the Port of Vladivostok. These concessions did not appease Russia's appetite and from that date on until 1904 her pressure southward was continuous. In 1894 war broke out between Japan and China over the question of the protection of Japanese interests in Korea. An

easy victory for Japan followed and the peace terms included the independence of Korea and the cession to Japan of Formosa and the Liaotung Peninsula. The cession of the latter was, however, more than Russia could stomach and, backed by France and Germany, she successfully brought pressure to bear on Japan to relinquish it. This is an important point because it constituted for Japan her first public humiliation.

Shortly after this, in 1896, the Chinese signed a secret treaty with Russia directed against Japan, the existence of which was not known till after the Great War. The outward and visible sign of this treaty was the grant of permission to Russia to build the Chinese Eastern Railway, which gave her a short cut to Vladivostok. In 1898 Kiaochao was leased to Germany, ostensibly as reparation for the murder of two missionaries. Russia's reaction was to occupy Port Arthur and to secure a twenty-five year lease of the Liaotung Peninsula and the right to link up Port Arthur with the Chinese Eastern Railway. Harbin became a great military base and Port Arthur was fortified. The expansionist aims of Russia were then as clear as daylight and contemporary observers in 1900 believed that Manchuria was lost to China.

It is not difficult to realise how humiliating and frightening these developments must have been to the Japanese. One of the direct consequences of Russian policy was the signature of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1902. In this connection it is worth recalling that at that date we ourselves had very lively apprehensions as to Russian designs on India.

The immediate cause of the Russo-Japanese war was again Korea, then nominally an independent state. Japanese fears of Russian intentions led them in 1903 to ask for a specific guarantee of Korean independence. This Russia refused to give and war became inevitable. It is interesting to note that Japan commenced the hostilities by a raid on Port Arthur without any declaration of war. The Russo-Japanese war was fought by Japan for self-preservation, in revenge for previous indignities and for empire. When exactly the idea of empire took concrete shape I do not know but I think it must have been after the war of 1894. As you know Japan won the war, but by the narrowest of margins only. The war for her was a tremendous thing and called for a colossal effort. The result must have been staggering even to the Japanese themselves. All that, I think, explains something of the half reverent, half proprietary feeling the Japanese have about Manchuria. South Manchuria is to them what Belgium has been to us. As the result of the war, Japan succeeded to

Russia's interests in southern Manchuria and secured the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula and the recognition of her paramount interests in Korea, over which country she asserted her sovereignty in 1910. Her position, however, was still precarious as it was obvious that Russia was steadily preparing for another conflict.

Japan entered the Great War on the side of the Allies and was responsible for the reduction of the German fortress of Tsingtao. This put her in a position to negotiate with China as to the future of German leased territory and other rights in Shantung. But she went much further than this. Without any outstanding quarrel or cause for complaint she presented China with a series of terms, which are generally known as the Twenty-one Demands. These demands fell into five groups. The first dealt with Shantung. The second dealt with the Japanese position in Manchuria. All Japan's leases were extended to 99 years and special rights of residence, travel and commerce were granted in south Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia. The other three groups need not be detailed beyond saying that the fifth contained provisions relating to finance, armaments and advisers that would have put China in the position of a Japanese protectorate. The first two groups were accepted by China under threat of an ultimatum. The remainder were rejected.

Now there are two important comments to make on this treaty. The Twenty-one Demands were in one sense a piece of pure opportunism. In another they were a far reaching declaration of policy and show that Japan's aims on the mainland have remained constant for approximately twenty-five years. The second point is that the treaty was signed under duress. Whether the ultimatum was genuine or was, as has been stated by some Japanese, presented at the Chinese request as a face-saving device, the Chinese have since argued that the Manchurian clauses should be null and void as the treaty was executed under pressure. This is a most important point. If the Chinese thesis is tenable the Versailles treaty and half the treaties in the world's history, as the Japanese point out, become inoperative. Actually, the Shantung Settlement embodied in Group I of the Demands was recognised in the Versailles treaty. Nevertheless, since the war the Chinese have consistently behaved as if the treaty was non-existent and done their best whenever practicable to attack Japanese interests in Manchuria and to embroil the League of Nations and America on their own side.

Our next landmark is the Washington Conference of 1921 which incidentally led, as a natural corollary, to the dissolution

of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The results of that conference were firstly, a treaty of naval limitation, secondly, an agreement to adjust disputes in the Pacific by arbitration, and thirdly, the famous Nine-Powers Treaty. That treaty bound the signatories to respect the territorial and administrative integrity of China, to maintain the principles of the open door and equal facilities for all, and to afford the fullest opportunities for Chinese self-development. The Japanese position in Manchuria did not come within the scope of the conference.

The results of the Washington Conference constituted a severe setback to Japanese ambitions and a blow to her self-esteem. Remembering what I said about a triangular contest, it is important to note that Russia was not a signatory to any of these treaties. In Japanese eyes that must have detracted enormously from their value and that consideration must always be at the back of their minds when any appeal to the provisions of the Nine-Power treaty is made by third parties.

There is not very much to be said about the period between the Washington Conference and the year 1931. Japan went ahead with the development of her interests in Manchuria and north China and for some years did not meet with much obstruction, as the northern warlords were not ill disposed. But towards the end of Chang Tso-lin's time the situation deteriorated and after his death friction steadily increased. In a number of ways the Chinese tried to discriminate against Japan in Manchuria and there were a number of breaches of the Twenty-one Demands treaty which, as I have just said, the Chinese refused to consider as binding.

Who was responsible for the bomb explosion at Mukden on September 18, 1931, is not known. What is beyond argument is that the Japanese army authorities had a cut-and-dried plan of a comprehensive nature ready for the occasion and that it was put into operation with a swiftness and decision that the situation did not in the least justify, except in Japanese eyes. Japan had a good case as regards Manchuria, but she put herself completely in the wrong by her high-handed action, which rapidly developed into blatant conquest of the whole country. Japan herself proposed that the League of Nations should send a commission of enquiry to Manchuria, but prejudged the issue entirely by proclaiming the country's independence before the commission could start work, and then left the League because she did not like its findings. Early in 1933, Jehol, the most eastern province of Inner Mongolia, was annexed and in the following year P'u Yi,

the ex-Emperor of China, was installed on the throne of Manchukuo, as the new state was now called.

We must now turn back to Shanghai for a moment. The immediate reaction there to events in Manchuria was the imposition of an effective boycott of Japanese goods. Feeling was running high and early in 1932 there was an incident in which a Japanese was killed, which led to fighting between Japanese marines and Chinese troops in Chapei. For this result the Japanese were primarily to blame. They at once treated the whole affair as a major issue and there was virtual war for several weeks. The Japanese had to bring over two divisions from Japan before the Chinese could be defeated and honour satisfied. The Shanghai incident of 1932 was a bad political blunder on the part of the Japanese in that it was unjustifiable, achieved no useful purpose and greatly increased the hatred between the two countries.

The next year (1933) Chiang Kai-shek commenced a long-drawn-out campaign against those centres of communism in central and western China which remained as legacies from Borodin's day. The only points to note are that the communist armies were not exterminated but were gradually driven north into the provinces of Kansu and Shensi and that in the process Chiang Kai-shek was able to consolidate his influence in several remote provinces, where his authority had previously been only nominal.

By the end of 1935 the situation from the Japanese point of view had deteriorated considerably. Russia had immensely strengthened her forces in the Far East and was making open preparations of a warlike nature. Her influence in Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia was paramount and the Chinese Red Army was now in contact with Russian spheres of influence. Border incidents involving fighting were of frequent occurrence in Manchukuo which was proving more of a liability than an asset. China was more united than ever before and her army was slowly improving under German instruction. Anti-Japanese propaganda and boycotts had proceeded more or less vigorously for years and murders and assaults on Japanese were not uncommon although Japanese behaviour, admittedly, did nothing to decrease Chinese hostilities. In these alarming circumstances, it must have seemed imperative to the Japanese to secure a hold, either political or otherwise, on North China and Inner Mongolia, before it was too late. In the autumn of 1935 the Japanese militarists attempted to stage an autonomy movement in the five north-eastern provinces

of China. For various reasons the attempt miscarried, but that of course did nothing to allay Chinese suspicions or to make for a more peaceful atmosphere.

The year 1936 opened with what is known as the February revolt in Tokio, when a number of young officers assassinated various public men, including the Finance Minister, in an attempt to secure a change in Government policy. For some months the political situation in Japan was highly unstable. In China too, the political situation was delicate as the southern provinces of Kwangsi and Kwangtung, whose leaders had never become reconciled to Chiang Kai-shek, virtually threatened to revolt unless war was declared on Japan. The bluff, however, was called and Chiang Kai-shek's position was strengthened considerably. Towards the end of the year a much more serious incident took place, to wit, the arrest and temporary detention of Chiang Kai-shek by Chang Hsueh-liang, better known as the "Young Marshal," the general who was supposed to be engaged in rounding up the Reds in Shensi. The inner history of this business is still obscure and it is far too complicated to discuss here. Its importance lies in the fact that Chiang came very near being assassinated and because it led to something like an entente with the Communists. In North China, and to a less extent elsewhere, there was constant friction between Chinese and Japanese interests and a vast amount of smuggling went on with Japanese connivance to the detriment of China's customs revenue. During the year Russia signed what amounted to a defensive alliance with Outer Mongolia, to the alarm of Japan and the annoyance of China.

The Sino-Japanese atmosphere was a little clearer at the beginning of 1937 and it did seem for a time as if Japanese policy was to be more conciliatory. There were, however, a number of quick changes of government in Tokio, as the result of which the Army's say in affairs was strengthened. In North China there were indications that the Kwantung militarists were getting restive and observers on the spot were convinced that trouble was imminent. Tension was considerable and there was great nervousness on the Chinese side. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the firing of a chance shot at Loukouchiao on the night of July 7th/8th was sufficient to produce the long expected explosion. I am inclined to think that the fact that the explosion took place at a time when there was acute international tension in Europe and when Russia was in the throes of a political purge which had eliminated most of her best soldiers was not purely a coincidence.

The war proper in China started at the end of July last year when the Japanese, after non-compliance by the Chinese with an ultimatum, proceeded to "clean-up" the Peiping-Tientsin area. It was caused by the usual incident and there followed the usual recriminations on both sides before matters took a serious turn. It is unprofitable to go into the rights or wrongs of the particular episode, because both nations were on the tips of their toes to find fault with one another, although I don't think that the leaders of either actually wanted war.

I want to emphasize here the fact that a war in a country the size of China is a war of communications. Distances are so great, the country in parts so difficult, roads and railways so few that there is no question once one gets inland of fighting on a continuous front with fixed and secure flanks. It is a question of fighting along axes, whether roads, railways or waterways. Railways are naturally a first choice owing to their carrying capacity.

The obvious lines of advance for the Japanese in North China were the three railways, the Pingsui, for protection of their northern flank, the Pinghan and the Tsinpu. I cannot attempt to describe the operations in detail. Generally speaking, the Japanese were everywhere successful. There was serious fighting at a few places only, owing to the fact that the majority of Chinese troops and commanders were of the poorest quality. By the end of October the Japanese had reached the line shown on the maps you have got. I call it a line for convenience, but please remember that Japanese influence did not extend permanently beyond their main arteries of communication. There were, and still are, large areas which were most of the time uncontrolled by them.

We must now go back in time and consider Shanghai. There again hostilities were due to an incident, for which the Chinese were mainly to blame, but from what I have said earlier I think you will have realised that Shanghai has always been the focal point of anti-foreign feeling and that it was, therefore, inevitable that something should happen there sooner or later. In any case it was to the Chinese advantage strategically to split the Japanese effort and there is a presumption that the hope of embroiling foreign powers was an added inducement. For nearly two months the situation at Shanghai approximated to trench warfare. Subsidiary causes of this were the difficulties of the flat, waterlogged country, and the bad weather and faulty tactics on the Japanese side. The main cause was that the Japanese underrated the opposition and employed too few troops. The mistake was

rectified in due course and towards the end of October the Japanese struck a series of heavy and well prepared blows on the Chinese positions. On November 5th an audacious landing was carried out on the northern shore of Hangchow Bay. This turned the Chinese right flank at Shanghai and started a collapse that did not stop until Nanking was captured five weeks later.

About the time that Nanking fell, various circumstances caused the Japanese to resume the offensive in Shantung and by the end of the year they had overrun the more important parts of that province. There ensued a lull of about a month in both north and central China.

Early in February of this year the Japanese advanced again in north China, both in Shansi and Hopei, and, generally speaking, reached the line of the Yellow River, both to the south and the west. In Shantung they attacked towards the end of March with the intention of capturing the eastern end of the Lunghai railway. The fighting round Taierchwang and the Japanese efforts to capture Suchow, which were unsuccessful for two months, are matters of recent history. When at last, on May 19th, Suchow fell, as the result of converging movements from north and south, the Japanese advanced westwards along the railway with Chengchow as objective. They had not got far beyond Kaifeng when their operations were brought to a complete halt by the flooding of the Yellow River between Chengchow and Kaifeng. These floods have flowed south-eastwards and interpose an effective barrier between the Japanese and their objectives. There is, I think, little doubt that the Chinese were responsible. The loss of life and hardship caused to their own countrymen would count for little compared to the strategic advantage to be gained. The net result of this flooding has been to throw the Japanese back on to the Yangtze River as their line of advance on Hankow, which is now their avowed objective. So far they have made reasonable progress and have now reached the neighbourhood of Kiukiang.

I have no time to consider either political developments in China since the war started or the Japanese naval blockade or aerial warfare. But in connection with the latter I will say that the results obtained by the Japanese during six months of undisputed air supremacy have not been very great compared with the effort involved. Latterly the Chinese have got on terms again to some extent, owing to the supply of Russian aircraft, pilots and mechanics.

I now want to comment on a few aspects of the war. The war started in north China. That was the logical area for it

to start in and the Japanese would have been well content had it been confined to that area. The added commitment at Shanghai was unwelcome to the Japanese but was inevitable sooner or later unless they were prepared to evacuate Shanghai and abandon all their interests there. That I think was impossible to the Japanese and would have been equally so to any other nation in their position. The Shanghai commitment had very important consequences. In the first place it disclosed a power of resistance on the Chinese side that was certainly a surprise to the Japanese and probably to the Chinese also. The war at once became a serious affair to the former, face had to be saved and prestige restored. The result was that Japan transferred all her weight to the Shanghai theatre with such results that the Chinese defence cracked and what had originally been undertaken purely to teach the Chinese a lesson became rapidly transformed into a major campaign to capture the capital of China. This, it was confidently predicted, would mean the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek's government. As we know, it did not. We are now told that the capture of Hankow must be achieved because it will lead to the same results. Personally I don't think it will by itself. I make the point because I think it shows how considerations of prestige have overridden ordinary questions of strategy and turned the war into an unlimited liability for the Japanese, which was not at all their original idea.

The next point I want to touch on is that after the capture of Nanking the Japanese turned back to North China as soon as the winter was over to round off their conquests there. In doing so, however, they met with a resistance unlike anything they had met with before in the north, and it took them two months' hard fighting to capture the eastern end of the Lunghai railway. The slowness of their progress was initially due to the fact that, as usual, they underrated their enemy. Subsequently when they reinforced their front, all went well, but to do so they had to denude their other fronts to what proved a dangerous extent. Now the point to note is that since last October Japan has had a more or less constant number of troops in China, about 500,000. Japan can mobilize about three times that number and has in fact mobilized about a million men. But she must, as she feels, keep roughly half a million men partly in Manchuria and partly in reserve in Japan, to meet possible intervention by Russia. She also wishes to avoid the grave dislocation of industry which would be involved by a general mobilization. The result of all this is that the number of troops available for the war in

China is strictly limited and the problem of being strong everywhere becomes more and more difficult as the conquest of China proceeds.

Now, if we consider the limitation of the number of troops available in conjunction with the ever increasing scope of the war, we shall realise the very serious dilemma in which the Japanese have placed themselves. Apart from the difficulty of the military problem of gaining a decisive victory, the fact that they must be weak in secondary theatres encourages guerilla warfare and makes it difficult for those areas to settle down and for ordinary commerce and cultivation to be carried on therein. The problem of garrisoning and administering the occupied territory is a difficult one in any case. Every day that the war continues makes it more difficult. Japanese economic policy must be to exploit these territories both as markets and as producing areas with the least possible delay. But the dislocation caused by the continuance of the campaign, and that continuance is of Japan's own choosing since she has never put forward any peace terms that had a ghost of a chance of acceptance, makes the early realization of her economic aims daily more hopeless.

As regards the financial position of the two countries there is reason to suppose that Japan can continue at the present scale of expenditure for at least another year. While the situation will naturally get more and more serious for her, it seems doubtful whether it will ever get bad enough by itself to cause Japan's collapse. China's financial situation is harder to assess. It is definitely very bad now, but then China's internal economy is so unorthodox that I gather that even the experts will not commit themselves to prophecy. As long as she can scrape together enough money to pay her troops and for war materials I think she will manage to carry on.

The last point I want to make about the war is this: We are apt, I think, to look on it rather as a "ragtime" war. So it is, to some extent. The Japanese have made obvious blunders and the Chinese have not merely made blunders but have at times shown such a complete ineptitude for war and such a disinclination for battle that it is not always easy to take their efforts seriously. Yet their efforts have been serious, far more serious than anything in recorded Chinese history and serious enough to extend Japan's available resources very fully. When we are inclined to look on it as a ragtime war, let us remember that the total casualties on both sides, so far, in one year of war, amount, as far as can be estimated, to about 800,000 killed, died of disease.

and seriously wounded or seriously ill. In the four years of the Great War the casualties sustained by the British Empire, albeit in killed only, amounted to roughly a million.

You may think that in this lecture I have been something of a Japanese apologist. It is quite true that I have taken pains to present the Japanese side of the question carefully. I have done that deliberately because it is less well known than the Chinese side and because the present war tends, I think, to prevent our seeing events in their proper perspective. At the moment our sympathies appear to be all with the Chinese. Let us remember that thirteen years ago we were, with the possible exception of the Japanese, the most cordially hated foreigners in China. Let us remember that Chinese policy has been for a century purely opportunist and still is so, as far as one can judge. When it suits her to do so China may be found just as ready as Japan to squeeze out any or all of our interests in the Far East. I suggest, therefore, that in considering the present war in China we should do so in a strictly objective fashion and always remember that it is, as I said at the beginning, only one phase in a struggle that has been proceeding for half a century between three unsentimental and quite unscrupulous nations.

THE IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUM

New Articles of Indian Army Interest.

BY MAJOR F. G. HARDEN.

Many officers of the Indian Army have, no doubt, at some time or other, visited the Imperial War Museum, either at South Kensington, where it was lodged until recently, or at its present site on Lambeth Road.

Until this year they would have found articles of general Service interest of the World War period. The only exhibits special to the Indian Army were a few pictures and photographs and the service-dress uniforms worn by half a dozen regiments.

Some of those who were commanding officers or adjutants at the close of the war may have remembered a letter addressed to them, soliciting a set of buttons, badges and articles of regimental interest for preservation in the War Museum, then being formed. If so, they may also have wondered what happened to these souvenirs, for they were certainly not on show.

Actually, they had not, as I had often thought, been sold to a metal-broker or annexed by some badge-collecting maniac. Owing to lack of space at South Kensington, and pressure of work since, it has only this year been possible to have them sorted out, ticketed, mounted in glass frames and suitably displayed.

The museum articles special to the Indian Army are housed together in the west wing.

Large glass-fronted show-cases contain a sepoy's khaki drill uniform, complete with buttons, badges and chevrons of each of the following corps:

Q.V.O. Sappers and Miners.	107th Pioneers.
9th Bhopal Infantry.	2nd Gurkhas.
15th Sikhs.	Army Bearer Corps.
57th Rifles, F.F.	

These uniforms are fixed on frames with the pagris on top or else placed by the boots. Naturally they would be displayed to better advantage if they were worn by dummies; but it is perhaps as well that they should not be, for, unless the heads of the dummies were modelled by an artist who had studied the physiognomy

of our Indian fighting classes, the result to the discerning would be grotesque.

The wall-cases contain various badges, buttons and small articles, grouped by regiments and clearly labelled. There are several hundred items, including such things as badges for caps, pagris, collars, titles for shoulders, buttons, waist-belt clasps, and different varieties of cloth-embroidered patches and "flashes."

Theoretically they are all of World War period, but we suspect that earlier articles have found their way in. We cannot believe that the curious old shoulder-strap made of leather with three strips of brass curb-chain sewn on and bearing badge XII BC. was in use as late as 1914.

Similarly, above the ivory label "49 Bengalis," we noticed the title-numeral of that war-time regiment grouped with a button and badge of the old 49th Bengal Native Infantry, which, thirty years before the World War started, had been reconstituted as Garhwal Rifles.

The number of articles pertaining to regiments varies greatly. Some are represented by as many as eight items, others by but a single button. Quite a number of corps are, I was sorry to find, unrepresented. In one or two cases an old regular regiment has nothing to mark it, though a brass title of the 2nd or 3rd battalion perpetuates its war-time expansion.

It is interesting to see the relics of those Indian units raised for the war, and now forgotten. We realise how great was the effort of the Indian Army when we read again names such as 45th Cavalry, 4th Bn., 9th Bhopals, 111th Mahars, 3/153 Rifles, and so on

Why, to-day even titles such as Brahmans, Deolis, Erinpuras, Merwaras, Carnatics, Hazaras and, alas, Pioneers begin to seem unfamiliar to us, and to belong to the army of some far-off age!

Mistakes there are, naturally, in the setting-up and labelling, but, considering the difficulties, surprisingly few. For instance, a brass XL is shown as title-badge of the 40th Cavalry, though those with memories know it to have come from the shoulder-chain of a 10th Lancer; again, a button embossed with $\frac{XX}{DH}$ has found its way into the 20th Hussars area, and must, perforce, remain attached to them till a reorganization enables it to rejoin the Indian Cavalry Corps, in the 20th Deccan Horse sector.

A brass 54 SCC has also gate-crashed into the 54th Sikhs, F.F. and must wait there till it is convenient for it to be removed to the S. & T. serai, amongst the other Sillidar Camel Corps relics.

Since these badges, etc., have been on view many officers have become interested in the exhibits, and have found and presented numerous additional articles, which will, as new cases are completed, be displayed. In the meanwhile, we can recommend any one on leave in London to go and view the Imperial War Museum. It is very well worth a visit. You will find it full of interest, and, like the best things in life—it is free.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1938

BY MAJOR J. D. MILNE, THE ROYAL SCOTS

SUBJECT

"Discuss the dictum that the size of modern armies has rendered strategy wholly subordinate to tactics."

Definitions and Principles.

Military, as distinct from national, strategy is usually defined as the leading of troops up to the time of contact with the enemy, and, "has as its object the direction of the movements of an army so that, when decisive collisions occur, it shall encounter the enemy with increased relative advantage." (*Operations of War*: Hamley). Tactics are the methods of employing troops in contact with the enemy.

An army draws all that it needs in food and material from its base along its lines of communications; it is obvious that any threat to these lines of communications constitutes a menace which no commander can afford to ignore and is one of the surest means of forcing an enemy to conform to a commander's movements.

Strategy is, therefore, fundamentally concerned in the following three factors: "The relations of the position of the base and the line of communication to the positions of the opposing armies, the conditions of time and the conditions of space." (*British Strategy*: Maurice). Whilst seeking to secure his own communications, a commander endeavours to "menace the enemy's communications with his base, to destroy the coherence and concerted action of his army by breaking the communications which connect the parts, and to effect superior concentration on particular points" (*Operations of War*: Hamley).

From the foregoing it will be evident that communications are the "Achilles Heel" of an army; this is even more so now than in the past. Since no commander will voluntarily expose his communications to an enemy, it follows that, air attacks apart, an essential preliminary to a thrust against an enemy's line of communication will be the envelopment or penetration of the forces covering that line of communication. In many cases manœuvres designed to create a favourable opportunity for attack precede the decisive attack.

Before considering the matter further, it is necessary to be clear on one other point; the meaning of the word subordinate.

From time immemorial strategy has, to a certain extent, been subordinate to the tactical act of battle in that the finest strategic conception can be made or marred by the equipment, fighting spirit and ability of the troops. This fact is particularly evident in operations on interior lines against converging attacks where any attempt to follow the classic prescription of striking first at the most dangerous opponent will almost certainly lead to disaster unless tactical success is achieved. The subordination of strategy to tactics can, to this extent, be accepted as axiomatic. The dictum under discussion would appear, however, to visualise a more complete subordination; a subordination in which all strategy is still-born until rendered possible by prior tactical success. It is from this view point that the dictum will be considered.

Lessons and Examples.

The lessons of history prove conclusively one fact—that for success in war an offensive strategy and offensive tactics are, sooner or later, essential.

The tactical difficulties in the way of a successful offensive require only brief comment, *i.e.*, the delaying power of modern weapons, barbed wire, defence in depth, trenches, and the difficulty of concealing movement and offensive preparations from hostile air observation are well known. To these must be added the administrative difficulties in pushing the attack to any depth, in the face of constantly stiffening hostile resistance over ground pulverised by concentrated artillery fire. In the Great War, on the Western Front, these conditions combined with the increase in strategic mobility afforded by modern communications to make the achievement of rapid success impossible. The conditions of time and space thus operated in favour of the defence. The advent of armoured fighting vehicles, when employed correctly, created once again the possibility of tactical surprise and obviated the necessity for prolonged artillery preparation, thus preserving the surface of the ground. These factors materially contributed, during the autumn of 1918, to the success and increased depth of penetration of our attacks. Nevertheless, the power of the defence was sufficient to prevent a complete strategic break-through on a scale large enough to produce a decisive victory.

Bearing the foregoing paragraphs in mind, let us now review in broad outline the course of operations in certain recent campaigns and attempt to deduce the extent to which the strategy in those theatres was influenced by the size of the contending armies.

This done, let us consider the problem afresh in the light of modern conditions and experience and draw conclusions applicable to modern times.

The Western Front; the Period of Manœuvre.

In August 1914, on the Western Front, the strength of the opposing forces was roughly as follows: Germans, 1,500,000; Allies, 1,250,000.

Along the common Franco-German frontier the main lines of possible advance were protected by permanent fortifications.

Germany required a quick decision in the west and to obtain this it was essential that these fortifications be side-stepped; hence the necessity for the German invasion of Belgium. By utilising their reserve divisions in the front line and by economy of force on their defensive front in the east the Germans were able to obtain the necessary superiority of force to carry out their enveloping attack through Belgium and at the same time to meet and break the French advance in the Ardennes and in Alsace Lorraine. As soon as the extent of the German thrust through Belgium was understood, the French realized that Plan XVII, on which their concentration was based, was unsuited to the situation then existing. Plan XVII was discarded and troops taken from the southern French armies were hurriedly moved to the north to stem the German advance. The strategic surprise obtained by the enemy through the strength and direction of their advance through Belgium at once threw the Allies on the defensive and forced them to conform to the German plan. The German advance threatened not only to envelop the Allied left flank but to sever the British communications with their bases at Havre and Boulogne. It was only our command of the sea which made it possible for the British Expeditionary Force to avoid this disaster, by establishing a fresh base at St. Nazaire on the Atlantic.

In this case the German plan was rendered possible by the use of reserve divisions which increased the size of the force at the disposal of General Headquarters.

Note well, however, that an open flank existed.

By the beginning of September, 1914, the German right wing had begun to outrun its communications. The German 1st Army under Von Kluck, pushed on to the south-east of Paris in an attempt to envelop the Allied left wing. In so doing, it exposed its own right flank to attack from the Paris area. The counter-offensive of the 6th French Army from Paris was, indeed, checked by the Germans but in so doing, Von Kluck was forced to denude his left of troops and lost touch with the 2nd German Army

under Von Bulow. Into the gap thus created advanced the British Expeditionary Force and the left of the 5th French Army. This advance menaced Von Kluck's flank and rear and also threatened to cut the communications between the German 1st and 2nd Armies. To avoid this, the German right wing commenced a general retreat and with this defeat on the Marne passed the German hopes for a short war. Had the German right wing not been weakened by an increase in the numbers employed in Alsace Lorraine and by the despatch of troops to the Russian front it is probable that their plan would have succeeded and the war might well have ended in 1914. Failure was due not to too many troops but to insufficient numbers being employed on the vital flank.

The Allied advance was checked on the Aisne and the whole front began to stabilise; trench warfare had begun. Mutual efforts to envelop each other's open flank resulted in the so-called race to the sea and by mid-November trench warfare had supervened along the whole front from Switzerland to the North Sea.

The Western Front; Trench Warfare.

A flankless trench barrier now protected the communications of both sides. From this time until the autumn of 1918, although strategy could dictate the strategic axis of advance, strategic fulfilment was entirely dependent on the tactical act of penetration of the hostile front, and this in sufficient width and depth to render a break-through possible. Both sides sought the solution to the problem of obtaining, or preventing, a break-through in a multiplication of material resources. In addition, the numbers on both sides were steadily increased. The enormous increase in material of all kinds now found necessary for the support of an attack further operated to rob strategy of the limited scope still left to it, because purely tactical considerations such as the state of the ground at certain seasons of the year and suitability of the terrain for tank attacks tended to dictate, even more than the strategic advantages likely to accrue from success, the locality in which an offensive should be staged.

In support of this contention, let us consider the German offensive of March 1918. At that time the opposing forces in France were roughly as follows: Germans, 3,574,000; Allies, slightly less.

These forces were disposed on a front of some three hundred and fifty miles. The German problem was to defeat the Allies before American reinforcements arrived in sufficient strength to restore the former Allied superiority in man-power.

Four possible offensives were discussed:

- (a) An attack at St. Quentin against the junction of the British and French Armies—a point known to be weakly held, but where penetration to a considerable depth would be necessary before strategical results could be expected to materialize.
- (b) An attack between Armentieres and La Bassée.
- (c) An attack at Ypres.
- (d) An attack between Arras and Notre Dame de Lorette

Attack (d) was abandoned as being too difficult; attacks (b) and (c), owing to lack of depth between the front line and the sea, would, if successful, soon have placed the Allied communications in jeopardy, but were abandoned because the ground was too dependent on the weather.

Plan (a), the only plan remaining, was, therefore, adopted, since an attack in the St. Quentin sector was not influenced by weather conditions. Ludendorff himself says: "In adopting the St. Quentin plan I was guided by the question of time and by tactical considerations. I was swayed in the first instance by the weakness of the enemy. Further, tactics were more important than pure strategy; strategy was indeed impossible without a tactical success," and again, "A modern battle compels the general to look for the enemy's weakest spot . . . if the plan succeeded the whole British front might be shaken." It was not, however, this alone which decided Ludendorff in attacking at St. Quentin, for strategically his object could have been gained more quickly in Flanders, but "the Flanders battle would have to be postponed until late in the spring and Ludendorff was not in a position to wait." (*Ludendorff: The Tragedy of a Specialist*. Karl Tschuppik).

Similarly, our tank offensive at Cambrai in November 1917 was staged in that area entirely because the terrain was suitable for the employment of tanks.

The Western Front; the Rupture of the Trench System.

By the autumn of 1918, however, the Allies had accumulated sufficient artillery and shells to enable them to mount more than one big attack at a time, thus making manoeuvre and surprise once more possible.

Tactical success was still an essential preliminary to strategic exploitation but the chances of a strategic break-through were now enhanced, particularly as the German morale had started to decline. It is true that the Allies did not succeed in encircling or

cutting off any part of the German army, nor was the German army decisively or utterly defeated. Although their trench lines were broken, the German armies continued to preserve an unbroken front and to protect their communications. The vital railway lines feeding the German front were only captured by the Allies after the Germans had fallen back from them in good order.

Generally speaking, the opposing forces on the Western Front were well matched in all respects. In addition, the theatre of war was, in comparison with the numbers engaged, small. Thus, from the moment that open flanks ceased to exist, strategy was hamstrung until tactical success re-opened the possibility of a war of manœuvre. It is worth noting that the nearest approaches to a complete break-through were attained as a result of either the employment of new tactical weapons or the novel employment of existing weapons, *e.g.*, the German use of gas in April 1915, the British tank attacks at Cambrai in November 1917, and on the 8th August 1918, and the German use of infiltration tactics following short and violent artillery bombardments from masses of guns, many of which had not previously registered, in their attacks of 1918.

The Eastern Front.

The troops employed on the Russian front were approximately as follows:

Russians from a minimum of 130 to a maximum of 140 divisions.

Austro-Germans from a minimum of 90 to a maximum of 130 divisions.

The Germans were far superior in every way to the Russians and the Russians to the Austrians. In particular the Russians were markedly inferior to the Germans in the matter of equipment and material resources, and poor communications made the Russian armies extremely immobile. Although the forces employed were large, the front was extensive and the trench system was not nearly so highly organised as was the case in the West; in many cases open flanks existed or could be created by penetration of a weakly held front.

Much of the strategy on both sides was of a high order, but that of the Russians and Austrians almost invariably broke down through lack of mobility, poor execution on the part of subordinate commanders and poor equipment and training of the troops.

In contrast, the German strategy was brilliantly supported by subordinate commanders and troops and striking successes were achieved.

The fact that, in this theatre of war, strategy and not tactics reigned supreme can be seen by a study of the following operations:

(a) The Tannenburg Campaign—a brilliant example of correct operations on interior lines.

(b) The German Campaign in South Poland in 1914, undertaken to extricate the Austrians from the consequences of their defeat at Lemberg. Of this campaign Hoffman, on page 78 of his "War of Lost Opportunities," says: "In my opinion the campaign in South Poland is the finest operation of the whole war: the rush from Cracow towards the Vistula to relieve our confederates, the retreat on Czenstochau, the throwing of the army from there to Thorn, and the renewed attack on the wing of the fleeing Russians are, as operations, to be classed much higher than the plan for Tannenburg or any other of the victorious battles of the Eastern Front."

(c) The defeat and double envelopment of the 10th Russian Army during the winter battle in Masuria, in which the bold decision of the German commander to throw forward his left wing along the outskirts of the Augustovo Forest to the district north-west of Grodno, without paying any regard to the fortress, resulted in the capture of 110,000 prisoners. (*The World Crisis*: Churchill.)

(d) The battle of Gorlice, in 1915, is an example of successful penetration followed by a wheel of the attacking front so as to envelop the enemy armies in the Carpathians. Although 140,000 prisoners were taken by the Germans and the Russians forced to retire from the Carpathians, the speed of the Russian retreat enabled them to escape envelopment and the attack rapidly developed into a pure frontal advance without prospect of a major strategic decision. Foreseeing this, Hoffman wished to switch all available troops, together with reinforcements to be obtained from France, to the exposed right wing of the Russian force opposite Kouno. He claimed that an enveloping attack from this area, directed on Vilna and Minsk, would cut off the Russian forces in the Warsaw area, who would not have been able to escape the blow by retiring, and would have led to the decisive defeat of the Russian army. This plan was not adopted and the truth of Hoffman's assertions cannot be proven, but it would appear that the possibility of a big strategical success was lost.

(e) The Russian offensives against the Germans almost invariably broke down in the face of the superior German equipment and training but against the Austrians the Russians obtained numerous successes. Examples of these are the encounter battle of Lemberg 1914; Brusiloff's offensive in the Bukovina in June 1916 (a frontal attack without previous preparation); and the Russian defeat of the Austrian 3rd Army south of the Dniester in July 1917.

Other examples could be quoted but enough has been said to illustrate the contention that on the Eastern Front strategy remained the dominant partner.

The Macedonian Front.

In the autumn of 1918, the front stretched from the Gulf of Orfano to the Adriatic and, although the rival armies were of approximately equal strength, the Bulgarian armies were known to be war weary.

The main natural lines of advance northwards *via* the Struma, Vardar and Crna Valleys were strongly entrenched and defended but, whilst no open flanks existed, other parts of the front were not heavily entrenched.

Former Allied attempts at advance over these recognised routes of invasion had met with either small success or definite defeat. In September 1918, however, the main Allied attack was directed against the Dobropolje, the most mountainous part of the whole front. This sector, though naturally formidable, was not strongly fortified. A comparatively short advance in this area held out immense strategic possibilities since the most northerly of several lateral lines of communication, the road Tetovo—Skoplje—Kyustendil, was only some fifty miles from the front line. If this road could be reached the Bulgarian armies would be cut in half and the western half faced with the alternative of surrender or retreat into a mountainous and roadless area. Furthermore, the lack of communications in that mountainous area would hamper the arrival of enemy reinforcements and, once initial success had been obtained, co-operation and adhesion between the enemy forces would become extremely difficult. The attack, which was a brilliant success, certainly depended on tactical success for its strategic fulfilment, but the plan, whilst making full use of tactical considerations, was formulated mainly on the strategic results likely to accrue from success. (*Official History: Macedonia, Vol. II.*)

The Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1938.

The forces at present engaged in China proper appear to be as follows: Chinese, 1,600,000; Japanese between 500,000 and 600,000.

The theatre of war is extensive and the Japanese enjoy immense superiority over the Chinese in leadership, training and material resources.

In the absence of authentic accounts of this struggle accurate analysis is impracticable, but it is possible to deduce that in all cases where space for manœuvre exists the superior mobility, equipment and training of the Japanese enables them to carry out their strategic conceptions without great difficulty. It is only when manœuvre is cramped or where frontal assaults on entrenched positions have been attempted with inadequate forces, such as occurred at Shanghai and Hsuehchow, that the Chinese have been capable of offering serious resistance. Even in these areas, ultimate success seems to have rested with the invaders as soon as they employed sufficient men and materials to enable them to develop a properly organised attack.

In spite of the successful action of Chinese guerillas against the Japanese communications, the successful employment by the Japanese of small mechanized columns in wide enveloping movements seems to have been one of the main features of the campaign.

Another noteworthy feature has been the inability of aerial attack either to destroy the Chinese will to war or to interrupt, for more than a few hours at a time, the railway line from Kowloon to Hankow. Too great importance must not, however, be attached to this as the scale of attack is small compared with the forces which could be made available in Europe, and the methods of bomb release employed by the Japanese appear to be primitive. Moreover, the Japanese attempts to sever communications along the Kowloon-Hankow railway reveal that their ideas as to how air forces can best achieve such an object are immature. Thus, instead of concentrating on continuous attacks on a few really vital points on the railway system, their attacks have been dispersed in sporadic raids over numerous stretches of the line.

Summary.

From the foregoing, it is evident that the delaying power of modern weapons has, in all cases when the opposing armies are equipped in an approximately equal manner, altered the conditions of time and space in favour of the defence. Improvements

in communications and in means of transportation have resulted in an increase of strategic mobility but this has been offset by a loss of tactical mobility. This again operates in favour of the defence. As applied to the Western Front, the advent of the tank restored, to a certain extent, the possibility of tactical manœuvre and surprise but post-war developments in anti-tank weapons make it problematical whether tank attacks of the future will attain the same degree of success as in the past, particularly if tanks have to be used in frontal assaults.

From a study of the campaigns in Russia and China, it can be deduced that mere numbers have little restraining effect on strategy, even when no flanks exist. The limiting factor is proved beyond doubt to be equality of armament and training when combined with lack of space for manœuvre. Thus it would appear that scope for strategy exists when:

(a) Space for manœuvre exists.

(b) The equipment and training of one side is markedly superior to that of the other.

(c) Conditions hampering the mobility of the defence are present.

(d) Material resources are great enough to enable several big attacks to be mounted at once, thus causing the enemy to dissipate his reserves and so re-creating the opportunity for surprise.

(e) New tactical weapons, or novel methods of using existing weapons, can be employed in sufficient strength and backed by sufficient force to warrant hopes of a strategic break-through.

The Future.

As has been explained, strategy is fundamentally concerned with three factors, the conditions of time and space and the situation of the lines of communication in their relation to the position of the base and the position of the hostile armies. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the lines on which modern armies are being developed and attempt to deduce from the organization of these armies the probable effect of modernization on strategical operations.

The outstanding facts appear to be:

(a) The enormous increase in the numbers and technical performance of air forces, the increased accuracy in aerial bombing and the great advance which has been made in the study of the methods of employing such forces,

(b) A similar increase in the efficiency and number of anti-aircraft units and weapons, whilst providing better defence, holds out no possibility of absolute prevention of air raids.

(c) The great increase in the numbers of automatic weapons with which infantry units are equipped.

(d) The increase in the numbers and performance of armoured fighting vehicles which now form part of the armament of all great powers and of many small powers.

(e) The universal development of anti-tank weapons.

(f) The great advance made in methods of communication by wireless telegraphy and radio telephony.

(g) The great increase of civil motor transport with, as a natural corollary, a corresponding improvement in the surface and numbers of roads and the development, for military purposes, of motor vehicles with a good cross-country performance.

(h) At the same time, the artillery power of modern armies is, compared with the standards of 1916—1918, small. A feature of the Spanish civil war, however, appears to be the successful employment of bombing and machine-gun attacks by low flying aircraft in direct support of infantry assaults. Against efficient anti-aircraft small arms defence such attacks may be costly but the possibility of aircraft being employed in this manner in substitution for, or to bolster up, weak artillery support cannot be ignored.

The above factors have had, as might be expected, the greatest effect on the way in which continental armies are now organized. Horse-drawn transport has largely disappeared and has been replaced by mechanical transport. Mobile divisions, largely composed of light and medium tanks, have been created and a certain number of motorised divisions have been organized as a strategic striking force. Within the infantry the general tendency has been towards an increase of fire power by augmenting the number of automatic weapons and anti-tank rifles and including, within the infantry organization, groups of close support weapons such as trench mortars and "infantry guns."

The mass of continental armies are, however, not permanently motorised although strategic movement of formations from this mass would undoubtedly be carried out by motor transport when desired.

The dominating idea in this organisation appears to be the creation of a powerful aerial striking force, supported by a small, but highly mobile, land striking force, composed of mechanized and motorised divisions. Behind this force would be concentrated the

mass of the land army which, though not permanently motorised, could be moved by motor transport for strategic purposes on specific occasions, or rushed up to consolidate ground won by the striking force.

The war of the future is thus likely to open suddenly, and probably without formal declaration of war. The comparatively small mechanized and motorised forces employed should have ample scope for strategic manoeuvre. The success or failure of the initial onslaught may largely depend on whether or not the anti-tank weapon cancels out the tank; or, in other words, whether the conditions of time and space operate in favour of the attack or the defence. Should the initial campaign fail, it would seem that a war in the west of Europe must develop on somewhat similar lines to the last war, *i.e.*, the slower moving mass of the main armies would come into action—both sides would go to ground and as soon as open flanks ceased to exist a war of attrition would commence once more.

It has been suggested, however, that a war of attrition is only unavoidable when equally matched armies face each other in a flankless theatre of war. What, therefore, are the conditions under which such a situation may obtain?

The first condition is obviously a theatre of war in which the area for manoeuvre is small compared with the size of the rival armies. The second is that the rival armies shall be equally matched in equipment, fighting spirit and training. A third condition is that the armies shall be of sufficient size to enable them to occupy the whole front in strength and that no flanks shall be exposed to envelopment; in fact, armies such as opposed each other in France during the last war.

The question naturally arises whether armies of the 1916-1918 size will be possible in future war. In brief the factors influencing the size of a well-equipped army are:

(a) The size of the population and the extent of the industrial resources and materials at the command of a nation.

(b) The advance in medical science which enables large forces to be crowded together without danger of disease.

(c) The development in modern communications, and in particular, the development of motor communication in advance of rail head.

As regards (a); the material demands of a nation at war will necessitate the employment of a large part of the able-bodied population on production, distribution and transportation of war material, food and other commodities. Large numbers will also be

employed by us in ensuring the security of our sea communications and centres of production. This fact was evident in the last war and may be even more evident in the future.

As regards (b); it is problematical whether armies of the size of the 1918 forces can be maintained in the face of modern air attacks on production centres and communications.

Although press comment has recently been made on the inability of the rival air forces in Spain and China to interrupt seriously the communications of the land forces, too great importance should not be attached to this failure. As has already been stated the handling of the Japanese air attacks on communications has been faulty. The writer is not in possession of the facts regarding the method of employment of air forces in Spain but the comparatively small numbers of aircraft and troops employed relative to those available in a war of the first magnitude preclude the formulation of deductions applicable to a first class war. The matter is still not proven. Past experience has, however, proved that, to be effective, attacks on communications must be continuous and must be concentrated on the really vital spots on each separate line of communication. In Western Europe, where many railway lines and good roads exist, complete interruption of communication would be at least difficult, if not impossible, and would entail the employment of a large portion of the available air force on this task alone. Although in well developed countries complete interruption of road and rail communications is thus not likely to be obtained, it should be possible to sever all communications for short periods over a restricted and carefully chosen area.

Interruption of this nature would be of great value if carried out at the time of a big offensive, the part of the hostile front selected for attack being isolated for a period of three or four days by concentrated air attack on the communications leading to the area.

A more profitable method of protracted attack, however, would be the concentration of air effort against the enemy's bases which are constitutionally immobile and which have to be concentrated in order to facilitate smooth working. In the case of a seaborne army similar attacks on its ports of embarkation and disembarkation would, at the least, seriously inconvenience its concentration and subsequent maintenance. In the face of such a concentrated attack on a modern scale, it is difficult to visualise how the enormous quantities of stores, supplies and material of all kinds required for static warfare on the 1918 model could

possibly be assembled and transported. If this proved to be so, large armies could not be maintained and the requisite force to present an unbroken and flankless front would not be available. Thus a higher form of war than that of pure attrition would once more be possible.

Conclusion

The mere size of modern armies does not limit in the slightest degree the carrying out of strategic operations.

Poorly equipped and ill trained masses remain now, as in the past, at the mercy of well equipped and highly trained opponents. In these circumstances increased numbers merely lead to increased casualties.

When, however, well matched opponents face each other, the delaying power of modern weapons makes the attainment of rapid tactical success increasingly difficult. As long, however, as space for manoeuvre exists, so long will scope for strategic manoeuvre remain. It is only when well matched armies face each other in a circumscribed theatre of war, when flanks do not exist and frontal attacks alone are possible, that strategic conception must be largely subordinated to tactical considerations. Even under these conditions the power of the air to isolate a sector of the hostile front and thus delay the arrival of enemy reinforcements, may make it possible for tank supported infantry assaults to effect a strategic break-through before the defence has time to concentrate.

But concentrated air attacks on an army's base and ports of embarkation and disembarkation may well make the maintenance of large armies impossible. If this is so the disappearance of large armies will automatically ensure the disappearance of the flankless front with its corollary of static warfare.

With the departure of these bogies will disappear also the claim of tactics to dominate strategy.

THE NEW INFANTRY TRAINING, 1937

BY LT.-COLONEL E.R.S. DODS, M.C.

The object of this article is to point out some of the differences between the new volume of Infantry Training and the old one, and also to discuss briefly the merits of some sections whether new or carried forward from the past.

The preface on page *viii* is interesting in that it foretells the issue of a revised volume about two years hence.

It is good to see that a recruit will now receive instruction in the use of ground, night work and as a scout. Section 9 (12) (*viii*). There can be no question but that a soldier should be taught these subjects very early in his career.

The idea of posting a squad of recruits to a platoon is excellent and should simplify the preparation of training programmes by company and platoon commanders. Unfortunately the majority of battalions in the Indian Army have three or more classes. Even so, if the squads are large enough to enable complete sections to be formed, that will be better than posting men separately to different companies. Sec. 9 (16).

Sec. 11 (i) relating to the individual training of the soldier in war is unfortunately unchanged. It reads as follows:—"The training will consist of:—(i) The training of soldiers in their individual duties in the section in war, including close order drill, fire discipline and the use of ground." Why should those three items be included in this paragraph? There is, or anyhow was until quite recently, a general tendency to neglect the training of soldiers in their individual duties in the section in war during the individual training period, except where they were specially catered for in other paragraphs of this section of Infantry Training, e.g., digging, wiring, scouting, etc. There is a tremendous amount of instruction which can and should be given to the soldier concerning attack, defence, outposts and patrols during this period, and as for mountain warfare there is hardly a limit as to what can be taught. If these subjects are not taught at this period, then collective training is almost bound to suffer. It is hoped that the next volume of Infantry Training will bring more emphasis to bear on this point.

[Infantry Training, 1937 (Training and War), did not reach units in India until May 1938.]

Chapter V, Field Formations, is new and its inclusion in the manual is very welcome.

Chapter VII, Training in Fieldcraft, is also new, and a useful addition to infantry training. Anyone who served on more than one front, or in varying terrain on the same front, during the Great War will realise how vitally important ground always is. Its use to the best advantage must become instinctive to every individual man, and more attention must be paid to it in our tactics during collective training if heavy casualties are to be avoided at the beginning of another war.

The earlier sections of Chapter VIII, Battle Procedure, are also new, and it is important to note that it is now recognised that throughout the battalion orders will usually be issued verbally. (Sec. 42.) Gunner officers carry in their haversacks a pro forma for issuing orders, and the writer has found that this procedure can be applied to battalion orders in the field with good effect. A useful note-book can be made by taking two soft file covers, quartering them and then looping them together, giving fourteen inside pages. Then turn up Field Service Regulations and Infantry Training and devote a page each to warning order, attack, defence, night march, night advance, night attack, outposts, patrols or anything else you fancy. A quick glance at the relevant heading during training will ensure that important points for orders are not overlooked or forgotten.

Patrols are now dealt with separately in Chapter IX which is undoubtedly easier to follow. It is a little unfortunate though, when, having read Sec. 49, you are cheered with the news that there are now only two kinds of patrols, reconnoitring and fighting, to discover in Sec. 53 that the standing patrol is not dead as you hoped. It would appear that the duties of a standing patrol can be performed equally well by a fighting patrol or by a reconnaissance patrol according to the task required of it, and it is considered that the title "Standing Patrol" could well be done away with.

Chapter XI deals with the attack, certain aspects of which will be discussed more fully. Before doing so it may be advisable to look back at the past, and then forward to the future, in order to see whether our instructions for the offensive are adequately framed to meet present-day tactical conditions. For many years the keynote of our training may perhaps be summed up as having been based on mobility plus offensive action. Both of these have been, are, and always will be most necessary in order to achieve victory, but it is thought that too often in the past they have not

been modified to suit the requirements of a particular phase of war or a particular battlefield. At times we have been prone to take our lessons from that phase of a war which appealed to our offensive nature. A classic example of this is Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign in the American Civil War. The lessons of any campaign are manifold, but the writer, quoting from Major-General Fuller in his "Grant and Lee," suggests that the following are of far greater importance than the lessons deduced from the Valley Campaign. It must be remembered that the rifle's effective range at the time was between three and five hundred yards.

Lesson 1. "The great feature of this campaign is the earth-works. When they halt, the rebels make a rifle pit; the second day a regular infantry parapet; the third day an abattis. This is often all done in twenty-four hours. Our men can and do do the same."

Lesson 2. "Throughout the American Civil War seven out of eight frontal attacks failed, whilst seven out of eight rear attacks succeeded."

Lesson 3. "The powers of the rifle were only discovered through trial and error, and it took a year of fighting to realise that a trench, the by-product of a rifle bullet, was as valuable as the product itself."

There can be little doubt that those were, at least, three very important lessons of that war, and they were lessons which have been largely disregarded ever since. They do not decry mobility and the offensive spirit, but rather emphasise that there is a time and place for everything.

The Boer War had many useful lessons but the value of the long range rifle was not fully appreciated by us. Many attacks were successful but others such as Paardeburg where, after nine days' fighting, Cronje surrendered cost us over a thousand unnecessary casualties. Liddell Hart tells us that at Biddulphsburg eighteen Boers defeated two whole battalions, which only goes to prove how difficult it is to attack even a few resolute enemy who can use ground skilfully.

Turning next to the Great War no one can deny that the trench was the keynote to all fighting. Whether the country was flat and undulating as in France, flat and devoid of cover as in Mesopotamia, or rocky and hilly as in Gallipoli, to mention only three battle fronts, we find trenches. That *rara avis* the encounter-battle, for which we have done so much training in the past, was

seldom met with even at the beginning of the Great War. In one or two instances French and German forces did meet in an encounter-battle in 1914 but on the rest of the front, as at Mons, and on other fronts such as East Prussia, Mesopotamia and Palestine, and in the American Civil, Boer and Russo-Japanese wars it will be noticed that one side had nearly always adopted the defensive before the two forces met. Nor was it always the defending force which had the worst of the ensuing battle. At Sheikh Saad in Mesopotamia, for example, where the Turks were inferior in numbers but greatly assisted by the flat desert country, no fair critic will deny that that three days' battle was a Turkish success. Too often has the commander of an attacking force forgotten the value of two of Wellington's principles: "Never fight except on your own ground and at your own time" and "never knock your head against a strong position."

The trench was again much in evidence in the Grand Chaco in South America, and appears to play an equally prominent part in Spain to-day. Why should it not do so in the future and why do we not train more for its use? Some people hope that the tank will restore permanent mobility to operations, but if the lessons of the past have been correctly interpreted a nation likely to be invaded will have an anti-tank line from which to operate, so that a really mobile campaign from the outset of war to its finish is not very probable. It appears more reasonable to suppose that in a future war our tactical successes will follow the general lines of those gained in the last Great War, which appear to continue in Spain to-day. These can be divided into two categories. The first, which requires the offensive spirit, is similar to those gained in France, from 1915 onwards, by the aid of surprise in one form or another, whether in the time of attack, the weight of numbers or shell, the use of artificial weather conditions or of new weapons. The second, which requires both the offensive spirit and mobility, is also gained by various methods of surprise, but is less dependent on shell power, and is comparable to those victories achieved in Mesopotamia and Palestine in 1918.

It should be remembered that in both cases our attacks started from trenches in close proximity to those of the enemy.

Infantry training is written for the Army at home. Here in India from a fighting point of view we can justifiably say there is a shortage of tanks and artillery. The moral seems to be that we must be more careful of what we set our infantry to do, especially in the attack. In war, principles hold good for ever, but little else. The weapons of the enemy and the nature of the country

will always vary, and it is almost impossible to advise generally on minor tactics without taking these two factors more fully into consideration. For this reason it is considered that Sec. 62 of Chapter XI contains some matter which can easily be misinterpreted. Remembering Wellington's dictums how does Sec. 62 (5) now strike the reader? It deals with the action of rifle companies during advanced guard fighting and the second paragraph is as follows: "When the leading companies come under the effective fire of machine-guns and rifles, they will be forced to fight their way forward with their own weapons and such assistance as may be obtained from machine-guns, mortars, artillery and tanks." Is this really possible in war? It is unfortunately too often seen during collective training since no amount of instruction to date has enabled the most willing umpire to paint a really warlike picture. Nor can the rank and file be easily slowed down during field training.

The fourth paragraph of this same section reads: "When, owing to increasing opposition, the advance shows signs of coming to a standstill, commanders should take steps to ensure that all necessary viewpoints and tactical features on the front are seized and held in order that the further attack may be planned and prepared successfully."

There may be times when this is possible but since the enemy are mentioned as having machine-guns, and assuming that our advance guard has not been given any tanks, it is more than likely that any battalion or battalions which, in one day, have got as close to the enemy as is envisaged, will have suffered very heavy casualties. It would seem that Foch's third task for an advanced guard, to find and fix the enemy is of easier interpretation. To anyone who is doubtful about these minor tactics and who has not tested them out for himself, it is suggested that he should do so in the following manner. The test is preferably carried out with a battalion, but could also be performed by a smaller or larger force. The first day act as an advance guard, with a skeleton enemy of from half to a quarter of the attacker's strength. Criticise all work fairly as you normally would. Next day repeat the exercise with yourself commanding the enemy, and then criticise from their point of view. It will be surprising if you are not converted to the view that advance guard attacks will seldom succeed. The enemy must be very demoralised, or the country very favourable, one might almost say unusual, as in Waziristan, if the use of the trench is to be disregarded. Nor, with the best battle drill in the world is it likely, even against a hastily prepared

position, that any commander higher than a battalion commander will be able to develop a successful attack on the same day that his advanced guard encounters such opposition. The men have to be given orders and it takes long enough for a battalion commander to stage an attack on his own; it takes even longer for a higher commander to appreciate the situation and issue his own orders for a properly co-ordinated attack. And often it is hoped that such an attack will be a flanking one. The conclusion reached, therefore, is that we want to teach our infantry to gain contact and then go to ground as a preliminary, possibly the next day, to a frontal attack from trenches (offensive spirit) or to a night march and rear or flanking attack (offensive spirit and mobility). Such tactics, it is thought, are more normal than those taught at present and would form a better basis for training for a future war.

Officers working for examinations should note that the intelligence section is now referred to in the intercommunication paragraph of orders [Sec. 64 (5) (viii)].

During the assault the platoon commander now leads his men [Sec. 67 (4)].

When a raid is carried out it is essential that the enemy should not be able to identify the unit to which a captured man belongs [Sec. 72 (3)]. This being so, the raiders must leave their identity discs behind and care should be taken to see that rifle butt discs and equipment are not marked with the unit's abbreviated title. This may be difficult during the initial stages of a war.

Chapter XII dealing with the defence has certain changes of which [Sec. 74 (8)] is the most important. This section deals with the question of the sort of trenches which should be dug. The "crawl" trench is a useful expression which has undoubtedly come to stay.

Appendix IV is new and contains useful information on the development of field defences. It must not be forgotten that the calculations on page 221 are for tasks in "average" ground. Possibly "easy" ground would be a better term to use and, since this type of ground is far less common in India than may be supposed, it follows that most of the trenches dug during training take considerably longer to construct. The same remark applies to wiring, since it is often necessary to dig a hole for every screw picket before it can be sunk sufficiently deep to carry out the work required of it.

In concluding this short attempt to review the new manual it must be pointed out that there are many minor changes to which no reference has been made. Special sections in various

chapters dealing with mortars and anti-tank weapons for example have not been referred to, but to compile a full and detailed comparison of the new and old books would take up too much space for an article of this nature. Not everyone will agree with the writer's views on the necessity for the revision of our attack tactics, but it is hoped that many will do so. Apart from frontier fighting, regarding which it is understood a new manual is in the course of preparation, it has been pointed out how difficult it is to frame minor attack tactics to suit every possible kind of enemy and any and every sort of terrain. It is suggested that if anyone feels inclined to rewrite a chapter on infantry in the attack that a passably good solution would be obtained if it was sub-divided into the following three main headings:

Firstly, the gaining of contact. This would include the action of advanced guards and would normally end with the leading troops going to ground in weapon pits.

Secondly, the attack proper. In the case of a frontal attack it would include the break-in and the break-through. It would also deal with the attack from the flank and the rear.

Thirdly, the pursuit. Once an enemy is on the run, every endeavour must be made to prevent him rallying. Infantry will often co-operate, possibly being carried in mechanical transport for this purpose, and mobility combined with offensive action will be the basis of this phase of the operations.

SECOND ECHELON IN FRONTIER OPERATIONS

BY MAJOR J. E. HIRST, 2ND PUNJAB REGIMENT

Note.—For the benefit of readers who may be unacquainted with India it is necessary to explain briefly the scope and purpose of the Special Procedure Pamphlet referred to in the following article.

This Pamphlet is the outcome of the periodical minor wars (involving reinforcement of the normal garrison) which have become an almost hardy annual on the N.-W. Frontier. For some time the administrative arrangements and orders governing these operations were worked out ab initio on each occasion.

The Pamphlet provides a means by which a selected force can be placed on an operational footing at short notice without the use of the word "mobilize." At the same time it introduces the provisions of Mobilization Regulations except as modified in the Pamphlet. It is designed so that if general mobilization occurs after a force has been despatched under its provisions, no administrative difficulties should arise. For example, the Pamphlet provides for the adoption of the war system of accounting for pay, rations, clothing and equipment. It also provides for the creation of "temporary" unit depots which remain at peace stations, and can later be merged into the war system of depots without difficulty if this becomes necessary. And it provides for the creation of a "2nd Echelon" office and system if this is warranted by the size of the force.

The Pamphlet does not attempt to cater for the administrative problems peculiar to any particular situation which may arise once the force has been despatched to its destination. Nor does it cater only for Frontier operations. It was used for the preparation of troops for despatch to Aden and Abyssinia in 1936 and to Hong Kong in 1937. In the latter case, many difficulties arose because the local authorities were not allowed to administer the unit on the war system of rations, clothing, etc.

The Pamphlet can be applied in whole or in part to any selected force or in any selected area or areas.—ED.

By far the most important responsibility of the Adjutant-General's Branch in war is the supply of personnel to the forces in the field, and arrangements for the selection and despatch to units of all ranks to make good deficiencies. This demands the collection and compilation of detailed statistical information which is carried out by what is called 2nd Echelon.

During the past few years, much attention has been paid to the working of 2nd Echelon during Frontier operations, and the Special Procedure Pamphlet now states that the formation conducting the operations will be responsible for forming a nucleus 2nd Echelon to carry out the duties summarized in Field Service Regulations. There is still, however, a good deal of doubt and misunderstanding regarding its functions. Even the name conveys little, and it might be changed with advantage. Those with experience of the Great War may have a hazy recollection of a big office at the Base, but the majority, unless they have been actively engaged on the Frontier in recent years, probably regard a 2nd Echelon as a peculiar institution with which they are not concerned, and which only emerges when mobilization is ordered.

There is a story told of an officer who was detailed as O.C., 2nd Echelon (N); (N referring to Nucleus). Whilst hastily packing his kit he casually asked a friend what his duties would be. The reply he got was: "Something to do with burying the dead, and disposal of deceased officers' kits. Anyhow it is all in the book!" There is a germ of truth in this reply, but the O.C. designate soon discovered that his duties were rather more numerous and onerous. Information of a general nature is to be found in F.S.R., Vol. I, in the Special Procedure Pamphlet, and in a lengthy publication known as The Regulations for the working of G.H.Q., 2nd Echelon. None of these references, however, completely cater for the peculiar conditions of operations on the Frontier, and the object of this article is to collate the experiences of the past few years as a guide for those who may have dealings with, or who may be interested in, 2nd Echelon. It is proposed, therefore, to examine the staff duties side of the problem first and then to proceed with an account of how 2nd Echelon works; what are its difficulties, and how they may be overcome.

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Captain E. H. Cotterill, M.B.E., 5th Mahratta Light Infantry, who allowed me to make use of his Report on the 2nd Echelon (N) 1937.

Staff Duties

From the staff duties point of view, the chief difficulty experienced has been to effect a quick change over from peace procedure to an operational footing under conditions not entailing mobilization. Operations on the Frontier may begin as the result of many causes, but it is usually only after a lapse of time that the provisions of the Special Procedure Pamphlet are introduced. This produces a lag that only strenuous work and careful planning can make up. It will be apparent, therefore, that the "A" Staff of the formation conducting the operations starts off in circumstances entirely different from those contemplated in Mobilization Regulations, and, at a slight disadvantage. A good deal can be done, however, as soon as it is known that the situation on any part of the Frontier is likely to deteriorate. (The necessity for close liaison with the General Staff does not require to be stressed.) At this stage "A" staff officers must begin to think in terms of units to be raised, personnel and establishments, so that there will be no delay in drafting their paragraphs of the administrative order which may have to be issued. Warning orders and, on occasions, demi-official letters can be very helpful. Army Headquarters is usually quite prepared to give authority in advance so that the various parts of the Special Procedure Pamphlet can be applied directly the necessity arises. Considerable forethought, however, is required, because once the Special Procedure Pamphlet has been applied, changes in administrative policy lead to confusion and make it even more difficult to overcome the time lag.

Strengths

2nd Echelon exists primarily to provide reinforcements, and the supply of personnel must be as systematic as the supply of any other commodity. But the necessary calculations are made more complicated and the reinforcement situation made more obscure unless all establishments are fixed from the beginning of the operations. These may be varied from time to time at the discretion of the commander, but the "A" staff require ample warning when such changes are contemplated in order that they can be put into effect smoothly and without dislocation of the 2nd Echelon machinery.

As a rule, however, difficulties are not likely to arise, except that Royal Indian Army Service Corps units have certain

peculiarities which require to be understood. The following are examples:

Minimum strengths are not laid down for an animal transport unit; it is expected to move with sufficient men and animals to enable it, in the opinion of the commanding officer, to perform its duties satisfactorily. The views of commanding officers, however, vary considerably and, unless some degree of control is exercised by the formation conducting the operations, no two units will arrive in the theatre of operations at the same strength, to the everlasting confusion and annoyance of 2nd Echelon. When supply units come on to a war footing, certain personnel, e.g., lascars, who are employed in peace, are no longer authorized, because there is no mention of them in War Establishments. If the retention of this surplus is considered essential it must be regularized immediately.

Temporary Depots and Reinforcements

The functions of temporary depots are given in the Special Procedure Pamphlet, and the main point to notice is that they act as reinforcement camps to their own units. They each send returns to 2nd Echelon, and unless these are accurately compiled, and despatched at the correct time, much unnecessary correspondence ensues.

The temporary depots of units for which minimum strengths have been laid down do not give cause for worry; each has its own quota of reinforcements, and improvisation and special orders are not required. For units which do not work on minimum strengths, arrangements are necessary for the formation of temporary depots and the supply of reinforcements. The first requirement, therefore, is to decide which units and establishments shall act as temporary depots for these units, and also for those raised specially for the operations. Miscellaneous personnel, such as nursing sisters and the men of the Indian Army Corps of Clerks must not be overlooked. It should also be remembered that the Command in whose area the operations may take place is responsible, as far as it can, for providing all personnel for new units; after which Army Headquarters can be asked to help.

In 1937 No. 1 Temporary Personnel Depot, R.I.A.S.C., was formed as the temporary depot for—

Supply personnel.

Mechanical transport personnel.

Animal transport (mule) personnel.

Indian superior personnel of camel units.

and Echelon demanded its reinforcements from this depot, which in turn placed its demands as follows:

British officers	...	On Headquarters, Northern Command.
British other ranks	...	
Viceroy's Commissioned officers (supply).	...	
Viceroy's Commissioned officers (animal and mechanical transport units).	...	
Indian superior personnel	...	
Indian other ranks [animal transport (mule) units].	...	On the animal transport training companies at Lahore and Meerut.
Indian other ranks (mechanical transport) units.	...	On the mechanical transport training battalion at Chaklala.
Followers	By direct enrolment in consultation with the recruiting officer concerned.

This indicates the arrangements that have to be made to co-ordinate the needs of a number of comparatively small units. By dealing with one central authority, the work of 2nd Echelon was made much easier.

An account of temporary depots and reinforcements would be incomplete without a reference to followers. It is essential that the follower establishment of all units should be kept up to strength, but occasions arise when the numbers at the call of 2nd Echelon fall short of demands and, to remedy this, the Special Procedure Pamphlet authorizes the formation of a "Followers Pool." It should be attached to a unit, preferably an Internal Security unit, near a large recruiting centre. Its size is largely determined by wastage figures in which the medical directorate can be of great assistance, and both skilled as well as unskilled non-combatants are required. There is no such thing as a Corps of Followers, so followers have to be enrolled into the unit selected for the purpose, and attached for temporary duty with units in the area of operations as required.

The Forming of 2nd Echelon

Considerations of strengths, temporary depots and reinforcements having been satisfactorily settled, the "A" staff is now in a position to begin preparations for the forming of 2nd Echelon, but before discussing these there are certain matters of policy to which attention must be drawn.

The sanction which delegates to the commander of the force the authority to apply the provisions of the Special Procedure Pamphlet usually permits the application of the whole pamphlet, or individual paragraphs at his discretion. The first question which arises is: Should a 2nd Echelon be formed immediately, or at a later date? Experience shows that there can only be one answer: immediately. Apart from the difficulty of overcoming the time lag, to which reference has already been made, 2nd Echelon is the only method by which casualties can be quickly and accurately reported.

The manner in which the special procedure for war is brought into force is familiar to everyone. A punitive column perhaps encounters stiff opposition necessitating reinforcements from its own Covering Troops district. They may not suffice, and more are required from other districts as the situation deteriorates. The provisions of the Special Procedure Pamphlet are applied, and it is now for decision whether all the forces within the defined area of operations shall come under the control of 2nd Echelon, or only those who have moved, or may move, into it. In 1937 a compromise was made whereby 2nd Echelon reported all battle casualties in the area of operations, but the peace time units of the Waziristan Military District, with the exception of those of the Royal Indian Army Service Corps, were not under its control for other purposes. This led to a duplication of work; certain 2nd Echelon duties devolved on the headquarters of Waziristan Division which had not the staff to deal with them; and 2nd Echelon was never able to present a true picture of Wazirforce as a whole. It would be unwise, however, to be too dogmatic on an important question of this nature; the arguments on both sides are many, but from the 2nd Echelon point of view, it is desirable that all units within the area of operations should be under its control.

The third item on which a decision is required relates to the issue of orders; 2nd Echelon is part of the "A" branch of the formation conducting the operations, and it is preferable that the officer in charge should issue his own orders, subject to the policy laid down from time to time.

When 2nd Echelon working was first introduced in Frontier operations difficulty was experienced in arriving at a correct establishment. The war establishment and war equipment table for G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon appeared to have been designed for a world war and were too elaborate, and it was only after trial and error that a satisfactory establishment was evolved. Appendix I shows the organization of 2nd Echelon, as it existed in 1937. This is probably the minimum for Frontier operations of any size, and the number of senior clerks that was considered essential is noteworthy. There is always a shortage of clerks but it is advisable to send only the best to 2nd Echelon. It should be remembered that the provision of most of the record clerks is automatic—they are allowed for in war establishments, but in the case of units which do not exist in peace arrangements have to be made.

A statistical sub-section was not included in the 1937 organization, but it is now generally accepted that one is desirable. The maintenance of statistics is, however, skilled work, and if it is decided to introduce this sub-section, Army Headquarters should be asked to detail one of its experts, with a calculating machine, in the capacity of supervisor and instructor.

A standing committee of adjustment is not required. Temporary depots deal with the estates of deceased British officers and other ranks; all effects of casualties must be sent to temporary depots, and not to 2nd Echelon.

The command of 2nd Echelon is none too easy, and whenever possible an officer with previous experience should be detailed. If this is not possible there may be one with experience somewhere in India whose services can be made available for a few weeks to supervise the settling down process and preliminary work. In any case it will be of great assistance if the commanding officer designate visits the headquarters of the formation conducting the operations, where he can be put into the picture, and learn details of the medical plan. Eventually he will be intimately concerned with medical installations and it will be to his

advantage to know which are being used, and where they are. The officers employed with 2nd Echelon are part of the "A" Staff, and they should be graded for the purposes of pay, and included in the list of staff officers in the order of battle. The issue of brassards to denote their status has a marked psychological effect. The officer in charge requires an imprest account, and this should be arranged as soon as possible.

The composition of 2nd Echelon and numerous other details having been decided, it should not be forgotten that its location is of importance. It has been found that personal liaison has helped to smooth away many difficulties, and it should therefore be located as near the theatre of operations as possible. On the other hand, once fixed, it cannot be moved without considerable dislocation. Barrack accommodation with electric light and room for expansion is most desirable. The personnel work long hours, and their comfort is also worth consideration.

Like other units which do not exist in peace, 2nd Echelon is dependent on Delhi and Calcutta for its supply of books, forms, regulations, stationery and office equipment. Again the war equipment table is not helpful, but experience has produced workable scales. In order to save time it is advisable to ask Army Headquarters to authorize the supplying departments to despatch these articles by passenger train on the receipt of a wire from the formation conducting the operations. Even then some delay is unavoidable owing to the distance involved, and the staff can help very materially by providing a supply of essentials to tide over the first few days.

Rest Camps and Reinforcement Camps

To complete this brief survey of staff duties, mention must be made of rest camps and reinforcement camps.

2nd Echelon calls up reinforcements, which, having been despatched by temporary depots, gradually converge on the theatre of operations. They cannot, however, make their own way to their units, and a rest camp has to be interposed on the line of communication. In many cases rest camps exist in peace at suitable railheads, and only expansion is necessary; but if such an arrangement is not available, a special unit must be raised, consisting of British and Indian sections as laid down in war establishments.

In India a rest camp fulfils the functions of the reception camp referred to in F.S.R., Vol. I.

Occasions may arise when formations and units from other Commands are engaged. Temporary depots are left behind, but their distance from the theatre of operations is often so great that unnecessary delay occurs in the arrival of reinforcements. This can be overcome by forming a reinforcement camp at some suitable place, at which temporary depots maintain a specified number of personnel. Elaborate arrangements are not necessary; all that is required is the forming of attached sections to be administered by appropriate units in the selected station.

2nd Echelon

Having obtained all the information and guidance possible in the short time at his disposal, the officer in charge, 2nd Echelon, leaves the headquarters of the formation conducting the operations, and makes his way to the station where 2nd Echelon is to be formed. He probably has with him: one or two clerks, some boxes of forms and stationery, one or two typewriters and a duplicating machine; a small nucleus from which to form such an important office. Even if he has had previous experience he will, if wise, make notes of the hundred and one things he has to attend to. On arrival at his destination he must take over the buildings allotted to him, arrange for furniture, and make sure that the promise of a telephone is being implemented. In the course of the next few days the remainder of his headquarters will begin to arrive, and will require accommodation. Before long unit record clerks will also begin to arrive, and similar arrangements for them must be made. His office has been placed under the local commander for local administration; there are numerous people to see, and a good deal to do in a very short time; but although these preliminaries are essential, the most important of his instructions is that 2nd Echelon must begin to function on a definite date. His first task, therefore, is to issue, as soon as possible, an order to give effect to this instruction.

Appendix II is a copy of 2nd Echelon (N), Order No. 1 issued for the Waziristan Operations, 1937. It was subsequently slightly amended, but remained unchanged in substance and was the basis of very successful 2nd Echelon working. It will repay

examination, because it shows how 2nd Echelon gathers the threads into its own hands and how details have to be thought of and carefully co-ordinated (The references are to the old edition of the Special Procedure Pamphlet).

Although all the forms mentioned in F.S.R., Vol. I, Appendix III, were not taken into use, it will be seen that a good many are referred to in the order. The submission of routine forms plays a large part in office work on service, but judging from the complaints made by 2nd Echelon, unit clerks are rarely taught their use, or exercised in preparing them, in peace. The mobilization box kept by a unit in peace appears to be opened only when the latter is ready to leave for the theatre of operations, and incorrectly compiled returns during the first few weeks lead to unnecessary correspondence and much overtime work in 2nd Echelon. It is suggested that it is too late to learn the use of mobilization forms once operations have begun, and commanding officers could help considerably by giving their clerks opportunities for practice during peace training. Other opportunities occur on manœuvres—higher formations can call for the more important returns as part of the administrative problems.

Although operations on the Frontier are fought under conditions not entailing mobilization, mobilization forms are taken into use. They are designed on the supposition that units will be working on war establishments, but confusion sometimes occurs because so many units are on minimum strengths. This is particularly so in the case of the Field Returns (A.Fs. W-3008 and 3009). These are intricate forms, and units experience difficulty in interpreting the instructions printed on the covers, but since it is impracticable to hold two sets of forms, the officer in charge, 2nd Echelon, must issue explanatory routine orders.

The organization of a 2nd Echelon is given in Appendix I. This division into Sections "A," "B" and "C" is constant, irrespective of the type of operations; and the principles governing the working of each section remain unchanged.

"A" Section

"A" Section is responsible for the maintenance of records, the issue of Part II Orders, and statistics.

The records sub-section maintains a complete record of the service of every individual throughout the operations. Information received from various sources is entered on "Service and Casualty forms" (A.F. B-103 and I.A.F. F-958), and their safe custody and accurate completion are matters of great importance. On receiving orders to join 2nd Echelon, unit record clerks take with them these forms, together with the nominal rolls of the unit; when no clerk is detailed in war establishments for 2nd Echelon, they are sent by post to the officer in charge as soon as possible. The service and casualty form of every man proceeding as a reinforcement is similarly disposed of, unless he has already served in the area, in which case 2nd Echelon is in possession of his documents. It should be noted that Mobilization Regulations, India, 1937, authorizes the use of A.F. B-103 for officers, although no mention is made of it for them in F.S.R., Vol. I. The officer in charge distributes unit record clerks according to the work that has to be done; he may decide to group small units, *e.g.*, form a Royal Artillery and Royal Tank Corps group, and thus relieve men for other duties.

The unit record clerk has important duties to carry out, and only reliable men should be sent to 2nd Echelon. Besides keeping a complete and accurate nominal roll of his unit or group he is responsible for compiling each service and casualty form. He extracts his information from the casualty return sent in by units (A.F. W-3010 and 3011), from field ambulance returns (A-36), hospital returns and convalescent depot returns. In addition, he receives each week a collection of offence reports. In major operations, these are checked by the discipline sub-section, but in operations on the Frontier, a special sub-section is not necessary, and the checking is done by an officer or senior clerk. Difficult cases can be sent to the deputy Judge Advocate-General of the appropriate circuit for advice. Much unnecessary correspondence and work can be obviated by those awarding punishments ensuring that their awards are legal and that all the details given are full and correct.

It might be thought that a casualty return has special reference to a battle or an engagement, but from a 2nd Echelon point of view a casualty is an event affecting a soldier's service; for example, battle casualties, accidents, admission to a field medical

unit, any kind of promotion, transfers, attachments, courts-martial, field punishments, forfeiture of pay, leave, alterations of name or address of next-of-kin or transfers to the "X" List. The "X" List is a list kept up by unit record clerks on which are entered the names of men who have either been posted, not attached, to fill a vacancy on a headquarters or other unit, or evacuated to a field medical unit. Since men on this list are struck off the strength of their units, and are replaceable by reinforcements, changes must be notified to "C" Section.

Part II Orders are compiled and issued weekly; on A.F. O-1810 for other ranks, and A.F. O-1810-A for officers. They are published separately for each unit, but for Royal Indian Army Service Corps units, it is more convenient to group animal transport, mechanical transport and supply personnel, and to issue separate orders for each category. They are compiled from the various returns, and the main principle to be observed is that as full information as possible is published in them, in order that all concerned may be kept fully informed of every circumstance affecting the service or pay of officers, other ranks and followers. 2nd Echelon, however, cannot be held responsible if the necessary details are not forthcoming, and there are occasions when temporary depots are concerned. They hold the permanent records of all personnel engaged and when, for example, a soldier is entitled to an increment of pay, the officer commanding the temporary depot should inform the unit in the field, which in turn reports the fact on its casualty return. By this means the necessary Part II Order can be published. Mention is made of this because it is sometimes thought that 2nd Echelon automatically publishes orders regarding pay.

A reference has already been made to the fact that operations on the Frontier are conducted under conditions not entailing mobilization. Mobilization Regulations, India, and F.S.R., Vol. I, can therefore only be taken as a guide. This situation affects the distribution list of Part II Orders, and the lists given in the manuals require amplification. Officers in charge of Records in England, temporary depots, the Controller of Military Account's Clearing House and many others want copies, and it is necessary to decide at the outset on a comprehensive list.

It is interesting to know that, in 1937, 2nd Echelon maintained the service and casualty forms of 45,451 men.

Besides being responsible for providing statistical information regarding the man-power situation, both to answer questions and for historical use, the statistical sub-section prepares statements showing the reinforcement situation, the number of reinforcements required, strengths in the field and their distribution and wastage. The information is obtained from the various returns which are received in 2nd Echelon, and the sub-section must keep up a close liaison with the other sections and seek out what is required.

"B" Section

The primary function of "B" Section is the correct reporting of all battle casualties, and those caused by sickness and disease. This section also contains a "Returns" sub-section which acts as a clearing house for returns.

The reporting of battle casualties takes precedence over all other work, and since 2nd Echelon is frequently thought to be responsible for the delays that sometimes occur, it will serve a useful purpose to point out the difficulties with which it has to contend. The first necessity in reporting battle casualties is accuracy, and this is not possible unless all the details are given, and unless the information regarding the next-of-kin as recorded on the service and casualty form is correct. The following instances of incorrect information were noticed in 1937:

- (a) Next-of-kin—"Wife, with husband."
- (b) Old 1918 forms which did not show the next-of-kin had been sent to 2nd Echelon.
- (c) Forms, purporting to refer to certain Departmental warrant officers, had not been brought up to date since their original enlistment in the British Army.

The responsibility of commanding officers in the matter of the correct completion of service and casualty forms cannot be over-emphasized.

The means by which casualties are reported by 2nd Echelon vary in accordance with the type of person concerned, and a complete list is to be found in the Special Procedure Pamphlet. In

most cases the first news is conveyed by telegram, but this is frequently anticipated by rumours which are always prevalent after an engagement. Uncertainty is often made worse by the incomplete announcements of the British Broadcasting Corporation, which cannot give full details. It is comparatively easy for a news agency to cable brief reports, mentioning numbers of casualties without names, but 2nd Echelon has to be more accurate. A definite routine must be followed which, of necessity, takes time.

Battle casualties are usually reported by wireless in the evening; that is when signal traffic is very dense and delay in transmission is often unavoidable. Moreover, if 2nd Echelon has the slightest doubt of the accuracy of any report, it must be referred back, because delay is preferable to inaccuracy.

It has been found that twenty-four hours usually elapse between the time a casualty is reported by a unit, and the time it is reported officially by 2nd Echelon. This may appear to be unnecessary delay, but in view of the many factors involved, it cannot be avoided.

In addition to reporting battle casualties, "B" Section reports hospital cases on the dangerously ill and seriously ill lists from any cause, and all deaths.

"C" Section

The task of "C" Section is to maintain units at their authorised strength by reinforcements. The authorised strength is either that given in war establishments, or the minimum strength or an establishment laid down for the operations, and this variation alone causes much additional work in verifying unit demands. When no statistical sub-section is formed the preparation of certain man-power returns also devolves on "C" Section.

In 1937 the daily strength state (Message Form A.F. W-3006), was not used, and reinforcements were calculated from the weekly strength returns. In the event, however, of large deficiencies owing to battle casualties or an epidemic, there is nothing to prevent "C" Section from demanding reinforcements without waiting for the weekly returns. "B" Section will give warning of such a contingency. Mention has already been made of the intricacy of these forms, and errors in compilation were very

frequent. Suggestions for their improvement are under consideration. After check, the strength returns are consolidated to show the strength of the Force on each Saturday night, together with deficiencies.

Having calculated the number of men required to make up deficiencies, "C" Section places demands on temporary depots and reinforcement camps, but before this can be done it must know the man-power situation. Information is obtained from the returns sent in by temporary depots showing, on Saturday night, the numbers, by ranks, of fit reinforcements on depot or station duties, on leave, sick or convalescent. Further information is abstracted from unit field returns, and returns from convalescent depots and rest camps.

The calculation of the number of reinforcements actually required is not, however, merely a matter of simple subtraction—authorised strength minus strength in the field. There are always a number of men absent from their unit who are classified as potential reinforcements, *e.g.*, those in rest camps after discharge from the local hospital, convalescents, men returning from leave and courses and so on, and these must be taken into account. Careful forecasts are therefore necessary to show when potential reinforcements will become available, in partial adjustment of unit deficiencies. The balance is then called up.

There are many factors affecting the man-power situation, and it will be of interest to outline the medical plan of 1937, because it materially affected the work of 2nd Echelon, particularly that of "C" Section.

Base hospitals were not formed; casualties were evacuated to peace hospitals in the same station as their temporary depots, where they eventually completed their convalescence. These potential reinforcements were therefore scattered, and a careful check on temporary depots returns was necessary. 2nd Echelon working is not facilitated by increasing the number of sources of information.

During the first few winter months casualties from the normal Waziristan District garrison were retained in hospitals in Waziristan, together with light cases from units which entered Waziristan for the operations. These light cases were not

transferred to their temporary depots when fit, but rejoined their units. This was a saving in man-power, but it made the calculations of "C" Section more complicated.

The winter policy was modified for the summer months, and it was decided to increase the hospital accommodation in Razmak, and to form convalescent depots there in order to accommodate, as far as possible, all casualties in the theatre of operations. This system of "Holding" was most successful. Apart from medical considerations there was no unnecessary wastage, and it reduced the number of reinforcements required from temporary depots, which effected a saving in transportation charges, but it produced problems for "C" Section which were almost unsolvable. The chief of these was the effect of a large number of potential reinforcements in the theatre of operations on reinforcement calculations. It could never be known, with any degree of certainty, when they would be discharged to units fit for duty, and it was therefore impossible to place accurate demands on temporary depots. Eventually it was decided that all sick and convalescents in Waziristan would count against unit field strengths, the only exceptions being personnel of the Royal Corps of Signals, Royal Tank Corps, Royal Indian Army Service Corps and medical units. By this means the difficulties were almost all overcome.

"Holding" in the theatre of operations was, however, peculiar to the 1937 operations, and it is not invariably applicable to all parts of the Frontier. Only the fortunate situation of Razmak, with its good accommodation, made the system feasible, and it is referred to, not as a contingency which must always be expected, but as an illustration of how administrative policy affects 2nd Echelon working.

Temporary depots and reinforcement camps are required to maintain reinforcements, equivalent to a month's wastage, ready for quick despatch on demand. "C" Section, from its returns and calculations, can say whether this number is likely to fall below the minimum, in which case a report is made to Army Headquarters. Arrangements are then made by the Adjutant-General's Branch to augment temporary depot and reinforcement camp strengths by reservists and men from recruit-producing units.

When operations are prolonged, questions of discharges, transfers to pension and reserve, etc., arise, and it is desirable that

wastage of this type should be controlled by 2nd Echelon, in accordance with the policy laid down by Army Headquarters.

The Closing down of 2nd Echelon


Operations eventually cease, the provisions of the Special Procedure Pamphlet are no longer applicable and 2nd Echelon must be closed down. This, however, has to be a gradual process, and in the first instance it is reduced to a cadre, with instructions to close finally on a definite date. As unit marching out returns are received, service and casualty forms are completed, leaving only those of sick and convalescents to be completed in due course by units themselves. These forms are finally sent to the units or peace record offices concerned, and other records are stored, usually at the headquarters of the formation conducting the operations. The extra pay of the officers of 2nd Echelon automatically ceases with the withdrawal of the Special Procedure Pamphlet, and sanction is required for it to be continued for those who are employed with the cadre.

In conclusion, it is hoped that this article has not created an impression that 2nd Echelon working is very difficult; it is not. All that is required is whole-hearted co-operation by the staff who should give every assistance, both before and after 2nd Echelon is formed; by commanding officers detailing efficient clerks, with complete nominal rolls and service and casualty forms; by all who send in returns, ensuring that they are accurate and rendered promptly; and finally, by the officer in charge keeping a sense of proportion even when the affairs of 2nd Echelon appear to be at their worst.

APPENDIX I.

ORGANIZATION OF 2ND ECHELON (N)—WAZIRFORCE, 1937.

OFFICER-IN-CHARGE



NOTE :—I. A. C. C.—Indian Army Corps of Clerks.

APPENDIX II.

WAZIRISTAN OPERATIONS, 1937

2ND ECHELON (N) ORDER NO. 1

2nd Echelon (N) Office is located in the Rest Camp, BANNU, telephone number BANNU 11.

"A" Records

1. 2nd Echelon (N) will prepare Part II Orders and maintain casualty forms (A.F.B-199-A, A.F. B-103 and I.A.F. F-958) for the following formations and units:

- (a) 1 Div.
- (b) All formations and units which have moved into Waziristan District from stations outside Waziristan, in connection with "Operations, Waziristan, 1937."
- (c) R.I.A.S.C. formations and units as enumerated in H.Q. Northern Command letter No. CRNC/20046/1/4/A6, dated 12th March 1937.

2. The above formations and units will comply with Mobilization Regulations, paragraph 166, viz:—

- (a) A.F. B-199-A (duplicate copies) for Officers of British Service, and specially prepared copies for Officers of the Indian Army; A.F. B-103 and I.A.F. F-958, will be despatched to 2nd Echelon (N) forthwith.
- (b) Complete nominal rolls of formations or units in triplicate, written or typed in BLOCK CAPITALS, numbers in numerical sequence:

- (i) As it existed in the Area of Operations at 2400 hrs. on 7th/8th March 1937

or

- (ii) As it entered the Area of Operations on or after 8th March 1937 giving dates of entry, will be forwarded to 2nd Echelon (N) forthwith.

N.B.—Attached Personnel *will* be shown on these rolls.

- (c) Record clerks from the above units will report to 2nd Echelon (N) on receipt of these orders.

Each clerk will be in possession of a typewriter.

3. A list of reports and returns to be submitted by the formations and units in paragraph 1 above is given in Appendix "A."
"B" Casualties

4. 2nd Echelon (N) is responsible for reporting casualties in the field (Battle Casualties), *vide* S.P.P., paragraph 55.

(i) All battle casualties of formations and units mentioned in paragraph 1 above will be reported by W/T to 2nd Echelon (N) as under:

Brigade H.Q. For all units under their command.

{ H.Q. 1 Div. and

{ Os.C. Div. Tps. For all units and personnel under their command.

(ii) In all cases the sequence of the report will be as follows:

(a) Date of casualty.

(b) Regimental number.

(c) Rank.

(d) Name (SURNAME in the case of B.Os., K.C.I.Os., I.C.Os. and B.O.Rs. FULL NAMES in the case of V.C.Os., I.O.Rs. and Followers).

(e) Initials (In the case of B.Os., K.C.I.Os., I.C.Os., and B.O.Rs.)

(f) Unit.

(g) Nature and extent of wound.

(iii) Reports will be confirmed daily by post on A.F. W-3010 and A.F. W-3011 as applicable.

(iv) As soon as practicable Field medical units will inform 2nd Echelon (N) the degree of seriousness of casualties admitted since the last report or of any change in those already reported.

5. *Returns to be submitted by Field Medical Units.*

A.F. A-36, nominal roll of patients in hospital, is required to be submitted daily to 2nd Echelon (N).

6. *Returns required from Military Hospitals.*

All military hospitals which receive casualties of formations and units mentioned in paragraph 1 from field medical units in Waziristan, *viz.*:

*C.I.M.H., Mir Ali, Bannu, Razmak and Kohat, †B.M.H., Rawalpindi; I.M.H., Rawalpindi; C.I.M.H., Abbottabad; B.M.H., Lahore; I.M.H., Lahore; B.M.H., Jhelum; I.M.H., Jhelum, Wana and Manzai, will forward the following reports to 2nd Echelon (N):—

- (a) Casualties received on previous day from Forward Area.
 - (b) Transfers the previous day to any other hospital or convalescent depot (if formed).
 - (c) Discharges to temporary depots.
 - (d) Progress reports on sick and wounded officers.
7. *Returns required from convalescent depots (if formed):*
Admissions and discharges.

Evacuations from hospitals

8. Personnel of formations and units in paragraph 1 evacuated out of WAZIRISTAN will, when fit, rejoin their temporary depots.

9. Personnel discharged from C.I.M.H., RAZMAK, will join units (or temporary depots of units) as under:

British personnel	... 1 Northamptons.
Gurkhas	... 1/9th Gurkha Rifles.
Pathans	... 5/12th F.F. Regiment.
Other Indian personnel	... 4/8th Punjab Regiment.
Administrative personnel	... Detachments of own Services in RAZMAK.

Os.C. above depots will render reports to 2nd Echelon (N) on Wednesdays and Saturdays, giving the following information:

- (a) Number, rank, name, unit.
- (b) Date of joining from hospital.
- (c) Date personnel will be fit to join unit in the field.
- (d) Date personnel have been despatched to join unit in the field.

10. Os.C. Bannu and Mir Ali hospitals will discharge personnel of formations and units in paragraph 1, when fit to:

- (a) Temporary Depots if located in Bannu or Mir Ali.
- (b) Rest Camps, for despatch to units in the field.

11. Os.C. Bannu and Mir Ali Rest Camps will forward a daily return to 2nd Echelon (N) showing:

- (a) Personnel received from hospitals.
- (b) Date of despatch to units in the field.

* Combined Indian Military Hospital.

† British Military Hospital.—Ed.

**D.I. and S.I. Lists.*

12. Os.C. Hospitals will report to 2nd Echelon (N), on A.F. A-21-A, personnel of the formations and units mentioned in paragraph 1 above who are placed on the D.I. or S.I. List. Next-of-kin will be given on A.F. A-21-A. 2nd Echelon (N) will render the necessary reports to all concerned.

"C" Reinforcements

13. Formations and units mentioned in paragraph 1 will submit the returns shown in Appendix "B" to 2nd Echelon (N) who will calculate and demand reinforcements for them.

14. Orders to despatch drafts or individuals will be issued by O.C., 2nd Echelon (N) direct to temporary depots of above units with copies to units concerned and Os.C. Rest Camp, Bannu, etc.

15. Under NO circumstances will drafts or individuals be despatched without the orders of 2nd Echelon (N), nor will units in the field make demands on temporary depots.

16. Drafts and individuals (including officers) from temporary depots will be ordered to report to O.C., Rest Camp, Bannu. Their onward despatch will be arranged by the O.C., Bannu, on information furnished by 2nd Echelon (N).

Waziristan District Signals

17. Demands for British and Indian reinforcements for Waziristan District Signals will be submitted to 2nd Echelon (N) by O.C. Waziristan District Signals when required. (CRNC/20078/Sigs., dated 9th March 1937.)

Action by Temporary Depots or Formations and Units mentioned in paragraph 1

18. The returns mentioned in paragraph 54 of the S.P.P.† will not be rendered by temporary depots.

In place of the above returns, the return given in Appendix "C" showing the state of the depot at 2359 hrs. on Saturdays will be submitted to 2nd Echelon (N).

19. The attention of Os.C. temporary depots of British units is directed to paragraph 18 of the S.P.P. These soldiers should not be treated as effective when considering the number of reinforcements available.

20. Temporary depots will forward copies of Depots Part II Orders to 2nd Echelon (N).

BANNU:
19th March 1937.

(Sd.) F. H. C., Captain,
Officer i/c 2nd Echelon (N), Bannu.

* Dangerously ill and seriously ill.—Ed.
† Special Procedure Pamphlet.—Ed.

APPENDIX "A."

How often rendered.	Army Form.	Return.	Remarks.
Daily or as often as practicable.	A. F. W-3010.	Casualty Return of B. Os. and I.C.Os.	These forms will show casualties from ALL causes and any other information normally published in Part II Orders.
	F. F. W.-3011.	Casualty Return of V. C.Os., B. O. Rs., I.O.Rs. and followers.	
Weekly by noon on Mondays.	A. F. N-2069.	Offence Report.	
First of each month.	A. F. B.-158.	Nominal Roll of B.Os. and I.C.Os.; attached officers shown separately.	In quadruplicate, quintuplicate for field medical units. 2nd Echelon (N) will arrange disposal as follows: 1 copy—M.S., A.H.Q., 1 copy—C. M. A., Rawalpindi. 1 copy—Temporary Depot. *1 copy—D. M. S., A.H.Q. *1 copy—D. D. M. S., Northern.
When required.	Manuscript (in triplicate).	Nominal roll of unit, formation or party marching out of area of operations.	To be prepared in BLOCK CAPITALS. Numbers in numerical sequence.

*For field medical units only.

APPENDIX "B."

How often.	Army Form.	Return.	Remarks.
Weekly to reach 2nd Echelon by noon on Monday showing the situation at 2359 hrs. the previous Saturday.	W.-3008.	Field Return of B.Os. and I.C.Os.	Reinforcements calculated and demanded by 2nd Echelon (N) and supplied by temporary depots.
	W.-3009.	Field Return of V. C.Os., B.O.Rs., I.O.Rs. and Followers.	Ditto.

Second Echelon in Frontier Operations

APPENDIX "C."

Temporary Depot Return

UNIT.

Week ending 2359 hrs. _____

	B. Os.	I. C. Os.	V. C. Os.	W. Os.	Sgts. Havs.	Cpls.	Nails.	B. O. Rs. I. O. Rs.	Cooks.	Bhisti.	Sweepers.	Total.	Remarks.
Fit reinforcements available.													
Employed on depot or station duties.													
Sick or convalescent.													
Furlough or leave.													

"A."

Nominal roll of personnel rejoined from units in the field from 2359 hrs. (previous Saturday).

"B."

Nominal roll of personnel despatched to join units in field from 2359 hrs. (previous Saturday).

QUANTITY OR QUALITY?

To live beyond one's means has always been fashionable amongst a certain type of individual. It is of all vices perhaps one of the most insidious and difficult to eradicate. A standard once set can be lowered only with loss of personal pride and standing amongst one's own kind. One's best friends are fellow competitors, each striving to keep up false appearances and driving the other to further excesses.

What has for all time been common to a certain type of individual is to-day becoming commonplace amongst the greater nations of the world, and, to some extent, for the same reasons. In a world in which national waste means eventual international economic depression, and where sources of wealth, in the form of human energy or raw materials, are tending in some cases to dry up, all the great nations are, year by year, increasing by huge sums the amounts spent upon non-productive armaments. The money now being poured out is spent not so much on numbers of armed men as upon material, ships, guns, aeroplanes, tanks and mechanical transport. Such expenditure involves the greatest possible degree of economic waste. Men get worn out, and can be replaced at comparatively small cost; pensions are relatively cheap, and the money returns all too rapidly into circulation. Machines, on the other hand, wear out even faster than men, and even more quickly become obsolete; they are initially extremely expensive, and yearly tend to become more so. Up-to-date mechanical efficiency, therefore, swells the defence bill of a nation with increasing velocity.

Eventually there must come a time for all nations when, for financial reasons alone, some compromise must be reached. Either quality must be allowed to deteriorate or quantity must suffer reduction.

Machines grow yearly more complex and efficient, their costs rising to a corresponding degree. In the long run, therefore, one is likely to see a reduction in quantity rather than quality, since no nation will be prepared to accord mechanical superiority to its competitor. The tendency will be for the large numbers of men and vehicles now comprising a first class continental army to decrease, and for the nations concerned to spend their money upon a smaller, more efficient and better equipped organization. So far as the British Empire is concerned such an event could

only be welcomed. With the basis of a great industrial efficiency and the voluntary system we have always strived for quality rather than quantity, and the reversal of our competitors to the same standard of living must leave us relatively in a more secure position.

Whereas, however, most nations are faced with the definite problem of production of a fighting machine designed for use under certain specific conditions, the British Empire has a wide variety of divergent responsibilities. Our numbers, already relatively small, have to be organized to meet many varying demands: the protection of overseas bases, the policing of overseas possessions or mandates, and the production of an efficient striking force. With such commitments as India, the Far East, Palestine and the Mediterranean bases it seems extremely doubtful whether we can effect any considerable reduction in actual numbers. As has so often been the case in the past, we may be forced to effect a compromise, and to reduce to some extent our quality as well as our quantity. At present we aim at a common organization and standard of equipment and training for all our armed forces, irrespective of their immediate rôles. There are cogent reasons for such a policy, and, were money no object, it could not be seriously questioned. Money, however, is an object, or soon will be, and it appears reasonably certain that eventually this policy will have to be reconsidered, and must suffer extensive revision.

Our striking forces must continue to be given the most up-to-date and powerful machinery to enable them to meet on equal terms an enemy who may have sacrificed quantity rather than quality. They require the maximum hitting power, mobility, mechanical protection and degree of training. There is, however, no apparent necessity for our "police" forces to be organized or equipped to the same scale. They require mobility, reasonable hitting power in comparison with their probable enemies, reduced mechanical protection and a lower standard of general mechanical knowledge and training. Internal security units do not need tanks, machine-guns in large numbers, mortars or artillery; for the most part such weapons are the last which would be employed, since their use would be contrary to the principle of preserving internal peace with the minimum of force. What they do need is fine discipline, reasonable ability in the use of personal weapons, and great mobility. Similarly, the garrisons of our overseas bases do not need great mobility, but they do need stopping power and mechanical protection.

Since we must effect a compromise somewhere, it is upon these lines, that is to say, the elimination of a common standard

irrespective of rôle, that we can best effect that reduction of quality without which the maintenance of our small numbers may become financially impossible.

The financial burden which our present policy imposes will, it has been suggested, be intolerable, in the long run, for the British taxpayer. It is likely to be even more of a burden in India, where there is less wealth to tap and where the political atmosphere is hardly likely to be one which encourages a steady increase in the Defence Services' budget. In this country we have a considerable number of British battalions; of these a relatively large proportion are earmarked for internal security duties in war. We are in fact maintaining the majority of our British Infantry units at a scale of equipment in advance of that necessitated by their rôle; this policy will become more and more expensive as the process of mechanization in the United Kingdom forces us to follow suit in India. We, like all other countries, shall be forced to reduce quality or quantity, or to compromise and reduce both to the minimum necessitated by finance. It is suggested that this compromise should take the form of a reduction in the organization, equipment and numbers of our internal security units, both British and Indian. Could we not afford, without undue risk, to reduce the fire power of these units, the money spent on their collective training and their unit transport? India is becoming every year more full of mechanically propelled vehicles, whilst roads, if poor by European standards, become more abundant. In emergency the transport is available, by hire or impressment, for the rapid transportation of troops to any centre of unrest; if reliance upon civil vehicles were considered too dangerous, a pool of Government transport at each station would be adequate insurance. Is it now necessary, moreover, for internal security units to be scattered over the face of India? With modern means of transport, rail, road and air, we could afford to concentrate our internal security troops far more than is the case at present, and rely upon mobility to overcome the distance involved.

Let us take, for example, the mythical district of Bogipur, a typical central Indian area in which communal or other form of strife is liable to break out at short notice. To-day in this district we have four internal security units, one at Banga, one at Cippur, one at Detegarh, and another at Fatimurg. At each station we have hospitals and military dairies. Were these units to be concentrated at Fatimurg, which one may imagine to be fairly centrally situated, the administrative needs of the garrison could be met by one hospital and one dairy. Their concentration would

effect a fluidity of our internal security resources which dispersion must restrict; moreover, concentration would reduce the numbers required for the immediate protection of barracks and stores, and thus increase the numbers available for a more active rôle. Concentration does, however, necessarily demand increased mobility. One would not dare to rely solely upon the railway, or even perhaps upon the road communications available; both are liable to interference by the elements or the opposition. Air transport is far less liable to dislocation by climate, and is immune to enemy interference, provided landing grounds at potential centres of disturbance are maintained and guarded, in emergency, by the civil forces at the disposal of Government. Given concentration and a high degree of mobility, India could afford to reduce the numbers of troops earmarked for internal security. In the mythical district of Bogipur, for example, one such battalion could be eliminated and some of the money saved could be spent upon the provision of load-carrying aircraft. Such aircraft need not necessarily be located permanently at Bogipur, since dispersion of air transport would mean increased overhead charges, but could be located in areas from which they could move rapidly and in the numbers required to any centre of emergency.

Any reduction in the equipment and training of internal security units raises, of course, the question of reliefs. All units must, it will be suggested, take their turn of duty on the frontier, with formations forming part of the field army, and in the good and bad stations. Here again we are confronted with a rigidity of organization which must, it is suggested, eventually be demolished. The personnel of the Royal Artillery are not bound for life to certain specified units or armament; nor are the personnel of the Royal Engineers; why must those of the cavalry and infantry arms be so restricted? A general list, and, in the case of privates, enlistment into an arm of the service rather than a particular unit, would overcome this difficulty of reliefs. These could then be effected by changes of selected personnel rather than by units; the latter could still be moved if required, but obviously the scope of such moves would be considerably reduced.

There are, of course, disadvantages in such a solution, of which loss of *esprit de corps* may be quoted as the major item. Financial stringency will eventually, however, force us to sacrifice something. The problem is to decide with what we can most easily afford to dispense. Can we much longer afford to use the most expensive machine to do what can be done by manual labour? A scheme on the lines indicated above may enable us

to achieve much the same practical results with far less expenditure. The present organization of Indian Infantry lends itself to the scheme proposed. For British units the concurrence of the Home Government would, of course, be essential, but finance may well make concurrence an eventual necessity. In India the money we save, if not diverted to more pacific measures when the present war scare is over, can best be spent on, and will in fact be essential for, the creation and maintenance of a striking force equal to the standard set by our possible opponents.

THE SHANGHAI EMERGENCY, 1937

[A lecture given before the members of the United Service Institution of India on 30th June 1938 by Major H. McL. Morrison, M.C., The Royal Ulster Rifles.

The lecturer was introduced by Lieut.-General Sir Bertrand Moberly, K.C.I.E., C.B., D.S.O.]

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

We are within nine days of the anniversary of the incident which set alight the present conflagration between Japan and China, a blaze which shows little sign of diminishing. It was on the 8th July last year that Japanese troops, carrying out night operations near Peking, were fired on by Chinese soldiers. The Japanese retaliatory measures which followed included the bombing of Peking itself and roused the already bitter anti-Japanese feeling, prevalent throughout the whole country, to fever pitch. In no place was this more likely to take violent form than in Shanghai and several minor incidents culminated on the 9th of August in the murder of two members of the Japanese Naval Landing Party. These men were motoring in the vicinity of the Chinese military aerodrome at Hungao, some three miles from Shanghai, when they were murdered. The officer had eighteen bayonet and bullet wounds in his body and his seaman-chauffeur was wounded in the eyes, face and body in a similar manner. The actual details of the killing were never disclosed, the Chinese and Japanese versions being at complete variance. How the Japanese were able to issue any version at all is a mystery since both their men were dead, and the subsequent inquiry indicated that the Chinese story also was open to doubt.

There can be no question that the act of motoring in the vicinity of a military aerodrome at this time of stress was an act of extreme recklessness and folly. The fact that this officer had done the same thing, at the same time each day, for several days preceding the murders, made it all the more rash. One point was clearly demonstrated by the inquiry, namely, that the killing had been carried out by members of a corps, euphemistically named The Peace Preservation Corps.

This Corps had been formed at the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War of 1932 with the object of policing a demilitarized zone between the borders of the International Settlement and a

line some twenty kilometres beyond it. For some inexplicable reason the zone extended only on the north side of the Soochow Creek. One can only presume that the Japanese expected the other interested powers to ensure its application to their sectors also. Had they done so, it is unlikely that the 1937 emergency would have occurred. At any rate, there would have been no Chinese aerodrome at Hungao for the Japanese to spy on.

Under the 1932 treaty, which was witnessed by British, American and French representatives, the Peace Preservation Corps was limited to two thousand men. Its members were to be drawn from gendarmerie only, and it was not to contain artillery or tanks, all of which provisions, it was said, had been broken.

To ensure that the terms of the treaty were carried out, a Joint Sino-Japanese Commission was established, and was authorised to "call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of the provisions of any of its articles." From the first the Commission had failed to function, but both governments were determined to use it and back up its efforts to settle this particular dispute. Neither China nor Japan appeared to want a war in the Shanghai area; events, however, were too strong for them.

On the 11th August, that is two days after the murders, the Japanese 3rd Fleet arrived off Shanghai and landed reinforcements for the Naval Landing Party. That same evening German trained Chinese divisions occupied the North Station and the Kiangwan area, and thus all hope of a peaceful settlement vanished.

Some of you may remember that during the 1932 trouble, the Rev. Dick Sheppard made the novel suggestion that a party of peace-loving individuals should go to Shanghai and squat between the opposing forces. This incredible proposal was now renewed in a different form by the Italian Consul-General, who suggested that neutral troops should carry out this rôle. Needless to say, there were no Italian troops in Shanghai.

The foreign garrisons in Shanghai were there under no treaty rights, but simply on account of the claim made by every civilised power to protect its own nationals when the local authorities were either unwilling or unable to carry out that duty themselves. Consequently, at the beginning of August, we find in Shanghai a British battalion, 1,000 American Marines, 1,800 Japanese Marines and the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, about 2,000 strong. In the French Concession there were 600 troops.

In both the French Concession and the International Settlement, the work of government is carried on by a municipal council similar to a municipality at home. The powers of the Shanghai

Municipal Council are, however, much wider, the Council being responsible not only for internal security but also for the protection of the Settlements from outside aggression. While Chinese sovereignty is recognised, that sovereignty is strictly limited and no armed Chinese are allowed in either Settlement. At the moment the Council of the International Settlement consists of two Americans, one of whom is chairman, five Englishmen, two Japanese and five Chinese.

The 1938 Whittaker shows Shanghai as the sixth largest city in the world with a population of 3,500,000, and approximately 1,200,000 live in the International Settlement. In 1937 only 30,000 of these were foreigners and of that number 20,000 were Japanese.

China is said to be a philosophical country, and if one is to judge from the calm way in which the coolie class accept their hard lot, there is justification for the statement. Nevertheless, Chinese are easily inflamed, and rioting in Shanghai has become chronic. Without warning and in an incredibly short space of time they can and do become dangerous mobs. The 3,500 members of the Shanghai Municipal Police, all Chinese, except for a handful of foreigners, cope with the situation very well in normal times, but when China is at war their loyalty is somewhat strained and the internal security problem becomes a serious one.

On the 12th August it was learned that the Joint Commission had failed to solve the problem, so the Council decided to mobilize the Volunteers. In previous emergencies the commanders of foreign garrisons had been notified of the need to prepare to defend their sectors by a proclamation of a state of emergency, but in 1932, when the Japanese were moving out to man their sector in accordance with the proclamation, they were fired on by snipers of the 19th Route Army. They were thus able to answer the Chinese objection to their use of the International Settlement as a base for operations by stating that they were acting in defence of it, whereas they alone had a quarrel with China. The Council determined that in 1937 they would avoid this embarrassing state of affairs and contented themselves with the mobilization of the Volunteer Corps, leaving the respective commanders to carry on as they thought best. By agreement, Brigadier Telfer-Smollett was given the task of co-ordinating the defence arrangements and placed in nominal command. Fighting had commenced between the Chinese and Japanese on the morning of the 13th, and by that evening all the sectors had been occupied and were hurriedly being put in a state of defence.

We were never able to find out the cause of the Chinese failure to sweep the Japanese into the Whampoo. They outnumbered them by at least ten to one, and in addition had numerous troops on the Pootung side of the river. It was said they were restrained from entering the Settlement by orders from Nanking, but these, if they were ever issued, could hardly have applied, after the outbreak of hostilities, to the Japanese sector.

The first big problem with which the Council had to deal was the question of refugees. Within two days of the Hungao killing nearly a million sought the sanctuary of the Settlement. In addition, hospital accommodation was prepared for five thousand wounded Chinese soldiers.

Shanghai is not a sanitary paradise, and the fact that outbreaks of cholera, typhoid, dysentery and other diseases were kept under control reflects the greatest credit on the medical authorities of the Municipality. The next problem, and perhaps the most serious, was the threat of the Chinese commanders to take over the Settlement. As it was completely surrounded by at least 50,000 Chinese soldiers, it was no idle threat. And the strain which would have been placed on the Chinese members of the Municipal Police must not be overlooked.

Before we pass on to a consideration of the defence scheme I must say a word about the Shanghai Volunteer Corps. Its two thousand members are divided into three battalions; "A" is British, "B" American and "C" Russian. The Russians are regular soldiers, recruited and paid by the Municipal Council, and are a fine body of men. They are armed with rifles and machine-guns, have armoured cars and a number of lorries. In normal times their main task is support of the police, a duty which they carry out with the utmost vigour and efficiency. The commandant of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps is a British Colonel and he is assisted by a Brigade-Major and Staff-Captain, both regular soldiers. The Russians have a regular officer of the British Army as Adviser.

The 1937 scheme involved the occupation of areas in advance of the actual Settlement boundaries, which are unsuitable in some sectors for defence. Thus in "A" sector a huge salient extends into Chinese territory, whilst in "D" sector an advance has been made to the Hangchow Railway.

Excluding the French, who are entirely responsible for the defence of their own Concession, the perimeter is divided into four sectors, A, B, C and D.

"A" sector was held by the Japanese, and it is in this Hongkew-Yantsepoo area that most of the 20,000 Japanese live and work.

The sector also contains the Shanghai Water Works, the supplies of frozen meat for British troops and the municipal gaol, and there were frequent disputes with the Japanese over these three places.

"B" sector was held in the first instance by the Russian contingent of the Volunteer Corps, then by the Volunteers proper, and finally by British regular troops. It was considered the most dangerous of the neutral sectors, lying as it did between the Japanese and Chinese lines. It has permanent blockhouses of various types, lettered "A" to "F", and access to it is controlled by huge iron gates, the side entrances of which are appropriately marked "Not bullet-proof."

The American Marines held "C" sector which runs for the whole of its length along the Soochow Creek. The Chinese were careful to place their batteries opposite the centre of this sector so that the Japanese would have some difficulty in attacking them. On more than one occasion the Americans were requested to vacate their front line posts to let the Japanese do the job, but the answer was always an emphatic "No," and the Japanese were warned that they would be held responsible for any damage or loss of life.

British troops held "D" sector which runs along the Soochow Creek from Ferry Road, where it joins the American line, to the Hangchow Railway, thence southward down the east side of the railway, and eventually joins the French Concession at the junction of Haig Avenue and the Avenue Joffre.

Excluding "A" sector, the troops available to hold this enormous frontage were less than 4,000 strong, and of these nearly 2,000 were Volunteers. It is not surprising, then, that a call was at once made on Hong Kong for reinforcement.

The G. O. C. in China has authority to move one battalion to wherever it may be needed, but has to obtain War Office permission before other moves are made. The Royal Welch Fusiliers were earmarked to move in the first instance and the battalion was placed at twenty-four hours' notice on the 12th August. It sailed for Shanghai at 6 p.m. on the 14th August. While it was nearing the hour for sailing, tragedy had overwhelmed Shanghai. The Chinese Air Force, making its first effort in war, dropped two enormous bombs on the Settlement, and another two on the borders of the French Concession. The point where the latter fell was crowded with refugees and over a thousand of them were instantly killed and another thousand wounded. It is difficult to grasp just what these huge figures mean. If we picture in our minds what an infantry battalion at war strength

looks like then we have some idea of the numbers knocked out in a matter of seconds. It is thought that the second bomb, which exploded in mid-air, giving it the effect of shrapnel, was detonated either by the force of the explosion of the first bomb, or by a splinter from it. In the Nanking Road explosions 729 people were killed and 861 injured. A line of motor cars caught fire and many of the occupants were incinerated beyond recognition. Nanking Road is the city's shopping centre, and it was a stroke of good fortune that the bombs fell on a Saturday afternoon. Most of the shops were closed and streets, by comparison with normal days, were deserted. It taxed the efforts of both municipalities to cope with these disasters, and lorry load after lorry load of corpses was removed by the Russian contingent, police and fire brigade personnel. At one cemetery in the French Concession a doctor examined some four hundred bodies and found sixty of them still alive.

The experiences of the 14th decided the authorities to begin evacuation of women and children, and on the 17th August the first party was embarked on the P.&O. Liner "Rajputana" at Woosung. They were taken there in destroyers, and while going aboard, had to undergo an air raid, the Chinese once more attempting to find the Japanese flagship which was lying close by. Fortunately, there were no casualties but one British mother gave birth to a son on H.M.S. "Duncan," and no doubt the Royal Navy dealt with the situation in true Nelson fashion. That same afternoon the Royal Welch disembarked at Shanghai.

When we waved farewell to the Royal Welch on the 14th August, we felt it would not be long before we followed them, and we were, in fact, warned to take their place as the next unit to move. Sunday the 15th, therefore, was spent in packing and making all arrangements to go. While busy doing this, Command Headquarters asked if we were taking any steps about it and, when told, advised us not to worry too much as we were guaranteed forty-eight hours' notice. Having proceeded so far, we decided to continue. Just as well too. Twelve hours later, that is at midnight, we were asked if embarkation on the "Empress of Asia" was possible by noon next day. The answer, of course, was "yes," but owing to three of our officers being employed on cipher duties at Command Headquarters, who were wanted back, we refrained from asking: "What about the forty-eight hours' warning?"

The "Empress of Asia" had been requisitioned to take refugees from Shanghai and its departure could not be delayed

beyond mid-day, but we were all on board by that time and sailed promptly to the hour.

The trip to Shanghai was uneventful except for an excellent lecture by Col. Tyndall of the R.A.M.C., who had been in Shanghai during the 1932 troubles. Amongst other things he told us that although the Whampoo was the dirtiest of rivers, yet its water, when treated by the Shanghai Water Works, was the purest in the world; better even than London water. The Captain of the "Empress of Asia" was a little dubious about this and said that the Canadian Pacific never took Shanghai water. When we arrived in the Whampoo we were inclined to agree with the Captain.

At 9 a.m. on the 18th we arrived at the Woosung anchorage and found two destroyers waiting to take us up river. The journey from Woosung onwards was most interesting, and it was not long before we came across the first of a line of Japanese warships busily engaged in shelling the Chinese positions. As we passed, each in turn stopped action to salute our ship. Not knowing what lay ahead of us we were engaged in filling machine-gun belts and Lewis gun magazines, and issuing ammunition. By the time this was done we had reached the outskirts of the city. Enormous fires could be seen all over the countryside and Japanese aeroplanes were bombing various localities around Shanghai and on the Pootung side of the river. We were landed on the Bund just eighteen hours after the Royal Welch. Shanghai itself was like a city of the dead. The Bund, in normal times teeming with life, was deserted, and the shuttered shops and empty streets seemed almost uncanny. Much to the amusement of our friends in Hong Kong, we were quartered in a girls' school.

We found that we were to relieve the Loyals in "D" sector on the 21st August and immediately began its reconnaissance. The frontage was not far short of five miles, but a company of marines and sailors from H.M.S. Cumberland were placed under our orders, also a party of a hundred sailors and marines from Italian gunboats.

The perimeter was held by a series of section posts, of which there were twenty-one in all, with liaison posts on each flank. Our first task was the rebuilding and resiting of some of these which, having been hurriedly constructed, were neither bullet-proof nor sited to the best advantage. In addition, traffic had to be controlled through the perimeter, only those carrying food-stuffs being permitted to enter, and the internal security of the sector had to be maintained. We were early afforded an example

of the latter problem. A large Japanese mill was located in the right sub-sector. Two of the staff, Japanese, elected to visit it soon after we took over. They were at once set upon by a Chinese mob and killed. A section cleared the street but was too late to save the men. Then followed a rather delicate task. You will remember that it had been found necessary to advance beyond the Settlement boundary to ensure proper protection. The area taken over was policed by Chinese Constabulary, responsible only to the Chinese Government. It was certain that some of them had taken a hand in the killing; in fact one of the victims had been blown to bits by German-made stick grenades. It was decided to disarm them. The presence of a platoon of riflemen made this somewhat ticklish task a simple matter.

Some two hundred yards in front of our centre sub-sector lay the two valuable Japanese Toyada Mills. In normal times these were garrisoned by Japanese marines. General Telfer-Smollett felt that the presence of a Japanese garrison surrounded by Chinese troops was an embarrassment to the peace of the British sector. He offered to take over the mills, but the Japanese would not hear of it. Eventually they saw reason and agreed, but when the time for evacuation came the Chinese would have none of it, so the general had to begin all over again. His diplomacy won the day and by the time we arrived in the sector they were in our hands. Then occurred an incident which one would imagine could only happen in some South American Republic. On the evening of the 20th August a Japanese airman made a bad shot at the Chung San Road bridge and hit one of his own mills, setting it alight. The Chinese fire brigade promptly arrived on the scene and extinguished the blaze.

Our most distressing problem was the refugee question. There were countless families trying to gain what they deemed to be the safety and security of the Settlement while an equal number were leaving it in order to escape the shelling and the bombing. The sorriest sight of all were the tiny children, almost too weary to walk, being dragged along by their bewildered parents. The problem was to take a turn for the worse before we left Shanghai.

An unique incident took place during our first tour in "D" sector. The municipal gaol was situated in Hongkew and suffered considerable damage from Chinese shell fire. On the 17th August one shell killed eight convicts and wounded others. At another time the gaol was completely cut off from the outer world by fires, and it was decided that it must be evacuated. Though not the largest gaol in the world it contained the most inmates,

and the 6,000 prisoners had gone through a very trying time since the commencement of hostilities. They were to be put through the perimeter in the centre of our sector. The convoy arrived at "O" post about 1 p.m. on the 22nd August and a queer sight it was. The escort comprised Russians in armoured cars and lorries, mounted Sikhs and British constables armed with almost every conceivable weapon ever invented. The sight was not an edifying one. The Chinese convicts were put across the wire in no gentle fashion. They were given their own clothes and a rice cake each and warned against any attempt to re-enter the Settlement. But by comparison, the lot of the fifty white prisoners was tragic. They had neither language nor money, and the argument that they had chosen to be released in this way was not valid. What man in such a situation would not choose freedom, not realising just what it meant until put across the wire.

Only some five hundred were released, the Japanese putting a stop to it. The Council had undertaken to place all the convicts over the perimeter, but presumed this did not apply to the hundred and fifty juvenile prisoners, who had neither parents nor guardians to receive them on the other side. Rather than put these children out they took them to a Chinese institution in the Settlement. The Japanese elected to treat this act of humanity as a breach of faith and refused to permit further evacuation.

On the following day, two huge bombs were dropped on the centre of the city, one of them, fortunately, failing to explode. The other landed at the junction of the Nanking and Chekiang roads, causing scenes of carnage similar to those of the 14th August. Two hundred and fifteen people were killed and nearly six hundred wounded. The plane which dropped these bombs was flying at a great height and its nationality was never discovered, both sides denying that they had any aeroplanes flying in the vicinity at that time. The same evening the British Ambassador to China, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Huggeson, passed through our left sub-sector, having been wounded some fifty miles from Shanghai by machine-gun bullets from a Japanese plane.

On the 30th of the month we were relieved by the Royal Welch and went into reserve, prior to taking over "B" sector on the 3rd September. It was the duty of the reserve battalion to provide various guards, and the most important of these was that over the Shanghai Water Works. These were situated right inside the Japanese sector, by the river, and our presence there was never much appreciated. It was not a pleasant place. Apart from the ill-concealed hostility of the Japanese, the place was

surrounded by numerous corpses, in varying stages of decomposition, the victims of Japanese brutality. It would seem that every Chinaman encountered in Yangtsepoo was treated as a sniper, his hands tied behind his back and the victim shot like a dog. If he happened to be found near the river, he was taken to the bank, shot, and tipped into it.

The nightly air raids on the Idzumo, the Japanese aerodrome and "A" sector generally resulted in many large bombs falling too close to be pleasant. However, no casualties were suffered by any of the units finding this guard, nor were the Water Works seriously damaged. Had this source of supply been interrupted, the situation in the Settlement would have been very dangerous. We were rather disturbed by the presence of so many corpses in the water from which our supplies were drawn but were assured by the experts that, if anything, it was improved thereby.

On the 3rd September we relieved the Loyals in "B" sector. Our letter to the regimental journal concluded with these words: " 'B' sector rests on the immediate flank of the opposing forces. Shanghai North Station is a favourite target for the Japanese artillery and air force. Sometimes both sides miss the mark and bombs and shells fall in our lines." We were soon to find out how true that was. On the very next day, a bomb was dropped within ten yards of block house "A." Fortunately, there were no casualties.

We then received the first of many visits from Japanese officers, all repeating the same refrain: "We are very sorry. We are taking steps to see that it does not occur again."

"B" sector being entirely built over was quite different from the open country of "D" sector. This factor played a considerable part in our avoidance of casualties, none being suffered during any of our tours in it, as either the shells burst on impact with the house tops, or protection was afforded by the walls from splinters. There were numerous casualties among the Chinese civilians, and hardly a day passed without several shells falling into the sector. The nature of the salient is clearly shown on the map. On the north and west Chinese, and on the east Japanese. Our posts on the western side almost touched those of the Chinese.

This was the first time we had come into close contact with Asiatic troops and their equipment surprised us. While we were still armed with Lewis guns, which had seen service in the Great War, both Chinese and Japanese were equipped with the latest weapons. Many of us obtained our first view of a Bren gun as it was carried past the North Station by a Chinese soldier. The

88th Division was in occupation of the station area and their bearing much impressed us. Contrary to our expectations, neither shelling nor bombing seemed to upset them. We struck up a strong liaison with this division and I must read you an extract from a letter sent to us by a Chinese Trench Mortar Officer. It was beautifully written and read: "It is rather funny to find yourselves along with the 88th Division, across a stretch of barbed wire in wrecked Chapei. What are all these fightings for? We are fighting a holy war for the salvation and existence of our father-land, while you are ready, I believe, to fight for humanity and that sacred covenant which mankind have to observe. (I fear he was speaking of the Covenant of the League of Nations.) We are trying our best to make ourselves worthy of your sympathy, and have made up our minds to make this North Station our last resting place."

He was not called upon to do so for the Chinese wisely withdrew from the North Station, and when we gained touch with this officer in "D" sector later, and enquired why he was still alive, he was furious at having given it up without a fight.

Although we had no casualties in "B" sector, there was never any lack of excitement or interest. Our observation post gave us a wonderful all-round view of whatever was going on. Japanese warships were rarely silent, either shelling the North Station area or the Pootung side of the river. The nightly air raids on the Idzumo, the Japanese aerodrome, and Yangtsepoo always produced magnificent firework displays, and we did not require to be reminded that everything shot into the air has to come down somewhere, be it dud anti-aircraft shell, splinter or bullet. The Japanese bombing of the North Station from "B" sector at first gave one a queer feeling. This was invariably carried out by planes operating in groups of three. They would approach over the sector and when well within our lines the bombs would be released. It looked as if they were coming right down on top of us, but we soon realised that the speed of the aeroplanes ensured their travelling in the direction of the target. Sometimes the planes indulged in power-dives, that is, as they approached the target, each in turn dived on it at full speed, and after releasing a bomb, zoomed up and away. One day they were not careful enough and a pilot dived into the machine below. This was greeted by the Chinese in the Settlement, who always took the utmost interest in these operations, by an outburst of clapping.

On the 13th October the Japanese carried out an intensive bombing attack on the North Station, and dropped their bombs

so close to our lines that they had to be evacuated temporarily. One sergeant found, to his horror, that a man was missing. He went back to the billet in haste and was relieved to find the missing man sleeping peacefully beneath bits of plaster, brickdust, rubble and broken glass.

The 14th was another hectic day. It opened with the dropping of a Japanese bomb in the American sector, twelve Chinese civilians being killed and seventeen wounded. In the evening the Chinese raided the Japanese lines and the resulting shell fire seemed to be directed against the Settlement rather than the opposing forces, "B" sector having a casualty list approaching a hundred—all civilians. Some of the shells came unpleasantly close to battalion headquarters, and the right of our line was subjected to a severe mortaring. I think the Chinese thought the Japanese were coming through our lines. They were most apologetic about it next morning.

We were back in "D" sector on the 24th October, and within 15 minutes of taking it over had our first casualty; a rifleman being killed by a machine-gun bullet from a Japanese aeroplane. The 'plane first machine-gunned a party of riders on the road between "M" and "Q" posts, then dived direct at post "Q." Several of the civilian riders had their horses shot under them, and were called into the post by the corporal in charge for protection. The corporal, seeing that the aeroplane was about to dive again, quickly mounted his Lewis gun on the parapet and opened fire. After that the 'plane sheered off.

Owing to Japanese pressure well to the north of Shanghai, the Chinese troops in the Chapei area were in grave danger of being cut off. On the evening of the 26/27th October, therefore, they withdrew to the south bank of the Soochow Creek, thus coming in contact with us again in "D" sector. At one point, in fact, one of their posts overlapped ours! The withdrawal was carried out in an orderly manner and there was no sign of haste or panic, but an important lesson stands out from this operation. Under German direction, a strongly fortified line had been constructed from Liuho through Quinsan to the Lakes. This was said to be well-wired and to contain concrete pill-boxes. The temptation, however, to stand, covered by such a difficult obstacle as the Soochow Creek, was too much for the Chinese to resist. But when they were forced out of this line, mainly by the landing in Hangchow Bay, fifty miles south of Shanghai, they were also forced into a running fight and never given an opportunity of settling down in

the Hindenburg line. Had they gone right back to this in the first instance, events might have taken a very different course.

We were affected by this withdrawal in two ways. First, the Toyada Mills became untenable and were handed over to the Chinese; secondly, the refugee problem took an acute form. In place of merely weary and bewildered refugees, we were now faced with a panic-stricken mob clamouring for admission to the Settlement. It was not possible to allow them in except in numbers that could be controlled, and there were literally thousands of them. Two instances will illustrate the chaos. I noticed, after one batch had been admitted, a little chap in a dreadful state of agitation, and found that his mother with one child on her back and another in her arms, had been carried through in the rush leaving him on the wrong side of the barrier. At another entrance a woman got down on her knees, a sure sign that something was really wrong. She had brought most of her family in, leaving her husband to come along with the infant. She had just heard that he had been commandeered by the Chinese to labour on defence works, and the infant was left alone. Neither the British nor the Chinese sentries would let her through the barrier to go back to the child. The point to stress is that for every one of the instances which came to light, hundreds must have passed unnoticed.

The logical outcome of these chaotic conditions is portrayed in an article which appeared in the Press a few weeks ago. Writing of present conditions in Shanghai, the correspondent says: "Wolf children, an outgrowth of Japan's war on China, are on the prowl in Shanghai. Singly or in packs of fifteen to twenty, these pariah-like youngsters scavenge the gutters and steal from small shopkeepers, then claw each other for a share of the spoils. If food-stuffs are displayed on open counters across shop fronts, then a clerk is stationed on guard. He is armed with a heavy stick to beat off the attacks of the wolf-children. Gaunt little bodies, eyes widened by fear and starvation, have even been seen in the Chapei area, where thousands of Chinese homes have been demolished by Japanese guns. These nine and ten-year-olds have found that loot from the shattered houses and shops give them a meal and the hope of another. Schooled by hunger and trained by fear in the desperate struggle to maintain their slender thread of life, most of these young Fagins have come to be suspicious of any show of kindness. They fight and bite the hospital attendants and health officers who try to take them to refugee camps and child hospitals. Some of them, speaking only the dialect of their parents' native province, are hopelessly isolated in a sea of

Shanghai pronunciation. Barely able to toddle, many of the smaller children who are loose on the streets of Shanghai to-day were separated from their parents in the mad rush of millions to leave their burning, shell-riddled homes during the early months of the war. Others found themselves holding the hand of a dead mother killed by bullet or shrapnel. They are too young to fend for themselves in the competition of the gutter existence. Hundreds have died each day. Each morning finds more of their blue little bodies waiting for the city undertaker."

On the 28th October while these poor creatures were pouring in at all approaches to the Settlement, the Japanese opened gun fire on the Jessfield Crossing. Twenty of them were killed and many others wounded. The wounded were rescued under this fire by some of our men, who exposed themselves fearlessly in the effort.

On withdrawing from Chapei the Chinese set the whole place alight. Never had any of us seen such a blaze. I hope to show you some photographs taken during the emergency, at the conclusion of this talk, and those relating to the Chapei fire will give a much better picture on the screen than I can ever give in words.

During the evening of the 29th October the Japanese artillery had moved forward and now commenced shelling the Chinese positions opposite our right at Jessfield Crossing. Innumerable shells fell in our sector and one gained a direct hit on post "J," killing three riflemen and wounding two others, one of whom died shortly afterwards. At the time a shell hit a café some five hundred yards behind our lines and another rifleman was killed. Two days later, the Japanese again dropped shells in the sector, this time in Jessfield Park Camp, three of our men being wounded and several having very narrow escapes. On the 1st November, we were relieved in "D" sector by the Loyals and went into reserve.

On the 4th November I left Shanghai in order to prepare for our move to India. Just as the ship was clear of the mouth of the Yangtse we were stopped by a Japanese destroyer and an officer, who came on board, told us that, as the Chinese had mined the sea ahead of us, we had better stop until 11 p.m., by which time the Japanese would have swept it clear. It was, of course, a childish statement, and next day we were not surprised to learn that a landing had been made that morning, from some forty transports, in Hangchow Bay.

A talk on the Shanghai Emergency should, I suppose, conclude with some reference to the future. The failure of the


Chinese to hold the Hindenburg line, in view of their earlier unexpected and courageous resistance, was a disappointment. They had been opposed by a nation strong in artillery, with command of the air by day, and with mechanised forces and tanks, yet they had given as much as they received. Perhaps the most important factors in favour of Japan were her superior organization, and the fact that only a few Chinese divisions were as well equipped and trained as those we saw in Shanghai. We thought that, man for man, the Chinaman had it all the way. Even from our limited viewpoint in Shanghai we felt that the Chinese had not only pricked the bubble of Japanese invincibility but blown it sky-high; a feeling which finds confirmation in the outstanding successes achieved by the Chinese last March at Suchow, when the Japanese left the field in great haste, leaving behind them large quantities of arms, ammunition, tanks and armoured cars. But without a better organization it is difficult to see how the Chinese can expel the Japanese from their country.

It would seem that only one thing can save China now, and that is, foreign intervention; but is it likely?


One thing I think is clear and certain. If we do not take steps to protect our interests in the Far East, those interests will vanish entirely. Japan does not seem to believe in the catchphrase of Geneva that "War Never Pays." She has good reason for thinking otherwise. Her war with China in 1932 gave her all she wanted. The fact that the £200 millions, invested by her in Manchukuo, has not yielded the expected return has nothing to do with the cost of the war. It is the rigorous climate that has beaten the Japanese settler. It is too cold and hard, nor can he compete with the frugal Chinese farmer already in occupation. But North China is a different proposition altogether. The Japanese can settle there, and its development will make Japan independent of imports from other nations.

Our investments in China amount to several hundred millions, and of that, one hundred and fifty alone are locked up in Shanghai. In 1936 our imports from China amounted to £7,643,000, while exports were £5,839,000, the adverse balance, of course, being more than covered by interest on investments. Are we going to sacrifice all this, and all that it means to employment at home? Well, these are questions which must be answered sooner or later. And even if we answer "yes," it may still not mean peace.

SHANGHAI



Approximate Scale $1\frac{1}{2}$ " to 1 mile



The millenium is always possible, but events in Japan and Europe have shown to-day that the weak still go to the wall and are deprived of their heritage! Indians should, therefore, watch the world's radio plate which is, as it were, televising war in the East and the possibilities of war in the West, and realise that the fate of India may well be decided hundreds of miles from her shores. They cannot take too broad an outlook on matters of defence to-day.

A VISIT TO PESHAWAR 100 YEARS AGO

BY "ZARIF"

In 1839 the 16th Lancers, who had taken part in the First Afghan War, were returning to India from Kabul. They arrived at Dacca in Afghanistan, and were preparing to ride through the Khyber Pass to Peshawar when they were told to expect trouble as the tribesmen were up in arms.

A Captain Lowe was with the regiment, and he has left a very good account of his travels and his visit to Peshawar in a diary. It is remarkable how little the scene has changed to-day; and from Lowe's description of the pass, it seems that he would have noticed little difference had he, like Rip Van Winkle, returned a hundred years later.

November 2nd, 1839.—About two miles from Dacca we entered the gorge of the Khyber Pass, and encamped at Landikhana on the dry shingly bed of a torrent. On the heights upon our right an old ruined fortification is carried along the crest of the hill known as Torkham; near it on some tableland has been a very good garden (*bāgh*), and some portion of a trellis-work for grapes is still standing. In the evening I walked through the most romantic glen that I ever saw.

November 3rd.—A long, and for the camels and baggage a very difficult, march the first three miles being a steep ascent by a well-constructed shelf-road winding up the side of the mountain.

On the summit where there is a good breadth of tableland, almost every spot appears under cultivation, and there are several small forts, each having a mud watch-tower attached. On a high mound, or rather on the shoulder of a hill, stands one of those *topes* supposed to be the burial place of the Bactrian monarchs; at a small distance this has the appearance of a Martello tower; the rough stone wall encircling the remains is still in good preservation. On the summit of the *tope* a mud Khyberee watch tower has been erected.

We encamped on the shingly bed of a stream, one-and-a-half miles below the fort of Ali Masjid. The fort is not strong but has a good breastwork, and the situation is admirably chosen

so as completely to command the passage of the defile; not an animal could get by undiscovered, or a man pass unscathed who omitted to pay tribute to the chief of the Khyberees.

The fort has for some time been garrisoned by two companies of the 21st Native Infantry and a Nazib battalion of Mussalman Sikhs. Few days or nights pass without their being attacked by these wild mountaineers. Three days ago a Nazib battalion occupying some high commanding ground, encircled by a low wall of piled stone, was attacked by the Khyberees and twice repulsed them. It is said that their ammunition now failed, and towards night they endeavoured to withdraw into their fort about two miles from the position. The Kyberees took advantage of this, swooped down like lightning upon them, and either killed or dispersed the whole battalion, which consisted of eight hundred men. Two hundred and sixty have been buried, and about two hundred made their way to Peshawar; of the remainder nothing is known.

I visited the scene of action, which was about half a mile to the left of our camp. The stench from the partially buried bodies was so great that it was barely possible to remain there. A leg was sticking up in one place, an arm in a second, and a grim-looking face, partly gnawed by dogs in a third; and amongst all this, numbers of our camp followers were grubbing in the hopes of finding something to repay them.

This defeat of the Nazib battalion is a most provoking event to have occurred at the end of the campaign; and the attack upon them is entirely attributable to the want of good faith shown by Colonel W——, the political agent at the Court of Lahore. When he was passing through on his way to Kabul, the Khyber chiefs waited upon him, and promised that, if the tenure of their lands was guaranteed them, they would give free transit to all men and supplies going to the army at Kabul.

Colonel W—— promised to bring with him on his return their exceedingly moderate terms duly ratified by Shah Shuja. In the meantime, the chiefs honourably fulfilled their promise; Colonel W——'s force and several small parties of officers passed through the Khyber and not one was molested or interfered with. To use the term of the chiefs, women and children might carry gold, through the pass.

Colonel W—— returned from Kabul, and not a camel or follower was plundered. The chiefs again attended upon Colonel W—— who told them that he had not brought the ratification of the treaty, but that one of his subordinates would bring it with him in a few days' time. The chiefs, having once been deceived, would place no confidence in this assertion, and the affair at Ali Masjid—or, as our men call it, Sally Musgrave was the consequence.

These political people appear to think that it is their business to deceive all who have any business to transact with them, and that it would be a disgrace to a diplomatist to act in a straightforward manner.

Colonel W—— no sooner got safely through the pass with his detachment than he left the matter unsettled and, on the principle of "the devil take the hindmost," went on to Lahore, taking with him the greater part of the force which had been in possession of the pass.

We halted during the 4th of November at Ali Masjid, and heard that the Khyberees were determined to attack our baggage, so we were ordered to march with it for its protection: the Sappers and Miners in front; then a squadron, followed by two squadrons with the baggage, and the fourth squadron bringing up the rear.

November 5th.—We marched in that order, and arrived at Jamrud without incident. We most certainly ought to be grateful for ever to the Khyberees for their forbearance in allowing us to get through their stronghold scot-free. Had they allowed the Sappers and Miners and our leading squadron to pass, we were perfectly helpless; and had they attacked the baggage there would have been such a crush of camels, bullocks, ponies and camp-followers in the bed of the stream down which the road lay, that we would have been picked off singly, and our men could never have got through.

The fort of Jamrud has been allowed to fall into decay. It was here that Akbar Khan, the favourite son of Dost Mohammed, made his gallant charge with a small body of Afghans against the Sikhs in 1837, killing numbers of men and Hari Singh, their general.

A mile-and-a-half from our encampment a large body of Sikh infantry was assembled under the walls of a new fort called Fatehgarh, their frontier position in the province of Peshawar.

Till to-day I never thought it possible that I could look over plain country with such pleasure; everybody seems delighted at having emerged from the mountains, and the joy of our servants is boundless.

November 7th.—To Peshawar. The first sight that attracted our attention on approaching the town was a triangular gibbet with three men hanging on it. These must have been hanging for some time, and I understand that criminals are never allowed to be taken down and buried unless a tax is paid for the permission.

We passed a newly erected fort which is kept in admirable order, and looks a very fightable place.

Beyond the fort on our right we passed a mosque with two very heavy minarets.

When we got to the eastern side of the town, we saw two men and a woman suspended high in the air, on a beam slung between two lofty palm trees; and a little further on, to a square gibbet formed of four beams, hung six men, one by the heels and without a head. They certainly display a degree of taste in this country in the arrangement of their malefactors that I have never seen equalled.

The governor of the province, General Avitabile, the Italian who has been for many years in the service of Ranjit Singh, came out to see the regiment, and we filed past him. He immediately issued an invitation to all the officers to breakfast and dine with him.

In the evening a party of upwards of fifty dined with the governor, a tall portly man with a very shrewd expression of countenance, but without the appearance of high caste. He was dressed in a sky-blue dress, profusely braided with gold lace, like all officers in the Sikh service; he allows his beard to grow and always keeps his head covered. There is no difficulty in carrying on a conversation with him, for besides Italian, he speaks French, Persian, and Hindustani like a native, and partly understands English.

The palace (two wings of which are still unfinished) stands on a high ridge of ground east of the city, and commands extensive views of the country all round, and of the principal bazaar which runs up to its west front. Altogether the place is a large edifice, built quite in the eastern style, the exterior plastered with cement and completely covered with red figures of birds and women and monkeys and beasts and monsters and trees and flowers all higgledy-piggledy, topsy-turvy.

The governor received us in a room wainscotted all over, ceiling as well as walls, and covered with coarse paintings, principally of women in the extreme of undress. The room was half-full of nautch-girls, some of whom were extremely pretty. Soon after our arrival, we were ushered into a balcony, extending eastward the whole length of the building, to view a display of fireworks worthy of Vauxhall. The fireworks were no sooner expended than we went upstairs to a most excellent dinner, the best dish of all being two lambs roasted whole, and stuffed with rice, raisins, and pistachio nuts. It is several months now since I tasted wine or beer. The room in which we dined was inconveniently narrow, but to overcome this several recesses were let into the walls which were decorated with red paintings of dahlias.

After dinner we went down to the reception room where the nautch-girls were assembled, and where they danced for the rest of the evening. These girls were extremely greedy in asking for cigars, which they smoked with real enthusiasm.

November 8th.—Having procured a Sikh orderly, I rode through the town. Two bazaars intersect it from east to west, the principal one running close up to the back of the palace. These bazaars have been recently nearly rebuilt; each shop has a narrow verandah supported on wooden uprights in front, and the houses are in uniform line; every shop appears to be tenanted, and a vast deal of traffic going on. The streets are both paved, with a gutter running down the centre; and though they can in no way compare with the four-arched bazaars of Kabul, I consider them the cleanest and the best regulated that I have seen.

General Avitabile has certainly worked wonders in the three years that he has been resident here; he entirely built the palace; he remodelled the bazaars, and a high strong mud wall which will completely encircle the city is nearly completed, with a broad,

well-constructed road laid down by its side. He has also reconstructed the walls of the fort to the north of the city, so as to make it strong enough to defy the attack of a native force unacquainted with the use of shells.

When Ranjit Singh sent General Avitabile to govern this province, it was in such a state of disorder that there was great difficulty in collecting any revenue, and no Sikh could appear outside the city or away from his cantonments, without running great risk of being murdered; and I hear that in the first year of his residence five hundred Sikhs met with that fate. No two people can hate each other more bitterly than the Mussalman inhabitants and their Sikh conquerors.

One of the first acts of Avitabile was to disarm the population, and the Sikh soldiery are now the only people seen with arms. The revenue is nine lakhs of rupees annually, and the country is fertile, well watered and cultivated, and trade flourishes.

Avitabile has the reputation of having amassed immense wealth, and to have been fortunate enough to have got it out of the country, always a matter of great difficulty with Ranjit's servants. He is now most anxious to return to Italy, probably foreseeing the inevitable downfall of the Sikh dynasty, which could never have been kept together except by such a master-mind as Ranjit Singh possessed. Already everything is in confusion at the Court of Lahore, and lately one of the principal ministers was murdered in open court in the presence of Kurruk Singh, the present king.

November 10th.—We were in orders to march this morning, but it has been found necessary to send supplies to that accursed fort of Ali Masjid and we must wait the return of the Detachment sent as convoy.

I rode early to the palace to accompany General Avitabile. We had coffee in the room where the nautching was last night, and I noticed that the figures of the women which were painted on the panels of the wainscot in such extremities of undress were now all decently attired in trousers; I asked if this was the consequence of the winter setting in so suddenly; but was told that the wife of the envoy at Kabul was shortly expected to pass through on her way to join her husband, and the General imagined that she might be shocked at so much exposure of the female

form; and this, as the Irishman would say, was the instigation of the trousers.

Having drunk our coffee, we started for the fort, the General being in a "sociable" drawn by four mules driven at full gallop; the rest of the party rode.

We first visited a very extensive garden, kept in bad order and sadly neglected, and then proceeded to the fort.

On three sides it rises from a mound of considerable height, and these sides might be battered at till doomsday without achieving more than knocking down the battlements. On the north side a low swampy country and rice cultivation extend down to the Kabul river, about six miles distant, and this could at any time be flooded. The city runs nearly close up to the southern face. The only entrance is by a strongly fortified gateway on the north, and there is a double curtain of inner and outer defences; a broad and deep ditch is being dug round the walls, and a glacis will be formed on the north and east faces. The reconstruction of this fort confers great credit on the General. The earth in all directions appears to be strongly impregnated with salt-petre.

November 13th.—The detachment which convoyed the supplies to Ali Masjid delivered them safely, but on their return yesterday with the unladen camels, were attacked by the Khyberees, who killed six or eight of the Sappers and Miners forming the rear guard, and drove away upwards of four hundred camels.

We are to remain here now till the arrival of Colonel W—with the 48th and 37th Regiments at Ali Masjid from Jallalabad. Verily, these political people, who are the greatest curse that can be attached to any army, should be severely punished.

November 23rd.—At last we have turned our backs upon Peshawar; our delay here of more than a fortnight has been most provoking. There has been a third skirmish in the Khyber, in which two Europeans and four natives were killed, and we hear that Mr. M— is now in treaty with the chiefs, and that Colonel W—has arrived at Ali Masjid with the 37th and 48th Native Infantry. The fort is so unhealthy that neither the European nor Hindustani constitution can bear against it, and it appears that both nearly equally suffer.

THE MEDITERRANEAN TO-DAY

By H. JAY

In the past two or three years the Mediterranean has been one, if not the chief, preoccupation of British foreign policy. But to many the situation has been rather like that in China, a little too complicated and obscure to understand. Its pre-war history was left chiefly to statesmen who were trained to understand all the inferences. To-day newspapers of all shades and countries combine to muddle us and give us, aided by abbreviated slogans, their often uninstructed views of the picture. As Lord Lytton remarked in his wireless talk on April 28th, the modern diplomats must envy their predecessors who were left to do their work without the interference of a badly informed public, a press that has to maintain its circulation and the journalist who must earn his pay. One result of this propaganda is that the public in Great Britain has come to look upon the free passage of its shipping through the Mediterranean as vital to the war-time existence of the Empire. There is no doubt as to its value, convenience and economy at all times, but vital means essential to existence which is a very different matter. A short time ago, Mr. Hector Bywater* caused no inconsiderable flutter by stating publicly that he did not consider it in any way vital, quite the reverse in fact. He very rightly remarks that "the reiteration of a principle does not make it true" though this seems to have become the basis of the vital theory. Some of his arguments are mentioned later and their soundness is indubitable. But say that he is not correct and that the free use of this sea is essential, then the question arises as to whether unhindered passage through this narrow channel can be guaranteed or even hoped for. If not, and if what the Press calls our vital artery can be cut, then of what use is all this vast expenditure on armaments and ship-building?

Great Britain imports annually over fifty million tons of food-stuffs and raw materials. Of this 11 per cent. comes from the Mediterranean littoral while another 9 per cent. consists of transit

* Naval and Shipping Correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph."

goods. Very little of the 11 per cent. consists of foodstuffs, it is chiefly cotton from Egypt and minerals and chemicals from Spain. All of these could be obtained elsewhere in an emergency, their temporary loss causing only inconvenience during the period of change. At the most 10 per cent. of Britain's foodstuffs come through the Mediterranean and such a proportion could not be called vital. To diminish farther this small percentage the greater part of it could be diverted round the Cape, though this would require a considerable increase in shipping. The extra mileage would be greatest from the Persian Gulf oil port, an increase of about 80 per cent. while the extra from Australian ports would be about 10 per cent. This is admittedly serious as it has been estimated that Britain is already some seven hundred merchant vessels short of her war-time requirements. In 1914 there were 9,240 vessels on the British register, a figure which had fallen to 7,246 in 1937. But surely it would be better to face this deficiency rather than to risk the smaller number of ships that we have to-day in a submarine infested lake. During the war of 1914—18 the Mediterranean was the only sea in which the submarine was not brought under control and, out of a gross world total of thirteen million tons of shipping sunk, five million tons, or over one-third, were lost in that restricted area.

It is thus clear that the food imports that must travel by the Mediterranean come to only about 2 per cent., a figure that it would be ridiculous to call vital to Great Britain at war. Further, the delay caused by longer routeing would be compensated by the saving of actual losses. Finally, it is obvious that the closing of this route to merchant vessels in war time would relieve the Navy of vast responsibility and dispersion, and leave it free for its correct rôle of aggressive naval tactics and for its work in the Indian Ocean and Pacific where we are so weak at the moment.

The historical background of British interests in the Mediterranean is interesting in the way that it shows clearly how haphazardly our commitments there arose before the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. At the beginning of the 19th Century France was our hereditary enemy and the base of her main fleet was at Toulon. Had it been on the Atlantic Coast Great Britain might never have worried about Gibraltar. As things were, however, it became

essential to hold this bottle-neck to prevent the junction of the French Mediterranean fleet with the smaller forces based on her western shore. To restrict still more any activities from Toulon we captured Port Mahon in Minorca. Three times did we take it, twice we lost it and finally at the peace of Amiens, in 1803, we handed it back to Spain. Malta, again, did not fall into our hands as the result of considered policy; it merely dropped like a ripe apple after the Battle of the Nile in 1798.

In 1869 the shorter passage to Britain's eastern possessions was opened and the necessity arose for protecting that route. At that time the bogey was Russia both as regards possible descent on India and encroachment in south-eastern Europe through Anatolia. When the crisis of 1878 died down it was found that the British had taken over the government of Cyprus, although the island was not actually annexed until 1914. But here again Disraeli's object was not so much to protect shipping but to have some point of departure from which to meet the feared Russian aggression. It may thus be said, as regards our present Mediterranean problem, that Cyprus also came to us fortuitously. At the time we occupied the island Anglo-French hatred had turned to friendship and, as a result, Britain offered France a free hand in Tunis at some unspecified date in the future provided the latter gave Britain a free hand in Cyprus. France demanded her pound of flesh in 1881. Mr. Gladstone's government, which had then come to power, was angry and, with the British virtual annexation of Egypt in 1882, friendship with France turned into sullen enmity leading to rivalry between the two countries in the Mediterranean. Italy at that time was very nervous of a French descent on her coast and so clung to the greater naval power with the result that the Mediterranean situation caused little sleeplessness to British statesmen. Then France retaliated by an alliance with Russia in 1891 and Great Britain saw her fleet sandwiched between that of France in the west and Russia in the east and the usual acute naval panic ensued as a result of the preceding years of unforeseeing economy. In Parliament Joseph Chamberlain said: "The British Navy in the Mediterranean would have to cut and run—if it could run."

In 1898 the Fashoda incident gave rise to a crisis. Russia was more than occupied in the Far East and could not help her ally

whose chief preoccupation was, at that time, the Dreyfus scandal. Delcassé had to give in and then initiated his policy of endeavouring to isolate Germany. His object was to secure a French rapprochement with England leading eventually to a triple entente with Russia as the third partner. His first success was the alienation of Italy from Germany which he brought about by offering the former a free hand in Tripoli in exchange for a similar liberty for the French in Morocco. Next Delcassé, to ensure the safety of France's frontier on the Pyrenees, offered Spain the slice of Morocco on the other side of the Mediterranean opposite her southern seaboard. But Spain, after her war with America, was almost defenceless and frightened of losing the Balearics and Canaries to Germany. Without Britain's support at sea she considered herself powerless to hold these islands and so insisted that England must also be a party to the agreement. Delcassé then had to offer Britain the free hand that she wanted in Egypt in exchange for her recognition of the Moroccan situation. England agreed with one important reservation. For years the British policy had been to oppose the presence of any Great Power in Morocco and especially in Tangier. As a palliative France agreed that no fortifications should be built between Mellila and the Atlantic and that Tangier should be neutral, or in modern terms a free city. Although this portion of Morocco was in her zone, weak Spain had no option but to accept this unmasked control of her territory. All these negotiations were brought to fruition by the famous agreement of April 8th, 1904. Even for those days the diplomatic difficulties had been tremendous but to-day the full blare of newspaper publicity would have made such an agreement quite impossible, in fact no country would dare to attempt it.

Then came Germany's trial of strength in Morocco in 1905. Once the crisis was over, France and England had to consider this future threat seriously. To avoid the possibility of a German seizure of the Balearic or Canary Islands, Britain, France and Spain agreed in the Pact of Cartagena that they would all and severally maintain their rights over their islands and maritime possessions in the area. General Franco has recently reiterated this statement which has been officially recognised by Italy and Germany.

Except for the Agadir crisis of 1911 the situation changed little till September of that year when Italy took Tripoli. This

gave her a potential base at Tobruk which was serious enough, but the ensuing capture of the Dodecanese Islands in May 1912 was an international threat. As a result, Italy lay across the routes from the Suez Canal either to Constantinople in the north-west or westwards to Malta and Gibraltar. A line from the Dodecanese to Tobruk, only some three hundred miles long, virtually cut off the eastern Mediterranean and the Suez Canal from Europe. That was Britain's point of view, while France saw her position in the Near East being seriously threatened. There was also the fact that Great Britain had by now been compelled to withdraw the greater part of her fleet from the Mediterranean to meet the German menace in the North Sea while France had to concentrate hers to protect her line of communication to North Africa against the growing Italian fleet. As Italy was an ally of Germany, was it not also possible that the former might allow the Germans to use a naval base in the Dodecanese or Tripoli? In her treaty with Turkey, Italy had agreed to evacuate these Dodecanese Islands as soon as the Turks left Tripoli. In spite of British and French threats, she was slow to do so and managed to find endless excuses for the delay. Grey, Cambon and Barrère did all they could to bring about an agreement with Italy which would avoid unpleasant shocks in future. Italy's only reply was to offer to give up most of the islands provided she was allowed to retain one or two. All that this lengthy argument appeared to do was to destroy Delcassé's hard won policy by forcing Italy further under the wing of Germany and Austria. Then came the Great War and the matter was shelved.

There can be no doubt that Italy's declaration of neutrality in 1914 saved France. It ruined the Mediterranean portion of the Triple Alliance naval agreement and enabled colonial troops from Morocco to be brought safely to France. The Dodecanese argument was conveniently forgotten; the essential thing was to range Italy on the Allied side. After the war the matter of the islands arose again but Italy was adamant and finally the Treaty of Lausanne recognised Italian sovereignty. By then Mussolini was in the ascendant and the possibility of retrocession, particularly as the real owner was Turkey and an ex-enemy, was out of the question.

The Abyssinian adventure of 1935 suddenly showed up the enormously increased commitments of both Britain and France in what Italy had by then termed *mare nostrum*. The interests of both countries in the Far East were much greater, while, in the Near East, the Syrian and Palestinian termini of the Iraq pipeline were an extremely valuable source of oil supply, to France almost essential. Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq and Egypt all depended for defence on France or Britain, either directly or by treaty. Again, the eastern Mediterranean was rapidly becoming the junction of British Imperial Airways for the East and for Africa while France was also developing similar communications. Last but not least there was the fact that about a third of the French standing army was now stationed in North Africa and any hitch in its immediate transportation would have serious consequences for France. All these commitments were and are important but, if the bluff were called now, it might be extremely difficult to maintain them.

Now to consider briefly the defence of the British possessions in this troublesome sea. The measures to deal with the submarine are admittedly more efficient than they were in the past, but our not unlimited navy cannot be everywhere and has other duties than convoy work. The danger to merchant vessels from submarine attack is still so serious that we must not expect any improvement in the losses figure of the last war when one out of every three ships passing through the Mediterranean was sunk. The potential submarine danger to warships, though important, fades into comparative insignificance when compared with that from modern aircraft. Development in this sphere during the past five years has upset all calculations and it would be a brave man who would state that finality is yet in sight. The fighting aircraft of to-day is easily capable of 300 m.p.h. while 250 m.p.h. is nothing unusual for a large bomber. This has conferred advantages on maritime states like Italy and Spain such as they never had before and never expected to have. It has also considerably reduced the value of purely naval stations like Gibraltar and Malta. The former has always been threatened from the Spanish side, as was evidenced by the recent anxiety in Parliament as to certain guns alleged to have been sited on the

mainland. At the same time, if Gibraltar were attacked, it seems doubtful if we should lose the fortress, though some authorities think we only hold it on sufferance. But whether we could hold it or not does not alter the fact that the air menace will make it an extremely uncomfortable place for the fleet to lie.

Malta has recently experienced the possibility of war and so here there are more tangible facts to consider than at Gibraltar. The outbreak of the Abyssinian affair found our Mediterranean forces very inadequate. Ships were collected from everywhere possible, many not fully manned and even some of these short crews were found hurriedly from vessels undergoing dockyard repair. This modern armada collected, as a matter of course, at Malta. As bad as the naval deficiency at that time was the woeful absence of sufficient aircraft. Again as many as possible were sent to the Mediterranean, chiefly to Egypt and Palestine. All this showed up our weakness elsewhere but mainly in the Far East where, luckily, the problem is not yet at its height. However, September 1935 found the Grand Harbour at Malta packed with ships virtually unprotected from the air. Twenty minutes away by bomber aircraft was Sicily which, as well as several other southern Italian airports, was choked with aircraft. The entrance to Malta harbour is narrow and, even in good weather, the egress of a big ship needs the utmost navigating care. In bad weather or at night extreme skill is required. In any circumstances it would be impossible for a large fleet to put to sea rapidly owing to the congested entrance and the whole mass would provide a virtually stationary target for aircraft. Cramped as the fleet was in 1935, with inadequate anti-aircraft defences, the loss of a large number of vessels would have had to be expected.

As a result of this recent severe shock the defences of Malta are being modernised though it is naturally impossible to make the harbour invulnerable to air attack. The visit of the British Secretary of State for War in April 1938 shows that the Government is fully aware of the seriousness of the situation. The fixed defences have been and are being greatly improved. Extensive anti-aircraft protection is being provided and also a considerable air force, not only for defence but also to carry out attacks on enemy bases and

flying fields. Even with all this an occasional raider will be able to get through and do great damage in an extremely short time. One is thus forced to the conclusion that Malta, in an emergency, is hardly to be relied upon in the face of modern aircraft and that it might be wise to let the fortress go. Instead of being an asset to a commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean it might become a serious liability should a war cabinet at home insist on its retention and use. Whether a cabinet would be likely to do so is admittedly extremely doubtful.

The question is whether Malta, with its restricted harbour entrance, can be replaced and it is here that Cyprus may prove valuable as an alternative, depending upon whom is the enemy. The harbour at Famagusta can be developed but only to hold a small fleet. The island can, however, be used as a base for any number of aircraft, the central plain providing aerodromes while Lake Akrotiri can be the seaplane base. From this strategic position we should be able to protect, to some extent, our commitments in the eastern Mediterranean, particularly the pipeline, and also be able to support any naval forces operating from Alexandria to cover the Suez Canal. Cyprus would also provide an answer to any air base in the Dodecanese Islands.

In reply to some of the British moves in 1936 Italy, as was to be expected, decreed the fortification of Pantellaria. This island is some hundred and fifty miles north-west of Malta lying between Sicily and Tunis. There is, however, another threat which is exercising considerable nervousness in France, and that is the Spanish situation. Although the three principal dictators have publicly stated that there is to be no alteration in the territorial *status quo* there remains the fact that friendly aerodromes and naval bases in the Balearics and Canaries could always be used by an ally of Spain. For some time now France has realised that Italy's position athwart the Mediterranean makes the possibility of obtaining oil from Syria an extremely doubtful one should there be trouble between the two nations. As a result she is laying in vast oil reserves. But an enemy base in the Balearic Islands might prevent the transportation of the French North African forces to any Mediterranean port. To obviate this possible threat arrangements now exist for these North African troops to make their way

to the Atlantic from where they would go by sea to Bordeaux. A longer journey with a short delay is better than complete absence. The threat to the Canaries is more serious as this would upset France's alternative embarkation plans and would also disturb Great Britain since it might interfere seriously with shipping on both the African and South American routes.

To return to the Mediterranean. With naval, submarine and air bases flanking this narrow 1,900 miles it seems obvious that we could not keep the route open in war for merchant shipping. As already explained, the necessity is comparatively small and the risk great. The most important loss would probably be the inability to draw oil from the pipeline terminus at Haifa. But, except for local requirements, it is probable that this source has already been largely discounted in our war-time arrangements. Iraq, Persia, Mexico and other countries across the Atlantic would supply our needs. It is, therefore, probable that the Government, on Admiralty advice, would declare the Mediterranean out of bounds for merchant shipping should Great Britain be at war with a first class power in that sea. There is little doubt but that this course would have had to be adopted in 1935-36 had the unfortunate tension then existing developed into war.*

Assuming that this sea is closed to merchant shipping, let us consider the possible action of our naval forces. For obvious reasons this can only be lightly touched upon. Unfortunately, there are two aspects of this action, the strategical or ideal from a war point of view and the political or essential from a human point of view. To take the strategical first.

If our enemy was dependent to any great extent, as is likely to be the case, on ship-borne food, then by closing the Mediterranean at Gibraltar and in the Red Sea we should be able to exert considerable pressure. Such a blockade would be more effective and could be carried out with fewer ships than had to be used for a similar purpose against Germany in 1914-18. This would also allow the freeing of considerable naval forces for service in the Far East where our present weakness is serious.

* As a result of this warning South Africa saw the future importance of her naval bases. Many ships from India, Australasia and the Far East were routed via the Cape during the emergency. Cape Town, or rather Simonstown, will shortly be one of the best equipped ports in the Empire with Durban not far behind.

Such a blockade seems a comparatively simple solution but unfortunately it is not as easy as that. We cannot leave our possessions, Malta and Cyprus, unprotected. The Palestine mandate involves certain commitments and finally there is the treaty with Egypt by which we are bound to protect her. And so, as usual in British history, strategy must be subordinated to policy. This does not affect the wisdom or necessity of allowing no merchant vessels in the *mare clausum* (as it would be in fact) but it would effect our naval dispositions. A small naval force to protect our interests in the eastern Mediterranean would be quite useless as it might be opposed by the whole strength, except for convoy guards, of an enemy fleet. Our Atlantic fleet could possibly be withdrawn secretly for a single battle but any enemy in the North Sea might take advantage of the situation if the absence of the fleet was known and prolonged. To concentrate the rest of our naval forces would leave the Pacific, where our greatest assets lie, virtually denuded. The alternative is a three-power standard, even though scaled down to allow for the naval ratio agreement with Germany, which is beyond the paying capacity of even Strube's "little man."

The recently signed agreement with Italy has considerably relieved the situation. The pact reiterates the statements made in the accord of January 2nd, 1937, by which both parties recognised that freedom of passage through, entry to and egress from the Mediterranean is equally essential to each of the two powers. The unrestricted passage through the Suez Canal for naval and merchant ships in peace and war has been re-affirmed. Both sides have agreed to inform the other of, and explain the reasons for, any increases in fortifications as well as of any major redistribution of troops in and around the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden as well as in Egypt, the Sudan, Kenya and all possessions in north-east Africa. It has recently been suggested that Great Britain should have a strategic reserve of troops in the Near or Middle East. It looks as if the Anglo-Italian agreement might make it impossible to locate this reserve in Palestine or Kenya even if it was desired to put it in either of these countries. Our note to Italy explaining the redistribution would have to state that the force was merely to protect our scattered possessions which might be inaccessible owing to the increased difficulties in the Mediterranean. Italy might logically reply that the agreement had done

away with those problems and that if we insisted she would have no alternative but to increase the garrison of Libya, now being reduced to 30,000,* to its original total of 60,000. It thus seems that some part of this reserve may have to be placed in India with possible repercussions and difficulties in this country. There is, of course, the Persian Gulf area but that is hardly salubrious except in the distant hills where communications are conspicuously absent.

Though the agreement benefits us in many ways it has, as it is bound to have, its disadvantages. Unfortunately, the inception of the negotiations was the cause of a serious Cabinet crisis over the question of the good faith of Italy at that time. Only the future will decide whether the Prime Minister or Mr. Eden took the correct view, at the moment it looks as if the former was right.† The Pact was not to come into force until two conditions had been fulfilled. The first was that Great Britain was to sponsor a resolution at Geneva which would give individual states the right to acknowledge the conquest of Abyssinia. This has been done. The other was the withdrawal of the Italian volunteers from Spain. At the time the Pact was signed the end of the Spanish war seemed in sight. But it has dragged on and the international withdrawal of volunteers which has not yet started will be an extremely slow business in any case. Italy is becoming restive under the delay and has recently appealed to Britain to wait no longer and implement the Pact at once, a difficult problem for British statesmen. Hitler can only have minor objections, if any, to a rapprochement between Britain and Italy but, in "Mein Kampf" he has emphasised, with amazing frankness, that the previous defeat of France is essential to the completion of Germany's forward policy, now launched, in South-East Europe. The isolation of France in the Mediterranean, not her consolidation, would thus appear to be Germany's policy, unless this has recently been changed. Unfortunately, it does not appear to have altered and the French-Italian talks have receded into the background with little hope of resuscitation at present. Mussolini's speech at Genoa in May, which drew a strong protest from France, when he referred cautiously to the conversations and said: "They desire victory for Barcelona, we want victory for Franco," seems to have killed at the outset any possibility of agreement.

* The recent announcements by France that she proposes to increase her North-African forces is likely to make it difficult for Italy to carry out this part of the agreements however much she may wish to do so.

† Mussolini's first public speech after Hitler's visit to Rome—"It is our intention to respect the Anglo-Italian agreement scrupulously." Genoa, 14th May 1938.

France's interests, commitments and needs have not been considered here. That country daily becomes more dependent on an increasingly powerful Great Britain, her basic policy is almost identical with ours and mutual rapprochement has intensified as a result of His Majesty's recent visit. War in Europe is likely to find France arrayed with us or we with her. Whether, to help the naval situation, she would be prepared to hold the Eastern Mediterranean with her fleet and use the longer line of communication to North Africa is doubtful. The protection of her Mediterranean ports is a large commitment and there is always the fear of losing Nice again. This question of the possible distribution of the French fleet in time of war is an absorbing problem in itself.

There is another cloud, no bigger than a man's hand at the moment. Germany has begun her "Drang nach Osten" movement and Austria is now an integral part of the Reich. Since she lost Trieste at the end of the war Austria has had no Mediterranean port. The famous map on sale in Vienna before the Hitler plebiscite* which shews the German speaking peoples in Europe has a scarlet Trieste and a large patch of the same colour in the hinterland. The "axis" did not keep the Germans from the Brenner Pass; there may be a "Sudeten Deutsche" movement in Trieste one day. Rumour has not been idle on the point and *The Times'* Berlin correspondent stated in May this year that the Nazi Press had been told to suggest that the voluntary cession of Trieste would enable Germany to give added help to Italy in the Mediterranean. As things are the trade of Trieste, in spite of official disclaimers, would vanish rapidly if Austrian commerce, which has used that port until now, were to be diverted under pressure to Hamburg. Alternatively Germany may develop her own shipping line to Trieste much as Italy may dislike this peaceful penetration.

Germany's farther intentions in South East Europe towards the Ukraine and the Black Sea raise many interesting questions that are beyond the scope of this article. For the moment the problem facing our statesmen and their advisers is to fulfil Britain's obligations in the Eastern Mediterranean while continuing to maintain order in the Atlantic and protecting the Dominions and our possessions in the Pacific.

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MOHMAND MUSINGS

By M. K.

An almost insuperable difficulty which arises on all frontier campaigns is to distinguish friend and foe. The following incident illustrates how intermingled they can become. It occurred in one of the opening clashes in July 1935, between the *khassadars** guarding the road to Ghalanai and the young tribesmen who objected to the road being repaired. After a prolonged battle the *khassadars* succeeded in killing two of the enemy. One of the dead proved to be one of three brothers, the second was a coolie working on the road, whilst the third was one of the *khassadars* fighting on our side. So it is quite conceivable that a *khassadar* accounted for his own brother in this engagement. It was not surprising, therefore, later in the campaign, to find Mohmands who started by fighting against us eventually in our employ.

One tough scallywag, who trekked round carrying the survey officer's paraphernalia, had several interesting discussions with an Indian Officer of ours.

"Oh yes," he said, "I started by fighting against you. My brother, who was in action beside me, got two bullets in the thigh and then two in the head. I didn't mind that so much; it was, after all, the fortune of war. But when a belt of machine-gun fire sprayed right across his back and just cut him in two, I decided to quit and take employment with Government instead."

"Is it true that your women incite you against Government?" asked the Subedar.

"Oh no, that's not true at all. They are usually against us fighting and many of us don't want to fight either. But we are in the hands of our mullahs. What they say goes, and obey them we must.

"But what of the Government pensioners? Surely they don't want to risk losing their pensions?"

"No, but those who are near British territory get over the border as quickly as they can with their families and all they've

* "Khassadars" are armed tribesmen in Government employ. They are used for road protection duties, as personal escorts, etc.—Ed.

got. The others haven't any say at all. A **lashkar* descends on their homes, and if they refuse to fight they are destroyed lock, stock and barrel. Naturally, they join up. Not all of them are actually in the firing line, but they carry our water and provisions. Several of them have been signallers in their time and we use them to read your messages. We also use them as signallers ourselves. They haven't got any flags, but they wave bits of cloth or their puggarees and often communicate to each other in this way."

"Which of our arms do you dislike the most?"

"Oh, we hate your aeroplanes except when in position. Then they can't see us. But we loathe them when we are on the move. They prevent us ploughing our fields and sowing our crops. And at night we can't light fires in our villages, and so we have great difficulty in cooking our food. The fact of being watched upsets us and we get little comfort when at war."

"In actual fighting we're most frightened of your machine-guns and the hail of bullets which they send sweeping round us. The guns we don't mind so much, because we see which way they are pointing and when the shell comes, we dive right and left into cover."

"The way we organise ourselves in a fight is to have one sharp shooter firing and about fifteen others waiting under cover. On seeing an opportunity he waves to us and we take up our positions. Our water comes up to us on donkeys and we use them to send away our dead and badly wounded. For food—well, the nearest village is under orders to supply us and if they don't, we just loot their stores of grain and kill their sheep. It's a hard time for us, all the same, when we're fighting. There's one thing, however; we're seldom surprised. If there are none of us actually employed in your camp, there are always some with the wood or forage contractor. As soon as a column moves out, word goes ahead to the villages nearby and through them to the *lashkars* waiting in the hills. These *lashkars* vary a lot in strength, increasing if we gain success and dwindling to a few hundreds when things go against us."

* "Lashkar," literally an army, is used to denote any hostile body of tribesmen.—Ed.

So much for the Mohmand's side. It is, I think, of interest to analyse him as well from one's own point of view.

As a marksman at shorter ranges he was not, as a rule, very accurate. This, I think, one may put down to the fact that he failed to show steadiness when being fired at himself. He lacked the deadly fire discipline of the Mahsud or the Wazir. When out of the reach of our covering fire as he was on the 29th September on Hill 4080, he showed that he could seize an opportunity when it was presented to him.

He disliked crowning the heights. His fire positions were as a rule in the rough ground in the nullahs, or often in caves in the hillside. From these, at longer ranges up to 1,500 yards, his shooting was unpleasantly accurate.

The case of one sportsman comes to mind. Throughout a long day in one of the valleys he sniped a stretch about fifty yards long. Although he did not have any actual success, he quickened the stride of even the most sluggish over his selected area. Ambulances gathered speed suddenly, unsuspecting horsemen broke into a trot. Those who had to cross it later can laugh reminiscently now.

On occasions, when roused, the Mohmand proved himself an intrepid antagonist. One case in point was after a reconnaissance up the Toratigga valley. Suddenly, on one flank, there appeared along the back wall of a village half a dozen gallants who took cover in a graveyard about two hundred yards beyond and loosed off several hearty volleys at a large group of senior officers. They then proceeded to pepper the brigade of artillery in action. The batteries got down to it first with their Lewis guns and then with their 4-5s. In an instant the whole valley was roused. The retirement was followed up with the greatest vigour, first of all by small parties as close as two hundred yards, and then by a large *lashkar* gathering in their rear.

The Mohmand who, throughout the operations, showed a great propensity for sniping camps at night that evening surpassed himself. He formed almost a complete ring round Ghalanai Camp and from 8-30 p.m. until 2-30 a.m. shot into it from all directions. "Granpop," a well-known character with an ancient .577, noisy as any howitzer, was well to the fore. Report has it that several hundred men formed up to make a *ghazi* rush

on camp. However, a timely burst of machine-gun fire damped their ardour.

Next morning when the brigade moved out against him, the Mohmand appeared to have lost his fiery spirit of the day before. The deduction seems to be that he is not capable of really sustained action. For the main part he is an ill-nourished specimen and his enthusiasm for a fight is even more spasmodic than that of other frontier tribesmen.

Experience, however, taught us that we could not afford to take liberties with him. When he found a position where his own safety was assured, the accuracy of his shooting improved a hundredfold. In the engagement where his fire action was successful he showed himself recklessly courageous in following up his advantage with shock tactics.

In conclusion, he deserves a meed of praise for the way he behaved after agreeing to our terms. It is true that he still continued to make repeated attempts to penetrate into those villages which we held as piquet positions and attempted almost to the end to carry off canvas water tanks and screens. With a wry sense of humour he also proceeded on occasions to enliven our camps with the most eerie jackal serenades. At the same time he definitely prevented the more unruly sections from taking actively hostile action against us, and sniping of our camps ceased almost entirely. So, in the later stages, whilst the road over the Nahakki was being completed, the slopes of Khazanasar became a happy hunting ground for a shot-gun. For this I feel we should thank him. After all, who does not appreciate an early season *chikor* with stuffing and bread crumbs, and roasted perchance to perfection by an artistically-minded cook?

MISCELLANEOUS SERVICE NOTES

THE ARMY IN ENGLAND

Conditions of Service for Officers

The conditions outlined below were brought into force for British Army officers in combatant arms of the Service from 1st August 1938. They do not apply to officers of corps such as the Royal Army Ordnance Corps and the Royal Army Pay Corps, which have their own terms of recruitment and service.

PROMOTION

1. Promotion, provided an officer is qualified and recommended, will be by time-scale up to the rank of major and thereafter by selection—

- to captain at 8 years' service;
- to major at 17 years' service.

The lowest rank from which it will be possible for an officer to receive accelerated promotion will be that of major, but officers who were brevet-majors before the 1st August will retain army seniority according to the dates of their brevets.

2. An officer selected to fill a lieutenant-colonel's or higher appointment will be promoted from the date on which he assumes duty in the appointment, or as soon afterwards as a vacancy on the establishment occurs. The rule that a lieutenant-colonel cannot become a substantive colonel until four years after the date on which he received his lieutenant-colonelcy has been abolished.

A lieutenant-colonel promoted to colonel will count seniority from either—

- (a) the date of his promotion to colonel,
- or (b) the date of his brevet-colonelcy, if he received one;
- or (c) three years from the date of his lieutenant-colonelcy, brevet or substantive,

whichever is the most advantageous to him.

3. Generally speaking, officers promoted to colonel and above will be promoted to fill vacancies in appointments, not vacancies in establishments.

A colonel temporarily superseded for promotion to major-general by an officer junior to him will regain his relative position in the army when he is, himself, promoted to major-general. A similar rule will apply in the case of major-generals on promotion to lieutenant-general.

TENURE OF APPOINTMENTS

Except for certain technical and colonial appointments, all command and staff tenures will in future be for three years.

RETIREMENT

The Army Council retains the right to keep any officer in the Service beyond the age-limits shown below, if retention is in the

public interest. Otherwise the upper age-limits for retirement will be:

Majors and below	... 47 years.
Lieutenant-colonels	... 50 years.
Colonels	... 55 years.
Major-generals	... 57 years.
Lieutenant-generals and above	... 60 years.

A major permanently superseded under the age of 47 will, unless the Army Council decide otherwise, have the right to serve on to that age.

PAY

The old and new rates of pay are compared in the following table:

Regimental Officers

RANK.	OLD RATE.		NEW RATE.	
	<i>s. d.</i>		<i>s. d.</i>	
2nd-Lieutenant	10 0	..	11 0	
Lieutenant ..	11 10	..	13 0	(After three years' service.)
Ditto ..	14 6	(After 7 years' service.)	14 6	(After six years' service.)
Captain ..	19 0	(No time-scale, but average promotion took place at 11 years' service.)	16 6	(On promotion at 8 years' service.)
Ditto	19 0	(At 11 years' service.)
Ditto ..	23 6	(At 15 years' service.)	23 6	(At 14 years' service.)
Major ..	28 6	(Average promotion took place at 20 years' service.)	28 6	(On promotion at 17 years' service.)
Ditto ..	33 6	(After 5 years' in rank, average 25 years' service.)	33 6	(At 22 years' service.)
Lieut.-Colonel	43 0	(Exclusive of command pay.)	43 0	(Exclusive of command pay.)

Pay of Colonels and above

	<i>s. d.</i>		<i>s. d.</i>	
Colonel ..	49 10	..	49 10	(On promotion.)
	58 4 (brigadier)		52 6	(After two years' in rank.)
			55 2	(After four years' in rank.)
			58 0	(After six years' in rank.)
Major-General	81 6	..	90 6	

Pay of Staff Officers

Pay classes in all staff and other appointments have been abolished. Such appointments will carry, instead—

For a lieutenant ... Regimental pay *plus* 2s. 6d.
For captains, majors and lieut.-colonels. Regimental pay *plus* 5s. od.

Retired Pay

The new rates of retired pay are calculated primarily on a basis of age, given a specified minimum of total service. They do not carry, as the old scales did, a substantial rank element for each year's service in a specified rank. The new rates of retired pay are larger than the old ones for most officers retiring in the rank of major.

1. Under the age of 40, with ten or more years' commissioned service—

£100 a year gratuity for each year's service.

2. For officers under the rank of lieutenant-colonel, having twenty or more years' commissioned service—

Maximum Pension £407-10-0

<i>Age.</i>		<i>Years service.</i>	<i>Retired pay.</i>		
			£	s.	d.
40	...	17	...	203	10 0
41	...	18	...	237	0 0
42	...	19	...	271	10 0
43	...	20	...	305	0 0
44	...	21	...	339	10 0
45	...	22	...	373	0 0
46	...	23	...	407	10 0

For each year's service over or under the scheduled amount at a given age, subject to a limit of five years either way, a sum of £13-10-0 will be added to, or deducted from, the pension in the above table. Thus, an officer commissioned at the age of 19 years and wishing to retire at the age of 43 (*i.e.*, with 24 years' commissioned service) will receive £305 plus £54, making £359 p.a. retired pay.

3. For officers of the rank of lieutenant-colonel—

Maximum Pension £543

<i>Age.</i>		<i>Years service.</i>	<i>Retired pay.</i>		
			£	s.	d.
44	...	19	...	407	10 0
45	...	19	...	440	10 0
46	...	20	...	475	10 0
47	...	20	...	508	10 0
48	...	21	...	543	0 0

The variable increment or decrement is the same as for captains and majors, *i.e.*, £13-10-0 a year up to the age of 48. Thus a lieutenant-colonel having twenty-five years' service at the age of 46 will receive the maximum pension on retirement at that age.

4. For officers of the rank of colonel there is a similar time-scale, except that the increment per year of service over and above the scheduled amount rises to £20 a year after the age of fifty. Thus, a colonel retiring at the age of fifty, with twenty-seven years' service, will receive £678-10-0 p.a., while a colonel aged 52, with twenty-eight years' service, will receive £732 p.a.

The maximum retired pay for a colonel will be £750. General officers will receive pensions, irrespective of length of service or age, as follows: Major-generals, £950; lieutenant-generals, £1,120; generals, £1,300.

VACATION OF APPOINTMENTS

To avoid hardship, no officer will be required to vacate any appointment, as a direct result of the new terms of service, before 1st August, 1939. Thus, an officer who, on 1st August this year, was serving in a normal four years' appointment or command and who had, on that date—

- (a) completed three years or more will be permitted to complete his original tenure; or
- (b) completed two, but less than three years, will not be required to vacate before 1st August, 1939; or
- (c) completed less than two years will be required to vacate on completion of three years.

DRILL BY THREES

With a view to bringing close order drill more into line with the requirements of field service, experiments have been conducted at Shorncliffe. Instead of forming fours and marching in column of fours, the troops taking part formed threes and marched in column of threes.

SNIPERS

During the Great War snipers proved themselves of great value and undoubtedly obtained a very high proportion of hits to rounds fired. Seventy-two picked men per battalion of infantry are, therefore, to be thoroughly trained as snipers. Special equipment is to be issued and practice will be carried out on field service targets.

DIRECTOR OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

Dr. H. J. Gough, M.B.E., Superintendent of the Engineering Department of the National Physical Laboratory, has been appointed to a new post as Director of Scientific Research at the War Office. He will be responsible to the Director-General of Munitions Production for the general direction and organization of research work for War Office purposes, for advising on the programme of research work to be undertaken and proposals for specific investigations, and for the efficiency of the various organizations for research and experimental purposes under the War Office. He will represent that Department on the inter-departmental research committees.

ROYAL ARMY ORDNANCE CORPS

The mechanization of the Army has necessitated the creation of the post of Inspector of Army Ordnance Workshop Services. The new Inspector will be responsible for the technical inspection of Royal Army Ordnance Corps workshops, mobilization equipment and field workshop units, and the organization and general supervision of Royal Army Ordnance Corps artisan training for men and boys.

The appointment is part of the recent reorganization of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps which is now organized in two branches, each with definite responsibilities in its own sphere, under the Director of Ordnance Services:

- (a) The Stores Branch, under the Principal Ordnance Officer, who controls provision, storage and supply of ordnance stores and undertakes the general administration of ordnance questions throughout the Army.
- (b) The Mechanical Engineering Branch, under the Principal Ordnance Mechanical Engineer, who is responsible for workshop services and technical inspections.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE ORGANIZATION

At the War Office an officer with the rank of lieutenant-general has been appointed Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Anti-Aircraft Defence). He will be responsible, through the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to the Secretary of State for all matters connected with anti-aircraft defence, and will devote the whole of his time to these duties.

Under the Deputy C.I.G.S. (Anti-Aircraft Defence) a new Director of Anti-Aircraft Training and Organization, with the rank of major-general, has been appointed.

Existing Territorial anti-aircraft formations, with the addition of others to be created, will be formed into five divisions instead of two, as at present. The strength of the personnel will be increased to about 100,000. The five divisions will form a corps under the command of a lieutenant-general, who will be responsible for training, inspection and personnel questions. In war, his headquarters will be adjacent to those of the Air Officer Commanding the Fighter Command, Royal Air Force, to whom he will be responsible for operations.

ARMY TECHNICAL SCHOOLS FOR BOYS

New Army Technical Schools for boys are to be opened in Jersey, at Chatham and Arborfield, near Reading. The school in Jersey is intended primarily to train apprentices for the Royal Army Service Corps, that at Chatham apprentices for the Royal Engineers and that at Arborfield apprentices for the Royal Army Ordnance Corps.

VOCATIONAL TRAINING

Vocational Training is to be allowed to soldiers during the period immediately before the termination of their service with the Colours. The Ministry of Labour assumed complete responsibility

for vocational training on 1st July this year, when the centres at Chisledon Camp and Hounslow were transferred to that department. The vocational training centre at Aldershot is being closed down.

THE SERVICES IN INDIA

MECHANICAL REPAIR ORGANIZATION

The Secretary of State for India has accepted the principle that responsibility for the provision, repair and maintenance of mechanical vehicles in India should be transferred from the Quarter-master-General to the Master-General of the Ordnance. The main reason for the change which, it is anticipated, will take place in April 1939 is to avoid duplication of workshops by the Royal Indian Army Service Corps and the Indian Army Ordnance Corps. The reorganization will necessitate the transfer of some personnel from the Royal Indian Army Service Corps to the Indian Army Ordnance Corps and the terms of service and conditions of transfer are under consideration.

Existing heavy repair shops will continue to carry out third line repairs for mechanical vehicles, but it is intended to rationalize all workshops both in heavy repair shops and arsenals, so that there will be the maximum of economy in the carrying out of third line repairs of armaments, ordnance stores and mechanical vehicles.

In the second line organization, workshop companies will undertake ordnance and mechanical transport repairs in peace and war. This will effect savings in transportation charges since, at present, second line ordnance repairs have to be sent back to arsenals. It will also reduce the size of working stocks now required to cover the long periods during which repairable armament stores are non-effective.

For first line organization it is proposed to attach light aid detachments consisting of artificers of the Indian Army Ordnance Corps to major mechanised units and formations. These detachments will assist unit artificers in running repairs.

At Army Headquarters the present Artillery Directorate will become the Directorate of Armaments and Mechanization, the duties of the mechanization portion of the new directorate being similar to those of the Directorate of Mechanization at the War Office.

INFANTRY

Interim organizations have been sanctioned for battalions in India to enable them, as far as conditions permit, to conform in training and tactical handling with rifle battalions in the United Kingdom. Battalions will have four rifle companies, each of three platoons of three sections. In battalions armed with the medium machine-gun, the headquarters company will include a platoon of eight guns.

FIELD SERVICE RATION

As a result of experience gained during the Waziristan Operations, 1937, the field service scale of rations for both British and Indian troops is under revision from the point of view of giving more "bulk" to men fighting in mountainous country or employed on arduous duties such as those of road protection.

CHARGERS FOR OFFICERS OF MECHANIZED UNITS

From the 1st November officers of mechanized cavalry and artillery units will be allowed one charger each. An additional fifty per cent. for the number of officers on the peace establishment of the unit has also been authorised. Officers will be allowed to buy a charger from Government at concessional rates if they do not already possess one. All chargers will be optional, not obligatory.

PROMOTION TO WARRANT OFFICER AND VICEROY'S COMMISSIONED OFFICER

Indian non-commissioned officers of cavalry or infantry will, in future, be eligible for promotion to warrant officer or Viceroy's commissioned officer provided they have qualified at either the small Arms School, Pachmarhi, or the Small Arms and Mechanization School, Ahmednagar, Armament wing.

ELECTRIFICATION OF INDIAN TROOPS BARRACKS

The Secretary of State for India has approved the electrification of Indian troops barracks in plains stations where British troops barracks have already been electrified. Work will be carried out only as and when the necessity for the construction of new, or the reconstruction of old, Indian troops barracks arises.

FAMILIES IN QUETTA

The situation regarding residential accommodation in Quetta has become easier and families of military ranks have been permitted to reside in that station, subject to the approval of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command.

DRESS IN MESS

Mess dress, or other uniform when mess dress is unsuitable, will continue to be worn on guest nights and other similar occasions in India. The wearing of dinner jackets on ordinary nights will be allowed at the discretion of commanding officers.

WOLSELEY HELMET

The "Wolseley" pattern of khaki helmet has been replaced as the official helmet in India by a pith khaki hat. Wolseley helmets and Cawnpore Tent Club pattern hats may be retained in use until the end of the year for wear on all occasions, except ceremonial parades and field service. The khaki Wolseley helmet remains the regulation headdress for officers at stations abroad other than in India.

ARMY RIFLE ASSOCIATION, INDIA

The central meeting will be held at Meerut during the week 18th—25th February 1939.

THE DEFENCE SERVICES IN INDIA, 1937-38

During a debate in the Legislative Assembly in 1934, the Defence Secretary promised to consider the possibility of producing annually for members of the Central Legislature an account of the chief activities of the Army during the previous twelve months. Extracts from the "Summary of Important Matters relating to the Defence Services in India," 1937-38, are given below.

Role of the Defence Forces in India

1. Defence Forces are maintained by the Government of India for the defence of India against external aggression and the maintenance of internal peace and tranquillity. This definition was accepted by the Legislative Assembly in 1921. The definition is qualified by the reservation that the forces maintained are not intended to repel external attack by a major military power, though the duties of those forces may include initial resistance to such an attack pending the arrival of Imperial reinforcements or the exercise elsewhere by Imperial forces of pressure which would relieve the situation.

2. The duties of each defence service are:

(a) *Royal Indian Navy*.—In so far as seaborne attacks by a major power are concerned, and also for the safety of her sea communications, India relies on the protection of the Royal Navy, supplemented by such assistance as the small sea-going vessels of the Royal Indian Navy can provide. The primary function of the Royal Indian Navy is the provision of local naval defence for the protection of shipping against raiders, mines and submarines in the immediate approaches to the major seaports of India. To this end, as finances permit, it is the policy of the Government of India:

- (i) to strengthen the active service and training establishments of the Royal Indian Navy;
 - (ii) to organize a reserve both of officers and trained ratings;
 - (iii) to provide armament and other equipment for use in auxiliary vessels to be equipped for and employed on local naval defence in war; and
 - (iv) to maintain a small but efficient squadron of sea-going combatant vessels.
- (b) *Army*.—The roles of the army are:
- (i) to support and assist the civil armed forces in controlling the tribes on the North West Frontier;
 - (ii) to support the civil power in the maintenance of internal law and order in peace and war, to guard the main arteries of communication within India itself and to undertake the local defence of major ports in time of war; and
 - (iii) to undertake operations in the defence of the land frontiers and coasts of India against external aggression, in anticipation of the arrival of Imperial assistance.

As finances permit, the modernisation of the army to keep pace with new developments is being undertaken, particularly in regard to the mechanization of both British and Indian units.

(c) *Air Forces in India.*—The duties of the Air Forces in India include co-operation with the Covering Troops in the control of the tribes on the North West Frontier, with the Field Army in the defence of India from external aggression and with the Army and Navy in the defence of India's coasts and major ports.

In addition the Air Forces in India are prepared to act independently of the other defence services either in the defence of India against external aggression or in the control of the North West Frontier tribes.

Although the Air Forces in India are at present equipped and armed on a scale below that obtaining in the United Kingdom, steps are being taken, as finances permit, to introduce aircraft and armament of modern types.

3. *Units outside India.*—Certain units have been lent to the governments of the United Kingdom and Burma. All charges in respect of such units are met by the government concerned.

4. *Finance.*—The budget estimate for the Defence Services, which include the Royal Indian Navy, the Army and Air Forces in India, for 1937-38, was fixed at Rs. 44.62 crores, inclusive of a sum of 75 lakhs for the reconstruction of Quetta. The provision for the ordinary Defence expenditure is thus Rs. 43.87 crores or Rs. 98 lakhs less than the corresponding figure for 1936-37. This decrease was mainly due to the separation of Burma (Rs. 104 lakhs) and Aden (Rs. 20 lakhs), partly counterbalanced by an increase under Ordnance Services.

The budget for 1938-39 has been fixed at Rs. 45.18 crores inclusive of the sum of Rs. 75 lakhs for the reconstruction of Quetta. The comparative figures of Defence expenditure since 1930 are as follows:

Year.	Crores of Rs.			
1930-31	54.30
1931-32	51.76
1932-33	46.74
1933-34	44.42
1934-35	44.34
1935-36	44.98
1936-37	45.45
1937-38	44.62 (Estimate)

Actual expenditure for 1937-38 has not yet been finally computed. It is approximately Rs. 47.22 crores. The increase over the budget estimate is mainly due to the operations in Waziristan and the abandonment of the Lahore abattoir scheme.

5. *Indian Units Overseas.*—There are at present three battalions of Indian infantry stationed overseas, excluding Burma, the cost of which is borne by His Majesty's Government. At Hong Kong the Kumaon Rifles form part of the normal garrison. Events in China in the latter half of last year rendered it necessary to reinforce the garrison of that place. The 5/6th Rajputana Rifles, an Indianized battalion from Secunderabad, was selected and embarked at Calcutta on the 24th August 1937. The 1st Bn., 2nd

Punjab Regiment, is serving at Taiping, Malay States, as a temporary measure.

6. *Separation of Burma*.—Consequent on the separation of Burma from India, the Burma Independent Military District ceased to be under the administrative control of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Army in Burma came into being on the 1st April 1937. By that date the Indian garrison had been replaced by Burmese Forces and withdrawn, with the exception of one field company Sappers and Miners, one mountain battery and one animal transport company (mule), which have been loaned temporarily to the Government of Burma. Their cost, including non-effective charges in respect of their service in Burma after separation, will be borne by the Government of Burma.

The Government of India have further agreed to loan the services of officers and other ranks to the Government of Burma until such time as Burma can replace them from her own resources. The Government of Burma have agreed to bear the entire cost involved, including proportionate non-effective charges.

7. *Policy*.—The accepted policy of Indianization of the Army entails the introduction of Indianized units to the equivalent of one division, one cavalry brigade and ancillary troops. This decision embraces all arms and branches of the service and is being effected by the Indianization of existing units, such as cavalry and infantry, and by the creation of new units where necessary, *e.g.* artillery.

Apart from the eventual replacement of British officers by Indian Commissioned Officers from Dehra Dun, the most important change necessitated by the process of Indianization is the eventual replacement in the units concerned of Viceroy's Commissioned Officers by Indian Commissioned Officers on first appointment (*e.g.*, as platoon commanders in infantry battalions) and by Indian warrant officers.

8. *Progress*.—The normal output of the Indian Military Academy is approximately 56 every year. One hundred and eighty-four cadets from Dehra Dun have so far received commissions and been posted to Indianized units as follows:

Cavalry	11
Infantry	95
Artillery	3
Signals	1

In addition 55 are serving their first year's attachment with British units and 19 are undergoing training prior to appointment to artillery, engineers and signals.

Apart from the units which are being Indianized a number of Indian Commissioned Officers are being posted to services and departments and Viceroy's Commissioned Officers and warrant officers are replacing British other ranks wherever possible.

9. *Entrance Examinations*.—There was again a reduction, as compared with the previous year, in the number of candidates

presenting themselves for examination for entry into the Navy, Army and Air Force. At the Interview and Record Board for entry held in October 1937, 20 candidates presented themselves for the Royal Indian Navy and 116 for the Indian Military Academy—a decrease of 8 from the figures for 1936. At a Board held in April 1938, 61 candidates competed for 15 commissions in the Army, 3 in the Royal Indian Navy and 3 in the Indian Air Force. This figure is again less than the number presenting themselves in April, 1937, when 72 candidates took part.

The distribution of candidates by communities and provinces is given in paragraph 14 below:

10. *Indian Military Academy*.—During the year, cadets were admitted to the Indian Military Academy as follows:

August 1937	By competitive examination	...	15
"	From the Indian Army	...	17
"	From Indian States for the		
	Indian States Forces	...	8
			<hr/>
Total			40
			<hr/>
January 1938	By competitive examination	...	15
"	From the Indian Army	...	15
"	From Indian States for the		
	Indian States Forces	...	10
			<hr/>
Total			40
			<hr/>

In the passing out examination held in June 1937, of 32 cadets all were successful, and at the examination held in December 1937, all the 35 cadets were successful.

11. *Intake of Indian Commissioned Officers*.—The results of the year's intake of Indian Commissioned Officers are shown in the following figures. Those of the previous year are added for purposes of comparison:

	31st March 1937.	31st March 1938.
Number of commissioned officers in Indian		
Land Forces	... 285	348

12. *Indian Army Cadets*.—Of the 15 Indian Army cadets selected for admission to the Indian Military Academy in August 1938, 13 were taken from candidates at the Kitchener College and two from the Auxiliary Force (India). As regards their education, physical training and power of expression in English the 13 cadets selected from the Kitchener College were in advance of Indian Army cadets admitted under the previous system.

13. *New Measures*.—In the Summary published last year reference was also made to the conclusions of an informal conference of members of both Houses of the Legislature regarding the measures to be taken to improve the quality of candidates for admission to the Indian Military Academy.

Arising out of the conference was:

- (a) The question of reducing the fees at the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun.

As a result of the quinquennial examination held in 1938, it was found that no reduction could be made in the fees now charged.

- (b) A proposal to give additional emoluments in some form to young officers during their year's attachment to British units.

It was decided that, with effect from the 1st September 1937, all 2nd lieutenant Indian Commissioned Officers should be granted financial assistance to the extent of Rs. 40 per mensem whilst serving in that rank.

With effect from the same date all lieutenant Indian Commissioned Officers during their first three years and nine months' service in that rank will be granted financial assistance to the extent of Rs. 15 per mensem.

In each case the allowance will be paid to the Officers' Mess and will be credited to the officer against his individual mess bill.

These allowances will continue only for so long as the conditions of service and pay of Indian Commissioned Officers remain as they are at present.

- (c) The value of the diploma at the Prince of Wales's Royal Indian Military College, Dehra Dun.

With effect from the examination for December 1938, the Cambridge School Certificate "A" will be substituted for the Royal Indian Military College Diploma.

14. *Communities and Provinces of candidates for entry to the Indian Military Academy who presented themselves before the Interview and Record Boards in 1937-38.*

(a) Candidates by communities.				October/ November 1937.	March/April 1938.	
Hindus	Brahmins	..	18	64	Brahmins .. 5	33
	Kshatriyas	..	19		Kshatriyas .. 18	
	Kayasthas	..	9		Kayasthas .. 4	
	Vaishyas	..	9		Vaishya .. 1	
	Non-Brahmins	..	9		Non-Brahmins 5	
Muslims	17		13
Sikhs	26		9
Parsis	Nil		3
Anglo-Indians	3		1
Domiciled European	1		1
Indian Christians	2		3
No religion	1		Nil
				114		63

(b) Candidates by Provinces and States.				October/November 1937.	March/April 1938.
<i>Provinces.</i>					
Punjab	36	23
Madras	4	1
N. W. F. P.	7	2
U. P.	22	9
Bengal	8	6
Bombay	8	7
Burma	3	1
C. P.	4	2
Bihar	3	1
Sind	1	<i>Nil</i>
Delhi	2	1
Orissa	<i>Nil</i>	1
Coorg	2	<i>Nil</i>
Indian States	14	9
TOTAL ..				114	63

ROYAL INDIAN NAVY

15. *Personnel*.—The present strength of the Royal Indian Navy is 130 officers and 1,118 ratings, excluding boys under training.

For administrative reasons the cadre of officers was divided into two branches in March 1937, namely:—

List I.—Seagoing officers.

List II.—Officers permanently seconded for employment under civil departments.

Proposals are under the consideration of the Government for an increase in the cadres of officers and men to meet existing commitments. All existing vacancies for commissioned officers have been filled and there has been no lack of volunteers for entry as ratings. There has been an increase in the number of boys under training in the Depot, and recruiting is now being carried out three times a year instead of twice. Recruiting was extended to the Deccan as an experiment and this District will be included with others in future.

16. *Strength—Craft*.—The following vessels comprise the Royal Indian Navy:—

Escort vessels—"Clive," "Cornwallis," "Hindustan," "Indus" and "Lawrence."

Survey ship—"Investigator."

Depot ship—"Dalhousie" (Boys' Training Establishment).

Patrol vessel—"Pathan" (tender to Boys' Training Establishment).

Trawler—"Madras."

17. *Local Naval Defence*.—The protection of coastal sea-borne trade will, to some extent, be provided for, if the present scheme for expansion of the Royal Indian Navy is put into operation. It must, however, be realised that the Royal Indian Navy, as at present constituted, can only be considered as a local defence force. Against attacks on a large scale, and for the protection of shipping on the ocean trade routes, India must remain entirely dependent on the Royal Navy.

18. *Indianization*.—Since the re-organization of the service on a combatant basis in 1928, the ratio of British and Indian personnel recruited as commissioned officers has been fixed at 2:1, and that of warrant officers at 50:50. All ratings are Indians. On the 1st of April 1938, there were 7 Indian officers in the Executive branch and 6 Indian officers in the Engineer branch, while there are 13 Indian cadets and midshipmen under training in the United Kingdom.

19. *New Wireless Station at Bombay*.—In November 1937 the construction of a new wireless telegraph station at Colaba (Bombay) was undertaken for the Royal Indian Navy. When completed, it will be the most up-to-date naval wireless telegraph station in the Far East with the exception of Singapore.

20. *Visit of "Indus" to United Kingdom*.—On 5th April 1937, "Indus" left Bombay for the United Kingdom to take part in the Coronation celebrations. She arrived at Portsmouth on 30th April and proceeded to the Thames, where she remained until 14th May.

After leaving London, "Indus" returned to Portsmouth for the Coronation Naval Review when the commanding officer had the honour of being received on board H. M. Yacht "Victoria and Albert" by His Majesty the King-Emperor. On 11th June the ship sailed for exercises with the First Minesweeping Flotilla which provided valuable experience for both officers and men.

21. *Exercises off Singapore*.—At the end of January 1938, "Investigator," "Indus" and "Hindustan" took part in exercises off Singapore with units of the China and East Indies Squadrons. Their participation was favourably commented on by the Commanders-in-Chief of the China and East Indies Stations. On completion of the exercises, they proceeded to Singapore where they were present for the opening of the new graving dock by H. E. the Governor of the Straits Settlements.

ROYAL AIR FORCE AND INDIAN AIR FORCE

22. *Strength—Personnel*.—The personnel of the Royal Air Force in India consists of 249 British officers and 1,820 airmen with 668 Indian ranks. No. 1 Squadron of the Indian Air Force consisting of squadron headquarters and "B" Flight is located at Drigh Road and "A" Flight is located at Peshawar. The squadron, as at present constituted, consists of 12 officers (2 under training in England) and 100 airmen (33 ex-apprentices and 14 apprentices under training).

23. *Strength—Aircraft*.—The strength of First Line aircraft is 106 aircraft *plus* reserves.

24. *Operational and Training Flights*.—In addition to taking part in the operations in Waziristan, the Air Forces in India carried out the following long distance flights during the period under review:—

Between 5th and 7th June 1937, Herr Dr. Bauer and party were flown to Gilgit in a bomber transport aircraft in connection with the German Nanga Parbat relief expedition.

Between 1st and 2nd November 1937, four Wapiti aircraft carried out the annual flight to Gilgit. The Governor of Kuh Khizar and his son were carried in these aircraft from Gilgit to Peshawar on their return flight.

During January-February 1938, No. 39 (Bomber) Squadron (12 Hart) and No. 60 (Bomber) Squadron (12 Wapiti) together with a Bomber Transport aircraft flew to Singapore and back for the purpose of training the units in long distance navigation and for participation in the Singapore combined exercise.

On 2nd-3rd March 1938, two Hart aircraft carried out an emergency flight from Risalpur to Gilgit carrying anti-rabic vaccine.

25. *Indian Air Force*.—The formation of the 2nd flight of the Indian Air Force squadron has now been completed and the 3rd flight will commence formation on 1st April 1938. It is intended to move the squadron to Ambala during the forthcoming year.

As difficulty has been experienced in recruiting other ranks, rates of pay and allowances have been revised, leave concessions improved and a married establishment introduced.

The flight of the Indian Air Force squadron stationed at Peshawar was employed at Miranshah during the Waziristan operations of 1937. This is the first time in the history of the Indian Air Force that they have been called upon to undertake active operations.

MISCELLANEOUS

26. *Abattoir Scheme—Liquidation*.—Owing to the spread of agitation against the proposal on religious grounds, the Government decided to abandon the scheme for a central abattoir at Lahore Cantonment and connected cold storage facilities. The final winding-up of the scheme is not yet complete but the loss entailed is estimated to be not less than Rs. 20 lakhs.

27. *Mechanical Transport*.—The experimental scheme for the subsidizing, against a guarantee of availability in war, of civilian mechanical transport sections, each of 30 lorries, was continued with minor modifications in the terms of the contract. It is proposed to subsidize more sections during 1938-39.

Owing to the improved performance of four-wheeled vehicles, the policy of replacing six-wheeled by four-wheeled lorries has been, with a few exceptions, accepted, thus effecting considerable savings.

28. *Accommodation—Officers*.—The situation throughout India regarding housing of officers is a matter of grave concern. It is becoming increasingly difficult to rent houses in cantonments owing to the fact that reasonable repairs, are, in many instances, not carried out by landlords. A small programme of acquisition in certain cantonments has been drawn up but, owing to lack of funds, a satisfactory solution seems far off. In the few cantonments where it has been possible to carry out this programme, there has been a distinct improvement in the situation.

29. *Accommodation—Indian Troops.*—The lines of many Indian units are old and below modern hygienic standards. A programme of reconstruction and improvements has been drawn up. This again is held up owing to shortage of funds.

30. *Ordnance.*—During the year under review, the attention of the ordnance authorities has been concentrated in stimulating the production in India of various articles of war stores required by the defence forces. Extensions of plant have been made which enable the new light automatic gun (Vickers Berthier) to be produced in the Rifle Factory at Ishapore. A 3-inch anti-aircraft gun has been completed at the Gun and Shell Factory, Cossipore. This is the first gun of its type to be manufactured in India. Steps have been taken to establish the complete manufacture in India of respirators required for anti-gas purposes. As the result of endeavours made by the Central Purchase Organization of the Defence Services, indigenous manufacture of the undernoted stores, previously obtained from abroad, has been developed:—

Ground sheets; cells and batteries; cutlery; hurricane lamps; horse shoes; barbed wire.

31. *Cantonments.*—As a result of the passage of the Cantonments (Amendment) Act, 1936 (XXIV), the Cantonments Department was re-organised during 1937. The main feature of the re-organization is the constitution of a separate Lands Branch of the Department and a Service of Cantonment Executive Officers.

The Land Branch consists of Military Estates Officers whose primary duty it is to manage military lands in and out of cantonments on more efficient lines, the necessity for such management having been felt for the past several years.

The rules for the Service of Cantonment Executive Officers provide for the recruitment of executive officers through the Federal Public Service Commission which method will automatically result in the complete Indianization of the Service.

The Cantonments Act was withdrawn from Dharmasala, and Cannanore was constituted as a cantonment, with effect from the 4th October 1937 and 1st January 1938, respectively.

32. *Maintenance Grant for Soldiers' Board Organizations.*—During the financial year 1937-38 the Indian Soldiers' Board made a grant of over Rs. 55,000 from the Indian Soldiers' Board Fund to the various Provincial, State and District Soldiers' Boards subordinate to them. District Soldiers' Boards spent this money in the maintenance of their organizations and in looking after matters affecting the home interests of *ex*-soldiers and their families. These include the initial examination of pension and medal claims, applications for the grant of scholarships, the distribution of medals, the investigation of cases of relief from charitable funds, the explanation of what educational concessions are available for *ex*-soldiers and the promotion of vocational training and rural reconstruction schemes. Besides the sum mentioned above, these Boards also obtain assistance from the Indian Red Cross Society's funds for *ex*-soldiers invalided out of the Indian Army for chronic diseases.

33. *Grants of Relief*.—One of the most important functions of the Indian Soldiers' Board is to afford relief from the funds at their disposal to Indian *ex*-soldiers or their dependants who are in distressed circumstances. During the year 1937-38 the Board sanctioned grants totalling about Rs. 52,000 in 874 cases from the Indian Army Benevolent Fund and Rs. 19,000 to 210 applicants from the India and Burma Military and Marine Relief Fund. Loans or grants amounting in all to Rs. 1,500 were also made in 10 cases from the Sir Victor Sassoon Fund.

The Board also pays a special pension of Rs. 5 a month in addition to their service pensions to Indian soldiers who lost their sight while on active service during the war. Funds for this purpose come from the balance of the St. Dunstan's Fund which was raised during the war and handed over to the Board after its close.

34. *Employment for ex-soldiers*.—During the year 1937-38, employment was found for about 3,800 *ex*-soldiers in official and non-official appointments. Various District Soldiers' Boards and recruiting officers maintain lists of reliable *ex*-soldiers desirous of employment in their own districts.

35. *Rural Reconstruction (ex-soldiers)*.—During the past year the Board decided to allot a sum of Rs. 10,000 a year for three years for promoting schemes of rural reconstruction in selected villages. The intention is that the inhabitants of a selected village shall decide upon a scheme of benefit to them, and provided they agree to meet half its cost either in money, kind or labour, the remaining half of the cost will be met from the Board's grant. Examples of the types of schemes which are now being worked out in districts of the Punjab are the provision of wireless sets, primary schools, wells, canals, irrigation and street paving, the training and maintenance of *dais* and improvements in village-hygiene.

36. *Vocational Training*.—The Board has made a number of efforts to promote vocational training for *ex*-soldiers after their discharge. Up to now they have not met with much success as *ex*-soldiers on the whole seem reluctant to undergo such courses even when the costs of training and of railway expenses to and from their homes to the place of instruction are met by the Indian Soldiers' Board. Further efforts are now being made to discover alternative methods of vocational and agricultural training in the Punjab and the United Provinces.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

PROTECTIVE PIQUETS

SIR,

The article by "AUSPEX" in your April number entitled "The Dream Sector, L. of C.," is as timely as it is interesting and instructive. As pointed out by "PUNJABI" in his letter published in your July number, offensive patrols instead of passive piquets proved their efficacy *on the L. of C.* in the Mohmand operations of 1935. Indeed, they have frequently been advocated before and since 1935 by experienced mountain warfare practitioners for *fixed sector*, or *L. of C.*, defence.

From the paragraph beginning at the bottom of page 209 and ending half way down page 210, it is not clear whether "AUSPEX" condemns the classic, or "doctrinaire's" method of piquetting in a march not protected by piquets *in situ* before the column arrives. It seems to me that this is a different tactical problem from that of keeping an L. of C. sector open for nearly twenty-four hours every day, and it would be interesting, perhaps instructive, if "AUSPEX" would tell us how to give all-round and continuous protection to a marching column in typical Frontier country. The transport would, of course, be mixed pack and draught.

Yours faithfully,

24th August 1938.

EDWARD RAMEL.

A FIRST-HAND DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPRESS JOSEPHINE

DEAR SIR,

The American writer, who in the year 1806 wrote a letter from Paris to his friend in Boston containing a description of the Emperor Napoleon, which was lately published in your Journal, was no less trenchant and observing in his comments when it came to a description of the Empress Josephine.

"As to the Empress," he writes, "she looks, from knowing a little of the old court, somewhat as becomes imperial majesty. There is an appearance of great anxiety, of that kind of disturbed feelings which a person has who is mounted on a high place, or in danger of being overturned in a carriage; a look which all her guard and splendour cannot banish from her countenance. She is generally

very well painted, well dressed, and seems to be about fifty. She is, or pretends to be, very religious. I saw on her toilette at St. Cloud several religious works and a splendid bible! It is said she is much troubled by the predictions of a fortune-teller when young. She was told that she would marry a nobleman, Count Beauharnois; that he would die an unnatural death; that afterwards she would pass a miserable and perilous life; would finally be a queen, and greater than a queen, but *gare la chute!* was the sentence (beware of the fall!). All this would naturally be invented, but I was told it by Frenchmen who were in the habit of meeting her during Bonaparte's absence in Egypt.

She is seldom seen in public, which I can account for only from her aversion to meet the eyes of some of her former gallants!—who would proudly proclaim their intimacy.

I should like to describe to you the wonderful magnificence of the apartments of St. Cloud, to which I had access in company with Madame Lauriston. Among other things, I could not help observing in the hall of the throne, fitted up, or begun before he was proclaimed emperor, that the cornice was ornamented by a cock (France) on the back of a crouching lion (England). The gentleman pointed at it very significantly. In four compartments of the ceiling were the Imperial Arms, executed before the people willed, so kindly, that he should be urged to do them the favour to accept the Empire!

The apartments of the empress are the most beautiful. The window curtains are principally of the finest muslin and silk, thrown over a rod or arrow, and drawn aside; silk on one, and muslin on the other side of the window.

Her bathing-room is a curiosity. It is about eight foot square and composed entirely of mirrors. On two opposite sides are narrow pilasters, which are so regularly and so many times reflected, that one is obliged to feel of the walls not to believe that there is a gallery three hundred feet long!

I could not avoid observing at Malmaison that in Bonaparte's library everything relates to Egypt; books, maps, and models. And at the annual exhibition the painting, which was crowned with laurel, represented him in the famous hospital at Jaffa, among the pestiferous soldiers, touching the virulent sore of one. I could mention other things, showing not only his penchant to Egypt, but

that he is proud and flattered by his bloody and abominable achievements there. Frenchmen are kept ignorant of, and many will not believe, what Sir R. Wilson wrote.

I often asked at Paris, whether he governed, or Tallyrand, or some others, and was always assured that he originates and conducts everything. Tallyrand may be ordered to draw up such a document; Cambaceres such a law; Marbois or Lebrun such a scheme of finance: but he is prime mover.

Bonaparte governs with an energy truly admirable; and although we hear of 'deeds of darkness' and all that, much exaggerated, the people of Paris, from the excellency of the populace, enjoy all the benefits which result from perfect order; benefits which I wish were to be enjoyed as surely in Boston!"

Yours truly,

N. G. GANE.

SIR,

In a lecture given recently at a Northern Command Intelligence Course on "The Organisation and Work of Frontier Corps," the lecturer laid stress on the importance of military commanders being acquainted with the characteristics and limitations of the Scouts, in order to get full value when employing them in co-operation with regulars. He also pointed out that the efficiency and morale of the Scouts depend largely on the support of regular troops.

I have read with interest the article "IBLANKE" in your Journal for April 1938, and would draw attention to a statement made in it, which might give quite a wrong impression of the Scouts to those of your readers who are unacquainted with their characteristics.

The author of the article was, no doubt, present, and possibly, on that occasion heard "The backchat that always passes between the Scouts and the enemy"

The Scouts are irregulars, and some of their tactics may be irregular, but judging by the number of casualties received, and inflicted on the enemy by them, during the Waziristan Operations, I would say that the *usual* backchat that passes between the Scouts and the enemy is the bullet!!

YOURS TRULY,

"FRONTIER CORPS,"

REVIEWS.

*Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War,
Volume I*

BY COLONEL A. FORTESCUE DUGUID
(The King's Printer, Ottawa, \$2.)

This first volume of the history of the Canadian Forces in the Great War takes the story from August 1914 to September 1915. During that time the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions were formed; the 1st Division had taken part in the battles of First Ypres, Festubert and Givenchy, and the 2nd Division had arrived in France. In fact, the book stops short of the formation of the Canadian Corps in the autumn of 1915.

To the reader, two phases stand out above all others—the story of the raising of the 1st Division in Canada and the description of the fighting in April 1915 by which the German attacks on the northern flank of the Ypres salient (aided for the first time by gas) were stopped.

Chapters one to four, dealing with the formation of the 1st Division, are most entertaining as well as instructive. Inevitably they are largely concerned with the exploits, there is no other word, of the Canadian Minister for Defence, Honorary Lt.-General Sir Sam Hughes. His amazing enthusiasm, personality and character permeated the whole of Canada's initial war effort. But they also led to the scrapping of all mobilization plans and to the formation of the 1st Division by personal orders from the minister direct to unit commanders. No attempt is made to hide the results of, or excuse, this unorthodox procedure; and Canada quickly learnt her lesson, for the 2nd Division was raised on plans worked out before the war. It is interesting to compare Hughes' action with that of Kitchener in raising the New Armies. Both have rightly been blamed for a mistake in organization. But due weight should always be given to the prestige and enthusiasm connected with their names. These undoubtedly exerted a great influence in countries wedded to voluntary enlistment; and it seems possible that, in Canada, Hughes' direct methods were more suited than any other to the temper of the nation at the outbreak of war.

The history refers to April 24th, 1915, as "a great and terrible day for Canada." Two days previously the Germans began their

drive against Ypres by launching their first gas attack against a French Algerian Division on the left of the Canadians. As a result, practically the whole of the previous inter-divisional boundary between the Algerians and the Canadians was added to the Canadian front line. Then, on April 24th, the Germans again attacked with gas against the apex thus formed, which was held by the 3rd Canadian Brigade. The story of the ensuing days is well known but still, when read afresh, it seems almost unbelievable. The effect is heightened by the simple manner in which it is told, and by a rigid avoidance of comment upon matters which are now the subject of argument. The reader is left to draw his own conclusions, and some of them are not comfortable ones. But the reputation of the troops was made; and as the historian truly says, in speaking of the Canadians, First Ypres set the pace for the remainder of the war.

The outstanding characteristic of this first volume is candour. It is more frank than the official histories to which we are accustomed, and in this lies its merit. No excuses are made; no blame is apportioned. But the facts are stated without evasion, and certainly with no attempt to shield the reputations of ministers, commanders and others in authority. It forms a refreshing corrective to the propaganda often provided from unofficial sources and, in this way, is typical of the men whose exploits it records, and of the country which gave them.

The maps are very good, and excellently arranged. All detailed ones are kept for the volume of Appendices; but throughout the main volume are a series of general maps which enable the reader to follow the narrative with the minimum of effort. Hardly ever does one have to turn back to find a reference—a matter of arrangement which many military historians would do well to copy.

G. W. W.

A NEW AMERICAN HISTORY

By W. E. WOODWARD

(*Faber and Faber, Ltd., 24 Russell Square, London.*)

The author presents the rise and development of the American nation, starting with the early emigrations in the reign of Henry VIII and ending at the point where "the way is open for the New Deal." It is both interesting and instructive for the Englishman to study the origins and growth of the American nation in order to appreciate points of contact with his American

cousins and, more important, differences of outlook. The country is divided geographically and historically into three sections, the eastern seaboard, the Middle West, and the Pacific coast, and the author traces the different types of people, and the differences of opinions both on internal and on foreign policies, from the early start of the various settlements to the present day.

He has made an interesting and consecutive story of all the phases of development; the earliest desires to throw off the yoke of the English Government and to become an independent nation; the penetration into and colonisation of new country; relations with South America, and the Monroe Doctrine; imperial ambitions, the Mexican War, the war with Spain and the acquisition of Cuba and the Philippines; the growing pains of a young nation, the rise of national sentiment and the evolution of the government of the country and of the democracy of to-day.

It is hard to decide whether Mr. Woodward is a bitter cynic or whether his attitude towards the American civilisation is inspired by a genuine desire to see an honest reconstruction. He exposes many scandals that have taken place during this century, and in a comprehensive review of the great men who have controlled the destiny of the United States of America he gives practically no praise but condemns character and ability in so merciless a manner that the reader is bound to wonder whether a less prejudiced historian could not have presented a fairer picture. His statement "we are a social democracy; we are not a financial or an economic democracy," sums up his disapproval of the power which money holds in America to-day.

Special mention must be made of the excellent chapters on the Mexican War, and on the secession of the Slave States and the Civil War. The fundamental cause of the Civil War, the conflict between the capitalist North and the agricultural South, is well brought out; with the victory of the North capitalism has continued to flourish throughout the years, and to affect the history not only of the American nation, but of the whole world.

E. S.

THE DOMINIONS AS SOVEREIGN STATES

BY PROFESSOR A. BERRIEDALE KEITH

(*Macmillan.*)

When European overseas colonisation first began, in America in the 16th and 17th centuries, the settlements were established

by the authority and with the help of the respective states and it was therefore natural that at the beginning they should be regarded as mere possessions, as properties to be exploited for the benefit of the mother countries.

But it was equally natural that, Englishmen being what they were, the English colonies from the outset should develop a considerable measure of independence and should claim the right to manage their own internal affairs through representatives. Thus we learn from an old colonial historian that as early as 1619 "A House of Burgesses broke out in Virginia." This growth of independence indeed was so marked that a quarter of a century before the declaration of Independence, Turgot, the French philosopher-statesman, expressed the opinion that "Colonies are like fruits which cling to the tree only till they ripen," adding, "As soon as America can take care of herself, she will do what Carthage did," and it was not surprising that after the remarkable fulfilment of his prophecy England should regard the growth of her second overseas empire with little interest or satisfaction, although she made some attempt to control and supervise it.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, another school of thought arose, and in 1890 Sir John Seeley in his "Expansion of England" propounded the theory that the overseas communities were merely an expansion of the British race and that Australia and Canada were as much parts of Greater Britain as Yorkshire and Cornwall were of England. The developments of the last forty years have shown that Seeley completely underestimated the importance of the growth of nationalism and self-interest in the Dominions, but we are not thereby driven to accept Turgot's view that as soon as the Dominions are strong enough to stand on their own feet, they will declare their independence.

History is being made every day, and as in the welter of current affairs we are apt to overlook the importance and the significance of events, it is desirable from time to time to take stock of the position. This is the task which has been undertaken in "The Dominions as Sovereign States" by one of the best-known modern authorities on the subject, Professor A. Berriedale Keith, who is well qualified for it, not only by his high legal and academic attainments, but also by his practical experience as an erstwhile Assistant Secretary of the Imperial Conference.

From the point of view of the general reader the more interesting part of the book is the first, in which the author deals with the relations of the Dominions with the United Kingdom, with one another, and with foreign powers, and discusses the extent to which the Dominions can claim to be considered sovereign states in international law and, on the other hand, the extent to which they must still be regarded as subordinate to the Imperial Government, a term to which no objection can be taken, for England alone was declared an empire as early as 1533. Their separate representation on the Council of the League of Nations and their powers of making treaties and of accrediting and receiving diplomatic representatives have strengthened their international position, but it must still be admitted that a declaration of war by Great Britain would involve the whole Empire in war and that at the most a Dominion could limit her participation therein to defending her own territory: a declaration of neutrality would amount to a declaration of independence, and even then might well be disregarded by the enemy power.

No one nowadays seriously doubts the right of a Dominion to secede, "any more than one doubts the right of a man to cut his own throat," but no legal provision is made for such secession, and from the preamble to the Statute of Westminster, 1931, on which the relations between the United Kingdom and the Dominions in internal affairs now rest, it may be inferred that the union of the parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations cannot be broken by unilateral action.

As Professor Keith well points out, this famous Statute "is not a revolutionary measure. It represents the outcome of a long process of development under which the Dominions had achieved almost full autonomy as regards internal affairs, and its importance lies mainly in the fact that it establishes as law what had before rested on convention." All the Dominions applied for and consented to the enactment of the Statute, but the measure received considerable criticism from many strong supporters of the Imperial connection on the ground that it was dangerous to define constitutions too closely and that the flexible, unwritten British constitution was the best model for the constitution of the Commonwealth.

The second and by far the longer part of the book deals with the systems of governments of the various Dominions under such headings as the executives, the legislatures, the judiciaries, the federations, defence, and so on, and it gives a very comprehensive

and authoritative account of the present position in these matters, with numerous references to the history and the legal decisions on which this position is based.

"The Dominions as Sovereign States" can be confidently recommended both to the general reader and to the student of Imperial affairs as a detailed and well balanced exposition of the present status of the Dominions, and it is particularly valuable at this juncture, for after the important developments of the last twenty years we have now reached a stage at which, as the author says in his preface, we may feel "a certain measure of assurance that no events in the near future will happen to disturb the essential principles affecting their (the Dominions) place in the Empire or the Commonwealth." How far this assurance is justified is a question which only time can answer.

C. S. W. R.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

(*Oxford University Press*. 15/-)

This book which is the report of a study group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs presents a short objective survey of the principal problems which came up for discussion at the Imperial Conference of 1937. It begins with a brief description of each member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and of the institutions which bind them together. The rest of the book discusses the problems arising out of the Imperial connection. In this, the second and enlarged edition, attention has been drawn to each important development in the Empire during the twelve months which have elapsed since the first edition went to press in March, 1937. The published account of the proceedings of the Imperial Conference of 1937 concerning defence is summarised in an appendix.

In Part I which provides a very valuable summary of the growth and development of each member of the Commonwealth, the objective method of presentation is particularly pleasing when dealing with a subject of this nature, and although the occasional omission of facts may tend to give rise to a suspicion of intent, each account forms on the whole a creditably impartial survey.

The chapters devoted to foreign relations and defence are of considerable interest in view of the many vital questions facing the Commonwealth at the present time. In that dealing with foreign relations there is a very able study of the principles on which the actual policies of the members of the Commonwealth are

based, and of the problems that arise in connection with their application. The chapter on defence follows logically on the examination of policy. An important section deals with the question arising out of the degree to which the Army in India is to be regarded as potentially available for Imperial purposes outside India, and attention is drawn to the fact that under the terms of the Government of India Act of 1935 "no burden shall be imposed on the revenues of the Federation or the Provinces except for the purpose of India or some part of India."

The book concludes with chapters dealing with problems of economic policy, population and migration, a commonwealth tribunal, and nationality and citizenship. There is an excellent index and a very clear map.

A. B-C.

HISTORY OF THE GUIDES, 1846—1922

(*Gale and Polden, Ltd.*)

It is the fate, inevitably, of an imperial power to be faced with the problem of its "Wall." Here is the story of our connection with the North-West Frontier, from the time of the overthrow of the Sikh power, and of the famous Corps which has borne a major share in compiling that story.

In the brain of Henry Lawrence originated the idea of a Corps of Guides which would be "the right hand of the army and the left of the political;" and to Lumsden, then a junior subaltern, was entrusted the task of raising the Corps which soon earned for itself the reputation of "ever ready, ever serviceable, ever soldier-like."

The history of the Corps of Guides is a record of constant service well performed, and the annals of no Army and no Regiment can show brighter feats than the historic march to Delhi, in 1857, and the defence of the Kabul Residency in 1879.

Among its officers the Corps has numbered some of the more famous names in the history of the Indian Army, and one has only to read these pages to understand the devotion that can be inspired by a handful of British officers who possess the gift of leadership. To the men who rendered this devotion no tribute can be too high, and every page is a record of loyal and unflinching service. Here one meets the original of "Gunga Din," who, for his bravery at Delhi, was awarded the Indian Order of Merit and raised to

combatant status, eventually reaching commissioned rank; and with slight imagination one can see in Subadar Dilawar Khan, who died eventually on patrol in Central Asia, the inspiration for "The Ballad of East and West."

For the deeds of such men this History is a worthy tribute, and must keep alive the spirit which has animated the Guides from the start.

To everyone concerned with its compilation, sincere congratulations are due for a most excellent and noteworthy addition to the literature and records of the Indian Army.

D. R. B.

ITALY'S FOREIGN AND COLONIAL POLICY, 1914—1937

BY MAXWELL H. H. MACARTNEY AND PAUL CREMONA

(*Oxford University Press*, 12s. 6d.)

The authors have analysed Italian Foreign Policy in an impartial manner. The work, which is free from criticism or adulation of the type which so often emanates respectively from the opponents or partisans of the Fascist form of government, takes the form of a series of essays on various aspects of Italian foreign relationships. Separate chapters are devoted to tracing the development of Italy's policy towards each of the great European Powers or groups of smaller nations, and to her attitude towards disarmament, the League of Nations and colonial expansion. This arrangement, combined with a very full index makes the volume an excellent book of reference. Repetition has to a large extent been avoided by cross reference between the chapters.

The main theme is that foreign policy is controlled by certain definite factors and that changes in the form of the government of a country do not alter these factors, but only the methods by which policy is carried out. In the case of Italy, the main consideration is her dependence for existence on sea-borne traffic in the Mediterranean. Before the coming of Fascism her security, in the absence of sufficient military power, depended to a large extent on the traditional friendship with Great Britain. Signor Mussolini's policy on the other hand, has been to try and ensure that Italy can be mistress at any rate of the eastern Mediterranean by the power of her armed forces. Further to ensure this security, there has always been the tendency towards expansion in the levant and the extension of Italian influence in south-east Europe. The

chapters concerning the Peace Settlements and relationships with the Balkan countries show how this principle has been applied, particularly in the insistence on the maintenance of an autonomous Albania under Italian protection. It is also shown how this policy is no product of the Fascist regime, but was acknowledged long before the advent of Signor Mussolini.

Two chapters, "Italy and Colonial Expansion" and "The Founding of an Empire," deal with Mussolini's determination to stage a striking manifestation that Italy under his rule had become a Great Power capable of asserting herself unaided, and show the various steps that led to the war and the annexation of Abyssinia. These chapters explain the tangle of misunderstandings and misinterpreted secret agreements that existed over this question, and put forward the theory that Mussolini gauged fairly accurately what British reaction would be, and so set out to ensure that France would not fully support Britain in imposing sanctions.

Written before the absorption of Austria by Germany, the references to the Rome-Berlin axis emphasize the strength of that alignment and in the final chapter, on Italian Future Aims, it is argued that in the end there must be a conflict between Great Britain and Italy for supremacy in the Mediterranean.

A. W.

SCIENCE AND MECHANIZATION IN LAND WARFARE

BY DONALD PORTWAY

(Cambridge. W. Heffer and Sons, Ltd.)

This little book is written as a text-book in connection with a course of lectures on the application of science to war given to students taking the "Military Special" at Cambridge University. While its special object is very obvious, it is a book which should prove of interest also to Regular and Territorial officers.

The author has had much varied experience, as a university lecturer, as an officer in the Royal Engineers (Signal Service) during the Great War, and as a unit commander in the Cambridge University O.T.C. ever since the Great War. He is, therefore, well qualified to write on the scientific side of warfare both from a theoretical and practical point of view.

The first chapter deals with fundamental scientific principles, but the reader should not be deterred by the highly scientific and theoretical nature of this chapter, since the remainder of the book deals with the more practical sides of the subject. There are

chapters giving good general accounts of the activities of the Royal Engineers and Royal Signals, and the long chapter on railways in war is perhaps the best in the book.

The author has dealt, possibly with rather less success, on certain controversial topics, and he appears to be inclined to underestimate the capacity of mechanical transport. His views, whether they commend themselves to the reader or not, undoubtedly provide food for thought, and all officers, of both technical or non-technical arms, will find something of value in this book.

P. R. A.

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United Service Institution of India

JANUARY, 1938

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I.—NEW MEMBERS

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st September to 30th November 1937:

Life Member :

Lieut. D. I. Monteath.

Ordinary Members:

His Excellency Sir Roger Lumley, G.C.I.E.

Colonel R. M. W. Marsden, M.C.

Major R. D. Jackson.

Major M. L. Palande, Bahadur, O.B.I.

Major R. B. Sitole.

Major R. C. R. Stevenson.

Captain S. F. Harvey Williams.

Captain Lakhinder Singh.

Lieut. Agya Singh.

Lieut. F. C. Thompson.

2/Lieut. R. F. T. Tyers.

II.—THE JOURNAL

The Institution publishes a quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage-free to members in any part of the world. Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2-8 per copy, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary.

III.—CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE JOURNAL

Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. They should be submitted in duplicate and typewritten on one side of the paper. Manuscript articles cannot be considered. Payment is made on publication at from Rs. 40 to Rs. 150 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, rule 333 and King's Regulations, paragraph 535, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit any matter which they consider objectionable.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

IV.—READING ROOM AND LIBRARY

The United Service Institution of India is situated on the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 a.m. until sunset. The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with most of the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines and journals of military, naval and service interest.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution from which members can obtain books on loan free in accordance with the following rules—

(1) The library is only open to members and honorary members, who are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) A member shall not be allowed, at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(4) No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the Library as useful as possible to members; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member, it will be recalled.

(5) Applications for books from members at outstations are dealt with as early as possible and books are despatched post free per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of the date of issue.

(6) If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print, the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(7) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(8) The catalogue of the Library is available for sale at Rs. 2-8 per copy plus postage. The Library has been completely overhauled and all books re-classified, hence the catalogue meets the general demand for an up-to-date production containing all military classics and other works likely to be of use to members of the Institution. Members who have not yet ordered their copies are advised to send a post card to the Librarian of the Institution, Simla.

V.—LIBRARY BOOKS

A list of the books received during the preceding quarter is enclosed in loose leaf form suitable for cutting into strips for pasting in the Library catalogue.

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and, while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Simla.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of old books, trophies, medals, etc., presented to the Institution.

VI.—PROMOTION EXAMINATIONS

(a) *Military History*—(Reference I. A. O. 257 of 1935).

The following table shows the campaigns on which military history papers will be set for Lieutenants for promotion to Captain in sub-head *b* (iii), and for Captains for promotion to Major in sub-head *d* (iii), with a list of books recommended for the study of each—

1 Serial No.	2 Date of Examination.	3 Campaign set for second time.	4 Campaign set for last time.
1	March 1938.	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao-Yang until the 24th August 1904 (excluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).
2	October 1938.	..	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.

The following books are recommended for the study of the campaigns—

Campaign.	Book.
Mesopotamia— <i>March and October 1938</i> ..	History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. III (Chapters XXXIV <i>et seq</i>) and IV. A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914–1918. Major R. Evans, M.C. (<i>Sifton Praed</i>). Mesopotamia, the last Phase, by Lt.-Col. A. H. Burne, D.S.O. (<i>Gale and Polden</i>).
The Russo-Japanese War ..	Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, Parts I (second edition) and II (<i>British Military</i>), or Official History of the Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military), Vol. I, Chapters 1–17 (less 4, 7, 9 and 10). The Liao-Yang Campaign, by Lt.-Col. A. H. Burne, D.S.O. (<i>Wm. Clowes</i>).

(b) *Other Subjects.*

In addition to the manuals and regulations mentioned in K.R. and R.A.I., the following books are recommended—

"Modern Military Administration, Organisation and Transportation" (Harding-Newman), 1933.

"Military Organisation and Administration" (Lindsell), 1937.

"A. and Q. or Military Administration in War" (Lindsell), 1933.

"Military Law" (Banning), 1936.

"The Defence of Duffers' Drift" (Swinton), 1929.

"Tactical Schemes, with solutions, Series I and II" (Kirby and Kennedy), 1931.

"Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School," Vol. I (Pakenham Walsh), 1926.

"Imperial Military Geography" (Cole), 1935.

"Elements of Imperial Defence" (Boycott), 1936.

"A Practical Digest of Military Law" (Townsend-Stephens Pub. Sifton Praed), 1933.

VII.—*STAFF COLLEGE EXAMINATION.*—[See Staff College, Quetta, Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Manager of Publications, Delhi or Calcutta.]

(a) *Campaigns.*

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign, up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

, The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The Strategy and Tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The Action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the first battle of Ypres.

The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

(b) In addition to his official books every student is recommended to provide himself with a copy of—

(i) Military Organisation and Administration (Lindsell), 1937.

Military Law (Banning), 1936.

British Strategy (Maurice), 1929.

Notes on the Land and Air Forces of British Overseas Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates (Official).

Outline of the Development of the British Army up to 1914 (Hastings Anderson), 1931.

Imperial Military Geography (Cole).

An Atlas.

(ii) The following pamphlets, etc., can be borrowed from the Orderly Room, and should be studied—

Examination papers for admission to the Staff College.

Training Memoranda—War Office.

Training Memoranda—A.H.Q. India.

Notes on certain Lessons of the Great War.

Passing it on (Skeen).

(iii) Periodicals, etc., to which students should subscribe—
"The Times."

"U. S. I. (India) Journal."

(iv) Books which can be obtained from libraries—

(Note.—Those marked with an asterisk should be used only as books of reference.)

R. U. S. I. Journal.

Army Quarterly.

Round Table.

Journal of the Institute of International Affairs.

Science of War (Henderson), 1905.

Transformation of War (Colin), 1912.

The War of Lost Opportunities (Hoffman), 1924.

*The Principles of War (Foch), 1918.

*The Direction of War (Bird), 1925.

Soldiers and Statesmen (Robertson), 1926.

*Historical Illustrations to F. S. R. II (Eady), 1926.

- *The British Way in Warfare (Liddell Hart), 1932.
- *Napoleon's Campaign in 1796 in Italy (Burton), 1912.
- *Waterloo Campaign (Robinson).
- *Outline History of Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to the Battle of Liao-Yang (Pakenham Walsh), 1935.
- *The World Crisis (Churchill), 1931 (abridged and revised edition).
- *A History of the Great War (Cruttwell), 1936.
- The Palestine Campaign (Wavell), 1931.
- A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia (Evans), 1926.
- *Official Histories of the War—France, Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Gallipoli.
- *Waziristan, 1919-20 (Watteville).
- *The Third Afghan War (Official), 1926.
- A. & Q. (Lindsell), 1933.
- *The Government of the British Empire (Jenks).
- *A Short History of British Expansion (Williamson), 1930.

(v) Books and Articles on Transportation—

- Railways in War. Lieutenant-Colonel E. St. G. Kirke, D.S.O., R.E., Army Quarterly, January 1930.
- Strategic Moves by Rail, 1914. Journal R. U. S. I., February and May 1935.
- The Lines of Communication in the Dardanelles. Lieutenant-General Sir G. MacMunn. Army Quarterly, April 1930.
- The Lines of Communication in Mesopotamia. Lieutenant-General Sir G. MacMunn. Army Quarterly, October 1927.
- History of the R.A.S.C., Vol. II (all campaigns).
- The Supply and Transportation Problem of Future Armies. Major B. C. Denning, M.C., R.E., Journal U. S. I. India, April 1932.
- The Supply of Mechanised Forces in the Field. Journal R. U. S. I., 1929.
- The Board of Trade and the Fighting Services. Journal R. U. S. I., 1929.
- Railway Organisation of an Army in War. Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, D.S.O., R.E., Journal R. U. S. I., 1927.
- What is Required of a Railway in a Theatre of Operations. Major-General Taylor, R. E. Journal, September 1932.
- F. S. P. B. War Office, 1932. Read Sections 36 to 38. Do not memorise detail. Know where to find it.
- F. S. P. B. India.

VIII.—A. H. Q. STAFF COLLEGE COURSE SERIES, 1937

A limited number of sets of papers of the abovementioned series, complete with maps, are available for sale at Rs. 9 per set. Full payment should accompany all applications.

IX.—HISTORICAL RESEARCH

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with typewritten copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per typewritten page.

X.—THE MacGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDAL

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June:

- (a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.
- (b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. The following are eligible for the award, whether at the time of the reconnaissance they were in military or civil employ:

- (a) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force and of the Dominion Forces, while serving on the Indian establishment.
- (b) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Indian Navy, Indian Army, Indian Air Force and of the Indian States Forces, wherever serving.

NOTE:—The term "Indian Army" includes the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces, Frontier Militia, Levies, Military Police and Military Corps under local governments.

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.*

7. Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has run the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the reward.

8. When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value or has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to deserve it.

*Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.


GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1938

The Council has chosen the following subjects for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1938:

- (i) "Discuss the dictum that the size of modern armies has rendered strategy wholly subordinate to tactics"
or, as an alternative subject,
- (ii) "A nation's fighting power is not now merely gauged by its armed fighting strength, but also by its productive strength."
Discuss this.

The following are the conditions of the competition:

- (1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration, the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force, Auxiliary Forces and Indian States Forces.
- (2) Essays must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.
- (3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.
- (4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.
- (5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1938.
- (6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 500, either in addition to, or in substitution for, the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published.
- (7) The name of the successful candidate will be announced at a Council Meeting to be held in September or October 1938.
- (8) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.
- (9) Essays should not exceed 15 pages of the size and style of the Journal, exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.



SAILINGS 1938

	Leaves Karachi		Leaves Bombay		Leaves Karachi		Leaves Bombay
Britannia	Jan. 7	Castalia	July 21	..	July 23
Elysia	Jan. 26	..	Jan. 28	Cilicia	Aug. 3	..	Aug. 5
Circassia	Feb. 9	..	Feb. 11	Elysia	Aug. 25	..	Aug. 27
Britannia	Mar. 18	Britannia	Sept. 7	..	Sept. 9
California	Mar. 31	Circassia	Sept. 21	..	Sept. 23
Castalia	Apr. 13	..	Apr. 15	Cilicia	Oct. 12	..	Oct. 14
Circassia	Apr. 20	..	Apr. 22	California	Oct. 27
Elysia	May 11	..	May 13	Castalia	Nov. 10	..	Nov. 12
Britannia	May 27	Britannia	Nov. 16	..	Nov. 18
Circassia	June 29	..	July 1	Circassia	Nov. 30	..	Dec. 2
				Cilicia	Dec. 21	..	Dec. 23

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I.—NEW MEMBERS

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st December 1937 to 28th February 1938:

Life Member:

2/Lieut. R. J. Henderson.

Ordinary Members:

Colonel G. N. Molesworth.

Captain B. F. Montgomery.

Lieut. R. St. G. G. Bartelot.

Lieut. Bikram Singh.

Lieut. C. G. J. Edge.

2/Lieut. Dharam Bir Chopra.

2/Lieut. P. J. Hearn.

2/Lieut. Niranjan Pershad.

2/Lieut. D. Prem Chand.

2/Lieut. J. D. C. Sixsmith.

2/Lieut. Sukhwant Singh.

2/Lieut. Virendra Singh.

II.—THE JOURNAL

The Institution publishes a quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage-free to members in any part of the world. Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2-8 per copy, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary.

III.—CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE JOURNAL

Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. They should be submitted in duplicate and typewritten on one side of the paper. Manuscript articles cannot be considered. Payment is made on publication at from Rs. 40 to Rs. 150 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, rule 333 and King's Regulations, paragraph 535, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit any matter which they consider objectionable.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

IV.—READING ROOM AND LIBRARY

The United Service Institution of India is situated on The Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 a.m. until sunset. The reading room of the Institution is provided with most of the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines and journals of military, naval and service interest.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution from which members can obtain books on loan free in accordance with the following rules—

(1) The library is only open to members and honorary members, who are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) A member shall not be allowed, at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(4) No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the library as useful as possible to members; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member, it will be recalled.

(5) Applications for books from members at outstations are dealt with as early as possible and books are despatched post free per registered parcel post. They must be returned carefully packed per registered parcel post within one month of the date of issue.

(6) If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print, the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(7) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(8) The catalogue of the library is available for sale at Rs. 2-8 per copy plus postage. The library has been completely overhauled and all books re-classified, hence the catalogue meets the general demand for an up-to-date production containing all military classics and other works likely to be of use to members

of the Institution. Members who have not yet ordered their copies are advised to send a post card to the Librarian of the Institution, Simla.

V.—LIBRARY BOOKS

A list of the books received during the preceding quarter is enclosed in loose leaf form suitable for cutting into strips for pasting in the library catalogue.

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and, while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Simla.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of old books, trophies, medals, etc. presented to the Institution.

VI.—PROMOTION EXAMINATIONS

(a) *Military History*—(Reference I. A. O. 195 of 1938).

The following table shows the campaigns on which military history papers will be set for Lieutenants for promotion to Captain in sub-head *b(iii)*, and for Captains for promotion to Major in sub-head *d(iii)*, with a list of books recommended for the study of each. See King's Regulations, 1935, Appendix XI.—

1 Serial No.	2 Date of Examination.	3 Campaign set for first time.	4 Campaign set for second time.	5 Campaign set for last time.
1	October, 1938.	The American Civil War from the beginning of 1864 to the end of the War.	..	Mesopotamia from 12th March, 1917, to the Armistice.
2	March, 1939.	Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June, 1917.	The American Civil War from the beginning of 1864 to the end of the War.	..
3	October, 1939.	..	Egypt and Palestine from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June, 1917.	The American Civil War from the beginning of 1864 to the end of the War.
4	March, 1940.	Egypt and Palestine from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June, 1917.

The following books are recommended for the study of the campaigns—

Campaign.	Books.
Mesopotamia from 12th March, 1917, to the Armistice.	History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. III (Chapters XXXIV <i>et seq</i>) and IV. A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—1918. Major R. Evans, M.C. (<i>Sifton Praed</i>). Mesopotamia—the Last Phase, by Lt.-Colonel A. H. Burne, D.S.O. (<i>Gale and Polden</i>). A History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861—5, by W. Birkbeck Wood, M.A., and Major J. E. Edmonds, R.E. (<i>Putman</i>). Sherman, by B. H. Liddell Hart (<i>Eyre and Spottiswoode</i>). Grant and Lee. A Study in Personality and Generalship, by Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. (<i>Eyre and Spottiswoode</i>).
The American Civil War, from the beginning of 1864 to the end of the War.	History of the Great War—Military Operations—Egypt and Palestine, Vol. I. The Palestine Campaigns, by Colonel A. P. Wavell, C.M.G., M.C. (<i>Constable</i>).
Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June, 1917.	

(b) *Other Subjects.*

In addition to the manuals and regulations mentioned in K.R. and R.A.I., the following books are recommended:

- "Modern Military Administration, Organisation and Transportation" (Harding-Newman), 1933.
- "Military Organisation and Administration" (Lindsell).
- "A. and Q. or Military Administration in War" (Lindsell), 1933.
- "Military Law" (Banning), 1936.
- "The Defence of Duffers' Drift" (Swinton), 1929.
- "Tactical Schemes, with solutions, Series I and II" (Kirby and Kennedy), 1931.
- "Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School," Vol. I (Pakenham Walsh), 1926.
- "Imperial Military Geography" (Cole).
- "Elements of Imperial Defence" (Boycott), 1936.
- "A Practical Digest of Military Law" (Townsend-Stephens Pub. Sifton Praed), 1933.

VII.—*STAFF COLLEGE EXAMINATION*.—[See Staff College, Quetta, Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Manager of Publications, Delhi or Calcutta.]

(a) *Campaigns.*

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination:

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign, up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The Strategy and Tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The Action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the first battle of Ypres.

The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

(b) In addition to his official books every student is recommended to provide himself with a copy of—

(i) Military Organisation and Administration (Lindsell), Military Law (Banning), 1936.

British Strategy (Maurice), 1929.

Notes on the Land and Air Forces of British Overseas Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates (Official).

Outline of the Development of the British Army up to 1914 (Hastings Anderson), 1931.

Imperial Military Geography (Cole).

An Atlas.

(ii) The following pamphlets, etc., can be borrowed from the Orderly Room, and should be studied—

Examination papers for admission to the Staff College.

Training Memoranda—War Office.

Training Memoranda—A.H.Q. India.

Notes on certain Lessons of the Great War.

Passing it on (Skeen).

(iii) Periodicals, etc., to which students should subscribe—
"The Times."

"U. S. I. (India) Journal."

(iv) Books which can be obtained from libraries—

(Note.—Those marked with an asterisk should be used only as books of reference.)

R. U. S. I. Journal.

Army Quarterly.

Round Table.

Journal of the Institute of International Affairs.

Science of War (Henderson), 1905.

Transformation of War (Colin), 1912.

The War of Lost Opportunities (Hoffman), 1924.

*The Principles of War (Foch), 1918.

*The Direction of War (Bird), 1925.

Soldiers and Statesmen (Robertson), 1926.

*Historical Illustrations to F. S. R. II (Eady), 1926.

- *The British Way in Warfare (Liddell Hart), 1932.
- *Napoleon's Campaign in 1796 in Italy (Burton), 1912.
- *Waterloo Campaign (Robinson).
- *Outline History of Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to the Battle of Liao-Yang (Pakenham Walsh), 1935.
- *The World Crisis (Churchill), 1931 (abridged and revised edition).
- *A History of the Great War (Cruttwell), 1936.
- The Palestine Campaign (Wavell), 1931.
- A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia (Evans), 1926.
- *Official Histories of the War—France, Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Gallipoli.
- *Waziristan, 1919-20 (Watteville).
- *The Third Afghan War (Official), 1926.
- A. & Q. (Lindsell), 1933.
- *The Government of the British Empire (Jenks).
- *A Short History of British Expansion (Williamson), 1930.

(v) Books and Articles on Transportation—

- Railways in War. Lieutenant-Colonel E. St. G. Kirke, D.S.O., R.E., Army Quarterly, January 1930.
- Strategic Moves by Rail, 1914. Journal R. U. S. I., February and May 1935.
- The Lines of Communication in the Dardanelles. Lieutenant-General Sir G. MacMunn. Army Quarterly, April 1930.
- The Lines of Communication in Mesopotamia. Lieutenant-General Sir G. MacMunn. Army Quarterly, October 1927.
- History of the R.A.S.C., Vol. II (all campaigns).
- The Supply and Transportation Problem of Future Armies. Major B. C. Dening, M.C., R.E., Journal U. S. I. India, April 1932.
- The Supply of Mechanised Forces in the Field. Journal R. U. S. I., 1929.
- The Board of Trade and the Fighting Services. Journal R. U. S. I., 1929.
- Railway Organisation of an Army in War. Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, D.S.O., R.E., Journal R. U. S. I., 1927.
- What is Required of a Railway in a Theatre of Operations. Major-General Taylor, R. E. Journal, September 1932.
- F. S. P. B. War Office, 1932. Read Sections 36 to 38. Do not memorise detail. Know where to find it.
- F. S. P. B. India.

VIII.—A. H. Q. STAFF COLLEGE COURSE SERIES, 1937

A limited number of sets of papers of the abovementioned series, complete with maps, are available for sale at Rs. 9 per set. Full payment should accompany all applications.

IX.—HISTORICAL RESEARCH

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with typewritten copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per typewritten page.

X.—THE MacGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDAL

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor who founded the United Service Institution of India. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June:

- (a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.
- (b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution of India, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. The following are eligible for the award, whether at the time of the reconnaissance they were in military or civil employ:

- (a) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force and of the Dominion Forces, while serving on the Indian establishment.
- (b) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Indian Navy, Indian Army, Indian Air Force and of the Indian States Forces, wherever serving.

Note.—The term "Indian Army" includes the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces, Frontier Militia, Levies, Military Police and Military Corps under local governments.

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.*

7. Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has incurred the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the award.

8. When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value or notice of it has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to deserve it.

Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1938

The Council has chosen the following subjects for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1938:

- (i) "Discuss the dictum that the size of modern armies has rendered strategy wholly subordinate to tactics"
or, as an alternative subject,
- (ii) "A nation's fighting power is not now merely gauged by its armed fighting strength, but also by its productive strength."
Discuss this.

The following are the conditions of the competition:

- (1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration in India and to all commissioned officers of His Majesty's Forces including Territorial Forces, wherever those forces have been raised and to officers of the Indian States Forces.
- (2) Essays must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.
- (3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.
- (4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.
- (5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1938.
- (6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 500, either in addition to, or in substitution for, the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published. The name of the successful candidate will be published in the October 1938 number of the Journal.
- (7) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.
- (8) Essays should not exceed fifteen pages of the size and style of the Journal, exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.



SHORT LEAVE 1938

TWO MONTHS

<u>VESSEL</u>	<u>Leaves</u> <u>Bombay</u>	<u>Arrives</u> <u>Marseilles</u>	<u>Arrives</u> <u>Liverpool</u>	<u>VESSEL</u>	<u>Leaves</u> <u>Liverpool</u>	<u>Leaves</u> <u>Marseilles</u>	<u>Due</u> <u>Bombay</u>
BRITANNIA	27 May	13 June	20 June	CILICIA	2 July	8 July	22 July
CIRCASSIA	1 July	15 July	21 July	BRITANNIA	5 Aug.	12 Aug.	26 Aug.
ELYSIA	23 July	10 Aug.	19 Aug.	CILICIA	10 Sept.	16 Sept.	30 Sept.
CASTALIA	27 Aug.	14 Sept.	23 Sept.	CALIFORNIA	29 Sept.	5 Oct.	19 Oct.
BRITANNIA	9 Sept.	23 Sept.	29 Sept.	BRITANNIA	14 Oct.	21 Oct.	4 Nov.
CIRCASSIA	23 Sept.	3 Oct.	12 Oct.	CIRCASSIA	29 Oct.	4 Nov.	18 Nov.
CILICIA	14 Oct.	27 Oct.	2 Nov.	CILICIA	19 Nov.	25 Nov.	9 Dec.

THREE MONTHS

BRITANNIA	27 May	13 June	20 June	BRITANNIA	5 Aug.	12 Aug.	26 Aug.
CIRCASSIA	1 July	15 July	21 July	CILICIA	10 Sept.	16 Sept.	30 Sept.
ELYSIA	23 July	10 Aug.	19 Aug.	CALIFORNIA	29 Sept.	5 Oct.	19 Oct.
CILICIA	5 Aug.	19 Aug.	25 Aug.	BRITANNIA	14 Oct.	21 Oct.	4 Nov.
CASTALIA	27 Aug.	14 Sept.	23 Sept.	CASTALIA	8 Nov.	16 Nov.	3 Dec.
BRITANNIA	9 Sept.	23 Sept.	29 Sept.	CILICIA	19 Nov.	25 Nov.	9 Dec.
CILICIA	14 Oct.	27 Oct.	2 Nov.	BRITANNIA	23 Dec.	30 Dec.	13 Jan. 1939

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United Service Institution of India

JULY, 1938

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I.—NEW MEMBERS

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st March to 31st May 1938:

Ordinary Members.

Rev. Donald MacDonald.

Air Commodore R. H. Peck, O.B.E.

Lt.-Colonel A. A. Phillips, V.D.

„ C. G. Toogood, C.I.E., D.S.O.

Major W. H. G. Costelloe.

„ J. E. H. Nicolls, M.C.

Captain A. G. S. Alexander.

„ A. W. Buchanan.

„ R. W. Burkis.

„ T. D. Fitzpatrick.

„ W. Kaye.

„ H. M. Prentice.

„ K. V. Sankunny Nayar.

Lieut. A. H. Dangerfield.

„ A. J. C. Rose.

II.—CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE JOURNAL

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by registered parcel post within two months of the date of issue, or immediately on recall.

(3) A member may not have on loan, at any one time, more than three books or sets of books without the Secretary's permission. Papers, magazines and works catalogued under the headings of "Works of Reference," "Not to be taken out" and "Confidential" may not be removed from the Institution.

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(a) If, after the expiration of three weeks from the date of issue, a book is wanted by another member, it will be recalled.

(b) A member wishing to retain a book for a period over *two* months from the date of issue must notify the Secretary to that effect, otherwise the book will be recalled.

(5) If a book is not returned within fourteen days of the date of recall, it must be paid for, if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost or defaced books that are out of print, the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee and the member will be required to pay the cost so fixed.

(6) The catalogue of the library is available for sale at Rs. 2-8-0 per copy plus postage. A list of the books received during the preceding quarter is enclosed in loose leaf form suitable for pasting in the library catalogue.

(7) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

IV.—OLD BOOKS AND TROPHIES

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and, while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Simla.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of books, trophies, medals, etc., presented to the Institution.

V.—PROMOTION EXAMINATIONS

(a) *Military History*.—(Reference I. A. O. 195 of 1938).

The following table shows the campaigns on which military history papers will be set for lieutenants for promotion to captain in sub-head *b* (iii), and for captains for promotion to major in sub-head *d* (iii), with a list of books recommended for the study

of each. See King's Regulations, 1935, Appendix XI.—

1 Serial No.	2 Date of Examination.	3 Campaign set for first time.	4 Campaign set for second time.	5 Campaign set for last time.
1	October, 1938.	The American Civil War from the beginning of 1864 to the end of the War.	..	Mesopotamia from 12th March, 1917, to the Armistice.
2	March, 1939.	Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June, 1917.	The American Civil War from the beginning of 1864 to the end of the War.	..
3	October, 1939.	..	Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June, 1917.	The American Civil War from the beginning of 1864 to the end of the War.
4	March, 1940.	France and Belgium, 1914; up to and including the battle of the Aisne.	..	Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June, 1917.

The following books are recommended for the study of the campaigns—

Campaign.	Books.
Mesopotamia from 12th March, 1917, to the Armistice.	History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. III (Chapters XXXIV et seq) and IV. A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—1918. Major R. Evans, M.C. (<i>Sifton Praed</i>). Mesopotamia—the Last Phase, by Lieut.-Colonel A. H. Burne, D.S.O. (<i>Gale and Polden</i>).
The American Civil War, from the beginning of 1864 to the end of the War.	A History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861—5, by W. Birkbeck Wood, M.A., and Major J. E. Edmonds, R.E. (<i>Putman</i>). Sherman, by B. H. Liddell Hart (<i>Eyre and Spottiswoode</i>). Grant and Lee. A Study in Personality and Generalship, by Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. (<i>Eyre and Spottiswoode</i>).
Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June, 1917.	History of the Great War—Military Operations—Egypt and Palestine, Vol. I. The Palestine Campaigns, by Colonel A. P. Wavell, C.M.G., M.C. (<i>Constable</i>).
France and Belgium, 1914.	Official History of the Great War, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1914, Vol. I, 1933 edition.

(b) In addition to the manuals mentioned in King's Regulations and Regulations for the Army in India, the following books are recommended:

Military Organization and Administration (Lindsell), 1937.

A. & Q. (Lindsell), 1933.

Imperial Military Geography (Cole), 1937.

Military Law (Banning), 1936.

VI.—STAFF COLLEGE EXAMINATION

Details of the syllabus for the entrance examination to the staff colleges are given in Staff College, Quetta, Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Manager of Publications, Delhi or Calcutta. The following notes are intended as a guide to officers studying for the examination. Obligatory subjects consist of:

(1) *Strategy and Tactics*

(a) Strategy and Tactics Paper No. 1 deals with military history. A suitable bibliography is shown below. Books marked with an asterisk should be used as works of reference only. The student should try to extract from the various campaigns those lessons which are applicable to the present. He should consider whether the principles of war were violated and if so what were the consequences:

British Strategy (Maurice), 1929.

The British Way in Warfare (Liddell Hart), 1932.

Soldiers and Statesmen (Robertson), 1926.

History of the Great War (Cruttwell), 1936.

The War of Lost Opportunities (Hoffman), 1924.

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell), 1931.

A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia (Evans), 1926.

Tannenberg (Ironside).

Napoleon—an Outline (Balford).

*The Various Official Histories of the Great War.

*The World Crisis—abridged edition (Churchill), 1931.

*The Principles of War (Foch), 1918.

*German Strategy in the Great War (Neame).

*Outline History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to the Battle of Liao-Yang (Pakenham-Walsh), 1935.

*The Battle of Liao-Yang (Bird).

*Napoleon's Campaign in 1796 in Italy (Burton).

*Waziristan, 1919-20 (Watteville).

*The Third Afghan War (Official), 1926.

*The Dardanelles Campaign (Callwell).

*Wellington's Campaign (Robinson).

*Historical Illustrations to F. S. R. (Eady), 1926.

(b) Strategy and Tactics Paper No. 2.

This paper deals with warfare against a civilized and highly trained enemy. A knowledge of the technique of writing orders and appreciations is necessary.

In addition to the official manuals the following should be studied:

Notes on certain Lessons of the Great War.

Training Memoranda issued by the War Office and A.H.Q., India.

Reports on War Office and A.H.Q. Exercises.

Infantry Reorganization, 1936.

Examination Papers for admission to the Staff College.

(c) Strategy and Tactics Paper No. 3.

This paper deals with military evolution and the influence of modern inventions on warfare. The War Office Training Memoranda should be studied.

(d) Strategy and Tactics Paper No. 4.

This paper deals with warfare in an undeveloped country against an uncivilized or partly trained enemy. The following should be studied:

F. S. R. II, Chapter X.

Manual of Operations on the North-West Frontier.

Passing it On (Skeen).

(2) Organization, Administration and Transportation

British Army organization and establishments only are dealt with. In addition to the official manuals the following are useful:

Outline of the Development of the British Army up to 1914
(Hastings Anderson), 1931.

Military Organization and Administration (Lindsell), 1937.
A. & Q. (Lindsell), 1933.

(3) History and Organization of the Empire

The following should be studied:

Notes on the Land and Air Forces of British Oversea Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates (Official), 1934.

Imperial Military Geography (Cole), 1937.

In addition articles of interest are to be found regularly in *The Times*, *Round Table* and the *Journal of the Institute of International Affairs*.

VII.—A. H. Q. STAFF COLLEGE COURSE SERIES, 1937

A limited number of sets of papers of the abovementioned series, complete with maps, are available for sale at Rs. 9 per set. Full payment should accompany all applications.

VIII.—HISTORICAL RESEARCH

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with typewritten copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per typewritten page.

IX.—THE MacGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDAL

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor who founded the United Service Institution of India. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June:

(a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution of India, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. The following are eligible for the award, whether at the time of the reconnaissance they were in military or civil employ:

(a) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force and of the Dominion Forces, while serving on the Indian establishment.

(b) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Indian Navy, Indian Army, Indian Air Force and of the Indian States Forces, wherever serving.

Note.—The term "Indian Army" includes the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces, Frontier Militia, Levies, Military Police and Military Corps under local governments.

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.*

7. Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has incurred the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the award.

8. When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value or notice of it has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to deserve it.

Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.

X.—GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1938

The following essays have been received at the time of going to Press (15th June) and are acknowledged:

1. "Plus Ca Change, Plus C'Est La Meme Chose."
2. "Historia Lux Veritatis."
3. "Carpe Diem."
4. "Be prepared."
5. "Et dona ferentes."

XI.—GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1939.

The Council has chosen the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1939:

"The rigidity of military policy in India has seriously hampered the necessary adaptation and modernization of our forces as a whole." Discuss this.

The following are the conditions of the competition:

- (1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration in India and to all commissioned officers of His Majesty's Forces including Territorial Forces, wherever those forces have been raised and to officers of the Indian States Forces.
- (2) Essays must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.
- (3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.
- (4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.
- (5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1939.
- (6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 500, either in addition to, or in substitution for, the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published. The name of the successful candidate will be published in the October 1939 number of the Journal.
- (7) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.
- (8) Essays should not exceed fifteen pages of the size and style of the Journal, exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

**XII.—UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTE OF VICTORIA,
VICTORIA BARRACKS, MELBOURNE, S.C.1.**


The above Institution would be happy to make available all facilities at Melbourne to members of the U. S. I. of India visiting Australia. Members wishing to avail themselves of this privilege should apply to the Secretary, United Service Institution of India, Simla, for letters of introduction.

XIII.—RULES OF THE INSTITUTION

The existing rules of the United Service Institution of India were drawn up in 1922. In the course of time many of the 1922 rules have become out of date, and the available supply of printed copies is nearly exhausted. The Council of the Institution have therefore drawn up a revised set of rules, which are now being printed. Copies will be issued free to all new members on joining and to existing members on request. The notes which follow explain the more important changes which the Council have made:

1. The number of members of the Council of the Institution have been reduced from thirteen *ex officio* and seven elected to four *ex officio* and eight elected members. The previous Council of twenty members had proved to be on the large side for practical working and the Council considered that a majority of elected, as opposed to *ex officio*, members on the new Council would reflect the wishes of most officers. The composition of the new Council is shown on the first page of this journal.
2. It has been found necessary to raise the subscription for future life membership. Although the Institution is as well off financially to-day as it has ever been, the fact remained that the old life membership, which was obtainable at the equivalent of only ten years ordinary subscriptions was usually a dead loss to the Institution. Officers wishing to become life members in future will be charged Rs. 160, representing an entrance fee of Rs. 10 and fifteen annual subscriptions. Present life members are unaffected by the decision.
3. The Council have decided to institute a provident fund for the two wholtime employees of the Institution, the librarian and clerk. Both have done excellent service for a number of years and the Council accordingly decided to make an initial donation of Rs. 1,000 in the case of the librarian and Rs. 500 in the case of the clerk towards this fund. The basis of the new fund is that one month's pay shall be put aside annually by the employee and an equal amount added to it by the Institution.

T. M. S. CILICIA



Maiden Voyage from India

OFF-SEASON FARES

FROM KARACHI	.	.	AUGUST 3rd
FROM BOMBAY	.	.	AUGUST 5th

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United Service Institution of India

OCTOBER, 1938

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I.—NEW MEMBERS

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st June 1938 to 31st August 1938:

Life Members.

General Sir A. M. Mills, C.B., D.S.O. } From Ordinary Members.
 Captain F. T. Chamier. }
 2/Lieut. Parkash Chand Mohan.

Ordinary Members.

H. E. Sir Francis V. Wylie, K.C.I.E.
 S. N. Bamroo, Esq., M.A., LL.B.
 E. W. C. Wace, Esqr., Indian Police.
 Brigadier B. T. Wilson, D.S.O.
 Colonel A. V. Milnes.
 " A. C. Munro, M.D., I.M.S.
 Lieut.-Col. E. Cotter, M.B., I.M.S.
 " A. A. Filose.
 " W. K. Morrison, D.S.O., M.B., R.A.M.C.
 Wing Commander Edward I. Bussell.
 Major F. J. Dillon.
 " H. McL. Morrison, M.C.
 Captain C. R. Buchanan.
 " J. A. C. d'Apice.
 " H. T. W. Jowell.
 " Mahadeo Singh.
 " D. Misri Chand.
 " C. W. Ridley.
 " A. D. Ward.
 Lieut. J. R. Cleghorn.
 " S. J. Dagg.
 " R. C. Dyke.
 " I. C. Harris.
 " H. J. Power.
 " Pritam Nath Kirpal.
 " A. C. MacE. Savage.
 " G. R. Stevens.
 " E. J. Tonson-Rye.

II.—CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE JOURNAL

Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. They should be submitted in duplicate and type-written, with double spacing between lines, on one side of the paper. Manuscript articles cannot be considered. Payment is made on publication at from Rs. 25 to Rs. 150 according to the value of the contribution.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 333, and King's Regulations, paragraph 535, the Executive Committee of the Institution will take action, when necessary, to obtain the sanction of the Chief of the General

Staff to the publication of an article in the Journal of the United Service Institution.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit or amend any matter which they consider objectionable. Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

III.—READING ROOM AND LIBRARY

(1) The library is only open to members, who are requested to look on books as not transferable to their friends.

Books are only issued on loan to members who are resident in India. Members borrowing books from the library in person must make the necessary entry in the register and record their address in India.

(2) Applications for books from members at outstations are dealt with as early as possible and books are sent post free by registered parcel post. They must be returned, carefully packed, by registered parcel post within two months of the date of issue, or immediately on recall.

(3) A member may not have on loan, at any one time, more than three books or sets of books without the Secretary's permission. Papers, magazines and works catalogued under the headings of "Works of Reference," "Not to be taken out" and "Confidential" may not be removed from the Institution.

(4) No particular limit is set on the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council wishing to make the library as useful as possible to members. This rule is, however, subject to the following limitations:

(a) If, after the expiration of three weeks from the date of issue, a book is wanted by another member, it will be recalled.

(b) A member wishing to retain a book for a period over *two* months from the date of issue must notify the Secretary to that effect, otherwise the book will be recalled.

(5) If a book is not returned within fourteen days of the date of recall, it must be paid for, if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost or defaced books that are out of print, the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee and the member will be required to pay the cost so fixed.

(6) The catalogue of the library is available for sale at Rs. 2-8-0 per copy plus postage. A list of the books received during the preceding quarter is enclosed in loose leaf form suitable for pasting in the library catalogue.

(7) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

IV.—OLD BOOKS AND TROPHIES

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and, while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Simla.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of books, trophies, medals, etc., presented to the Institution.

V.—PROMOTION EXAMINATIONS

(a) *Military History*.—(Reference I. A. O. 195 of 1938).

The following table shows the campaigns on which military history papers will be set for lieutenants for promotion to captain in sub-head *b* (iii), and for captains for promotion to major in sub-head *d* (iii), with a list of books recommended for the study of each. See King's Regulations, 1935, Appendix XI.—

1 Serial No.	2 Date of Examination.	3 Campaign set for first time.	4 Campaign set for second time.	5 Campaign set for last time.
1	October, 1938.	The American Civil War from the beginning of 1864 to the end of the War.	..	Mesopotamia from 12th March, 1917, to the Armistice.
2	March, 1939.	Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June, 1917.	The American Civil War from the beginning of 1864 to the end of the War.	..
3	October, 1939.	..	Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June, 1917.	The American Civil War from the beginning of 1864 to the end of the War.
4	March, 1940.	France and Belgium, 1914; up to and including the battle of the Aisne.	..	Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June, 1917.

The following books are recommended for the study of the campaigns—

Campaign.	Books.
Mesopotamia from 12th March, 1917, to the Armistice.	History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. III (Chapters XXXIV et seq) and IV. A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—1918. Major R. Evans, M.C. (<i>Sifton Praed</i>). Mesopotamia—the Last Phase, by Lieut-Colonel A. H. Burne, D.S.O. (<i>Gale and Polden</i>).
The American Civil War, from the beginning of 1864 to the end of the War.	A History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861—5, by W. Birkbeck Wood, M.A., and Major J. E. Edmonds, R.E. (<i>Putman</i>). Sherman, by B. H. Liddell Hart (<i>Eyre and Spottiswoode</i>). Grant and Lee. A Study in Personality and Generalship, by Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. (<i>Eyre and Spottiswoode</i>).
Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June, 1917.	History of the Great War—Military Operations—Egypt and Palestine. Vol. I. The Palestine Campaigns, by Colonel A. P. Wavell, C.M.G., M.C. (<i>Constable</i>).
France and Belgium, 1914.	Official History of the Great War, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1914. Vol. I. 1933 edition.

(b) In addition to the manuals mentioned in King's Regulations and Regulations for the Army in India, the following books are recommended:

- Military Organization and Administration (Lindsell), 1937.
- A. & Q. (Lindsell), 1933.
- Imperial Military Geography (Cole), 1937.
- Military Law (Banning), 1936.

VI.—STAFF COLLEGE EXAMINATION

Details of the syllabus for the entrance examination to the staff colleges are given in Staff College, Quetta, Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Manager of Publications, Delhi or Calcutta. The following notes are intended as a guide to officers studying for the examination. Obligatory subjects consist of:

(1) *Strategy and Tactics*

(a) Strategy and Tactics Paper No. 1 deals with military history. A suitable bibliography is shown below. Books marked with an asterisk should be used as works of reference only. The student should try to extract from the various campaigns those lessons which are applicable to the present. He should consider

whether the principles of war were violated and if so what were the consequences:

British Strategy (Maurice), 1929.

The British Way in Warfare (Liddell Hart), 1932.

Soldiers and Statesmen (Robertson), 1926.

History of the Great War (Cruttwell), 1936.

The War of Lost Opportunities (Hoffman), 1924.

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell), 1931.

A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia (Evans), 1926.

Tannenburg (Ironsides).

Napoleon—an Outline (Balford).

*The Various Official Histories of the Great War.

*The World Crisis—abridged edition (Churchill), 1931.

*The Principles of War (Foch), 1918.

*German Strategy in the Great War (Neame).

*Outline History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to the Battle of Liao-Yang (Pakenham-Walsh), 1935.

*The Battle of Liao-Yang (Bird).

*Napoleon's Campaign in 1796 in Italy (Burton).

*Waziristan, 1919-20 (Watteville).

*The Third Afghan War (Official), 1926.

*The Dardanelles Campaign (Callwell).

*Wellington's Campaign (Robinson).

*Historical Illustrations to F. S. R. (Eady), 1926.

(b) *Strategy and Tactics Paper No. 2.*

This paper deals with warfare against a civilized and highly trained enemy. A knowledge of the technique of writing orders and appreciations is necessary.

In addition to the official manuals the following should be studied:

Notes on certain Lessons of the Great War.

Training Memoranda issued by the War Office and A.H.Q., India.

Reports on War Office and A.H.Q. Exercises.

Infantry Reorganization, 1936.

Examination Papers for admission to the Staff College.

(c) *Strategy and Tactics Paper No. 3.*

This paper deals with military evolution and the influence of modern inventions on warfare. The War Office Training Memoranda should be studied.

(d) Strategy and Tactics Paper No. 4.

This paper deals with warfare in an undeveloped country against an uncivilized or partly trained enemy. The following should be studied:

F. S. R. II, Chapter X.

Manual of Operations on the North-West Frontier.

Passing it On (Skeen).

(2) Organization, Administration and Transportation

British Army organization and establishments only are dealt with. In addition to the official manuals the following are useful:

Outline of the Development of the British Army up to 1914
(Hastings Anderson), 1931.

Military Organization and Administration (Lindsell), 1937.

A. & Q. (Lindsell), 1933.

(3) History and Organization of the Empire

The following should be studied:

Notes on the Land and Air Forces of British Oversea Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates (Official), 1934.

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In addition articles of interest are to be found regularly in *The Times*, *Round Table* and the *Journal of the Institute of International Affairs*.

VII.—A. H. Q. STAFF COLLEGE COURSE SERIES, 1938

A limited number of sets of papers of the abovementioned series, complete with maps, are available for sale at Rs. 16 per set.

(i) Précis of lectures and papers ... Rs. 4

(ii) Strategy and Tactics papers, including 6 maps at
Rs. 2 each ... Rs. 12

VIII.—HISTORICAL RESEARCH

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6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.*

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*Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALISTS

(With rank of officers and soldiers at the date of the award.)

- 1889 ... BELL, Colonel M. S., V.C., R.E. (specially awarded a gold medal).
- 1890 ... YOUNGHUSBAND, Captain F. E., King's Dragoon Guards.
- 1891 ... SAWYER, Major H. A., 45th Sikhs.
RAMZAN KHAN, Havildar, 3rd Sikhs.
- 1892 ... VAUGHAN, Captain H. B., 7th Bengal Infantry.
JAGGAT SINGH, Havildar, 19th Punjab Infantry.
- 1893 ... BOWER, Captain H., 17th Bengal Cavalry (specially awarded a gold medal).
FAZAL DAD KHAN, Dafadar, 17th Bengal Cavalry.
- 1894 ... O'SULLIVAN, Major G.H. W., R.E.
MULL SINGH, Sowar, 6th Bengal Cavalry.
- 1895 ... DAVIES, Captain H. R., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
GANGA DYAL SINGH, Havildar, 2nd Rajputs.
- 1896 ... COCKERILL, Lieutenant G. K., 28th Punjab Infantry.
GHULAM NABI, Sepoy, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1897 ... SWAYNE, Captain E. J. F., 10th Rajput Infantry.
SHAHZAD MIR, Dafadar, 11th Bengal Lancers.
- 1898 ... WALKER, Captain H. B., Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
ADAM KHAN, Havildar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1899 ... DOUGLAS, Captain J. A., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
MIHR DIN, Naik, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
- 1900 ... WINGATE, Captain A. W. S., 14th Bengal Lancers
GURDIT SINGH, Havildar, 45th Sikhs.
- 1901 ... BURTON, Major E. B., 17th Bengal Lancers.
SUNDAR SINGH, Colour Havildar, 31st Burmah Infantry.
- 1902 ... RAY, Captain M. R. E., 7th Rajput Infantry.
TILBIR BHANDARI, Havildar, 9th Gurkha Rifles.
- 1903 ... MANIFORD, Lieut.-Colonel C. C., I.M.S.
GHULAM HUSSAIN, Lance-Dafadar, Q. V. I. Corps of Guides.
- 1904 ... FRASER, Captain L. D., R.G.A.
MOGHAL BAZ, Dafadar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1905 ... RENNICK, Major F., 40th Pathans (specially awarded a gold medal).
MADHO RAM, Havildar, 8th Gurkha Rifles.
- 1906 ... SHAHZADA AHMAD MIR, Risaldar, 36th Jacob's Horse.
GHAFUR SHAH, Lance-Naik, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALISTS—(contd.)

- 1907 ... NANGLE, Captain M. C., 92nd Punjabis.
SHEIKH USMAN, Havildar, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
- 1908 ... GIBBON, Captain C. M., Royal Irish Fusiliers.
MALANG, Havildar, 56th Punjab Rifles.
- 1909 ... MUHAMMAD RAZA, Havildar, 106th Pioneers.
- 1910 ... SYKES, Major P. M., C.M.G., late 2nd Dragoon Guards
(specially awarded a gold medal).
TURNER, Captain F. G., R.E.
KHAN BAHADUR SHER JUNG, Survey of India.
- 1911 ... LEACHMAN, Captain G. E., The Royal Sussex Regiment.
GURMUKH SINGH, Jemadar, 93rd Burmah Infantry.
- 1912 ... PRITCHARD, Captain B. E. A., 83rd Wallajahabad Light Infantry (specially awarded a gold medal).
WILSON, Lieutenant A. T., C.M.G., 32nd Sikh Pioneers.
MOHIBULLA, Lance-Dafadar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
- 1913 ... ABBAY, Captain B. N., 27th Light Cavalry.
SIRDAR KHAN, Sowar, 39th (K.G.O.) Central India Horse.
WARATONG, Havildar, Burmah Military Police (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1914 ... BAILEY, Captain F. M., I.A. (Political Department).
MORSHEAD, Captain H. T., R.E.
HAIDAR ALI, Naik, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1915 ... WATERFIELD, Captain F. C., 45th Rattray's Sikhs.
ALI JUMA, Havildar, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1916 ... ABDUR RAHMAN, Naik, 21st Punjabis.
ZARGHUN SHAH, Havildar, 58th Rifles (F.F.) (specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1917 ... MIAN AFRAZ GUL, Sepoy, Khyber Rifles.
- 1918 ... NOEL, Captain E. W. C. (Political Department).
- 1919 ... KEELING, Lieut.-Colonel E. H., M.C., R.E.
ALLA SA, Jemadar, N.-W. Frontier Corps.
- 1920 ... BLACKER, Captain L. V. S., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
AWAL NUR, C. Q. M. Havildar, 2nd Bn., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides (special gratuity of Rs. 200).
- 1921 ... HOLT, Major A. L., Royal Engineers.
SHER ALI, Sepoy, No. 4952, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
- 1922 ... ABDUL SAMAD SHAH, Captain, O.B.E., 31st D. C. O. Lancers.
NUR MUHAMMAD, Lance-Naik, 1st Guides Infantry, F.F.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALISTS—(concl'd.)

- 1923 ... BRUCE, Captain J. G., 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.
SOHBAT, Head Constable, N.-W. F. Police.
HARI SINGH THAPA, Survey Department (specially
awarded a silver medal).
- 1924 ... RAHMAT SHAH, Havildar, I.D.S.M., N.-W. F. Corps,
GHULAM HUSSAIN, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps.
- 1925 ... SPEAR, Captain C. R., 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
JABBAR KHAN, Naik, 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
- 1926 ... HARVEY-KELLY, Major C. H. G. H., D.S.O., 4/10th
Baluch Regiment.
- 1927 ... LAKE, Major M. C., 4/4th Bombay Grenadiers.
- 1928 ... BOWERMAN, Captain J. F., 4/10th D. C. O. Baluch
Regiment.
MUHAMMAD KHAN, Havildar, Zhob Levy Corps.
- 1929 ... ABDUL HANAN, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps.
GHULAM ALI, Dafadar, Guides Cavalry (specially
awarded a silver medal).
- 1930 ... GREEN, Captain J. H., 3/20th Burmah Rifles.
- 1931 ... O'CONNOR, Captain R. L., 1/9th Jat Regiment.
KHIAL BADSHAH, Naik, 1/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
- 1932 ... BIRNIE, Captain E. St. J., Sam Browne's Cavalry.
SHIB SINGH NEGI, No. 4013, Rifleman, 10/18th Royal
Garhwal Rifles.
- 1933 ... ABDUL GHAFUR, Havildar, K. G. O. Bengal Sappers and
Miners.
- 1934 ... No award.
- 1935 ... FERGUSON, Lieutenant K. A. P., R.A.
BOSTOCK, Lieutenant T. M. T., R.E.
- 1936 ... ANGWIN, Captain J. B. P., R.E.
MUHAMMAD ISHAQ, No. 8372, Lance-Naik, 2/15th Punjab
Regiment.
- 1937 ... GOADBY, Major F. R. L., M.B.E., 1/6th Rajputana Rifles.
- 1938 ... L. NAIK MIAN BADSHAH, 2/13th F. F. Rifles.

X.—GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1938.

The judges of the 1938 Gold Medal Prize Essay of the United
Service Institution of India were:

Lieut.-General Sir Roger Wilson, K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C.,
Adjutant-General;

Brigadier E. E. Dorman-Smith, M.C., Director of Military Training; and

Colonel G. B. Henderson, C.I.E., Deputy Director of Military Operations and Intelligence.

The judges have awarded the Gold Medal to Major J. D. Milne, The Royal Scots, for his essay "Suum Cuique." In addition, they highly commend the following essays:

"Historia Lux Veritatis," by Lt.-Col. C.M.P. Durnford.

"Plus Ca Change, Plus C'Est La Meme Chose," by Major D. F. W. Warren.

"Sapiens Qui Prospicit" by Major A. W. W. Holworthy.

The following essays were received and read by the judges:

"Suum Cuique."

"Sapiens Qui Prospicit."

"The Watchword? . . . Security."

"They were Defeated."

"And watch the things you gave your life to broken,
And stoop and build 'em up with worn out tools."

"No Bridges in Sight?"

"Union is Strength."

"Tush, Man! Abodements must not now affright us.

"Plus Ca Change, Plus C'Est La Meme Chose."

"Historia Lux Veritatis."

"Carpe Diem."

"Be Prepared."

"Et Dona Ferentes."

XI.—GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1939.

The Council has chosen the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1939:

The Secretary of State for War, introducing the Army Estimates for 1938-39, said:

"The rigidity of military policy in India has seriously hampered the necessary adaptation and modernization of our forces as a whole." Discuss this.

The following are the conditions of the competition:

- (1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration in India and to all commissioned officers of His Majesty's Forces including Territorial Forces, wherever those forces have been raised and to officers of the Indian States Forces.

- (2) Essays must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.
- (3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.
- (4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.
- (5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1939.
- (6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 500, either in addition to, or in substitution for, the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published. The name of the successful candidate will be published in the October 1939 number of the Journal.
- (7) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.
- (8) Essays should not exceed fifteen pages of the size and style of the Journal exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALISTS

(With Rank of Officers at the date of the Essay.)

- | | | |
|------|-----|--|
| 1872 | ... | ROBERTS, Lieut.-Colonel F. S., V.C., C.B., R.A. |
| 1873 | ... | COLQUHOUN, Captain J. S., R.A. |
| 1874 | ... | COLQUHOUN, Captain J. S., R.A. |
| 1879 | ... | ST. JOHN, Major O. B. C., R.E. |
| 1880 | ... | BARROW, Lieutenant E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry. |
| 1882 | ... | MASON, Lieutenant A.H., R.E. |
| 1883 | ... | COLLEN, Major E. H. H., S.C. |
| 1884 | ... | BARROW, Captain E.G., 7th Bengal Infantry. |
| 1887 | ... | YATE, Lieutenant A. C., 27th Baluch Infantry. |
| 1888 | ... | MAUDE, Captain F. N., R.E. |
| | | YOUNG, Major G. F., 24th Punjab Infantry (specially awarded a silver medal). |

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALISTS—(contd.)

- 1889 ... DUFF, Captain B., 9th Bengal Infantry.
- 1890 ... MAGUIRE, Captain C. M., 2nd Cavy. Hyderabad
Contingent.
- 1891 ... CARDEW, Lieutenant F. G., 10th Bengal Lancers.
- 1893 ... BULLOCK, Major G. M., Devonshire Regiment.
- 1894 ... CARTER, Captain F. C., Northumberland Fusiliers.
- 1895 ... NEVILLE, Lieut.-Colonel J. P. C., 14th Bengal Lancers.
- 1896 ... BINGLEY, Captain A. H., 7th Bengal Infantry.
- 1897 ... NAPIER, Captain G. S. F., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
- 1898 ... MULLALY, Major H., R.E.
CLAY, Captain C. H., 43rd Gurkha Rifles (specially
awarded a silver medal).
- 1899 ... NEVILLE, Colonel J. P. C., S.E.
- 1900 ... THULLIER, Captain H. F., R.E.
LUBBOCK, Captain G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver
medal).
- 1901 ... RANKEN, Lieut.-Colonel G. P. P., 46th Punjab Infantry.
- 1902 ... TURNER, Captain H. H. F., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
- 1903 ... HAMILTON, Major W. G., D.S.O., Norfolk Regiment.
BOND, Captain R. F. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver
medal).
- 1904 ... MACMUNN, Major G. F., D.S.O., R.F.A.
- 1905 ... COCKERILL, Major G. K., Royal Warwickshire Regi-
ment.
- 1907 ... WOOD, Major E. J. M., 99th Deccan Infantry.
- 1908 ... JEUDWINE, Major H. S., R.A.
- 1909 ... MOLYNEUX, Major E. M. J., D.S.O., 12th Cavalry.
ELSMIE, Major A. M. S., 56th Rifles F. F. (specially
awarded a silver medal).
- 1911 ... PETRIE, Mr. D., M.A., Punjab Police.
- 1912 ... CARTER, Major B. C., The King's Regiment.
- 1913 ... THOMSON, Major A. G., 58th Vaughan's Rifles (F.F.).
- 1914 ... BAINBRIDGE, Colonel W. F., D.S.O., 31st Sikhs (F.F.).
NORMAN, Major C. L., M.V.O., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides
(specially awarded a silver medal).
- 1916 ... CRUM, Major W. E., V.D., Calcutta Light Horse.
- 1917 ... BLAKER, Major W. F., R.F.A.
- 1918 ... GOMPERTZ, Captain A. B. M.C., R.E.
- 1919 ... GOMPERTZ, Captain M. L. A., 10th Infantry.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALISTS—(concl'd.)

- 1920 ... KEEN, Lieut.-Colonel F. S., D.S.O., 2/15th Sikhs.
- 1922 ... MARTIN, Major H. G., D.S.O., O.B.E., R.F.A.
- 1923 ... KEEN, Colonel F. S., D.S.O., I.A.
- 1926 ... DENNYS, Major L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
- 1927 ... HOGG, Major D. McA., M.C., R.E.
- 1928 ... FRANKS, Major K. F., D.S.O., 5th Royal Mahrattas.
- 1929 ... DENNYS, Major L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
- 1930 ... DURNFORD, Major C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.
- 1931 ... FORD, Lieut.-Colonel G. N., 2/5th Mahratta Light Infantry.
- 1932 ... THURBURN, Lieutenant R.G., The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles).
- 1933 ... No award.
- 1934 ... DURNFORD, Major C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.
- 1935 ... No award.
- 1936 ... No award.
- 1937 ... RANKING, Lt.-Colonel R. P. L., M.C., 2nd Royal Lancers.
- 1938 ... MILNE, Major J. D., Royal Scots.

XII.—UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTE OF VICTORIA,
VICTORIA BARRACKS, MELBOURNE, S.C.1.

The above Institution would be happy to make available all facilities at Melbourne to members of the U. S. I. of India visiting Australia. Members wishing to avail themselves of this privilege should apply to the Secretary, United Service Institution of India, Simla, for letters of introduction.

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